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# **Evaluation of the Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines: 2003-2015**

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## ACRONYMS

|            |  |
|------------|--|
| ATCU       | Anti-Transnational Crime Unit                                  |
| ATU        | Anti-Trafficking Unit  |
| CTMS       | Casework Tracking Management System                            |
| CIDG       | Criminal Investigation and Detection Group                     |
| CSEC       | Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children                     |
| CSO        | Civil Society Organization <sup>1</sup>                        |
| CSX        | Child Sex Trafficking  |
| DOJ        | Department of Justice  |
| DOLE       | Department of Labor and Employment                             |
| DSWD       | Department of Social Welfare and Development                   |
| FO         | Field Office   |
| HQ         | Headquarters   |
| IACAT      | Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking                       |
| IJM        | International Justice Mission                                  |
| LGU        | Local Government Units   |
| MOA        | Memorandum of Agreement  |
| MOU        | Memorandum of Understanding                                    |
| NAP        | National Action Plan   |
| NBI        | National Bureau of Investigation                               |
| NBI AHTRAD | Nation Bureau of Investigation Anti-Human Trafficking Division |
| NGO        | Nongovernmental Organization                                   |
| OSEC       | Online Sexual Exploitation of Children                         |
| PHILJA     | Philippine Judicial Academy                                    |
| PLT        | Philippine Leadership Team                                     |
| PNP        | Philippine National Police                                     |
| PNATT      | Philippine National Anti-Trafficking Team                      |
| RAHTTF     | Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force                     |
| RAHTSOG    | Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Special Operations Group       |
| RATTG      | Regional Anti-Trafficking Task Group                           |
| RSIU       | Regional Special Investigations Unit                           |
| RSN        | Reintegration Support Network                                  |
| TIP        | Trafficking in Persons   |
| ToC        | Theory of Change   |
| UN         | United Nations   |
| US         | United States  |
| WCPC       | Women & Children Protection Center                             |

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<sup>1</sup> The phrase 'NGO' is contested terminology, and for many has been subsumed within a broader category of 'CSOs', i.e., voluntary organizations with governance and direction coming from citizens or constituency members, without significant government-controlled participation or representation. This evaluation uses the term CSO, except where respondents specifically used the term NGO. CSOs include "all non-market and non-state organizations outside of the family in which people organize themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain. Examples include community-based organizations and village associations, environmental groups, women's rights groups, farmers' associations, faith-based organizations, labor unions, co-operatives, professional associations, chambers of commerce, independent research institutes and the not-for-profit media." NGOs and CSOs: A Note on Terminology. Retrieved on February 12, 2017 from: <http://www.cn.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP-CH03%20Annexes.pdf>

## KEY DEFINITIONS

The following definitions were used by IJM to focus their Program activities in the Philippines.

**Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children** is the sexual abuse of a child by another individual in return for remuneration, in cash or kind, paid to the child or to a third person or persons.<sup>2</sup> Commercial sexual exploitation of children is a general term for a variety of related, and in some cases overlapping, forms of sexual abuse of children. These include but are not limited to child sex trafficking and child pornography.<sup>3</sup>

**Child Sex Trafficking** is defined by the United States Government as the “recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a child for the purpose of a commercial sex act.”<sup>4</sup> In child sex trafficking, the victim is trafficked by one individual to the abuser in return for payment in cash or in kind. Traffickers directly or indirectly facilitate the sale of children, most commonly girls, to other individuals in order for those abusers to engage in sexual contact or sexual conduct with the trafficked child. The connection between the trafficker, child victim and abuser is commonly made in a commercial sex establishment, street prostitution or through pimps who advertise the availability of victims via the internet. The sexual abuse typically occurs in a commercial sex establishment, nearby hotel, guesthouse or private residence.

In the Philippines, **sex trafficking** is defined in accordance with Republic Act No. 10364, An Act Expanding Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003), as “The recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs. The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.”<sup>5</sup>

**Child Pornography** is defined by U.S. law as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a child. Visual depictions include any photograph, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where: the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; such as visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or such depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear than an identifiable minor is engaging in sexual explicit conduct. Undeveloped film, undeveloped videotape, and electronically stored data that can be converted into a visual image of child pornography are also deemed illegal visual depictions under U.S. law. Notably, the legal definition of sexually explicit conduct does not require that an image depict a child engaging in sexual activity. A picture of a naked child may constitute illegal child pornography if it is sufficiently sexually suggestive. Additionally, the age of consent for sexual activity is irrelevant. Any depiction of a minor under 18 years of age engaging in sexually explicit conduct is illegal under U.S. law (Title 18, United States Code, Section 2256).

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<sup>2</sup> First World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, 1996.

<sup>3</sup> UNICEF 2006.

<sup>4</sup> US Trafficking Victim Protection Act of 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Retrieved on June 30, 2016 from: [http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2013/ra\\_10364\\_2013.html](http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2013/ra_10364_2013.html)

In the Philippines, **pornography** is defined by Republic Act No. 10364 as “any representation, through publication, exhibition, cinematography, indecent shows, information technology, or by whatever means, of a person engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a person for primarily sexual purposes.”

As it relates to child pornography, Republic Act No. 9775 defines a child as “a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.”<sup>6</sup> A child also refers “to a person regardless of age who is presented, depicted or portrayed as a child; and computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted images or graphics of a person who is represented or who is made to appear to be a child,”<sup>7</sup> In turn, child pornography is “any representation, whether visual, audio, or written combination thereof, by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means, of a child engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities.”<sup>8</sup> Explicit sexual activity includes “actual or simulated, as to form: including: sexual intercourse or lascivious acts including, but not limited to, contact involving genital to genital, oral to genital, anal to genital, or oral to anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; bestiality; masturbation; sadistic or masochistic abuse; lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts, pubic area and/or anus; or use of any object or instrument for lascivious acts.”<sup>9</sup>

**Online Sexual Exploitation of Children** is the production, for the purpose of online publication, of visual or audio depictions (e.g., photos, videos, live streaming) of the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor for a third party who is not in the physical presence of the victim.

**Live Streaming Child Sexual Exploitation** is a growing form of commercial sexual exploitation of children and represents the confluence of traditional forms of child sex trafficking and online sexual exploitation of children. This involves abusers around the world who pay to view, and in some cases direct, live-streaming video of sexual abuse of children, who are typically located in another country. The abuse may involve one or more child victims. Payment is often made to an “operator”, a trafficker who is in control of the victim(s) and facilitates, and in some cases, participates in the abuse. The nature of those performances varies depending on the requests of abusers abroad, but range from children posing in a suggestive manner to engaging in sex acts with other children or adults.

**Entrapment** is sanctioned by Philippines law as an approved method of apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to entrap and capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan; whereas instigation involves the inducement of the would-be accused into the commission of the offense, in which case instigators become co-principals themselves.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Retrieved on June 3, 2017 from: [http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra\\_9775\\_2009.html](http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9775_2009.html)

<sup>7</sup> Retrieved on June 3, 2017 from: [http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra\\_9775\\_2009.html](http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9775_2009.html)

<sup>8</sup> Retrieved on June 3, 2017 from: [http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra\\_9775\\_2009.html](http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9775_2009.html)

<sup>9</sup> Retrieved on June 3, 2017 from: [http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra\\_9775\\_2009.html](http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9775_2009.html)

<sup>10</sup> *Entrapment vs. Instigation; explained – G.R. No. 173485. Law and Justice: Issues and Developments* (December 9, 2011) Retrieved on July 6, 2017 from: <http://lcmlaw1.blogspot.com/2011/12/entrapment-vs-instigation-explained-gr.html>

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The overall goal of International Justice Mission's (IJM's) Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines was to reduce the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas by addressing specific gaps that exist in the local public justice system. IJM's primary strategy was to support and build the capacity of public justice system actors to enforce anti-human trafficking laws and provide quality aftercare to child sex trafficking victims through the government and other relevant stakeholders.

In the three project areas, IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children focused on three common outcomes:<sup>11</sup>

- Increased capacity, will and mandate of regional and national Philippine law enforcement to investigate and intervene in suspected sex trafficking cases;
- Increased quantity and quality of child sex trafficking prosecutions in the Philippines, resulting in an increase in the number of convictions;
- Increased capacity of Philippine government and private social service providers to process sex-trafficking survivors immediately post-rescue, provide trauma-informed care and reintegrate sex trafficking survivors into local communities.

IJM's Program was premised on a Theory of Change (ToC) that evolved over time. In essence, the ToC was that improving enforcement of anti-human trafficking laws would increase the prosecution and conviction of traffickers, leading to an increased deterrence from sex trafficking and resulting in reduced prevalence of child sex trafficking. The ToC was also premised on the understanding that by improving government aftercare services and delivery of those services to sex trafficking victims, IJM would be able to increase victim recovery, reintegration, and restoration.

### Evaluation Objectives

The objectives of this external evaluation are to assess the relevance, effectiveness, and impact of IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines during the period of 2003 to June 2016, as well as to assess the potential for sustainability of results achieved.

### Evaluation Methods and Processes

To ensure that the evaluation approach was as thorough and reliable as possible, different analytical tools and data collection methods were utilized (evaluation methods were in keeping with the Terms of Reference for this consultancy). These included:

- Desk review of IJM documents, training materials, evaluations, and prevalence studies related to their Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines
- Analysis of data from IJM's Casework Tracking Management System (CTMS)
- Consultations with IJM management and staff from Headquarters (HQ) in Washington, DC USA and the Philippines Field Offices (FO) in Cebu, Manila, and Pampanga
- In-depth interviews with IJM management and staff
- In-depth interviews with IJM's partners and stakeholders
- Consultation on preliminary findings and conclusions with IJM HQ and Philippines FO management and staff

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<sup>11</sup>IJM Philippines National Anti-Trafficking Team System Transformation Proposal, December 31, 2012, p. 1

## Findings

Findings from this evaluation resulted in conclusions that were aligned with the evaluation’s objectives related to relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.

### Relevance

This evaluation found that IJM’s Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines was very relevant and helped to build political support for a strong public justice system response to child sex trafficking (98.9% of respondents reported IJM’s Program was relevant to the situation of child sex trafficking in the Philippines). In fact, IJM was recognized as a significant and influential partner by the Philippine Government when it was appointed to be a member of the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking (IACAT), the national mechanism for monitoring implementation of anti-trafficking legislation. Serving as a member of the IACAT demonstrated that IJM’s Program was aligned with the relevant strategies of the Philippine Government for combatting human trafficking, and provided IJM with a platform from which to contribute to the dialogue on trafficking in persons in the Philippines. Being a member of the IACAT allowed IJM to participate in working group meetings that shaped national priorities and action plans (NAPs), including the NAP for Combatting Human Trafficking for 2010-2016, and the succeeding NAP for 2017-2023, and to provide input into the amended R.A. No. 10364. It was found that 82.8% of respondents maintained IJM’s Program was aligned with the national priorities and action plans for combatting trafficking in persons, and 78.5% thought IJM’s Program contributed to the dialogue on trafficking in persons in the Philippines and helped to shape national priorities and action plans.

IJM was able to contribute to the development and implementation of national and stakeholder plans and strategies, and to respond to and support needs identified by stakeholders and partners. For instance, through MOUs with the PNP and DSWD, IJM was able to support and build the capacity of public justice system actors to enforce anti-sex trafficking law and provide quality aftercare to trafficking victims through the government and other relevant stakeholders. IJM’s Program was particularly relevant because it supported the PNP to establish anti-trafficking units in the three project areas. IJM also trained the anti-trafficking police and provided the anti-trafficking police units with intelligence, logistical support, and technical assistance needed to arrest sex traffickers and rescue sex trafficking victims. Over time, IJM’s Program contributed to increases in prosecutions and convictions of child sex traffickers in the three project areas. For DOJ prosecutors, having IJM lawyers there to prosecute child sex trafficking cases as private prosecutors helped to improve DOJ prosecutors’ abilities to prosecute child sex trafficking cases. IJM also supported DSWD and LGU social workers, as well as private aftercare providers to provide post-rescue care and quality aftercare services to survivors of sex trafficking. IJM initiated and supported the establishment of processing centers, where rescued trafficking victims could receive victim-centered and gender sensitive support, counselling, and crisis care immediately after rescue.

Findings presented throughout this report clearly demonstrate that IJM’s Program was able to effectively monitor and adapt to changes in the operating environment, including political changes and changes in the nature and extent of commercial sexual exploitation of children in the three project areas. IJM assigned an internal team of managers to a Philippine Leadership Team (formerly known as the Philippine Anti-Trafficking Team) that was responsible for providing support and guidance to ensure IJM successfully achieved defined outcomes and effectively engaged with and advocated for activities within the Philippine Government.

### Effectiveness

This evaluation found that IJM’s Program was effective on multiple levels, including improving the abilities of law enforcement to combat child sex trafficking, improving prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, improving courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases, and improving aftercare for child sex trafficking victims.

In terms of improving the abilities of law enforcement to combat child sex trafficking, IJM was able to achieve its intended outputs, outcomes, and impact. Through an MOU with the PNP in the three project areas, IJM supported the PNP to create dedicated regional anti-trafficking law enforcement units and provide the units’ officers with capacity-building trainings, logistical support, and technical assistance/guidance to improve their abilities to investigate sex trafficking cases, collect evidence, conduct raid and rescue operations, interview sex trafficking victims, and arrest sex

traffickers. In fact, the majority of respondents recognized that IJM effectively contributed to improving investigations and evidence collection techniques of the anti-trafficking police (95.1%), raid and rescue operations (100.0%), and skills and abilities of anti-trafficking police to interview child victims of sex trafficking (97.4%). All respondents (100.0%) also recognized that IJM effectively contributed to improving the police's abilities to arrest sex traffickers. These findings demonstrate how strategic support provided by IJM brought about system transformation in the PNP, including improving the knowledge, attitudes, and skills of anti-trafficking police to effectively enforce anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking. IJM also helped to strengthen coordination among the PNP, DOJ, DSWD, and DOLE to effectively enforce anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking.

In terms of improving prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, IJM provided strategic support to DOJ prosecutors by acting as a private prosecutor in IJM-supported child sex trafficking cases. The results included improvement in charges filed against perpetrators of child sex trafficking and prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, improvement in the abilities of prosecutors to interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings, and evidence presentation in court proceedings. In fact, the majority of respondents maintained IJM effectively contributed to improving the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases (61.9%), the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child victims in pre-trial and court proceedings (80.0%), and evidence presentation in court proceedings related to sex trafficking cases (95.8%). Respondents also recognized that IJM contributed to improving public prosecutor's understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws (60.9%).

In terms of improving courts' handling of child sex trafficking cases, 57.1% of respondents maintained IJM contributed to improving the family courts' handling of child sex trafficking cases. Documented improvements were in the family courts' use of child-friendly practices and conviction of sex traffickers. The majority of respondents recognized that IJM effectively contributed to ensuring courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved as victims and witness (61.9%) in sex trafficking cases, and IJM effectively contributed to the increase in the number of convictions of sex traffickers (95.8%). These improvements resulted in a total of 138 IJM-supported convictions of sex traffickers.

In terms of improving aftercare for child sex trafficking victims, IJM provided strategic support that resulted in improvements in post-rescue and crisis care for sex trafficking victims, and the abilities of DSWD social workers to provide trauma-informed care and referrals to aftercare shelters. IJM was also able to provide strategic support that resulted in improvements in the quality and range of services provided to child sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters, and development of a more coordinated aftercare network of government and private aftercare providers. In general, improvements in aftercare led to improved victim outcomes (improved recovery and restoration), and reductions in the number of child sex trafficking victims being re-trafficked after rescue and recovery. It is important to note that the majority of respondents maintained IJM contributed to improvements in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims (83.7%), crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters (100.0%), and the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters (90.9%). The majority of respondents also recognized IJM contributed to the development of a more coordinated aftercare network (86.7%), and all respondents thought IJM helped to improve victim outcomes (100.0%).

In the Philippines, IJM committed significant resources to monitoring and evaluating the impact of their program activities, including the impact of collaborative casework and system reform activities on public justice system transformation. IJM carried out monitoring and evaluation during each of the three phases of Justice System Transformation to document progress made toward project goals and outcomes, and to identify and analyze remaining gaps in the public justice system, and challenges faced in program implementation. Effective monitoring and evaluation enabled IJM Philippines FOs to develop and enhance program activities while making sure they remained aligned with national priorities and needs in the three project areas. Monitoring and evaluation also enabled IJM to build upon lessons learned.

## Impact

To evaluate the impact of IJM's Program, data from IJM's CTMS was analyzed to document the number of IJM-supported and government-led raid and rescue operations, and the number of sex trafficking victims rescued in the three project areas. From 2007 to 2015, there were a total of 261 IJM-supported and government-led raid and rescue operations, of which 196 were focused on child sex trafficking. During this same time period, IJM-supported Philippine law

enforcement efforts that resulted in the rescue of 1,314 sexually exploited persons in the three project areas, of which 777 were children and 537 were adults. Among the children, 759 were rescued from sex trafficking and 18 were rescued from online sexual exploitation. In general, there was a fairly steady increase in the number of raid and rescue operations, and child sex trafficking victims rescued from 2007 to 2015 with peaks in 2012 and 2015. CTMS data also revealed IJM-supported raid and rescue operations resulted in the closure of a total of 52 entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex between 2007 and 2015.

IJM's CTMS data revealed that from 2003 to 2015, a total of 816 suspects were arrested for commercial sexual exploitation by the PNP and/or NBI with IJM's support, and 722 arrests were specifically for child sex trafficking. In addition, a total of 747 suspects were charged with child sexual abuse, exploitation, and/or trafficking during this same period; of which 655 were charged specifically with child sex trafficking. In total, there were a total of 181 IJM-supported convictions of traffickers from 2003 to 2015; 138 of those convictions were specifically for child sex trafficking. In general, the number of suspects charged, prosecuted, and convicted for child sex trafficking steadily increased from 2003 to 2015.

In terms of aftercare, this evaluation found that IJM increased the capacities of social workers and aftercare service providers to provide child sex trafficking victims with post-rescue care. IJM also supported the development of safe spaces (processing centers) where sex trafficking victims could be processed and receive gender sensitive and victim-centered post-rescue care. IJM also improved services offered to child sex trafficking victims in shelters, including trauma-informed care and post-trauma counselling that supported victim rehabilitation and recovery, and services designed to support survivors' reintegration and access to community-based services. IJM had an MOU with the DSWD, and partnered with both DSWD-run shelters and private shelters to support trafficking victims in their rehabilitation and recovery. IJM also focused on identifying transitional housing facilities that could support survivors of trafficking in the process of reintegration. Finally, IJM contributed resources to facilitate the development and functioning of local government Reintegration Support Networks (RSNs) in Metro Manila and Metro Cebu. RSNs were designed to provide community-based clients (i.e., reintegrated sex trafficking victims) with access to needed rehabilitation and reintegration services (e.g., psychological counselling, vocational and job readiness training, and medical services).<sup>12</sup> RSNs were staffed by DSWD and LGU social workers, as well as trained volunteers from faith-based groups.

*Reduction in the Prevalence of Child Sex Trafficking.* An important component of IJM's monitoring and evaluation was to measure the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas. In Metro Cebu, IJM commissioned Crime and Justice Analysts (CJA) to design and conduct prevalence studies at the baseline (2006), midline (2008) and endline (2010) of Project Lantern (Phase I).<sup>13</sup> Prevalence studies enabled IJM to measure and document whether IJM was achieving its intended impact (i.e., reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in entertainment establishments and on the streets in and around Metro Cebu). IJM carried out similar prevalence studies in Metro Manila (2009, 2014, and 2016) and Pampanga (2012 and 2016).<sup>14</sup>

Based upon a methodology and indicators developed by CJA in 2006, 6.6% (103 out of 1,560) of the commercial sex workers identified in Cebu were minors. The assessment was replicated in 2008, at which time 2.2% (29 out of 1,200) of the commercial sex workers identified were minors. By 2010, 1.5% (21 out of 1,400) of the commercial sexual workers found were minors. From 2006 to 2010, data collectors also found that locating minors became more difficult, leading CJA to conclude that the availability of sexually trafficked and commercially exploited minors had substantially decreased over time. Based upon these prevalence studies, Project Lantern exceeded IJM's expectations and demonstrated the effectiveness of a law enforcement-based model to combat child sex trafficking. IJM recognized success was limited to the local context, given the local focus of Project Lantern.

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<sup>12</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Project Lantern was a five-year anti-sex trafficking project in Metro Cebu (2006-2011) that IJM implemented with \$5 million (USD) in funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

<sup>14</sup> The 2012 prevalence study in Pampanga was a baseline study that was conducted before the Pampanga FO was opened.

By 2009, IJM conducted a prevalence study of child sex trafficking in Metro Manila. Building upon methodology developed by CJA, IJM used a time-space sampling approach to identify non-detected child sex trafficking victims.<sup>15,16</sup> In 2009, IJM found that among the 92 sex establishments visited in District 5 of Manila City, Paranaque, and Pasay, 8.13% of the 1,306 commercial sex workers observed were minors. In 2014, they found that 5.54% of commercial sex workers identified in 292 locations visited were minors.<sup>17</sup> Finally, in 2016, the prevalence of child sex trafficking victims was estimated at 1.94% to 2.00%, depending on the sample comparison to 2006 or 2014. Based upon this longitudinal data, IJM maintained there had been a 75.4% reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking from 2009 to 2016, and a 64.44% reduction in child sex trafficking from 2014 to 2016.<sup>18</sup>

In 2012, IJM used the same methodology and time-space sampling approach to conduct a baseline of child sex trafficking in Pampanga, particularly in Angeles City and Mabalacat. The 2012 baseline study revealed 8.79% of commercial sex workers found were minors. In 2016, IJM conducted a follow-up assessment and found that 1.21% of commercial sex workers identified were minors. Based upon this data, IJM concluded there had been an 86.23% reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Angeles City and Mabalacat from 2012 to 2016. They also concluded the locations where minors were being exploited for sex decreased by 72.0% from 2012 to 2016.<sup>19</sup> Based upon this data, along with documented improvements in the public justice systems response to child sex trafficking in Pampanga, and restructuring of the PNP's regional anti-human trafficking unit (i.e., development of anti-trafficking units into a national unit with bases in Manila, Cebu and Mindanao), IJM decided to close their Pampanga FO.

As part of this evaluation, respondents were also asked if they had seen a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas. It was found that 66.7% of respondents maintained they had seen a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the project areas since 2003, of which 91.9% maintained IJM contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking. Also, 75.9% of respondents reported there were fewer entertainment establishments in the project areas where children/minors were being exploited for sex (compared to 2003), of which 74.2% maintained IJM contributed to the closure and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex. As for sustainability of these reductions, there were mixed responses. While 60.3% of respondents thought the reduction in child sex trafficking would be sustained over time, some 38.1% thought the problem could re-emerge. Also, while 52.2% of respondents thought the reduction of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited for sex would be sustained, some 40.3% thought the problem could re-emerge.

*Confidence in the Public Justice System.* Respondents were asked about their confidence in public justice system agencies' abilities to combat child sex trafficking (they were asked to rank their confidence on a scale of 1 to 10, 1=not confident to 10=very confident). The focus was on their confidence in the abilities of police to enforce anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking, the abilities of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases, courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers, and the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities.

On average, when respondents were asked to rank their confidence in public justice system agencies going back to 2003 or as far back as they could remember, they reported they generally lacked confidence in the ability of police to enforce the anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking (mean=3.5). They also lacked confidence in the ability of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases (mean=3.9), and courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking and convict sex traffickers (mean=4.0). And, they lacked confidence in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities (mean=4.6).

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<sup>15</sup> Time-space sampling was developed in the late 1980's and has been considered by many researchers to be a standard method for HIV behavior surveillance among at-risk populations in the United States. IJM (2016). Expert Paper: How to Measure the Prevalence of Child Sex Trafficking. Global Study Exploitation of Children in Travel and Tourism, p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> The prevalence study in Metro Manila and the time-space sampling approach did not include the proxy indicators were included in the 2006, 2008, and 2010 assessments conducted in Metro Cebu.

<sup>17</sup> The 2015 prevalence study included not only District 5 of Manila City, Paranaque, and Pasay which were included in the 2009 prevalence study, but also Makati and Quezon City.

<sup>18</sup> Shaw & Fruge (2016). *Child Sex Trafficking in Metro Manila*. Washington, DC: International Justice Mission.

<sup>19</sup> Shaw & Fruge (2016). *Child Sex Trafficking in Angeles City*. Washington, DC: International Justice Mission.

When asked to rank their confidence in public justice system agencies in 2016, respondents expressed much higher levels of confidence in the abilities of police to enforce anti-trafficking laws and to combat child sex trafficking (mean=7.4, a point change of 3.9 from 2003). They also had much higher levels of confidence in the abilities of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases (mean=8.0, a point change of 4.1 from 2003), and courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking and convict sex traffickers (mean=7.9, a point change of 3.9 from 2003). Their confidence also increased in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities (mean=7.8, a point change of 3.2 from 2003).

## Sustainability

In terms of sustainability, IJM's approach was to identify weaknesses in the local public justice system, form relationships with local authorities and public justice system actors, and help to strengthen the public justice system by providing resources, training, technical assistance/guidance, and accountability. IJM also supported policy changes, including amendments to the anti-trafficking law, and the creation of PNP dedicated regional anti-trafficking units, which were new structures in the public justice system. IJM aimed to demonstrate to local authorities and public justice system actors that change is possible. To improve sustainability, IJM recognized the need to continue addressing identified gaps in the public justice system's response to child sex trafficking.

*Sustainability of Improvement in the Abilities of Anti-Trafficking Police.* Respondents were asked to rank on a scale of 1 to 10 (1=not sustainable, 10=very sustainable) the sustainability of improvements in the abilities of anti-trafficking police to investigate and collect evidence in sex trafficking cases, to conduct raid and rescue operations, to interview sex trafficking victims, and to arrest sex traffickers. On average, respondents were quite confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the anti-trafficking police's abilities to investigate and collect evidence in sex trafficking cases (mean=7.6), conduct raid and rescue operations (mean=8.3), interview sex trafficking victims (mean=7.5), and arrest sex traffickers (mean=7.8).

Although there is a high level of confidence in the ability of the anti-trafficking police to sustain improvements made, there are still several challenges that could affect sustainability going forward. The four most common challenges to sustainability include resources, turnover of law enforcement officers assigned to anti-trafficking units, coordination between agencies, and corruption.

*Sustainability of Improvement in the Abilities of Public Prosecutors.* Respondents also ranked on a scale of 1 to 10 the sustainability of improvements in the abilities of the public prosecutors to file charges against sex traffickers, to prosecute sex trafficking cases, to interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings, and to present evidence in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases. On average, respondents were very confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the ability of public prosecutors to file charges against sex traffickers (mean=7.9), prosecute sex trafficking cases (mean=8.1), interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings (mean=7.9), and present evidence in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases (mean=8.0).

Although respondents had a high level of confidence that public prosecutors could sustain such improvements, they identified three main challenges that could affect sustainability going forward. These include resources (time and manpower) needed to prosecute sex trafficking cases, evidence presentation in court proceeding (particularly ensuring sex trafficking victims appear to testify in court), and corruption.

*Sustainability of Improvement in Courts Handling of Child Sex Trafficking Cases.* Respondents also ranked the sustainability of improvements in the abilities of courts to handle child sex trafficking cases, to use child-friendly practices in trafficking cases that involve children as victims and witnesses, and to convict child sex traffickers. On average, respondents were very confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the ability of courts to handle child sex trafficking cases (mean=8.1), to use child-friendly practices (mean=8.2), and to increase convictions of child sex traffickers (mean=8.1). Although respondents had a high level of confidence that courts would sustain such improvements, there were still a couple of challenges that could affect sustainability. The most notable challenges to sustainability were corruption and ensuring victims testify in court proceedings.

[Sustainability of Improvement in Post-Rescue and Aftercare Services.](#) Finally, respondents ranked how sustainable are improvements in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue and crisis care to sex trafficking victims, and to refer rescued victims to aftercare shelters. Respondents were also asked to rank how sustainable are the improvements made to the quality and range of aftercare services for sex trafficking victims. On average, respondents were confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the DSWD's ability to provide post-rescue care (mean=7.5) and crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters (mean=7.3). Respondents were also confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the quality and range of aftercare services for sex trafficking victims (mean=7.5). Still, however, challenges to sustainability are resources, manpower, and supervision. DSWD and LGU social workers recognized that without support from IJM, it will be difficult to sustain the range and quality of services currently being offered to child sex trafficking victims.

## Recommendations

This evaluation revealed IJM's Justice System Transformation Model has been effective in the Philippines at bringing about justice system reform in the law enforcement and aftercare sectors; however, more time is needed before the long-term impact and sustainability of IJM's Program can be assessed. Given the strengths of IJM's Justice System Transformation Model and the way it was implemented in the Philippines, the recommendations that follow are limited in number and scope. Recommendations relate to IJM's ongoing program activities in the Philippines, and to IJM programming in general.

Recommendation 1: IJM should continue employing collaborative casework as a core driver to its system reform approach.

Recommendation 2: In general, IJM should continue to conduct prevalence studies on child sex trafficking at the baseline, midline and endline using a time-space sampling approach to measure progress toward their goal of reducing child sex trafficking in project areas.

Recommendation 3: IJM should provide strategic support to the DSWD and private aftercare providers to develop a coordinated network of aftercare providers.

Recommendation 4: IJM should continue to operate their Philippine Leadership Team, but enhance its function.

Recommendation 5: IJM should be cognizant of gender discriminatory practices in policing and take steps to make sure that both male and female police officers assigned to the WCPCs are equally responsible for interviewing and taking affidavits from sex trafficking victims.

Recommendation 6: IJM should explore ways to strengthen their results-based monitoring.

Recommendation 7: IJM should explore ways to collect annual government administrative data related to child sex trafficking arrests, prosecutions, and convictions, as well as to trafficking victims rescued in project areas so that IJM can more effectively demonstrate the contributions of their work as a proportion of the larger work carried out by anti-trafficking units, public prosecutors, and the courts to combat child sex trafficking.

Recommendation 8: IJM should commit more time and resources to Phase 3, Sustaining Gains, of their Justice System Transformation Model.

Recommendation 9: IJM should communicate more effectively with partners to highlight the impact of IJM's effort to improve public justice system agency responses to commercial sexual exploitation of children.

Recommendations 10 to 12 should inform IJM's new program to combat online sexual exploitation of children in the Philippines, as well as child sex trafficking programming in other countries around the world. At the time this evaluation was written, IJM Philippines reportedly recognized these challenges related to aftercare for child victims of online commercial sexual exploitation, and appreciated the below recommendations. IJM maintained their future program

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activities in the Philippines were being developed to include aftercare system reform strategies that would address Recommendations 10 to 12.

Recommendation 10: IJM should work with the DSWD to identify alternative systems of long-term care for boys rescued from commercial sexual exploitation.

Recommendation 11: IJM should work with the DSWD to identify alternative systems of long-term care for very young children rescued from commercial sexual exploitation.

Recommendation 12: IJM should provide training to social workers and aftercare providers to understand boys and young children who experience commercial sexual exploitation.

# CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

## 1.1. Situation of Trafficking in Persons in the Philippines

International Justice Mission (IJM) began working in the Philippines in 2001, at a time when the country was identified as major source and transit country for cross-border trafficking in persons, and to a lesser extent a destination country.<sup>20</sup> There was also a significant number of adults and children being trafficked internally from poorer rural areas to urban centers for commercial sexual exploitation and domestic servitude. At the time, there were no laws that specifically prohibited trafficking in persons, and prosecutions were rare due to pervasive corruption and a slow, underfunded, and ineffective public justice system.<sup>21</sup> As a result, the Philippines was ranked as a Tier 2 country in the US Department of State's *2001 Trafficking in Persons Report*.<sup>22</sup>

On May 28, 2002, the Philippine Government ratified the United Nations (UN) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, along with the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Pursuant to its obligations under international law, on May 26, 2003, the Philippine Government enacted the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9208, An Act to Institute Policies to Eliminated Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Establishing the Necessary Institutional Mechanisms for the Protection and Support of Trafficked Persons, Providing Penalties for its Violations, and for Other). This Act defined "trafficking in persons" as:<sup>23</sup>

"The recruitment, transportation, transfer, or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation, which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered as trafficking in persons, even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph."

In accordance with the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208), a child was defined as "a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."<sup>24</sup>

The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208) also defined several other types of sexual exploitation and key terms relevant to this evaluation. This includes sex tourism, sexual exploitation, and pornography (see Box 1.1).<sup>25</sup>

<sup>20</sup> US Department of State (2001). *2001 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>21</sup> US Department of State (2001). *2001 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>22</sup> US Department of State (2001). *2001 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>23</sup> The definition of trafficking in persons in the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Action of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208) is consistent with the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000.

<sup>24</sup> Retrieved on July 18, 2016 from: [http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2003/ra\\_9208\\_2003.html](http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2003/ra_9208_2003.html)

<sup>25</sup> Retrieved on July 18, 2016 from: [http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2003/ra\\_9208\\_2003.html](http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2003/ra_9208_2003.html)

Despite enactment of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208), arrest and criminal prosecution of traffickers was limited, in part because corruption was identified as a pervasive problem among police and justice system actors.<sup>26</sup>

| <b>Box 1.1. Definitions of sexual exploitation in Republic Act No. 10364</b> |   |
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| <b>Trafficking in Persons</b>  | <p>The recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.</p> <p>The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.</p> |
| <b>Sex Tourism</b>   | <p>A program organized by travel and tourism-related establishments and individuals which consists of tourism packages or activities, utilizing and offering escort and sexual services as enticement for tourists. This includes sexual services and practices offered during rest and recreation periods for members of the military.</p>   |
| <b>Sexual Exploitation</b>   | <p>Participation by a person in prostitution or the production of pornographic materials as a result of being subjected to a threat, deception, coercion, abduction, force, abuse of authority, debt bondage, fraud or through abuse of a victim's vulnerability.”</p>  |
| <b>Pornography</b>   | <p>Any representation, through publication, exhibition, cinematography, indecent shows, information technology, or by whatever means, of a person engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a person for primarily sexual purposes.”</p>   |
| <b>Entrapment Operations<sup>27</sup></b>                                    | <p>Entrapment is sanctioned by Philippines law as a legitimate method or approved method of apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan; whereas, instigation involves the inducement of the would-be accused into the commission of the offense, in which case instigators become co-principals themselves.</p>   |

In 2004 and 2005, the Philippines was placed on the Tier 2 Watch List by the US Department of State, due its failure to show evidence of increased efforts to convict traffickers, and justice officials’ complicity in human trafficking.<sup>28,29</sup> During these same years there was a growing recognition that internal trafficking and sexual exploitation of children were pervasive problems. Factors contributing to human trafficking in the Philippines were “endemic poverty, high rates of unemployment, a cultural propensity towards migration, a weak rule-of-law environment, and sex tourism.”<sup>30</sup>

<sup>26</sup> US Department of State (2003). *2003 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>27</sup> *Entrapment vs. Instigation; explained – G.R. No. 173485. Law and Justice: Issues and Developments* (December 9, 2011) Retrieved on July 6, 2017 from: <http://lcmlaw1.blogspot.com/2011/12/entrapment-vs-instigation-explained-gr.html>

<sup>28</sup> US Department of State (2004). *2004 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>29</sup> US Department of State (2005). *2005 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>30</sup> US Department of State (2005). *2005 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

Corruption at all levels of government and a weak judiciary remained serious impediments to the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of traffickers.<sup>31</sup>

In 2006, the Philippines was removed from the Tier 2 Watch List and was ranked as a Tier 2 country in the US Department of State's *Trafficking in Persons Reports* from 2006 to 2008. In 2009 and 2010, the Philippines was back on the Tier 2 Watch List due to continued problems of widespread corruption and an inefficient judicial system that seriously limited the prosecution of trafficking cases.<sup>32,33,34,35,36</sup> IJM reported it took at least five to seven years to prosecute human trafficking cases. In 2009, despite a lack of resources and an inefficient judicial system, the Department of Justice (DOJ) mandated that prosecutors prioritize trafficking cases; however, the court system had no method or means to fast-track trafficking cases.<sup>37</sup> In 2009 and 2010, government complicity in human trafficking was highlighted as a key factor for why the Philippines was again placed on the Tier 2 Watch List. Not only did some government officials reportedly partner with traffickers and organized trafficking syndicates, but police officers allegedly conducted indiscriminate raids on commercial sex establishments to extort money from managers, clients, and sex workers. In some cases, police reportedly extorted both money and sexual services by threatening sex workers with imprisonment for vagrancy.<sup>38</sup>

In 2010, the Philippine Government signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with three civil society organizations (CSOs) to serve on the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking (IACAT), and to jointly train government officials in agencies responsible for enforcing anti-trafficking laws and prosecuting trafficking cases. With the support from these CSOs (one being IJM), law enforcement units conducted raid and rescue operations which led to the rescue of women and children from commercial sexual exploitation and sex tourism operations.<sup>39</sup> It was at this same time that the Philippine Government began to increase the number of trafficking cases filed in courts, and the number of convictions in trafficking cases.<sup>40</sup> The increase in convictions was a reflection of the fact that private attorneys, such as private attorneys from IJM, were prosecuting cases under the direction and control of DOJ prosecutors.

In addition to focusing on prosecution of trafficking cases, the Philippine Government continued their efforts to provide trafficking victims with support services; however, the government's capacity to shelter and protect victims was severely limited due to a lack of resources and an inadequate budget. The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) also referred victims to accredited CSOs for care; however, the quality of the referral process varied by location. The government also encouraged victims to assist in the investigation and prosecution of human trafficking cases; however, factors such as victim fear of retaliation from traffickers, government's lack of victim and witness protection, and lengthy trial processes caused many victims to decline cooperation with authorities and to recant their testimonies.<sup>41</sup>

From 2011 to 2015, the Philippines was again ranked as a Tier 2 country in the US Department of State's *Trafficking in Persons Reports*.<sup>42,43,44,45, 46</sup> During these years, child sex trafficking and sex tourism continued to be serious problems, and it was found that Filipino children were being coerced to perform sex acts for live internet broadcasts to paying

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<sup>31</sup> US Department of State (2005). *2005 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>32</sup> US Department of State (2006). *2006 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>33</sup> US Department of State (2007). *2007 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>34</sup> US Department of State (2008). *2008 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>35</sup> US Department of State (2009). *2009 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>36</sup> US Department of State (2010). *2010 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>37</sup> US Department of State (2010). *2010 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>38</sup> US Department of State (2012). *2012 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>39</sup> US Department of State (2010). *2010 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>40</sup> US Department of State (2010). *2010 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>41</sup> US Department of State (2010). *2010 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>42</sup> US Department of State (2011). *2011 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>43</sup> US Department of State (2012). *2012 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>44</sup> US Department of State (2013). *2013 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>45</sup> US Department of State (2014). *2014 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>46</sup> US Department of State (2015). *2015 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

foreigners. There were reports that online sexual exploitation of children was occurring in private residences and internet cafes and were often facilitated by family members.<sup>47,48</sup>

On July 23, 2012, the Philippine Government passed R.A. No. 10364, An Act to Institute Policies to Eliminate Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Establishing the Necessary Institutional Mechanisms for the Protection and Support of Trafficking Persons, Providing Penalties for its Violations and for Other Purposes. R.A. No. 10364 amended and expanded the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208). In 2012, the Philippine Government also significantly increased funding for the IACAT and continued to arrest, prosecute, and convict traffickers. The Government also implemented a new program to protect and rehabilitate victims; however, the government lacked a formal policy to safeguard victims willing to testify against their traffickers.<sup>49</sup> The challenge was that the victim-witness protection, security, and benefits program failed to fully cover victims' needs, and the lengthy approval process discouraged trafficking victims from applying for assistance. In addition, there were "no financial incentives for victims to cooperate in criminal proceedings since out-of-court settlements often resulted in monetary compensation, while financial penalties imposed upon offenders by courts often went unpaid."<sup>50</sup>

Despite the fact that corruption remained common at all levels of the government, authorities continued to take steps "to address trafficking-related corruption by filing criminal cases against officials complicit in trafficking, and dismissing officials who may have facilitated trafficking for administrative violations."<sup>51</sup> Although the DOJ continued to encourage courts to expedite processing of trafficking cases, inefficiencies in the judicial system continued to cause lengthy delays and pose serious challenges to the successful prosecution of human trafficking cases.

The DSWD operates temporary shelters for women and children victims of abuse, which also accommodate trafficking victims; however, the number of facilities that can shelter male trafficking victims are limited.<sup>52</sup> Since 2012, the DSWD has continued to train government social workers and private service providers on human trafficking, victim identification, and recovery and reintegration of trafficking victims.<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, the facilities and services for trafficking victims remain inadequate to address the specific needs of trafficking victims, and social workers remain inadequately trained on how to properly assist rescued trafficking victims, particularly child sex trafficking victims.<sup>54, 55</sup> The Philippine Government increased efforts to protect trafficking victims by funding the Recovery and Reintegration Program for Trafficked Persons, which provides trafficking victims with access to shelter, legal assistance, and skills training, as well as financial assistance to seek employment or start a business. Some trafficking victims have received support through DSWD residential and community-based services, and others have been referred to short- and long-term care facilities. The Philippine Government has provided a small amount of funding to CSOs to provide aftercare to survivors of trafficking.<sup>56,57</sup>

In 2016, given progress made in the areas of prosecution of trafficking cases and protection of survivors of trafficking, as well as prevention of human trafficking, the Philippines was ranked as a Tier 1 country in the US Department of State's *2016 Trafficking in Persons Report*.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> US Department of State (2012). *2012 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>48</sup> US Department of State (2015). *2015 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>49</sup> US Department of State (2012). *2012 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>50</sup> US Department of State (2015). *2015 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>51</sup> US Department of State (2015). *2015 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>52</sup> US Department of State (2015). *2015 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>53</sup> US Department of State (2012). *2012 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>55</sup> US Department of State (2012). *2012 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>56</sup> US Department of State (2015). *2015 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>57</sup> US Department of State (2015). *2015 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>58</sup> US Department of State (2016). *2016 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

## 1.2. IJM Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines

In 2001, IJM opened a field office (FO) in Manila and began working in the Philippines with a focus on child sexual abuse. By late 2002, the focus began to shift to child sex trafficking; however, an anti-trafficking law had yet to be enacted and the first few cases that IJM prosecuted had to be prosecuted under the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act (R.A. No. 7610).<sup>59</sup> In 2003, the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208) was enacted; that was the year IJM launched its Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines. In 2006, IJM opened its second FO in Cebu to implement a five-year anti-sex trafficking project, entitled Project Lantern. Then, in 2012, building upon lessons learned from Project Lantern, IJM opened its third FO in Pampanga.

Figure 1.1. Map of the Philippines



The overall goal of IJM’s Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children was to reduce the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas by addressing specific gaps that exist in the local public justice systems. IJM’s primary strategy was to support and build the capacity of public justice system actors to enforce anti-human trafficking laws and provide quality aftercare to victims through the government and other relevant stakeholders. IJM’s strategy

<sup>59</sup> The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act defines child abuse as “the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: 1) psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; 2) any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; 3) unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or 4) failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.”

included supporting the development of an effective law enforcement response to child sex trafficking, which is a critical component of any comprehensive counter-trafficking strategy.

In the three project areas, IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children focused on three common outcomes:

- Increased capacity, will, and mandate of regional and national Philippines law enforcement to investigate and intervene in suspected sex trafficking cases;
- Increased quantity and quality of child sex trafficking prosecutions in the Philippines, resulting in an increase in the number of convictions;
- Increased capacity of Philippine government and private social service providers to process sex-trafficking survivors immediately post-rescue, provide trauma-informed care and reintegrate sex trafficking survivors into local communities.

IJM's Program was premised on a Theory of Change (ToC) that evolved over time. The ToC was that improving enforcement of anti-human trafficking laws would increase the prosecution and conviction of traffickers, leading to an increased deterrence from sex trafficking and a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking. The ToC was premised on the understanding that by improving government aftercare services and delivery of those services to sex trafficking victims, IJM would be able to increase victim recovery, reintegration, and restoration.

In terms of sustainability, IJM's approach was to identify weaknesses in local public justice systems, form relationships with local authorities and public justice system actors, and then help to strengthen the public justice system by providing resources, training, technical assistance/guidance, and accountability. IJM also lobbied for and secured increased government allocation of resources to the problem both in terms of money and people, ultimately demonstrating to local authorities and public justice system actors that change is possible.

### 1.3. IJM's Three Phase Justice System Transformation Model

In the Philippines, IJM implemented its Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children using a *Justice System Transformation Model* that includes collaborative casework and targeted justice system reform initiatives in the law enforcement and aftercare sectors.<sup>60</sup> IJM's *Justice System Transformation Model* has three key phases which are typically implemented over a ten-year period:<sup>61</sup>

- Phase 1: Collaborative Casework - IJM experts learn about victims and perpetrators, build relationships with relevant authorities and stakeholders, and diagnose why police, prosecutors, courts, and supporting social services provide no effective deterrent against the targeted forms of violence. IJM experts also provide tangible, hands-on support to local public justice systems in individual cases of violent abuse from beginning to end. Collaborative casework not only provides urgently needed relief and safety to individual victims of violent crimes, but is also the most effective way to accurately diagnose what is broken in the criminal justice system.
- Phase 2: System Reform - While the primary objective for collaborative casework is services to individual victims and building an accurate diagnosis of system gaps, the primary objective of the system reform phase is to build and implement a cooperative plan with the host government to address those gaps and improve performance. Collaborative casework in the form of work on individual cases continues to be a critical driver of capacity building, monitoring and learning.
- Phase 3: Sustaining Gains - IJM seeks to sustain the gains achieved through its system reform initiatives with robust advocacy initiatives, while reducing direct IJM collaborative casework support and scaling back system reform initiatives implemented during Phase 2. During Phase 3, monitoring and evaluation activities measure whether or not gains are sustained.


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<sup>60</sup> IJM's three phase justice system transformation model was introduced in 2014, after nearly all of IJM's programs were doing a mix of phase 1 and 2 activities.

<sup>61</sup> IJM Outline Document of Justice System Transformation Program, October 2014 (Version 7.3), pp. 3-4.

Figure 1.2 provides a graphic format of the Justice System Transformation Model.

Figure 1.2. Justice System Transformation Model



Note: This figure was provided by IJM.

Monitoring and evaluating the impact and sustainability of IJM’s Program activities, including collaborative casework and system reform in the three project areas, was an important part of IJM’s Program in the Philippines. IJM took steps to monitor and evaluate implementation of their Justice System Transformation in the Philippines. This included documenting progress made toward project goals and outcomes, and identifying and analyzing gaps in the public justice system, and challenges faced in program implementation. Effective monitoring and evaluation enabled IJM Philippines FOs to develop and enhance their program activities, making sure they remained aligned with national priorities and needs in the project areas, and to build upon lessons learned.

An important component of the monitoring and evaluation process was also to measure the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas. In Metro Cebu, IJM commissioned CJA to design and conduct prevalence studies at the baseline (2006), midline (2008) and endline (2010) of Project Lantern Phase I.<sup>62</sup> Prevalence studies enabled IJM to measure and document the impact of program activities on the prevalence of child sex trafficking in entertainment establishments and on the streets in and around Metro Cebu. IJM conducted similar prevalence studies in Metro Manila (2009, 2014, and 2016) and Pampanga (2012 and 2016).<sup>63</sup>

#### 1.4. Description of IJM’s Justice System Transformation Program in Project Areas

In 2003, when IJM began their work in the Philippines, they engaged in collaborative casework in Metro Manila. They made an effort to learn about the victims and perpetrators of child sex trafficking, build relationships with relevant authorities and stakeholders, diagnose why public justice system agencies were not effectively combatting or deterring child sex trafficking, and documented the lack of interventions and support services for trafficking victims. During the


<sup>62</sup> IJM contracted Crime and Justice Analysts, Inc. to conduct each of the prevalence studies for Phase I of Project Lantern.

<sup>63</sup> The 2012 prevalence study in Pampanga was a baseline study that was conducted before the Pampanga FO was opened.

collaborative casework phase, IJM experts also provided tangible, hands-on support to local public justice system actors to establish protocols for case management and intervention in cases of child sex trafficking. Additionally, they focused on establishing networks and practices for identifying and accepting case referrals, investigating cases of child sex trafficking, rescuing child sex trafficking victims Metro Manila, and providing relief to rescued victims. In these early years, IJM identified lawyers who could offer *pro bono* legal services in response to case work needs; holding perpetrators accountable through prosecution in criminal cases.

Through collaborative casework, IJM experts identified the most significant failings of law enforcement were in the areas of crime detection, investigation, evidence collection, and delivery of evidence at trial. In regard to aftercare, shortcomings were in the areas of post-rescue processing, post-trauma counselling in shelters, reintegration preparation, and aftercare services for community-based clients (i.e., reintegrated sex trafficking victims). These were the most significant impediments to the overall public justice system response to sex trafficking.<sup>64,65</sup> IJM recognized early on that if these problems were not addressed, improving other public justice system services would have little impact. Thus, IJM focused their Philippines Justice System Transformation Program on law enforcement and aftercare, assisting to a lesser extent other public justice system actors, such as public prosecutors and judges.<sup>66</sup> Figure 1.3 presents an image of IJM’s Transformed Public Justice System.

**Figure 1.3. Transformed Public Justice System**



Note: This figure was provided by IJM.

#### 1.4.1. [Metro Cebu \(2005-2016\)](#)

In November 2005, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation awarded IJM a 5 million-dollar (USD) grant to support a five-year anti-sex trafficking project entitled Project Lantern in Metro Cebu. The goal of Project Lantern was to demonstrate the effectiveness of a law enforcement-based strategy and prosecution as part of a comprehensive strategy to reduce the prevalence of commercial sexual exploitation and trafficking of children in Metro Cebu.<sup>67</sup> In 2006, IJM opened a FO

<sup>64</sup> IJM Manila did not ignore prosecutors and courts, or other key public justice system actors (e.g., judges), but recognized that taking steps to work with prosecutors and courts would have less impact without solid evidence and arrests from law enforcement officials.

<sup>65</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 16.

<sup>66</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 16.

<sup>67</sup> Jones, Schlangen & Bucoy (2010). *An Evaluation of the International Justice Mission’s “Project Lantern: Assessment of Five-year Impact and Change in the Public Justice System.”*

in Cebu to implement Project Lantern in Cebu City, Mandaue City, and Mactan Island, which includes Lapu-Lapu City and resorts and clubs on Mactan Island.

The ToC that guided Project Lantern was that by conducting investigations to locate sex trafficking victims and working on cases to prosecute sex traffickers, IJM would build the capacities of key stakeholders to combat sex trafficking in Metro Cebu. In other words, as the capacities of law enforcement officials improve, and IJM provides intelligence on suspected cases of sex trafficking, the numbers of sex traffickers arrested should increase.<sup>68</sup> Another activity of the project was to build the capacities of courts to improve prosecutions and convictions of traffickers.<sup>69</sup> IJM anticipated such improvements would lead to increased expectations for criminal sanctions against sex traffickers, which would deter traffickers as they weigh the risks against anticipated profits and benefits from sex trafficking.<sup>70</sup> Ultimately, IJM maintained increased deterrence would lead to a decrease in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Metro Cebu.

In 2010, an evaluation of Project Lantern (2006-2010) revealed that IJM was able to influence the public justice system and increase enforcement of anti-trafficking laws. IJM identified a 79.0% reduction in the availability of children for commercial sexual exploitation in Metro Cebu from 2006 to 2010.<sup>71,72</sup> For IJM, the success of Project Lantern exceeded their expectations and demonstrated the effectiveness of a law enforcement-based model to combat child sex trafficking. Success, however, was limited to the local context, given the local focus of Project Lantern. At the same time, IJM understood that public justice system actors were still reluctant to take independent initiative to rigorously enforce the anti-trafficking law and provide necessary support to victims.

Other gaps that IJM identified were that “most law enforcement operations were prompted by IJM or required substantial assistance from IJM and CSOs, and there was very little inter-agency coordination without IJM facilitation.”<sup>73</sup> IJM also found public justice officials continued to exhibit a lack of understanding of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208), often failed to conduct proper and effective investigations, and did not regularly provide proper post-rescue support, crisis care, and/or aftercare to trafficking victims.<sup>74</sup> To improve sustainability of Project Lantern, IJM recognized the need to continue addressing identified gaps in the public justice system’s response to sex trafficking in Metro Cebu.<sup>75</sup>

In 2011, IJM began Phase II of Project Lantern (2011-2015), as part of their Justice System Transformation Model. Phase II was a five-year follow-up to Phase I, and it focused on targeting remaining deficiencies in the public justice system. Phase II was an effort to further enhance the public justice system’s response to commercial sexual exploitation of children in Metro Cebu; in particular, IJM focused on increasing the quantity and quality of independent public justice system-initiated sex trafficking investigations, prosecutions, and convictions. IJM also focused on increasing the DSWD’s ability to provide quality aftercare to ensure sex trafficking survivors are rehabilitated and not re-trafficked.<sup>76</sup> IJM planned that at the end of Phase II, they would begin scaling back their casework and anti-sex trafficking activities in Metro Cebu, as public justice system actors should be able to take greater responsibility and initiative for combatting sex trafficking.<sup>77</sup> To ensure sustainability, IJM focused on improving political will to address sex trafficking by providing trainings on human trafficking related issues to local government partners. They lobbied for and secured increased resource allocations (human and financial) to key areas of effort, such as PNP dedicated regional anti-trafficking units.

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<sup>68</sup> IJM Project Lantern. Project Document Revision 2, January 30, 2008.

<sup>69</sup> IJM Project Lantern. Project Document Revision 2, January 30, 2008.

<sup>70</sup> IJM Project Lantern. Project Document Revision 2, January 30, 2008.

<sup>71</sup> IJM System Reform Project Overview. Philippines - Cebu

<sup>72</sup> The baseline study conducted in October 2006 estimated that 6.6% of sex workers in Cebu were minors (identified a total of 102 children being offered for commercial sexual exploitation). A mid-term study conducted in August 2008 estimated the prevalence of CSEC dropped to 2.2% (identified a total of 29 children being offered for commercial sexual exploitation). And, the final prevalence study conducted in May 2010 estimated the prevalence of CSEC dropped to 1.7% (only 21 children were identified). These findings indicate a 79% reduction in the availability of minors for commercial sex over the lifetime of Project Lantern.

<sup>73</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Program Overview, 2012, p. 3.

<sup>74</sup> IJM System Reform Project Overview. Philippines - Cebu

<sup>75</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Program Overview, 2012, p. 1

<sup>76</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 2.

<sup>77</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 2.

They also worked closely with government partners and actors on the IACAT (i.e., the primary government body responsible for coordinating anti-trafficking efforts among Philippine government agencies).<sup>78,79,80</sup>

In Phase II of Project Lantern, IJM was focused on two specific outcomes. One outcome was that law enforcement rescue sex trafficking victims, arrest traffickers, and treat victims appropriately. In other words, IJM focused on assisting law enforcement with raid and rescue operations in Metro Cebu to rescue child sex trafficking victims and arrest, charge, and convict traffickers. The second outcome was that the government social workers and authorized private aftercare providers would effectively provide rescued sex trafficking victims with post-rescue care, treat post-trauma disorders, and provide aftercare services that support their recovery and reintegration into communities.<sup>81</sup>

To achieve results, in 2012, IJM entered into a revised Memo of Agreement (MOA) with the PNP to strengthen its police training program with three levels of specialized anti-human trafficking training: 1) Managing Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Operations (for commissioned police officers); 2) TIP Investigations (for investigators); and 3) TIP Awareness and First Responder Training (for new police recruits involved in patrolling).<sup>82</sup>

IJM also focused on supporting the PNP to improve the effective functioning of the Regional Anti-Trafficking Units. Under the terms of the MOA, the PNP prioritized the selection of personnel who were regularly assigned to be TIP investigators and members of the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Groups (RAHTTG), including the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (RAHTTF) in Cebu. IJM's Cebu FO provided logistical, legal, and strategic consultations and technical assistance (including collaboration on raid and rescue operations) to the RAHTTF in specific cases of trafficking. IJM also monitored and mentored RAHTTF to improve its officers' capacities to effectively manage TIP operations and investigations. As needed, IJM also provided logistical, legal, and strategic consultations to other law enforcement units in and around Metro Cebu. IJM's focus was mainly on ensuring law enforcement units followed established coordination protocols in human trafficking investigations and operations to ensure they led to successful prosecutions. As Phase II of Project Lantern was coming to an end, IJM began to scale back direct casework and anti-trafficking support to law enforcement officers from the RAHTTF.<sup>83</sup>

In addition to focusing on law enforcement, IJM simultaneously focused on assisting the DSWD and LGUs, as well as authorized private aftercare providers to effectively process rescued sex trafficking victims, provide post-rescue care, treat post-trauma disorders, and provide aftercare services that supported the recovery and reintegrate of survivors into communities.<sup>84</sup> During Phase I of Project Lantern, IJM provided direct aftercare services to trafficking victims to fill gaps in the aftercare provided by partner service providers; whereas, during Phase II, IJM acquired and invested funds into developing quality aftercare facilities and 'good practices' to improve shelter care, psychological counselling, and rehabilitation and reintegration support services for trafficking victims.<sup>85</sup> In partnership with the DSWD, IJM facilitated the development of 'HerSpace,' a safe and comfortable victim-friendly center for processing and interviewing trafficking victims immediately after rescue operations. In 'HerSpace,' trafficking victims could meet with social workers and provide testimony. Before the creation of 'HerSpace,' victims were often questioned at police stations and in the presence of their traffickers and exploiters.<sup>86</sup> IJM's casework indicated that 'HerSpace' improved the quality of post-rescue care provided to trafficking victims and increased the quality of statements and testimony provided during interviews. Despite the success of 'HerSpace,' in 2011, following a change in DSWD Regional Directors, funding for

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<sup>78</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Program Overview, 2012, p. 1

<sup>79</sup> IJM Philippines National Anti-Trafficking Team System Transformation Proposal, December 31, 2012, p. 1.

<sup>80</sup> IJM's Philippines National Anti-Trafficking Team (PNATT) has advocated for its anti-trafficking priorities at the national level.

<sup>81</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 10.

<sup>82</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 6-8.

<sup>83</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 6-8.

<sup>84</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 10.

<sup>85</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 8-10.

<sup>86</sup> IJM Testimony of Holly J. Burkhalter, International Justice Mission, Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Next Ten Years in the Fight Against Human Trafficking: Attacking the Problem with the Right Tools*, July 17, 2012. Retrieved on July 17, 2016 from: [http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Burkhalter\\_Testimony.pdf](http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Burkhalter_Testimony.pdf)

‘HerSpace’ was cut and ‘HerSpace’ fell into disrepair.<sup>87</sup> In recent years, ‘HerSpace’ was re-established and funded by the DSWD.

During Phase II of Project Lantern, IJM also established the first Reintegration Support Network (RSN) in partnership with the Mandaue City Social Welfare Office. RSNs were established to ensure community-based clients are treated appropriately and provided with quality aftercare services to improve their chances of restoration.<sup>88</sup>

One of the strengths of IJM’s system reform approach was that victim care was considered an important part of IJM’s law enforcement strategy, and a key part of an effective perpetrator prosecution strategy. Given this approach, IJM and DSWD social workers were on-site immediately after raid and rescue operations to counsel victims and ensure they were not harassed, intimidated, or victimized by either their traffickers/exploiters or the police. Also, IJM took steps to ensure that victims were placed in aftercare facilities where they could get the protection, care, and services needed for their rehabilitation and recovery. IJM’s aftercare approach was focused on assisting trafficking victims to permanently improve their quality of life and reduce their risk of being re-trafficked.<sup>89</sup> IJM understood that establishing such an approach requires coordination and collaboration between law enforcement and aftercare service providers.

Near the end of Phase II of Project Lantern, IJM turned over increasing portions of direct service work to the DSWD and LGUs, as well as to private aftercare providers. This included producing initial case reports and treatment plans, providing regular counseling, life skills training and daily activities for shelter-based clients, conducting planning and assessments for each client’s next phase of treatment or family reintegration, and taking full responsibility for victim security while in the custody of the service provider.<sup>90</sup>

In Metro Cebu, other supplementary project activities included:<sup>91</sup>

- Training prosecutors, judges, and other court staff in partnership with the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA)
- Advocating for improvement in sex trafficking trial efficiency to the Office of the Court Administrator
- Training Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) staff on effective enforcement of labor regulations to deter sex trafficking
- Working with Barangay governments<sup>92</sup> to create structures to prevent trafficking and assist current and former victims, including drafting and adopting local anti-trafficking ordinances
- Cultivating relationships with community-based partners (e.g., church and student groups, community groups, and other local CSOs) to support a public justice system response to human trafficking
- Mobilizing advocates concerned about human trafficking to influence public justice system officials to take more aggressive and specific actions to enhance anti-trafficking efforts, including to address corruption and call for more effective anti-trafficking law enforcement.<sup>93</sup>
- Cultivating relationships with mass media to support a public justice system response to human trafficking.

In Cebu, building political will among public justice officials to address commercial sexual exploitation of children was an important part of IJM’s work. In fact, IJM used their casework experiences and relationships to identify and directly advocate for needed increases in political will among high-level public justice officials and political leaders in Metro Cebu, as well as at the national level.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> IJM Testimony of Holly J. Burkhalter, International Justice Mission, Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Next Ten Years in the Fight Against Human Trafficking: Attacking the Problem with the Right Tools*, July 17, 2012. Retrieved on July 17, 2016 from: [http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Burkhalter\\_Testimony.pdf](http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Burkhalter_Testimony.pdf)

<sup>88</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 8-10.

<sup>89</sup> IJM Project Lantern. Project Document Revision 2, January 30, 2008, p. 17.

<sup>90</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 8-10.

<sup>91</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 8-10.

<sup>92</sup> Barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines and is the native Filipino term for a village, district or ward.

<sup>93</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 6-8.

<sup>94</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 6-8.

Over time, IJM observed that “when we were able to demonstrate success in trafficking interventions and case successes, some government officials were willing to increase their investment in subsequent anti-trafficking activities.”<sup>95</sup> For instance, at the start Project Lantern’s Phase I, IJM reported that law enforcement partners were responding very slowly to IJM requests for intervention; however, after several successful small cases, law enforcement partners began intervening much faster and against larger targets based upon IJM’s requests.<sup>96</sup> IJM also used letters of commendation and good press to encourage good anti-trafficking initiatives and performance by public justice officials, and to draw public attention to the positive performance of public justice system agencies on trafficking issues.<sup>97</sup>

#### 1.4.2. [Metro Manila \(2003-2016\)](#)

IJM officially established its first Philippines FO in Manila in 2003, and in later years launched its Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Project in Metro Manila. This project was designed to replicate lessons learned and ‘good practices’ from Phases I and II of Project Lantern in Metro Cebu.

To prevent justice system transformation impacts from being diluted, IJM focused on enhancing the National Bureau of Investigation’s Anti-Human Trafficking Division (NBI AHTRAD) through mentorship and technical consultations on operations and investigations. Given the massive geographic size and population of Metro Manila, IJM advocated for the creation of a parallel PNP anti-human trafficking task force in Metro Manila, similar to Cebu’s RAHTTF.<sup>98</sup> IJM also focused on developing the capacities of relevant law enforcement officials from both the NBI AHTRAD and RAHTTF to ensure they had the knowledge and skills needed to effectively enforce anti-trafficking laws, rescue trafficking victims, treat victims properly, arrest suspects, gather evidence, and charge traffickers. In addition, IJM established new and improved intra- and inter-agency coordination protocols to support enforcement of anti-trafficking laws.<sup>99</sup>

As it relates to aftercare, IJM’s project in Metro Manila focused on improving aftercare at both the front and back “ends” of the public justice system pipeline, as well as service provision in the center of the pipeline.<sup>100</sup> At the front end of the pipeline, IJM developed ‘Safe Space’ at a DSWD facility. Similar to ‘HerSpace’ in Cebu, ‘Safe Space’ was where trafficking victims could be processed and receive gender sensitive and victim-centered post-rescue care. At the center of the aftercare pipeline, IJM focused on enhancing the provision of services in shelters, especially post-trauma counseling, trauma-informed care, and victim assessment. IJM partnered with Marillac Hills (‘Marillac’) and The Haven for Women (‘Haven’), the main shelters for sex-trafficking victims in Metro Manila. Finally, at the back end of the pipeline, IJM contributed resources to facilitate the development and functioning of two government Reintegration Support Networks (RSNs), with appropriate protocols, trained staff, and facilities where community-based clients could receive needed rehabilitation and reintegration services (e.g., psychological counselling, vocational and job readiness training, and medical services).<sup>101</sup> RSNs were staffed by DSWD and LGU social workers and trained volunteers from faith-based groups. IJM Manila also focused on identifying transitional housing facilities that could support community-based clients with reintegration.

In Metro Manila, IJM faced numerous challenges. For instance, the PNP, DOJ, and DSWD often failed to coordinate and collaborate on sex trafficking investigations and raid and rescue operations, leading to insufficient care for trafficking victims both during and immediately after rescue operations.<sup>102</sup> Law enforcement also failed to collect necessary evidence and to adequately support bringing criminal charges against sex traffickers, and there was inadequate legal support from prosecutors. IJM recognized that these challenges resulted in failure to charge suspected traffickers, defendants being acquitted during trial, reduced cooperation from potential victims, and the release of victims without

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<sup>95</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 6-8.

<sup>96</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 6-8.

<sup>97</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 6-8.

<sup>98</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 1.

<sup>99</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 1.

<sup>100</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 2.

<sup>101</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 2.

<sup>102</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 10.

receiving necessary crisis care and support.<sup>103</sup> In recognition of these risks, IJM focused on building capacities for inter-agency coordination, and mechanisms for implementing coordination protocols. Where inter-agency coordination protocols did not exist but were needed, IJM advocated with the PNP, DOJ, DSWD, and the IACAT to develop and implement necessary coordination protocols.<sup>104</sup> From IJM's perspective, improvement in inter-agency coordination can result in an increase in the number of successful prosecutions, and improved aftercare service provision to victims of trafficking; in turn, leading to a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking.<sup>105</sup>

In 2016, IJM documented a significant reduction in the prevalence of minors trafficked for sex in Metro Manila, compared to 2009 (Wave 1) and 2014 (Wave 2). In 2009, IJM conducted a baseline (Wave 1) which estimated the overall prevalence of child sex trafficking was 8.13% among the 92 sex establishments visited in District 5 of Manila City, Paranaque, and Pasay. In 2014, a follow-up prevalence study found that minors trafficked for sex was reportedly reduced to 5.54%.<sup>106</sup> Finally, in 2016, the prevalence of minors trafficked for sex was found to be to be 1.94% to 2.00%, depending upon sample comparisons to the 2009 and 2014 prevalence studies. Based upon the data and comparisons, IJM identified a 75.4% reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking from 2009 to 2016, and a 64.44% reduction from 2014 to 2016.<sup>107</sup>

### 1.4.3. [Pampanga \(2012-2016\)](#)

In 2012, IJM established its third FO in Pampanga, after receiving an invitation from the government to replicate in Angeles City lessons learned from Cebu's Project Lantern. Angeles City had high incidents of commercial sex trafficking.<sup>108,109</sup> Pampanga has a long history with the sex trade, particularly in and around Angeles City, which emerged when Clark Air Force Base was in operation (1903-1991). Clark Air Force Base had been one of the largest U.S. overseas military bases during the Cold War. In 1991, the U.S. military pulled out of Clark Air Force Base and Angeles City after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo; yet, the infrastructure of the military base and the hundreds of bars set up for U.S. servicemen remained. Many of these bars were reportedly purchased by Australians and other Westerners who married Filipino women, and were able to register the bars in their wives' names. It did not take long for military prostitution to be replaced by sex tourism, and Angeles City quickly developed a reputation as the "Entertainment Capital of Central Luzon." Angeles City became the site of a highly developed prostitution industry of *casas* (brothels), karaoke bars, and freelance prostitutes, particularly along Fields Avenue. Filipino women were not only being sexually exploited by local Filipino men, but also foreign men living in the Philippines and men travelling from abroad as sex tourists.<sup>110</sup> In 2010, the NBI Region-3 Director referred to Pampanga and Angeles City as "ground zero" for human trafficking in the Philippines.<sup>111</sup>

IJM designed their Pampanga Project to support the government to achieve and sustain a significant reduction (by at least 40%) in the prevalence of commercial sexual exploitation of children in Angeles City. The focus was on enhancing anti-sex trafficking law enforcement, while assisting to a lesser extent other public justice system actors. This included development of a dedicated PNP Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Special Operations Group (RAHTSOG). Building upon lessons learned from IJM's Project Lantern in Metro Cebu, IJM provided capacity building trainings and technical assistance to the RAHTSOG, and assisted the PNP in drafting and implementing basic protocols and procedures governing the RAHTSOG's operation. IJM also provided the RAHTSOG with a police trainer who provided regular

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<sup>103</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 10.

<sup>104</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 10.

<sup>105</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 10.

<sup>106</sup> The 2015 prevalence study included not only District 5 of Manila City, Paranaque, and Pasay which were included in the 2009 prevalence study, but also Makati and Quezon City.

<sup>107</sup> Shaw & Fruge (2016). *Child Sex Trafficking in Metro Manila*. Washington, DC: International Justice Mission.

<sup>108</sup> IJM's Pampanga project was funded with a grant from the US Department of State.

<sup>109</sup> IJM System Reform Project Overview, Philippines - Pampanga

<sup>110</sup> Ralston & Keeble (2009). *Reluctant Bedfellows: Feminism, Activism, and Prostitutions in the Philippines* (p. 77). Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press.

<sup>111</sup> Shaw & Fruge (2016). *Child Sex Trafficking in Angeles City*. Washington, DC: International Justice Mission.

technical assistance during investigations, case buildup, entrapment operations<sup>112</sup>, raid and rescue operations, and the arrest of traffickers. IJM also focused on securing government commitment to coordination protocols that included the RAHTSOG, DOJ, DOLE, and the DSWD.<sup>113</sup>

Unlike in Metro Cebu, IJM Pampanga FO did not initially have an aftercare pillar as part of its system reform project; however, one was eventually added. IJM provided government social workers and private aftercare providers in Pampanga (i.e., those responsible for providing aftercare services to victims of trafficking) with a Basic Counselling and Psychological Intervention Training Curriculum.<sup>114</sup> IJM also established a Survivor Support Networks (SSN) in Pampanga; the SSN were modeled after RSNs which were established in Metro Cebu. Essentially, the SSN was established to provide a wide range of services (e.g., trauma counselling, alternative learning and life skills trainings, medical treatment, parenting classes, and vocational training) to survivors in one centralized location. By providing resources in the survivor's municipality, survivors are able to access services and create connections and healthy relationships within their own communities. IJM funded a portion of the start-up costs and staff needed for the SSNs, but then planned to transfer the SSNs operations to an LGU after startup.<sup>115</sup>

From 2012 to 2016, IJM documented an 86.23% reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Angeles City and Mabalacat (from 8.79% in February 2012 to 1.21% in March 2016). The 2016 prevalence study also revealed a 72.0% reduction in the percentage of surveyed locations found to be exploiting minors for sex.<sup>116</sup> In 2016, given the significant reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking and documented improvements in the public justice system response to child sex trafficking in Pampanga, as well as restructuring of the PNP's regional anti-human trafficking unit structure (i.e., development of anti-trafficking units into a national unit with bases in Manila, Cebu and Mindanao), IJM decided to close their Pampanga FO.

### 1.5. Phase 3: Sustaining Gains

At the time of this evaluation, all three of IJM Philippine FOs had concluded Phase 2 of the Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children (as of June 30, 2016), and had begun transitioning into Phase 3 of the Justice System Transformation model. In the process of reducing direct support for existing child sex trafficking prosecutions, on a case-by-case basis IJM was transitioning those responsibilities to DOJ prosecutors. IJM was also looking into transitioning responsibilities for aftercare of their clients to DSWD and LGU social workers, and private aftercare providers. IJM wanted to ensure ongoing prosecutions would not be undermined, and that clients would continue to receive adequate care and rehabilitation services to support their recovery and reintegration.<sup>117</sup>

Phase 3 of IJM's Program was also focused on documenting the public justice system's ability to sustain anti-trafficking law enforcement interventions and improved victim aftercare without direct IJM involvement. The expected outcomes of Phase 3 were:<sup>118</sup>

- Increased performance of the PNP Women & Children Protection Center Anti-Trafficking Units (WCPC-ATUs) to identify and rescue victims, arrest suspects, and treat victims appropriately
- Increased performance of DSWD and LGU social workers, and private aftercare providers to effectively process, treat, and reintegrate sex trafficking victim
- Increased performance of DOJ prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases and obtain convictions for human trafficking

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<sup>112</sup> Entrapment is sanctioned by Philippines law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan; whereas, instigation, involves the inducement of the would-be accused into the commission of the offense, in which case instigators become co-principals themselves. *Entrapment vs. Instigation; explained – G.R. No. 173485. Law and Justice: Issues and Developments* (December 9, 2011) Retrieved on July 6, 2017 from: <http://lcmlaw1.blogspot.com/2011/12/entrapment-vs-instigation-explained-gr.html>

<sup>113</sup> IJM System Reform Project Overview, Philippines - Pampanga

<sup>114</sup> IJM System Reform Project Overview, Philippines - Pampanga

<sup>115</sup> IJM (2014). *Combatting Sexual Exploitation in Central Luzon*, p. 31.

<sup>116</sup> Shaw & Fruge (2016). *Child Sex Trafficking in Angeles City*. Washington, DC: International Justice Mission.

<sup>117</sup> IJM Child Sex Trafficking Justice System Transformation Program Philippines, Phase 3 Concept Note, July 1, 2016 – June 30, 2018.

<sup>118</sup> IJM Child Sex Trafficking Justice System Transformation Program Philippines, Phase 3 Concept Note, July 1, 2016 – June 30, 2018.

## 1.6. IJM's Transition to Combatting Online Sexual Exploitation of Children in the Philippines

Leading up to the end of Phase 2 of IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children, each of the FOs transitioned to case intake related to online sexual exploitation of children.<sup>119</sup> Trends identified in IJM's investigations and CTMS data, along with research conducted by UNICEF Philippines and Terre des Hommes in the Netherlands provided a growing body of evidence that the Philippines was emerging as one of the primary suppliers for the commercial production of child pornography, specifically the abuse of children for online sexual exploitation.<sup>120</sup> Based upon this evidence, IJM developed a new project focused specifically on combatting online sexual exploitation of children in the Philippines, particularly in the Luzon and Visayas regions. This project is currently being developed to demonstrate an effective model for international law enforcement coordination to combat online sexual exploitation of children.<sup>121</sup>

## 1.7. Challenges and Barriers to Program Implementation

Over the years, as IJM implemented their Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines they were confronted with a multitude of challenges and barriers that they worked to overcome, or at least worked around with varying degrees of success. Notable challenges and barriers that IJM had to confront included: corruption; lack of political will to confront trafficking in persons; insufficient capacities of public justice system agencies; and insufficient capacities of aftercare services. Each of these are briefly discussed below.

Corruption. In the Philippines, corruption was a major challenge and barrier. Corruption exists at all levels of the Philippine Government, including in public justice system agencies. Corruption was one of the primary barriers to enforcing anti-trafficking laws. According to Transparency International, perception surveys and international assessments consistently rank the Philippines among the most corrupt countries.<sup>122,123</sup> From year-to-year, the US Department of State's *Trafficking in Persons Reports* have drawn attention to the fact that some government officials are complicit in human trafficking, partnering with traffickers and organized trafficking syndicates, and permitting trafficking operations to occur in the country. Also, police officers reportedly conduct indiscriminate raids on commercial sex establishments to extort bribes from establishment managers, clients, and sex workers. In some cases, police extorted both money and sexual services by threatening sex workers with imprisonment for vagrancy.<sup>124</sup> Traffickers have also been known to bribe and threaten prosecutors and judges, trafficking victims and their families, and witnesses. Given the challenges of corruption, IJM addressed corruption during its law enforcement and legal trainings with public justice system actors.<sup>125</sup>

Lack of Political Will. Lack of political will to confront trafficking in persons was another challenge or barrier for IJM. Over the years, IJM observed the potential power of political leaders to motivate anti-trafficking efforts, as well as the lack of political will to systematically confront human trafficking. Lack of political will often stemmed from a combination of corruption, indifference, and lack of awareness and understanding of human trafficking by political leaders, law enforcement officers, justice officials, and the public.<sup>126</sup>

Insufficient Capacities of Public Justice System Agencies. Insufficient capacities of the public justice system were another significant challenge for IJM. IJM had to contend with many public justice officials that possessed neither the knowledge nor skills to effectively combat child sex trafficking. Thus, IJM invested heavily in building knowledge,

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<sup>119</sup> IJM Child Sex Trafficking Justice System Transformation Program Philippines, Phase 3 Concept Note, July 1, 2016 – June 30, 2018.

<sup>120</sup> IJM Project Concept Note, The Philippines (Luzon and the Visayas) Online Sexual Exploitation of Children, Phase II, July 2016-June 2023.

<sup>121</sup> IJM Project Concept Note, The Philippines (Luzon and the Visayas) Online Sexual Exploitation of Children, Phase II, July 2016-June 2023.

<sup>122</sup> Philippines ranked 95 out of 176 on the Corruption Perceptions Index for 2015, 10 ranking lower than its 2014 ranking. Retrieved on July 18, 2016 from: [https://www.transparency.org/country/#PHL\\_DataResearch\\_SurveysIndices](https://www.transparency.org/country/#PHL_DataResearch_SurveysIndices)

<sup>123</sup> Philippines ranked 101 out of 176 on the Corruption Perceptions Index for 2016, 6 rankings lower than its 2015 ranking. Retrieved on January 27, 2017 from: [http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption\\_perceptions\\_index\\_2016](http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016)

<sup>124</sup> US Department of State (2012). *Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

<sup>125</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 3-4.

<sup>126</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 4.

changing attitudes, and developing the skills of public justice system actors to implement the anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking. Over the years, IJM saw improvement in the capacities of law enforcement officials, particularly from anti-trafficking units and task forces, to investigate cases of sex trafficking and conduct operations to rescue victims and arrest traffickers. IJM also saw improvement among prosecutors and judges in their willingness and abilities to prosecute and convict sex traffickers. Still, however, IJM regularly encountered weak evidence compilation, incorrect application of legal standards, and lack of convictions for human trafficking.<sup>127</sup>

*Insufficient Capacities of Aftercare Services.* Finally, insufficient capacities of aftercare services were another challenge that IJM encountered. IJM worked to address gaps in aftercare services and insufficient aftercare, including ill-trained social workers, in an effort to improve aftercare services for sex trafficking victims. IJM's efforts to develop and strengthen aftercare services for sex trafficking victims have not been without challenges. For instance, DSWD and LGU social workers, and private aftercare providers were not always able to provide sex trafficking victims with sufficient shelter and/or transitional housing, psychosocial counseling and rehabilitation services, and/or reintegration support services and alternative employment options. These gaps in aftercare capacities and service provision remain a problem in the Philippines.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 4.

<sup>128</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 5.

## CHAPTER 2: EVALUATION APPROACH

### 2.1. Evaluation Purpose and Scope

In 2016, IJM contracted an external evaluation team, including an international lead evaluator and national evaluator – to conduct a summative evaluation of IJM’s Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines. The evaluation was conducted in the three project areas of Metro Manila, Metro Cebu, and Pampanga. The purpose of this external evaluation was to assess the relevance, effectiveness, and impact of IJM’s Program activities in the three project areas during the implementation period of 2003 to June 2016. This included assessing changes in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas, and evaluating the extent to which IJM’s activities contributed to these changes, as well as changes in the public justice system. The evaluation also assessed the potential for sustainability of IJM’s work in the Philippines.

It was intended that findings, conclusions, and recommendations from this evaluation would serve to inform decisions regarding future planning, design, and management of IJM’s justice system transformation programs. In addition, results would be distributed to stakeholders and partners to share lessons learned and ‘good practices’, as well as to inform decisions regarding future program planning.

### 2.2. Evaluation Objectives

The objectives of this external evaluation were to assess the relevance, effectiveness, and impact of IJM’s Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines during the period of 2003 to June 2016, as well as to assess the potential for sustainability of IJM’s Program and results achieved. The evaluation questions related to relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability are identified below.

Relevance – Was the program appropriately aligned with the relevant strategies of the Philippine government for countering TIP? How did the program contribute to the development and implementation of appropriate national and stakeholder plans and strategies? Were the activities and outputs of the program consistent with the intended outcomes and impact? How well did the program anticipate and adapt to changes in the operating environment?

Effectiveness – To what extent has the program achieved its intended outputs, outcomes, and impact? If not achieved, what progress was made towards these results? What are the reasons for the achievement or non-achievement of program results? Did the program have effective monitoring mechanisms in place to measure progress towards results? How well did it use program information to adapt? What lessons learned, best practices, or recommendations should be considered by IJM or other anti-trafficking organizations?

Impact – What was IJM’s contribution to the development of coordinated law enforcement and perpetrator accountability systems in the Philippines? Was there an increase in the quantity and quality of government-led child sex trafficking investigations, prosecutions and convictions? To what extent has the program contributed to a reduction in the prevalence and scale of child sex trafficking in the program project areas? Since the beginning of the program, have key stakeholders’ confidence increased in the performance of public justice system actors to appropriately address the problem of child sex trafficking in the Philippines? Are child sex trafficking survivors being provided aftercare? What was IJM’s contribution to any identified changes in the capacity of government and private social service providers in the Philippines to provide aftercare to survivors? What was IJM’s contribution to improved outcomes for specific IJM aftercare clients? What other positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term economic, environmental, and social change(s) were produced by the program, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended?

Sustainability – To what extent do public justice system actors targeted by the program have increased capacity to perform their relevant roles in combatting child sex trafficking and providing adequate care to survivors (in particular law enforcement agencies and government social service providers)? To what extent has the program built political support for a sustained public justice system response to sex trafficking of children?

### 2.3. Evaluation Methods and Processes

To ensure the evaluation approach was as thorough and reliable as possible, different analytical tools and data collection methods were utilized (evaluation methods were in keeping with the Terms of Reference for this consultancy). These included:

- Desk review of IJM documents, training materials, evaluations, and prevalence studies related to their Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines
- Analysis of data from IJM’s Casework Tracking Management System (CTMS)
- Consultations with IJM management and staff from Headquarters (HQ) in Washington, DC USA and the Philippines FO in Cebu
- In-depth interviews with IJM management and staff
- In-depth interviews with IJM’s partners and stakeholders
- Consultation on preliminary findings and conclusions with IJM HQ and Philippines FO management and staff

Throughout the evaluation, the external evaluators used a participatory approach that recognizes program partners, key stakeholders, and beneficiaries as important and active participants that contribute to the production of knowledge and understanding. In keeping with a participatory approach, the evaluators set out to collaborate with program partners, key stakeholders, and beneficiaries, including IJM management and staff from HQ and the Philippine FOs throughout the evaluation.

Triangulation was an important part of the evaluation approach to ensure not only the credibility of information and data collected, but also to allow diverse perspectives and experiences to be captured. The lead evaluator used the analysis and interpretation of data collected in the field as an opportunity to allow the diverse perspectives and experiences captured through triangulation to come to the forefront and reveal the influence or impact, and range and reach of IJM’s Program on improving the public justice system’s response to child sex trafficking in the Philippines.

In addition, the external evaluators applied principles of integrating human rights in evaluations, including recognizing stakeholders and beneficiaries as rights-holders, and the responsibility of the State and other public justice system actors to act as ‘duty-bearers’ to support protection of the rights of trafficking victims.

#### 2.3.1. Desk Review

The evaluation began with a desk review of IJM organizational overview documents, program documents related to the Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines, and external literature on child sex trafficking in the Philippines. More specifically, IJM Program documents included program narratives, internal program reports, grant reports, media clips, past evaluations, and prevalence studies for each of the three project areas – Metro Manila, Metro Cebu, and Pampanga. The desk review also included MOUs with government entities and private aftercare and service providers in Metro Cebu, Metro Manila, and Pampanga. Program documents also include training curriculum and modules utilized in the Philippines when conducting trainings related to aftercare for trafficking victims, community mobilization trainings, and law enforcement and legal responses to child sex trafficking. The desk review informed the design of the evaluation approach and data collection tools to ensure all questions and measures were related to the focus on the evaluation and to IJM’s Program. Early consultations with IJM management and staff at HQ and the Philippines FO in Cebu helped to ensure all IJM documents were properly understood, both in terms of their merit and use.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Early consultations included phone conference calls, Skype sessions, and e-mails with IJM HQ and FO staff.

The desk review continued during the data analysis and report writing stages (including a review and analysis of Program documents, training curricula, Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), and findings from past evaluations and prevalence studies) and was used to generate findings that complimented the quantitative and qualitative data gathered during the in-depth interviews.

### [2.3.2. Analysis of Data from IJM's Casework Tracking Management System](#)

Data from IJM's CTMS was analyzed using Tableau. Charts were generated prior to arrival in-country so they could be used to discuss the Program's relevance, effectiveness, and impact with IJM Philippines FO management and staff. These discussions enabled the lead evaluator to develop a deeper understanding of the Program's relevance, effectiveness, and impact from 2003 to 2015; as well as limitations of the data. The lead evaluator and IJM Philippines management came to an agreement as to which data and tables should be incorporated into this final evaluation report.

CTMS data was analyzed and disaggregated by year, project area, and type of trafficking/exploitation. CTMS data was analyzed in relation to the goal and outcomes of IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children.

### [2.3.3. Consultations with IJM HQ and FO Management and Staff](#)

Evaluations are typically characterized by extensive team engagement throughout the evaluation period, coupled with independent data collection in the field by the evaluation team to ensure independence and open discussions. Thus, IJM HQ management and staff in Washington, DC USA, and in the Philippine FOs were extensively involved in this evaluation. In the beginning, IJM was involved in the planning for the evaluation, selection of partners and stakeholders to be interviewed, and finalization of the Inception Report and data collection tools. IJM Philippines FO staff were also involved in the identification, selection, and hiring of the national evaluator.

From May to August 2016, prior to beginning data collection in the field, a series of weekly consultations between the lead evaluator and IJM Philippines FO staff occurred via Skype. The focus of these consultations was on the implementation of IJM's Program, planning for the evaluation and data collection in the field, and selection of the national evaluator. The consultations helped to inform the development of the Inception Report, the evaluation approach and data collection tools, and finalization of the list of stakeholders, partners, and IJM staff that should be interviewed. In addition, the consultations helped with the logistics of the evaluation and data collection in the field.

While the evaluators were collecting data in the field, IJM provided support with scheduling interviews with partners and stakeholders, and IJM managers and staff. Following data collection in the field, IJM was heavily involved in the review process for this report and provided extensive feedback to bring it to finalization.

### [2.3.4. In-Depth Interviews with IJM's Partners and Stakeholders](#)

An important component of this evaluation approach was to conduct in-depth interviews with IJM's partners and stakeholders. IJM Philippine FOs generated a list of 140 partners and stakeholders including government officials, public justice system actors (anti-trafficking police, public prosecutors, and social workers), private aftercare providers, civil society groups, and religious leaders in Metro Manila, Metro Cebu, and Pampanga. This list of 140 partners and stakeholders was the result of a stratified purposive sampling approach that staff from each of the three IJM FOs went through to identify and prioritize partners and stakeholders.

Given data collection in the field was carried out during a six-week period from August 15 to September 23, 2016, the external evaluators focused on trying to complete interviews with all of the prioritized partners, stakeholders, and staff included on the list generated by IJM staff in each of the FOs. In the event all prioritized persons on the list were unable to be interviewed during the six-week period, IJM arranged for the lead evaluator to return to the Philippines for a two-week period from October 20 to November 4, 2016 to conduct additional interviews with IJM's partners and stakeholders in the three project areas. Some partners and stakeholders from the list were not interviewed because they were either unavailable for an interview during the periods of data collection or were no longer living and/or working in the project areas.

In many cases, more than one person was identified as a relevant contact in each of the different agencies/organizations sampled, and the external evaluators interviewed more than one representative from each of the different agencies/organizations selected for sampling. In most cases, interviews were conducted as one-on-one interviews; however, on a few occasions small group interviews were conducted with two to four persons. When small group interviews were conducted, they were typically with line level officers, frontline service providers, or staff of the same rank in the same agency/organization. Small group interviews allowed for some degree of synergy and discussion on questions which allowed for more depth and perspective by individuals from the same agency/organization. Small group interviews also allowed the external evaluators to maximize their contact with each of the 140 partners and stakeholders identified by IJM.

All interviews were conducted in the language of preference to the respondents. Most interviews were conducted in English; however, some respondents preferred doing the interview in Tagalog (these interviews were conducted by the national evaluator).

Structured interview schedules were used to guide the interviews with IJM's partners and stakeholders. Separate interview schedules were developed for use with:

- Law enforcement officers
- Public prosecutors
- Social workers and aftercare providers
- Church partners

Each of the interview schedules included questions that focused on IJM's substantive focus areas, program activities, and expected outcomes, as well as included questions aligned to the evaluation's focus on issues of relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. Many of the questions were designed to capture historical perspectives of IJM's Program, i.e., to the degree to which respondents had a historical perspective of IJM's Program and the situation of child sex trafficking in the project areas. To accomplish this, respondents were often asked to either recall back to 2003, or to the period in time when they began their partnership or collaboration with IJM, and then to compare that to 2016.

The structured interview schedules included open- and closed-ended questions, and primary and probing questions. The interview schedules were designed to generate a combination of both quantitative and qualitative data related relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of IJM's Program. When small group interviews were conducted with two to four persons, responses to each of the close-ended questions in the interview schedule were recorded separately.

On average, interviews lasted two to two and a half hours, and respondents were willing to accommodate such an in-depth and lengthy interview.

### [2.3.5. In-Depth Interviews with IJM Management and Staff](#)

Another important component of this evaluation approach was to conduct in-depth interviews with IJM management and staff in IJM's Philippine FOs in Manila, Cebu, and Pampanga. IJM generated a list of current and former IJM managers and staff who worked in the three Philippine FOs; then interviews were conducted with a sample of those identified. Interviews were conducted with the head of each FO and staff working in the law enforcement, legal, and aftercare sectors, as well as public relations, advocacy, and church mobilization.

All interviews with IJM management and staff were carried out during the six-week period from August 15 to September 23, 2016. Also, all interviews with IJM management and staff were conducted in English as one-on-one interviews.

A structured interview schedule was developed for use with IJM management and staff which included many of the same questions that were asked of IJM partners and stakeholders, except specific questions related to management and implementation of the Program were added. IJM staff were asked questions relevant to their area of work, such as

law enforcement, legal, aftercare, church mobilization, and/or management. The structured interview schedule included both open- and closed-ended questions, as well as primary and probing questions.

On average, interviews with IJM management and staff took three hours, and respondents were willing to accommodate such an in-depth and lengthy interview.

### **2.3.6. Consultations on Preliminary Findings and Conclusions**

The lead evaluator presented preliminary findings and conclusions to IJM Philippines FO management and staff in the Manila FO at the end of the first field visit on September 23, 2016. At this presentation, quantitative data from closed-ended questions and general findings and initial conclusions from the qualitative data were presented and discussed. Again, on November 4, 2016, at the end of the second field visit, a second presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions was presented to IJM FO management and staff in the Manila FO.

## **2.4. Confidentiality**

All respondents were guaranteed confidentiality. To ensure confidentiality, names were not recorded anywhere in the interview notes; instead, all respondents were assigned an ID Number, which was recorded in the interview notes. In addition, each agency/organization that participated in the evaluation was assigned an organization number and sector of work number to ensure the identity of the agency/organization and sector of work remains protected. All interviews were saved in files with only the ID numbers assigned to them to further ensure confidentiality and stored in a password protected file.

In the findings section of this evaluation report, ID Numbers are used to identify and differentiate among respondents. Generic categories are also used to identify and differentiate respondent's employment type as coming from IJM, government, CSO, or church. The project area of respondents is also identified as Manila, Cebu or Pampanga.

It is important to note that interviews were not audio recorded; rather, detailed interview notes were typed directly into Word on a laptop by the lead evaluator during the interviews, and cleaned thereafter. The lead evaluator has significant experience recording detailed interview notes in this manner, which is more time efficient and just as effective as audio recording interviews.

All respondents were asked to give written consent to participate in the interview and agreed to be quoted anonymously using their ID number and with only a general reference to the respondent's employment type and project area. Respondents were also informed that if they wanted to skip questions or end the interview at any time they could do so without penalty.

## **2.5. External Evaluation Team**

This external evaluation was conducted by two independent consultants, including: Dr. Robin Haarr, international lead evaluator, from the United States; and, Mr. Paulo Tiangco, national evaluator, from the Philippines. The international lead evaluator was recruited and contracted by IJM Headquarters, with input from the Philippine FOs; whereas the national evaluator was recruited and contracted by IJM Philippines.<sup>130</sup>

The evaluation approach and data collection tools were developed by Dr. Robin Haarr, who worked closely with IJM HQ and FO staff to ensure they were relevant to the evaluation and IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children. It is important to note that IJM staff reviewed and approved the evaluation approach and data collection tools prior to beginning the external evaluation. The national evaluator mainly provided logistical support, including scheduling interviews and arranging transportation; however, he did participate in interviews.

The field evaluation was conducted solely by the two external evaluators, Dr. Robin Haarr and Mr. Paulo Tiangco, with input from IJM HQ and FO management and staff, between August 15 and September 23, 2016, during which time field

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<sup>130</sup> IJM Philippines screened and interviewed the national evaluator.

visits occurred in Metro Manila, Metro Cebu, and Pampanga. Dr. Robin Haarr made a second trip to the Philippines between October 20 and November 4, 2016 to complete additional interviews with IJM partners and stakeholders in Metro Manila, Metro Cebu, and Pampanga.

## 2.6. Data Management and Analysis

All data was coded and analyzed using grounded theory.<sup>131</sup> Grounded theory allowed data collection and analysis to occur simultaneously, strengthening both the quality of data and analysis. As data collection and analysis progressed, and preliminary findings began to emerge, the lead evaluator was able to identify and explore emerging themes, such as results achieved, lessons learned, challenges encountered, and adjustments made.

Standardized coding procedures and an SPSS data management system were developed by the lead evaluator, and the lead evaluator input data from the close-ended questions into the SPSS data management system. Close-ended questions that lacked a response (i.e., respondents either skipped questions or questions were not asked by the interviewer due to respondent's lack of knowledge) were coded as missing data in SPSS. Close-ended questions were analyzed in SPSS using frequencies and cross-tabulations to explore differences based upon type of agency (i.e., IJM, government, civil society, and church), project areas (i.e., Manila, Cebu, Pampanga), and sector of work (i.e., law enforcers, legal, aftercare, management, and other).<sup>132</sup> Missing data is reported at times throughout this report, particularly when the proportion of missing data was relevant to a particular type of agency, project area, or sector of work. The lead evaluator was responsible for analyzing all data in SPSS.

Data from open-ended questions was saved in Word files. Qualitative data was then coded based upon themes and sub-themes, and analyzed for patterns. The lead evaluator was responsible for coding and analyzing all qualitative data. All Word interview files and the SPSS data set have been stored in a password protected file.

## 2.7. Evaluation Limitations

The main limitation of this evaluation was that the beneficiaries of IJM's Program (i.e., survivors of sex trafficking) were not interviewed; therefore, their voices are not included in this evaluation. The evaluators did not have the opportunity to interview survivors who had been rescued and restored as a result of IJM's Program; thus, the impact of IJM's Program activities on their clients' lives was not assessed. This, in part, was because priority was placed on the external evaluators being able to interview a large number of stakeholders (n=93) in three project areas in a short timeframe. Unfortunately, there was little time to organize and interview survivors.

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<sup>131</sup> Glaser & Strauss (1967). *Grounded Theory*.

<sup>132</sup> Analysis of differences among interviewees in Metro Manila, Metro Cebu, and Pampanga will be analyzed to the degree the number of respondents is large enough to make such comparisons and avoid false findings and conclusions.

## CHAPTER 3: SAMPLE

This chapter provides data on the sample of respondents who participated in this external evaluation. First data is presented for the full sample, and then comparisons are made across each of the three project areas.

### 3.1. Sample of Respondents

The final sample included a total of 93 respondents. Table 3.1 shows that 38.7% of respondents were in Metro Manila, 34.4% in Metro Cebu, and 26.9% in Pampanga. There were more respondents in Metro Manila and Metro Cebu because IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children had been operating in those two project areas for longer period of time than in Pampanga. In addition, Manila is the capital of the Philippines and the base for national agencies and central-level authorities, including the IACAT.

Table 3.1 also reveals the majority of respondents were from the government (65.6%), whereas 17.2% of respondents were from IJM, 11.8% from CSOs, and 5.4% from churches. In terms of sector of work<sup>133</sup>, 38.7% of respondents were in the aftercare sector (i.e., DSWD, LGU, and IJM social workers, and CSO aftercare providers), 25.8% were in the law enforcement/investigative sector (i.e., PNP, NBI, DOLE, and IJM), and 20.4% worked in the legal sector (i.e., DOJ prosecutors and IJM private prosecutors). In addition, 7.5% of respondents were IJM management, 5.4% were religious leaders, and 2.2% were other (e.g., advocacy). See also Table 3.3 for a breakdown of type of agencies represented in each sector of work.

| Table 3.1. Sample demographics             |                     |          |
|--|---------------------|----------|
|  | Full Sample<br>N=93 |          |
| <u>Location</u>                            | <u>n</u>            | <u>%</u> |
| Metro Manila                               | 36                  | 38.7     |
| Pampanga                                   | 25                  | 26.9     |
| Metro Cebu                                 | 32                  | 34.4     |
| <u>Type of agency</u>                      |                     |          |
| IJM  | 16                  | 17.2     |
| Government                                 | 61                  | 65.6     |
| CSOs                                       | 11                  | 11.8     |
| Churches                                   | 5                   | 5.4      |
| <u>Sector of work</u>                      |                     |          |
| Law enforcement/investigative <sup>1</sup> | 24                  | 25.8     |
| Legal                                      | 19                  | 20.4     |
| Aftercare                                  | 36                  | 38.7     |
| IJM management                             | 7                   | 7.5      |
| Religious leaders                          | 5                   | 5.4      |
| Other                                      | 2                   | 2.2      |

<sup>1</sup> Sample includes 20 government law enforcement officials and 4 IJM staff with investigative responsibilities

Table 3.2 shows how the sample of respondents compared across project areas in terms of type of agency and sector of work. In each project area, the majority of respondents were from government; this is particularly evident in

<sup>133</sup> Sectors of work include the cumulative number and proportion of respondents from IJM, government, CSOs and churches working in each of the specific sectors (see Table 3.3)

Pampanga where 92.0% of respondents were from the government. In comparison, in Metro Manila, a larger proportion of the sample was from IJM (30.6%); this is because Manila is the location of IJM’s national FO. At the time of the evaluation, IJM was in the process of closing down its FO in Pampanga, so the numbers of IJM staff were significantly reduced in Pampanga.

It is also notable that respondents from CSOs and churches were interviewed in Metro Manila and Metro Cebu, but not in Pampanga. This is because IJM’s main partners and stakeholders in Pampanga were government agencies (particularly the PNP, DOJ, and DSWD); there are very few CSOs that operate in Pampanga, compared to Cebu and Manila.

Table 3.2 also shows the sample of respondents by sector of work in the three project areas. In general, there was a larger proportion of respondents from the aftercare sectors in the three project areas; this included largely DSWD social workers, and to a lesser extent LGU social workers and private aftercare providers.

| Table 3.2. Sample demographics by project areas |                      |          |                  |          |                    |          |
|---|----------------------|----------|------------------|----------|--------------------|----------|
| Type of agency                                  | Metro Manila<br>N=36 |          | Pampanga<br>N=25 |          | Metro Cebu<br>N=32 |          |
|   | <u>n</u>             | <u>%</u> | <u>n</u>         | <u>%</u> | <u>n</u>           | <u>%</u> |
| IJM   | 11                   | 30.6     | 2                | 8.0      | 3                  | 9.4      |
| Government                                      | 18                   | 50.0     | 23               | 92.0     | 20                 | 62.5     |
| CSOs  | 5                    | 13.9     | 0                | 0.0      | 6                  | 18.8     |
| Churches  | 2                    | 5.6      | 0                | 0.0      | 3                  | 9.4      |
| Sector of work                                  |                      |          |                  |          |                    |          |
| Law enforcement/investigative                   | 8                    | 22.2     | 9                | 36.0     | 7                  | 21.9     |
| Legal   | 9                    | 25.0     | 3                | 12.0     | 7                  | 21.9     |
| Aftercare                                       | 11                   | 30.6     | 11               | 44.0     | 14                 | 43.8     |
| IJM management                                  | 4                    | 11.1     | 2                | 8.0      | 1                  | 3.1      |
| Religious leader                                | 2                    | 5.6      | 0                | 0.0      | 3                  | 9.4      |
| Other   | 2                    | 2.8      | 0                | 0.0      | 0                  | 0.0      |

Finally, Table 3.3 shows the sample of respondents by sector of work and type of agency. Among IJM respondents, 43.8% were current or former managers, 25.0% were in the law enforcement/investigative sector, 12.5% in the legal sector, 12.5% in the aftercare sector, and 6.3% were other (i.e., working on advocacy and church mobilization).

In the government, there was a fairly equal distribution across the law enforcement/investigative (32.8%), legal (27.9%) and aftercare (37.7%) sectors; however, there were slightly more respondents in the law enforcement/investigative and aftercare sectors because IJM had MOUs with the PNP and DSWD. IJM’s collaboration with DOJ was largely in their role on the IACAT and as private prosecutors handling child sex trafficking cases in courts, under the direct supervision of DOJ prosecutors.

Among CSOs, all respondents were aftercare providers. Among churches, all respondents were religious leaders.

| Table 3.3. Sample demographics by type of agency |             |          |                    |          |              |          |                 |          |
|--|-------------|----------|--------------------|----------|--------------|----------|-----------------|----------|
| Sector of work                                   | IJM<br>N=16 |          | Government<br>N=61 |          | CSOs<br>N=11 |          | Churches<br>N=5 |          |
|  | <u>n</u>    | <u>%</u> | <u>n</u>           | <u>%</u> | <u>n</u>     | <u>%</u> | <u>N</u>        | <u>%</u> |
| Law enforcement/investigative                    | 4           | 25.0     | 20                 | 32.8     | 0            | 0.0      | 0               | 0.0      |
| Legal  | 2           | 12.5     | 17                 | 27.9     | 0            | 0.0      | 0               | 0.0      |
| Aftercare  | 2           | 12.5     | 23                 | 37.7     | 11           | 100.0    | 0               | 0.0      |
| IJM management                                   | 7           | 43.8     | 0                  | 0.0      | 0            | 0.0      | 0               | 0.0      |
| Religious leader                                 | 0           | 0.0      | 0                  | 0.0      | 0            | 0.0      | 5               | 100.0    |
| Other  | 1           | 6.3      | 1                  | 1.6      | 0            | 0.0      | 0               | 0.0      |

## CHAPTER 4: RELEVANCE OF IJM'S PROGRAM AND COLLABORATIONS

### Chapter Highlights

- IJM was very important at helping to build political support for a strong public justice system response to child sex trafficking
- IJM's Program was relevant because it enabled IJM to provide technical support and resources to the PNP to establish anti-trafficking units in the three project areas, and contributed to increases in arrests, prosecutions, and convictions of traffickers
- IJM's Program was relevant to aftercare providers because it supported DSWD and LGU social workers and private aftercare providers to provide post-rescue care, trauma-informed care, and quality aftercare services to survivors of sex trafficking
- 98.9% of respondents reported IJM's Program was relevant to the situation of child sex trafficking in the Philippines
- 94.3% of respondents recognized IJM's Program was aligned with national priorities and action plans for combatting trafficking in persons in the Philippines
- 78.5% of respondents reported that IJM's Program contributed to the dialogue on trafficking in persons in the Philippines and helped shape national priorities and action plans
- 50.6% of respondents reported IJM encouraged their organization/agency to collaborate with other organizations/agencies that they did not typically partner with, of which 76.9% reported they will sustain those partnerships going forward, even without IJM's involvement
- 90.9% of respondents reported they had clear communication with IJM, and nearly all described communication with IJM as being *"clear, in terms of what they would want"* and *"open when they need something"*

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The purpose of this chapter is fourfold, including: 1) to document partnerships and collaborations that have shaped IJM's Program to Combat Child Sex Trafficking of Children; 2) to document collaborations that IJM fostered with its partners, as well as collaboration that IJM fostered among and between their partners; 3) to assess the relevance of IJM's Program and its alignment with national priorities and action plans; and 4) to analyze some of challenges that partners faced at various point in time in their collaboration with IJM.

#### 4.1. IJM's Partnerships and Collaborations

To effectively implement the Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines, IJM established working relationships and collaborations with the PNP, NBI, DOJ, DSWD, DOLE, LGUs, and private aftercare providers in the three project areas. Each of these working relationships and collaborations will be analyzed and discussed in the chapters that follow in this report. Attitudes and perspectives of actors from each of these agencies/organizations were carefully analyzed and are presented throughout this report to provide greater depth of insight and understanding into the relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines.

It is important to note that all respondents who were interviewed as part of this evaluation were familiar with IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines, and had collaborated with IJM to implement the

Program (see Table 4.1). In addition, 83.1% of respondents reported they were still collaborating with IJM to combat sexual exploitation of children, including online sexual exploitation of children in the Philippines.

| Table 4.1. Collaboration with IJM’s Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines |                             |       |
|--|-----------------------------|-------|
|  | Sample<br>N=77 <sup>1</sup> |       |
|  | n                           | %     |
| Familiar with IJM’s Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines                 | 77                          | 100.0 |
| Your agency/organization collaborated with IJM   | 77                          | 100.0 |
| <u>Is your agency still collaborating with IJM?</u>  |                             |       |
| Yes  | 64                          | 83.1  |
| No   | 12                          | 15.6  |

<sup>1</sup> Sample includes only government officials, CSOs, and churches

Throughout this evaluation the collaborations IJM had with each of the agencies and organizations will be discussed and analyzed, but at this stage a brief presentation of those collaborations offers background and context. Given that the majority of respondents were still collaborating with IJM, in some capacity, many of their quotes are in the present tense, not the past tense.

***Philippine National Police.*** The PNP was one of IJM’s primary partners in the three project areas. Since 2003, IJM has had MOUs with the PNP to provide trainings, technical assistance, and logistical support, including resources to support raid and rescue operations. The MOUs were particularly to support PNP regional anti-trafficking units in Metro Manila, Metro Cebu and Pampanga. Box 4.1 provides a timeline and brief description of the evolution of the PNP anti-trafficking units in the three project areas. For this evaluation, effort was made to interview PNP officers who had been assigned to each of the different anti-trafficking police units at different points in time between 2003 and 2016; however, given the fact that many officers were transferred to other provinces over the years, interviewing officers previously assigned to these units was a challenge.

*“IJM was a big help to me . . . I don’t have much people or legal advisors, or logistics. We work together a lot. [The WCPC has conducted] 52 operations that occurred since I started [in 2015]. We have 53 operations nationwide and half of that in collaboration with IJM.” (19, Government, Manila)*

In addition to the PNP, IJM also collaborated with the NBI’s Anti-Human Trafficking Division (AHTRAD) which was established in 2004. Since 2006, IJM supported the NBI’s AHTRAD in their efforts to identify sex trafficking victims and to conduct raid and rescue operations. Although the NBI’s AHTRAD is based in Manila, it has national jurisdiction; yet, it is a relatively small unit/division in terms of manpower and resources. Although most of the AHTRAD’s human trafficking investigations focused on Metro Manila, there were NBI agents operating in Pampanga and Cebu that IJM collaborated with over the years. Thus, interviews were conducted with NBI agents that served in the AHTRAD at different points in time over the past 14 years, and were able to recall their experiences working in collaboration with IJM to combat child sex trafficking.

*“I assumed the position in the WCPC in 2015, and immediately IJM collaborated with me and introduced themselves as an NGO and we work together . . . One of the first thing I did was to create policies for the Unit. IJM was a big help to me . . . I don’t have much people or legal advisors or logistics. We work together a lot. [The WCPC has conducted] 52 operations that occurred since I started [in 2015]. We have 53 operations nationwide and half of that in collaboration with IJM.” (19, Government, Manila)*

| Box 4.1. PNP Anti-Trafficking Police Units by Project Target Area |  |
|---|--|
| <u>Metro Manila</u>   |  |
| 2012 - 2014   | Several different PNP units were designated as the PNP's anti-trafficking unit in Metro Manila, including the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) and the PNP Anti-Transnational Crime Unit (ATCU). In 2014, the mandate to conduct anti-trafficking investigations was removed from both the CIDG and the ATCU and assigned to the PNP's Women & Children's Protection (WCPC) Luzon Unit. |
| 2014 - Present  | PNP Women & Children's Protection Center (WCPC) Luzon Unit – In November 2014, the WCPC Luzon Unit was designated as the primary PNP anti-trafficking unit in Metro Manila. IJM has an MOU with the WCPC Luzon Unit and provides the Unit with significant financial support, technical assistance, and capacity building trainings.   |
| <u>Metro Cebu</u>   |  |
| 2008 - 2009   | PNP Regional Special Investigations Unit (RSIU) – Officers assigned to the RSIU were expected to keep their existing unit assignments; as a result, this was not a truly “dedicated” unit. In 2009, the RSIU was replaced by the PNP Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (RAHTTF-7).  |
| 2009 - 2015   | PNP Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (RAHTTF-7) – This was the first truly dedicated PNP anti-trafficking unit in Cebu, and it was the one that IJM invested in most heavily. In late 2015, the RAHTTF-7 was replaced by the PNP's WCPC Visayas Field Unit.  |
| 2015 - Present  | PNP Women & Children's Protection Center (WCPC) Visayas Field Unit – The WCPC Visayas Field Unit has an expanded mandate and increased funding and staffing, compared to the RAHTTF-7. In 2016, the WCPC Visayas Field Unit is also IJM's primary anti-trafficking partner in Cebu.  |
| <u>Pampanga</u>   |  |
| 2012 - 2014   | PNP Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Special Operations Group (RAHTSOG-3) – Some RAHTSOG-3 officers were not assigned to the unit full-time which hampered its effectiveness; nevertheless, the RAHTSOG-3 was better resourced and more effective than the similar RSIU in Cebu. In 2014, the RAHTSOG-3 was expanded and replaced by the PNP Regional Anti-Trafficking Task Group (RATTG-3).                  |
| 2014 - Present  | Regional al Anti-Trafficking Task Group (RATTG-3) – The RATTG-3 is a truly dedicated anti-trafficking unit, very similar in structure to the RAHTTF-7 in Cebu.   |

Department of Social Welfare and Development. The DSWD has been another one of IJM's key partners. The DSWD is the government agency responsible for the protection of social welfare rights, including child protection and promotion of social development. IJM had MOUs with the DSWD in the three project areas to provide training, technical assistance, and resources to support post-rescue care, shelter, and aftercare to child sex trafficking victims until they achieve rehabilitation and recovery.

Department of Justice. In the Philippines, the DOJ serves as the government's prosecution arm and administers the government's criminal justice system by investigating crimes, prosecuting offenders, and overseeing the correctional system.<sup>134</sup> Ultimately, the DOJ is responsible for enforcing the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208) and as amended by R.A. No. 10364, which mandates the prosecution of persons accused of human trafficking. IJM has supported the DOJ by serving as private prosecutors, prosecuting child sex trafficking cases under the direct supervision of DOJ prosecutors (i.e., state and city

*“What is good about IJM is they are good in developing the trust with the police and us [DOJ]; the trust factor is important because we are dealing with an NGO. What is important are their capabilities to produce results. When we see their work, it is a seal of trust that this case was well made, well developed, and we will be assured, battling any complications later on, that it will go through the process and lead to convictions. Knowing IJM is behind it, I know about their capabilities, the kind of work they produce, I trust it.” (47, Government, Pampanga)*

<sup>134</sup> Retrieved on 9 January 2017 from: <https://www.doj.gov.ph/vision-mission-and-mandate.html>

public prosecutors) in the three project areas. IJM also provided capacity building trainings to DOJ prosecutors under sponsorship of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) and IACAT.

[Inter-Agency Council Against Anti-Trafficking](#). The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208) established the IACAT to coordinate and monitor the implementation of R.A. No. 9208 and as amended by R.A. No. 10364. The IACAT is composed of Secretaries of the DOJ and the DSWD, as chairperson and co-chairperson, as well as members from:<sup>135</sup>

- Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
- Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
- Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
- Commissioner
- Bureau of Immigration (BI)
- Philippine National Police (PNP)
- Philippine Commission on Women (PCW)
- Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO)
- Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
- Philippine Center for Transnational Crimes (PCTC)
- Three CSOs representing women, overseas Filipino workers, and children sectors.

Other ex-officio members include the:<sup>136</sup>

- National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
- Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC)
- National Youth Commission (NYC)
- Anti-Money Laundering Council of the Philippines

*“One of the advantages of IACAT is there are people who are made accountable for cases involving trafficking and there are people mandated. If you are mandated you tend to be more active in prosecution and the intervention, as far as trafficking is concerned. The disadvantage is there are people that tend to think, in the police and prosecution, that if they are not part of IACAT it is not part of their job. So, it lessens the tenacity in pursuing this kind of crime.”  
(117, Government, Cebu)*

From 2003 to 2010, the IACAT did not function or have the same influence that it did after 2010. This is because prior to 2010, human trafficking was not considered a significant priority by the Philippine Government, and IACAT was provided with only a small budget. In 2010, President Aquino’s administration (2010-2016) invested more heavily in combatting human trafficking and in the IACAT because the Philippines had been placed on the Tier 2 Watch List for two consecutive years (2009 and 2010) by the US Department of State. After 2010, given improved functioning and influence of the IACAT it was able to make significant strides in efforts to combat sex trafficking.<sup>137</sup> As a result, in 2016, the Philippines was ranked a Tier 1 country in the US Department of State’s *2016 Trafficking in Persons Report*. The IACAT was clearly instrumental in helping to achieve a Tier 1 ranking for the Philippines.

*“In 2003, IACAT was established. It became active in 2010 when funding was there. If you look at the statistics from 2005 to 2010, there were not much gains as far as the anti-trafficking was concerned, but when IACAT became active since 2010 there has been a lot of gains. If you compare conviction from 2005 to 2010, then 2010 to now we have over 200 convictions . . . We can envision that we are here in Tier 1 because of IACAT . . . It is IACAT that monitors the strict implementation of the anti-trafficking law, and a lot of programs were put in place because of IACAT, and IACAT would make sure all efforts are coordinated. But it’s not perfect yet; so many things to do yet. (87, Government, Manila)*

In 2012, IJM became an official member of the IACAT as a CSO representing the children’s sector.<sup>138</sup> From the perspective of the government, the benefits of IJM being a member of the IACAT have been in terms of the support, expertise, and resources IJM provided to IACAT member agencies. This included legal capabilities and assistance with enforcement of anti-trafficking laws, and prosecution and conviction of sex traffickers. After all, the IACAT has no prosecutorial function.

<sup>135</sup> Retrieved on 9 January 2017 from: <http://www.iacat.net/index.php/about-us-2/16-about-us-history/38-about-us-history>

<sup>136</sup> The Office of the Vice President was also given an ex-officio status as Chairman Emeritus of the Council.

<sup>137</sup> Retrieved on 9 January 2017 from: <http://www.iacat.net/index.php/about-us-2/16-about-us-history/38-about-us-history>

<sup>138</sup> Prior to 2012, IJM did engage with the IACAT in various ways, such as conducting capacity building trainings for IACAT member agencies and participation on technical working groups.

One respondent stated, *“I think there was a pretty good partnership, but it was a very productive partnership.”* (26, Government, Manila)

There are also regional IACATs that IJM supported. The advantages of having regional IACATs was to have local prosecutors trained on the anti-trafficking laws and more committed to prosecuting sex trafficking cases. As a result of regional IACATs, head prosecutors in city and provincial prosecutor’s offices now have a cadre of trained prosecutors to which they can assign sex trafficking cases for prosecution *“because they know the law, they cannot just dismiss it”* (54, IJM, Pampanga). Another respondent added,

*“My dealings with them [IJM] are mostly in prosecution and as part of the IACAT; so, they coordinate with us on child trafficking. What I can say is that they [IJM] have impacted so much the lives of children, especially the victims of abuse. They made an impact because their approach is holistic, from day one of rescue to after the case is over. I found they contributed a lot to the justice system in the city; they have empowered a lot lawyers/prosecutors in the way they handle the case professionally and with utmost dedication and passion. I cannot imagine a city without IJM.”* (115, Government, Cebu)

[Department of Labor Enforcement](#). DOLE is also a member of the IACAT and is the government agency responsible for enforcing labor laws. The PNP and IJM regularly collaborated with DOLE to enforce labor laws and protect children from illegal labor and commercial sexual exploitation. Over the past decade, DOLE played an important role in combatting child sex trafficking because they have the authority to close down commercial establishments (such as bars, karaoke clubs, and massage parlors) that illegally employ children and/or sexually exploit children.

*“If they [children/minors] are engaged in prostitution or [working in] bars, if they are under age they should not be employed in them and we are responsible for overseeing the minors in that type of work. So, IJM does the surveillance in the establishment and they go with the police and do the entrapment. They employ our personnel during the rescue operations and if there are minors, those minors should be rescued. So, what DOLE does is secure the establishment and make sure employees are given their work benefits and [the establishment] is not employing minors . . . We have an operations manual and procedural standards to follow . . . When we go to an establishment we have a checklist to follow – minimum wage, over time pay, and we have a checklist we use to see if besides engaging the minor, are they giving others of legal age the benefits under the labor laws.”* (46, Government, Pampanga)

This same respondent went on to explain,

*“When a case has been filed saying a minor was rescued [from an establishment] and this is the proof of the minor’s age, they [IJM] submits their complaint before us and I schedule a conference with the owners of the establishment; usually IJM also appears before us. DOLE has the authority to close the establishment where a minor is working.”* (46, Government, Pampanga)

These are some of the partnerships and collaborations that IJM had with government agencies over the years. Collaborations with CSOs and churches are discussed in later sections.

## **4.2. Relevance of IJM’s Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children**

This evaluation found IJM’s Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children was very relevant over the years, including relevant in helping to build political support for a strong public justice system response to child sex trafficking. Over the years, IJM demonstrated that their Program is *“relevant and responsive to the gaps in the public justice system; responding with specific actions and programs to increase performance and address the gaps.”* (36, IJM, Pampanga). As public justice system agencies demonstrated improvement in their abilities to enforce anti-trafficking laws and to rescue and restore trafficking victims, confidence of public justice system actors increased. Increased confidence led to increased enforcement and a demonstrated reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking, as documented in this evaluation and prevalence studies commissioned and conducted by IJM in each of the project areas.

Table 4.2 shows that 98.9% of respondents reported IJM’s Program was relevant to the situation of child sex trafficking in the Philippines; the remaining 1.1% of respondents did not know. In an effort to measure how important IJM’s Program was to building political support for a strong public justice system response to child sex trafficking, respondents were asked to rank IJM’s importance on a scale of 1 to 10; then an average score was calculated. Table 4.2 shows the mean or average score for all respondents on a scale of 1 to 10 (1=not important, 10=very important). On average, respondents thought IJM was very important (8.7) at helping to build political support for a strong public justice system response to child sex trafficking.

| Table 4.2. Relevance of IJM’s Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children  |                     |                         |
|--|---------------------|-------------------------|
|  | Full Sample<br>N=93 |                         |
|  | <u>n</u>            | <u>%</u>                |
| IJM’s Program was relevant to the situation of child sex trafficking in the Philippines <sup>1</sup>                                   | 88                  | 98.9                    |
|  | <u>n</u>            | <u>Mean<sup>2</sup></u> |
| How important has IJM been to helping to build political support for a strong public justice system response to child sex trafficking? | 87                  | 8.7                     |

<sup>1</sup> 1.1% (n=1) reported they ‘do not know’


<sup>2</sup> The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not important to 10=Very important

Chart 4.1 shows the mean score for all respondents on a scale of 1 to 10 by type of agency. On average, IJM respondents (9.0), government officials (8.8), CSO respondents (8.3), and church leaders (8.0) all thought IJM was very important at helping to build political support for a strong public justice system response to child sex trafficking. In particular, IJM was able to effectively position themselves to advocate for and strengthen public justice system agencies to combat child sex trafficking. While most CSOs focus on awareness raising and prevention of human trafficking, and/or offering protection and support to rescued trafficking victims, IJM’s Program was uniquely focused on building capacities and strengthening the abilities of public justice system agencies to effectively investigate child sex trafficking cases, rescue trafficking victims, prosecute and convict traffickers, and protect and rehabilitate child sex trafficking victims. Government respondents described the important role IJM played in helping to “keep us [public justice agencies] focused, keep us aware, and inspire us to compete further” (47, Government, Pampanga).

*“I think IJM is very a cut above a lot of organizations because of its professionalism; we always did quality work, it was engrained in the culture and the value of the organization. We need to be at our best; we can’t be sloppy or haphazard.” (85, CSO, Manila)*

IJM was recognized as a significant and influential partner by the Philippine Government when it was appointed to be a member of the IACAT, the national mechanism for monitoring implementation of anti-human trafficking legislation. As a member of the IACAT, IJM was able to “take the collaborative casework and lessons learned, and provide the information to that body to make the best decisions.” This same respondent explained that IJM was able to “help the international community know how to be effective here [in the Philippines]” (5, IJM, Manila). In some cases, IJM helped the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) understand Philippines’ anti-human trafficking laws and to refer them to the proper law enforcement agencies (e.g., the NBI and/or PNP) that could work with them on international human trafficking cases.

**Chart 4.1. Importance of IJM’s Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not important to 10=Very important

IJM’s collaborative casework and system transformation approaches were also relevant. Collaborative casework entailed partnering with relevant stakeholders, particularly law enforcement/investigative agencies and public prosecutors responsible for responding to cases of child sex trafficking, including rescuing victims and holding traffickers accountable, as well as government social workers responsible for rehabilitating and restoring trafficking victims. The collaborative casework approach also served as a diagnostic that IJM used to identify specific gaps in the public justice system’s response to child sex trafficking, and address those gaps with system reform programming. The collaborative casework approach also served as a key tool for monitoring and adapting their approach to remain relevant over the years. As one IJM respondent explained,

*“We began to realize that we need to create programs that can sustain the efforts in the public justice system. We branched out into system reform programs, and when we went there the government started to listen to us because we were able to show credibility and familiarity with what is happening. We were able to advocate for new structures and policies that would address sex trafficking in the country on a wider scale and in a sustainable manner.” (36, IJM, Pampanga)*

IJM’s system transformation approach complemented the collaborative casework approach by providing strategic support to relevant stakeholders in the public justice system to address the gaps identified through collaborative casework.

IJM’s Program was also relevant because it began at a time when *“there was no specific NGO’s working on trafficking from a multi-disciplinary approach – investigation, legal, and aftercare – thus, IJM’s collaborative casework model has been very influential and effective” (2, IJM, Manila)*. Because IJM’s Program was focused specifically on child sex trafficking they had the *“time and capacity to analyze in a more effective and efficient way the gaps in the system, and needs . . . and was ready to work with government partners in influencing system reforms.”* This same respondent went on to explain,

*“Just showing that we can successfully prosecute trafficking cases and also address systematic gaps in the way the public justice system responds to the issue. What is great about IJM’s model is the focus on collaborative casework, and it provides us with a diagnostic tool to identify gaps and strengths of the system. To show we can move the case from the start to the end point, whether successful or not and to leverage our learning to address the gaps in the system. In terms of collaborative casework . . . it provides us with a well of information.” (1, IJM, Manila)*

*“IJM came at the time when there was not a lot of progress in moving the cases through the pipeline, and we were able to identify the gaps and work with our partners. We are able to achieve convictions. In Cebu, when we started in 2006, there had been no convictions in the entire Central area [Central Visayas]. By 2007, we had the first conviction supported by IJM and partners in the public justice system*

*and that kind of boosted the morale of our partners, because it showed we can support a conviction; then there were a lot of firsts, such as the first establishment closure.” (1, IJM, Manila)*

Over the years, IJM remained committed and focused on providing strategic support to anti-trafficking police units and DOJ prosecutors to enforce anti-trafficking laws, and to social welfare officers to protect, rehabilitate, and restore sex trafficking victims. Working side-by-side or as one respondent described, “*shoulder-to-shoulder,*” with public justice agencies, IJM was able to demonstrate how the public justice system can and should work to combat child sex trafficking. IJM also encouraged replication of successful approaches across project areas. For instance, IJM started in Metro Cebu with supporting the development of a PNP dedicated anti-trafficking police unit, along with a model for social workers to provide post-rescue care and aftercare services to child sex trafficking victims. IJM then brought these ‘good practices’ and approaches to Metro Manila and Pampanga.

*“Just showing that we can successfully prosecute trafficking cases and also address systematic gaps in the way the public justice system responds to the issue. What is great about IJM’s model is the focus on collaborative casework, and it provides us with a diagnostic tool to identify gaps and strengths of the system. To show we can move the case from the start to the end point, whether successful or not, and to leverage our learning to address the gaps in the system. In terms of collaborative casework . . . it provides us with a well of information.” (1, IJM, Manila)*

IJM’s Program improved and became “*carefully designed to support the Philippines’ success . . . In the beginning, it was not so tied to Philippines’ success as it was in the end. [But] there was a realization, if we want for it to be sustainable, it needs to be tied [to government success]” (3, IJM, Manila).* IJM was also able to draw upon lessons learned to help frame “*the amended anti-trafficking law to make it stronger. IJM was able to do that because we had lawyers in courts, so we knew what was needed” (59, IJM, Cebu).*

#### 4.2.1. [Relevance of IJM’s Program to Anti-Trafficking Police](#)

IJM’s Program was relevant because it enabled IJM to support the PNP to establish anti-trafficking units in the three project areas, and “*they trained law enforcement in terms of the legal knowledge of what is happening [in terms of child sex trafficking], the legal basis of our [the PNP’s] mandate according to the law, and what we can do . . . [IJM] they ensure all officers are trained and skilled in this regard” (20, Government, Pampanga).*

In addition to training anti-trafficking police, IJM provided anti-trafficking police units with both intelligence on child sex trafficking cases, and logistical support and technical assistance needed to conduct entrapment and raid and rescue operations. In general, officers in both the NBI and PNP maintained, “*IJM is a very competent organization . . . When we entered into conducting entrapment operations with minors and the street pimps, all of them were joint collaborations. Working with IJM gave us almost 100% successful operations” (37, Government, Pampanga).* Similarly, another respondent explained,

*“Their support against child sex trafficking is definitely relevant because the problem of trafficking is growing so fast that we would not be able to cope with it alone. We have to admit that we need to work hand-in-hand to keep up with the rising problem of child trafficking. We have to admit that we have limitations in our resources and logistics; we don’t even have a vehicle. We have limitations in our resources and that is where the support of IJM is very timely and relevant, because they fill in the gaps we don’t have in order to capacitate us to pursue the task of trafficking in our area of responsibility.” (78, Government, Cebu)*

*“I think they are very effective in conducting case buildup in collaboration with law enforcement. They usually give us initial information of human trafficking and often work with us, in tandem with undercover operations, to conduct the case buildup; and they are very helpful in post-operation buildup, especially in handling victims of human trafficking and prosecution of cases. Their lawyers would act as private prosecutors and they would assist the law enforcement and witnesses prior to their testifying in court; they would plan ahead of the hearings. There is a higher chance of conviction*

*if there is good planning and collaboration of all the stakeholders through IJM.” (25, Government, Manila)*

Lack of technical capacities and resources hampered the ability of anti-trafficking police units to combat sex trafficking. Thus, IJM was very relevant, because IJM provided PNP anti-trafficking units with the technology needed to conduct surveillance and entrapment operations, technical assistance and guidance to ensure proper evidence collection and case buildup, and resources to support raid and rescue operations. IJM also provided qualified social workers who could provide trafficking victims with post-rescue care and take affidavits from rescued victims. Law enforcement officials in the three project areas recognized that IJM’s Program “*made things possible*” because “*the government does not have enough funds for the operations*” (50, Government, Pampanga). Similarly, another respondent maintained IJM was “*very relevant because the government does not have much funding, so IJM fills the gap/void the government cannot deliver. It becomes easier for us with IJM*” (115, Government, Cebu).

*“In terms of operations and case buildup, from the beginning of the case to gathering evidence they are really good at that and working in collaboration with the police. We get a lot of support from them in terms of cases filed. Their presence in the beginning of the case strengthens the case before the prosecutor, and eventually when it goes into court . . . I think all throughout the process . . . IJM’s support is really valuable” (15 and 16, Government, Manila).*

Another respondent explained, “*They [IJM] don’t leave a stone unturned, they do everything they can possible. The experience I had with them [IJM]; they exhaust all the remedies to see that justice is served*” (115, Government, Cebu).

#### 4.2.2. [Relevance of IJM’s Program to DOJ Prosecutors](#)

IJM’s Program contributed to increases in prosecutions and convictions of traffickers in the each of the project areas. Respondents described IJM as “*101% very relevant and very effective.*” The same respondent explained that “*without IJM there would not be a lot of convictions. If it was not for IJM we should not be on the map. When I took over and with IJM behind and beside me the convictions came in; without them, the Task Force would not be as successful*” (50, Government, Pampanga).

For DOJ prosecutors, having IJM lawyers there to prosecute child sex trafficking cases as private prosecutors helped to improve DOJ prosecutors’ abilities to prosecute cases. Given IJM’s focus on child sex trafficking, IJM prosecutors had the time to prepare their cases, gather affidavits, and write motions. Moreover, IJM’s involvement in child sex trafficking cases from the start (including during case build up strengthened the evidence) through to prosecution strengthened their knowledge and understanding of the cases and evidence presentation in court proceedings.

*“In terms of investigation and prosecution, most relevant is when they [IJM] are involved, we get the sense that there is a solid buildup of the case because they [IJM] have lawyers involved with the law enforcement, so it is better to have lawyers involved. IJM sends their investigators with the law enforcement, from the rescue to the case buildup, that is very relevant and good support for us from the government . . . With cases, we have IJM prosecutors involved, most of the cases we get a conviction because they care of the witness and make sure we do not lose the witness. That is a very good part of their participation in prosecution.” (87, Government, Manila)*

Given the support IJM provided to rescued child sex trafficking victims, IJM was also able to locate complainants (sex trafficking victims) and prepare them to testify in court, both of which were crucial when it came to prosecuting child sex trafficking cases and obtaining convictions for human trafficking.<sup>139</sup> In the Philippines, without testimony from

*“What they did in court, how they defended the victims, and how they prosecuted with zeal and fervor; they were passionate.” (50, Government, Pampanga)*

<sup>139</sup> Philippine law does not have a separate statute specific to child sex trafficking, but has ‘qualified trafficking’ that includes egregious cases where there are multiple victims (3 or more) or where a victim is a minor.

complainants or witnesses, there is typically no prosecution because the complainant/witness is considered the legal evidence in the case.

DOJ prosecutors recognized that IJM’s lawyers were “*very persistent in keeping the case active; they see it through . . . they keep on making updates and cooperating with the public prosecutors*” (46, GO, Pampanga). Some DOJ prosecutors thought that IJM lawyers “*made us [DOJ prosecutors] to present our case better, because if IJM is involved with a case in court they represent, they help the public prosecutors in prosecuting the case. With IJM on our side, most probably we can expect convictions*” (29 and 30, Government, Manila).

#### 4.2.3. [Relevance of IJM’s Program to Aftercare Providers](#)

IJM’s Program was also relevant to aftercare providers because it supported DSWD and LGU social workers, as well as private aftercare providers to provide post-rescue care and quality aftercare services to survivors of sex trafficking. IJM provided capacity building to social workers and aftercare providers to help them better understand child sex trafficking victims, and to develop their skills to provide trauma-informed care and psychotherapy to victims. IJM supported the DSWD to understand, “*on the aftercare side there was a huge vacuum, the biggest thing we did was raise the level of care working with NGOs and DSWD to raise the minimum standards of care. If you have a trafficking survivor you cannot take them to the police station after a rescue, immediate care meant taking them to a special place*” (59, IJM, Cebu).

IJM also provided the DSWD in Cebu with resources needed to refurbish one of their buildings so that it could serve as a processing center for trafficking victims. IJM also provided the DSWD with supplies and beds for the processing centers, and provided trafficking victims with clothing, and hygiene kits. From the perspective of the DSWD, “*It was very big for us*” (68, Government, Cebu).

*“IJM continues to be a good partner of the DOJ and the DOJ is a leading agency in the country . . . and the IACAT is where IJM sits, that is indication of how IJM has become very effective in their partnership, not only at the regional level, but now at the national level.” (64, Government, Cebu)*

In addition to improving post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims, IJM’s Program helped to “*raise minimum standards of care for post-rescue through training [social workers] on trauma-informed care . . . Trauma-informed care is one of the highlights of the program*” (59, IJM, Cebu). IJM also supported improved case management and encouraged the use of case conferences by DSWD and LGU social workers to improve aftercare for trafficking victims. IJM focused their efforts on strengthening the ability of government social workers and aftercare providers to focus on providing quality aftercare services that support victims in their rehabilitation, recovery, and restoration.

*“When IJM came into Cebu, their work was not just relevant, I think IJM’s work was indispensable in enabling a higher level of government response in rescue, prosecution, capacity building, and creating facilities dedicated to the care of children. DSWD used to have a place called Haven for Women that were victims of domestic abuse and it was transformed into a place for children because of the partnership [with IJM]. IJM made us understand that trafficking of children and child survivors need a special kind of response and cannot be put together with children of other types of abuse. IJM capacitated the house parents that did not know how to handle the children . . . If this were a movie there were so many casts, IJM played a leading role in the story of child protection.” (64, Government, Cebu)*

This evaluation found that IJM was able to push and encourage government public justice system agencies to combat child sex trafficking. IJM led public justice agencies to rescue child sex trafficking victims and pursue justice for trafficking victims in courts, and to support trafficking survivors’ rehabilitation and recovery.

### 4.3. [IJM’s Program Alignment with National Priorities](#)

This evaluation found that IJM’s Program remained aligned with national priorities over the years. Moreover, IJM contributed to the dialogue on trafficking in persons in the Philippines, and helped to shape national priorities and action plans, particularly through their participation on the IACAT and their MOUs with the PNP and DSWD.

Table 4.3 shows that 94.3% of respondents recognized IJM’s Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children was aligned with national priorities and action plans for combatting trafficking in persons in the Philippines. In addition, 78.5% of respondents reported that IJM’s Program contributed to the dialogue on trafficking in persons in the Philippines and helped shape national priorities and action plans.

| Table 4.3. IJM’s alignment with national priorities  |                     |      |      |
|--|---------------------|------|------|
| Over the years, was IJM’s Program aligned with the national priorities and action plans for combatting trafficking in persons? <sup>1</sup>                            | Full Sample<br>N=93 |      |      |
|  | n                   | %    |      |
| Yes  | 77                  | 82.8 |      |
| No   | 0                   | 0.0  |      |
| Do not know  | 6                   | 6.5  |      |
| Did IJM’s Program contribute to the dialogue on trafficking in persons in the Philippines, and did it help to shape national priorities and action plans? <sup>2</sup> | Yes                 | 73   | 78.5 |
|  | No                  | 0    | 0.0  |
|  | Do not know         | 9    | 9.7  |


<sup>1</sup> 10.8% (n=10) had missing data

<sup>2</sup> 11.8% (n=11) had missing data

Data in Table 4.3 was further analyzed by type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 4.2 shows differences based upon type of agency. The data shows that 95.0% of government officials and 93.3% of IJM respondents reported IJM’s Program was aligned with national priorities and action plans for combatting trafficking in persons, compared to 75.0% of CSO respondents. Those respondents who did not report ‘yes’ reported they ‘do not know.’ In particular, 25.0% of CSO respondents did not know if IJM’s Program was aligned with national priorities and action plans for combatting trafficking in persons.

Chart 4.2 also shows that 100.0% of IJM respondents, 87.5% of CSO respondents, and 85.0% of government officials reported IJM’s Program contributed to the dialogue on trafficking in persons in the Philippines, and helped to shape national priorities and action plans. All of those respondents who did not report ‘yes’ reported they ‘do not know’.


**Chart 4.2. IJM’s alignment with national priorities by type of agency**



Note: Respondents who did not report ‘yes’, reported they ‘do not know’

Chart 4.3 shows differences based upon project area. In particular, 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 93.5% in Manila, and 85.7% in Cebu reported IJM’s Program was aligned with the national priorities and action plans for combatting trafficking in persons. In addition, 96.8% of respondents in Manila, 87.5% in Pampanga, and 81.5% in Cebu reported IJM contributed to the dialogue on trafficking in persons in the Philippines, and helped shape national priorities and action plans. As revealed in Table 4.3, respondents who did not report ‘yes’, reported they ‘do not know’.


**Chart 4.3. IJM’s alignment with national priorities by project areas**



Note: Respondents who did not report 'yes', reported they 'do not know'

Finally, Chart 4.4 shows differences based upon sector of work. In particular, 100.0% of IJM managers, 95.7% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector, 90.6% in the aftercare sector, and 89.5% in the legal sector reported IJM’s Program was aligned with the national priorities and action plans for combatting trafficking in persons in the Philippines. In addition, 100.0% of IJM managers, 88.9% of respondents in the legal sector, 87.5% in the aftercare sectors, and 87.0% in the law enforcement/investigative sector maintained IJM’s Program contributed to the dialogue on trafficking in persons in the Philippines, and helped shape national priorities and action plans. Respondents who did not respond 'yes' reported they 'do not know'.

**Chart 4.4. IJM’s alignment with national priorities by sectors of work**



Note: Respondents who did not report 'yes', reported they 'do not know'

This evaluation found that IJM’s engagement with the Philippine Government and public justice system agencies, as well as their membership on the IACAT, helped to ensure that their work was aligned with national priorities and action plans for combatting trafficking in persons. Through these collaborations, IJM was also able to participate in working group meetings that shaped national priorities and action plans, including to develop the National Action Plan (NAP) for Combatting Human Trafficking for 2010-2016, and succeeding NAP for 2017-2023.

*“I understand it was IJM that lobbied behind the law on anti-human trafficking . . . IJM helped me to come up with a roadmap . . . a practical guide to come up with a program of actions in the future. Even though there are challenges in gaining the resources needed, they provided advice and strategic initiatives on how to come up with a stronger anti-human trafficking unit in the PNP.” (19, Government, Manila)*

IJM also contributed to the amended R.A. No. 10364, which expanded the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208).

*“We pushed for the amendments in the law to address gaps in the original law.” This same respondent maintained, “IJM was instrumental in writing the bill that would become the law. We worked with members of the congress, and most of what IJM wrote was passed into law. Since we knew the law, we were instrumental in writing it, we conducted trainings for the prosecutors and judges on the amendments to the law” (31, IJM, Manila).*

IJM was cognizant that they “developed credibility to speak into policies and programs of the national government.” This credibility led to IJM’s membership on the IACAT and participation in forums organized by the government, international organizations, and CSOs where national policies and programs related to combatting human trafficking were discussed, planned, and developed. One respondent explained, “We invited IJM as our resource person and they are always willing to participate and share their knowledge on the matter; the IACAT invites them” (87, Government, Manila). IJM respondents were satisfied that “IJM developed an expertise on investigations and prosecutions, and aftercare that can effectively contribute to the development of an effective national action plan.” (1, IJM, Manila)

This evaluation found that because IJM “works in accordance with the plans of the government and works harmoniously with the different organizations” their work is aligned with national priorities and action plans (95, Government, Pampanga). Another respondent explained,

*“When the law was passed in 2003, the government identified several areas where government should focus efforts - advocacy, initiating awareness among the community, capacity building for agencies to implement the law, in rescue, prosecution and conviction . . . IJM fit into these priorities. They demonstrated how to address these major areas to put in place a better government with partnership, with local to be able to combat.” (64, Government, Cebu)*

#### **4.4. IJM Encouraged Collaboration among Partners**

IJM recognizes that human trafficking is a complex, multi-faceted crime, and that efforts to combat human trafficking require the expertise, resources, and efforts of many individuals, groups, and entities. As a result, IJM developed their Program to support a comprehensive and multi-sectoral response involving government agencies, CSOs, and foreign enforcement agencies that work in the areas of law enforcement, prosecution and legal advocacy, social welfare and child protection, health care, labor and employment, and immigration to name a few. Since 2003, IJM remained committed to fostering effective partnerships and collaborations with government agencies (e.g., PNP, NBI, DOJ, DSWD, and DOLE), participating on inter-agency task forces (e.g., IACAT), and partnering CSOs that provide community-based services to survivors of sex trafficking. IJM also encouraged effective partnerships and collaboration among and between these entities.

*“Whoever we see can help and support the trafficking victims we get in touch with them and connect them with each other. When we started here we just talked to the main pillars of the government, now we have support coming from the different agencies whether government or NGO, and we connect all this in one. We have this regional thing, wherein all government and nongovernment officers meet together and discuss the needs of the regions.” (54, IJM, Pampanga)*

IJM even “spear-headed efforts to bring churches together” (referred to as church mobilization) to provide outreach and support to survivors of sex trafficking, particularly those in processing centers and community-based clients. IJM was also able to connect church groups with the police to improve identification and reporting of suspected cases of child sex trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation of children. In Manila, IJM led a Filipino inter-faith movement against trafficking, including religious leaders from both Catholic and Evangelical churches.

*“We provide opportunities for our partners to collaborate with each other. We connect with church partners like the faith-based organizations that provide services for clients. We are part of the coalition, like the faith-based aftercare providers. We try to connect this coalition with government*

organizations, and we invite the government to connect with our partners. We maximize every opportunity for our partners to collaborate with each other.” (7, IJM, Manila)

Table 4.4 show that 50.6% of respondents reported that IJM encouraged their organization/agency to collaborate with other organizations/agencies that they did not typically partner with (the sample included only government officials, CSO staff, and religious leaders). Among respondents who reported IJM encouraged their organization/agency to collaborate with other organizations/agencies, 76.9% reported they will sustain those partnerships into the future, even without IJM’s involvement. One government official reported, “IJM has been instrumental in putting all of us from different agencies together” (78, Government, Cebu).


| Table 4.4. IJM encouraged collaboration among partners   |                          |      |
|--|--------------------------|------|
| Did IJM encourage your organization/agency to collaborate with other organizations/agencies that you did not typically partner with? | Sample N=77 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|  | n                        | %    |
| Yes  | 39                       | 50.6 |
| No   | 33                       | 42.9 |
| Do not know  | 5                        | 6.5  |
| Will you sustain those partnerships going forward, even without IJM’s involvement?   | N=39 <sup>1</sup>        |      |
| Yes  | 30                       | 76.9 |
| No   | 1                        | 2.6  |
| Do not know  | 5                        | 12.8 |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes only government officials, CSO staff, and religious leaders

Data from Table 4.4 was analyzed to understand differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 4.5 shows differences based upon type of agency. All church leaders reported IJM encouraged them to collaborate with organizations/agencies with whom they did not typically partner; this is because IJM was the first to engage churches in efforts to prevent sex trafficking and to be a resource for survivors of sex trafficking. In comparison, only 54.2% of government officials and 20.0% of CSO respondents reported IJM encouraged them to collaborate with other organizations/agencies with whom they did not typically partner.

Among respondents who reported IJM encouraged their organization/agency to collaborate with other organizations/agencies, 100.0% of CSO respondents, 82.8% of government officials, and 80.0% of church leaders reported they will sustain those partnerships going forward, even without IJM’s involvement. It is notable that 20.0% of religious leaders and 13.8% of government officials reported they ‘do not know’ if they will sustain the partnerships going forward.


**Chart 4.5. IJM encouraged collaboration among partners by type of agency**



Note: 13.8% (n=4) of government officials and 20.0% (n=1) of religious leaders reported they ‘do not know’ if they will sustain the partnerships going forward, even without IJM’s involvement.

Chart 4.6 shows differences based upon project area. Respondents in Cebu (62.1%) were more likely to report that IJM encouraged their organization/agency to collaborate with other organizations/agencies, compared to respondents in Manila (47.8%) and Pampanga (45.5%). Among respondents who reported IJM encouraged their organization/agency to collaborate with other organizations/agencies, respondents from Pampanga (100.0%) were more likely to report they will maintain those partnerships going forward, even without IJM, compared to respondents in Cebu (82.4%) and Manila (70.0%).


**Chart 4.6. IJM encouraged collaboration among partners by project areas**



Note: 30.0% (n=3) of respondents in Manila and 11.8% (n=2) of respondents in Cebu reported they 'do not know' if they will sustain those partnerships going forward, even without IJM's involvement

Finally, Chart 4.7 shows differences by sector of work. Respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (73.7%) were more likely than those in the legal (52.9%) and aftercare (33.3%) sectors to report that IJM encouraged their organization/agency to collaborate with other organizations/agencies with whom they did not typically partner. Among respondents who reported IJM encouraged their organization/agency to collaborate with other organizations/agencies, 100.0% in the legal sector, 85.7% in the law enforcement sector, and 70.0% in the aftercare sector reported they will sustain those partnerships going forward, even without IJM involvement. It is notable that 20.0% of respondents in the aftercare sector and 14.3% in the law enforcement/investigative sector reported they 'do not know' if they will sustain those partnerships going forward.

**Chart 4.7. IJM encouraged collaboration among partners by sector of work**



Note: 14.3% (n=2) of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector and 20.0% (n=2) in the aftercare sector reported they 'do not know' if they will sustain those partnerships going forward, even without IJM's involvement

One of the important partnerships and working relationships that IJM supported was between the PNP anti-trafficking units and the DSWD. In the early years, the PNP conducted raid and rescue operations without involving the DSWD; as a result, trafficking victims were rescued and then re-traumatized during the rescue. Eventually, IJM worked with the PNP and DSWD to collaborate and develop a protocol to protect trafficking victims. Included in the protocol were procedures for the PNP to coordinate with the DSWD to ensure social workers are present during raid and rescue operations to provide sex trafficking victims with post-rescue care and referrals to shelters. The goal was to provide trafficking victims with a soft landing, including protection, care, and support needed to understand what happened to them (i.e., that they were the victim of a crime), to determine their age and identity, and to take their affidavits.

Establishing the partnership between the PNP and DSWD was significant because *“before they didn’t work well with each other. We heard a lot of complaints from the DSWD where the PNP would dump victims to them and that caused tensions between the two agencies.”* This same respondent explained,

*“That was a challenging aspect of our work because we bridged the gap between PNP and DSWD. PNP is mandated by law to conduct the rescue operations, but not really the DSWD, but the impact of the presence of government social workers is unquantifiable. The impact of having them [DSWD] at the rescues and the impact on the survivors is huge. It is still a challenge, but we have seen a lot of improvements. DSWD created a pool of social workers that can be called on any time when the police conduct rescue operation. That is showing that DSWD see the importance of their presence at a rescue operation.” (1, IJM, Manila)*

Another important partnership that IJM supported was between the PNP and DOLE. In Pampanga, DOLE was not part of the PNP’s raid and rescue operations, until IJM advocated that DOLE participate. DOLE was an important partner because they have the legal mandate to enforce labor laws and shut down establishments where children/minors are working illegally and/or sexually exploited and trafficked. Now DOLE’s participation is standard in raid and rescue operations conducted by the PNP in Pampanga. Building partnerships such as these was an important part of IJM’s approach to combatting sex trafficking of children.

*“Bridge building is a core part of our work. We will always build them up, rather than burn a bridge. You can see this with the PNP and DOLE, now PNP knows to call DOLE to shut down establishments. I have seen efforts of the PNP and DSWD to work together, but the challenge is the demand on each of the organizations. I do think that we have worked with private aftercare facilities to support victims, while those agencies naturally want to work together we have helped to facilitate that in a manner to support victim care.” (5, IJM, Manila)*

Another respondent explained,

*“The PNP usually conducts operations on their own . . . [Now] before we conduct operations we coordinate with DSWD and DOLE. Other PNP units conduct operations and after rescuing minors they call the DSWD and the DOLE; because they want to work on their own first, without intervention with other units. It helped us in our operations [to coordinate with DSWD in advance of the operations] . . . coordination with those units are now easier. We tell them the number of social workers we are requesting for this operation; they don’t need the specifics. We try to limit or decrease the percentage of compromise. IJM made them understand that there are some things that we need to address even with limited information.” (20, Government, Pampanga)*

Guided by IJM, the practice of having both DSWD social workers and DOLE officers present during raid and rescue operations has become *“part of the protocol by the IACAT . . . they [the PNP and DSWD] are mandated to coordinate with each other; even without IJM support they [the PNP] still call on DSWD” (1, IJM, Manila).* Now the DSWD and DOLE *“know what they have to do when we have an operation” (37, IJM, Pampanga).*

A third important partnership that IJM supported was *“between DSWD and private NGOs, to make sure they are working together and communicating with each other” (59, IJM, Cebu).* IJM took steps to establish partnerships between DSWD social workers and private aftercare providers; however, those partnerships could have been strengthened through

formal coalitions of DSWD and LGU social workers, and private aftercare providers. A formal coalition of aftercare providers would support improved rehabilitation, recovery, and restoration of sex trafficking victims.

Finally, IJM also fostered improved collaboration between PNP anti-trafficking units and DOJ prosecutors. Traditionally, *“law enforcement feels prosecutors are working against them instead of with them, and now there is the beginning of a relationship that law enforcement can call a prosecutor [in a human trafficking case]”* (8, IJM, Manila).

#### 4.4.1. Collaboration Challenges with IJM

International organizations that implement long-term social justice programs, such as IJM’s Program, often experience challenges and, in some cases, occasional conflicts or differences of opinion with their partners and stakeholders. Challenges often relate to shifts in the environment, including changes in political leaders and officials, changes in national priorities and agendas, changes in social attitudes, and economic downturns.

Table 4.5 shows that only 33.8% of respondents faced challenges in their collaboration with IJM over the course of 14 years of program implementation. However, the majority of these respondents maintained they were able to overcome those challenges through discussion and dialogue with IJM. In most cases, they came to a resolution or agreement on the way forward.

| Table 4.5. Collaboration challenges with IJM                |                             |      |
|---|-----------------------------|------|
| Did you face any challenges in your collaboration with IJM? | Sample<br>N=77 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|   | n                           | %    |
| Yes   | 26                          | 33.8 |
| No  | 41                          | 53.2 |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes only government officials, CSO staff, and religious leaders

Data from Table 4.5 was further analyzed to understand differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 4.8 reveals differences based upon type of agency. Religious leaders (60.0%) were more likely than CSO respondents (36.4%) and government officials (31.1%) to maintain they faced challenges in their collaboration with IJM. Challenges faced by religious leaders were largely related to scheduling of meetings. The challenge was *“how to bring the [religious] groups together, because we are busy people.”* This same respondent explained that *“IJM helped a lot when we were trying to organize, they were a great help in terms of organizing people, taking notes, and they did most the ground work. The challenge was to bring the heads together”* (17, Church, Manila).

**Chart 4.8. Collaboration challenges with IJM by type of agency**



Chart 4.9 shows differences based upon project area. Respondents in Cebu (52.0%) and Pampanga (40.0%) were more likely to report challenges in their collaboration with IJM, compared to respondents in Manila (22.7%). Bear in mind, these were not necessarily long-term challenges in the collaboration with IJM, and these challenges were typically resolved through dialogue and discussion.

**Chart 4.9. Collaboration challenges with IJM by project areas**





Chart 4.10 shows differences based upon sector of work. Respondents in the aftercare sector (44.8%) were more likely than respondents in the law enforcement/investigative (31.3%) and legal (31.3%) sectors to experience challenges from time-to-time in their collaboration with IJM.

**Chart 4.10. Challenges in the collaboration with IJM by sector of work**



Below are examples of different challenges that DOJ prosecutors and DSWD social workers identified in their collaboration with IJM.

*Collaboration Challenges Identified by DOJ Prosecutors.* From the perspective of DOJ prosecutors, “sometimes there have been disagreements on how to approach a specific case or how to deal with a judge, and what tactic to use during a trial.” This same respondent went on to explain, “I usually have the final say, but sometimes it requires a lot of work. If we disagree it usually stalls in the final proceeding, but I have final say” (26, Government, Manila). Similarly, another respondent explained, “one time when I had to resolve a case which they thought I should resolve otherwise; meaning we had different views on the evidence presented. But that was settled. They are good lawyers.” This same respondent went on to add, “We saw the evidence differently, we discussed and argued, and everything came to a conclusion. The rest all of our cases were good” (50, Government, Pampanga). From the perspective of DOJ prosecutors, disagreements between private and public prosecutors is par for the course.

*“One thing good about them [IJM], because of the trust we know as lawyers there are times we disagree on a lot of things. There are as many legal opinions as lawyers. We are allowed to disagree, but not become disagreeable. You are allowed to disagree and have a contrary opinion” (47, Government, Pampanga).*

Although public prosecutors sometimes disagreed with IJM lawyers on evidence presentation, trial tactics, and how to deal with judges, they also appreciated and respected the work of IJM lawyers as private prosecutors in child sex trafficking cases. They recognized that IJM lawyers have expertise in prosecuting child sex trafficking cases, as well as the time and resources needed to work on case buildup and preparation. IJM also made sure trafficking victims were prepared to testify in court and appeared in court. This led to increased convictions of traffickers.

*“On a personal level, we work closely with them, on the legal aspect, but sometimes there are differences of opinions, which is normal, but you cannot argue with success. So, those professional disagreements are always resolved. Like any other working environment there are issues that are always resolved and if you review our output you would see you cannot argue with success.” (86, Government, Pampanga)*

[Collaboration Challenges Identified by the DSWD.](#) Challenges faced by the DSWD were more numerous and often related to case management and the provision of services to child sex trafficking victims, particularly child sex trafficking victims under IJM’s care and supervision. Early on, the DSWD faced challenges accommodating child sex trafficking victims in their shelters, which were originally established to shelter girls and young women who experienced violence, abuse, and neglect. When the DSWD began sending rescued sex trafficking victims to government shelters, immediately after rescue, shelter staff found they were ill-prepared to respond to and manage victim’s trauma-impacted behaviors (e.g., combative and aggressive behaviors and acting out through destruction of shelter property).

To address this challenge in Cebu, the DSWD and IJM worked together to develop a processing center, referred to as ‘HerSpace’, where trafficking victims could be taken after rescue and shelter for approximately 48 hours. ‘HerSpace’ provided a safe and comfortable victim-friendly center for processing and interviewing trafficking victims immediately after rescue operations. In ‘HerSpace’, trafficking victims could meet with social workers and provide testimony and give affidavits. IJM’s casework indicated that ‘HerSpace’ improved the quality of post-rescue care provided to trafficking victims, and increased the quality of statements and testimony provided during interviews.

*“When I was assigned here in 2009 . . . The challenge was there were intensified rescue operations with IJM . . . There were rescued victims who were transferred here [to the shelter]; however, because these women were forced, they didn’t want to be here, they didn’t like being rescued, they liked to work in the bar and establishment where they earned money. When they were brought here we struggled, we were not prepared to accept these kind of girls; they were violent, they broke our windows, plates, computer, and glasses. They threatened us. That was the first challenge, how to go about this kind of attitude and behavior. There were 42 of them and this facility accommodates only 30 . . . I can imagine the struggle of the staff and some of the staff that were not part of the rescue operations . . . We didn’t know how to go about the situation, so there were trainings to equip us. We believe that women from the establishments should not be brought here immediately . . . For the trafficking victims, it is not good to integrate them into a community at the shelter that is already established. So, they [IJM and DSWD] conceived ‘HerSpace’, which was conceived as a processing center.” (74, Government, Cebu)*

Other challenges the DSWD faced in their collaboration with IJM revolved around issues of: perceived duplication of services and case management; differences in standards of care and service delivery to support the rehabilitation and recovery of sex trafficking victims; and differences in criteria for determining recovery and restoration. In general, the DSWD believed that trafficking victims should receive the same care, treatment, and services as all other girls and young women in the shelter, including victims of abuse, neglect, and domestic and/or sexual violence. The DSWD was generally reluctant to provide specialized and tailored aftercare services for sex trafficking victims.

*“The communication challenges we had was in making the leadership understand we want to be part of the journey of the client. The shelters had been doing their things on their own and here they are now and IJM wants to be part of the process. There was initial resistance, like discharging a client without a case conference. It was a slow process and facilitated by our patience. In our contract between IJM and DSWD we put in to sit down together twice a year or more and address issues and how we are going to work together. There is a forum for airing out differences and coming up with agreeable solutions.” (57, IJM, Cebu)*

Similarly, another respondent explained,

*“In terms of case management, because we are the DSWD, our practice is usually that when a referral is here we do the case management, but with IJM sometimes we were confused because they also do case management with the clients they refer. So, sometimes there are confusion for our clients. We should do the case management and we should just ask assistance from them if needed. The clients are here and the social workers are here. It is good they visit the client, but we request . . . we should be informed what is happening on the case because the clients are here; those are our concerns. But we spoke with IJM and they acknowledged the problem. There is no regular communication regarding the clients, [which is] sometimes confusing for the clients. They have agreements that we are not informed about; we only came to know when clients told us. We recognize the partnership in terms of case management, but there is no regular communication . . . we should be the one to lead because they client is here. They should be an external resource. When the clients are reintegrated with the families they should be there to assist once realized.” (89, Government, Pampanga)*

As mentioned above, from time-to-time, there were disagreements between the DSWD and IJM social workers as to when child sex trafficking victims should be reintegrated with their families and communities. Typically, child sex trafficking victims were placed in DSWD-run processing centers and shelters where they were provided with counselling and services that should lead to their rehabilitation and recovery. There were times, however, that the DSWD’s focus on deinstitutionalization and commitment to maintaining families resulted in child sex trafficking victims being reintegrated with their families too soon, prior to the victim achieving rehabilitation and recovery. Lack of resources and bed space in shelters was another reason the DSWD sometimes reintegrated child sex trafficking victims ahead of their full recovery. Challenges occurred when DSWD and IJM social workers disagreed about service delivery to victims and progress made toward rehabilitation and recovery. This is because IJM had more stringent standards and criteria for determining recovery and restoration, and for conducting home visits, compared to DSWD social workers.

As a result, IJM experienced situations where the DSWD released sex trafficking victims from their shelters earlier than expected and without a proper case conference, or even informing IJM.

*“Before the discharge of clients, sometimes we are not informed they are going to discharge clients and before that the case conference has not been established. We just discovered they were already discharged in the community and we were not informed. The clients insist in getting out of the shelter and the case manager in the shelter is pressured by the client to get out of the shelter. And sometimes in the scheduling of meetings and joint check-ins with clients, they are very busy in the shelter, and sometimes it is not given priority.” (7, IJM, Manila)*

DSWD and LGU social workers also recognized they lacked the resources to conduct proper home assessments and to provide community-based aftercare services to child sex trafficking victims and their families. This led to disagreements between DSWD and IJM social workers about when to reintegrate child sex trafficking victims.

*“IJM they have many social workers, but in the center we have very few social workers and they cannot do the aftercare; the aftercare is dependent on the LGU social worker, and most of the challenges is the LGU social worker . . . The IJM social worker has enough time and resources, while the LGU social worker has so many cases aside from trafficking, so the assessment is not as thorough as the IJM social worker [wants] . . . But we have to agree, so one thing we did to avoid this disagreement on the*

*assessment was to have the regular case conference, so whatever decisions made by the team, there is no more arguments.” (67, Government, Cebu)*

Despite occasional challenges and disagreements between IJM and DOJ prosecutors and DSWD social workers, DOJ prosecutors and DSWD social workers recognized the quality and strength of their collaborations with IJM in a positive manner. Most government officials described IJM as a “good partner” maintaining they “wouldn’t feel hesitant to ask, even for sheets of paper. We have a good partnership; it is easy to really raise whatever it is that you need to raise” (78, Government, Cebu). Similarly, another respondent stated, “I would like to believe we have gone beyond work and we have established a personal relationship as friend, without sacrificing the objective perspectives of cases brought to our attention” (82, Government, Cebu).

*“I need them, we want them. It is not because I am biased because there was a scare for a while when there was Project Lantern, when they set foot here and there was scare for a while that they will be gone . . . We need people like them. I don’t know if other local people can do the kind of work they are doing.” (73, Government, Cebu)*

IJM also acknowledge the great working relationships they had with their partners.

*“I think we have great working relationship; all of our partners see us as a benefit or added value. They know we are not trying to take credit or usurp their role; we are trying to help them do their job. We care about the survivors and the justice system and helping to make it strong. We have good working relationship with the director and the line staff; they know we care. With law enforcement, if they don’t have money in their budget, we provide food and a van, we provide logistics . . . They know we are working alongside them. Our strategy is not to point the finger, but to come alongside them through training and mentoring. They know we want to build them up and they will get the credit; in that way, we have good working relationships. Because we are doing justice system transformation we are pushing the envelope.” (59, IJM, Cebu)*

#### **4.5. Communication with IJM**

Despite occasional challenges in their collaboration with IJM, Table 4.6 shows that 90.9% of respondents reported they had clear communication with IJM. Nearly all respondents described communication with IJM as being “clear, in terms of what they would want” and “open when they need something.” They also recognized that “when I need something from IJM, such as sometimes requesting them to appear in court on my behalf, all the assistance they can provide they usually provide” (88, Government, Manila). Another respondent explained, “We are always texting and emailing. We can meet any time we want to” (28, Government, Manila).

Despite having clear communication with IJM, 24.7% of respondents reported they faced communication problems with IJM from time to time. Among respondents who reported communication problems with IJM, 47.4% of respondents reported they were able to overcome those communication problems.

*“They are always available when there is a case, if we think IJM is best to handle, they are one call away . . . I appreciate their western style . . . they always give us heads up that someone is coming.” (47, Government, Pampanga)*


| Table 4.6. Communication with IJM                              |                             |      |
|--|-----------------------------|------|
| Was there clear communication with IJM?                        | Sample<br>N=77 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|  | n                           | %    |
| Yes  | 70                          | 90.9 |
| No   | 6                           | 7.8  |
| Did you face communication problems with IJM?                  |                             |      |
| Yes  | 19                          | 24.7 |
| No   | 58                          | 75.3 |
| Were you able to overcome the communication problems with IJM? |                             |      |
| N=19 <sup>1</sup>  |                             |      |
| Yes  | 9                           | 47.4 |
| No   | 3                           | 15.8 |
| Do not know/missing data                                       | 7                           | 36.9 |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes only government officials, CSO staff, and religious leaders

Data in Table 4.6 was analyzed to explore differences among IJM’s partners in their communication challenges with IJM based upon type of agency. Chart 4.11 shows that 100.0% of CSO respondents and 91.8% of government officials reported having clear communication with IJM; whereas, only 60.0% of religious leaders had clear communication with IJM. Most respondents described communication with IJM as open and frequent.

Still, however, 27.3% of CSO respondents and 21.3% of government officials experienced occasional communication problems with IJM, whereas 60.0% of religious leaders had communication problems with IJM. Among respondents who reported communication problems with IJM, 69.2% of government officials reported they were able to overcome the communication problems, whereas no CSO respondents or religious leaders were able to overcome the communication challenges with IJM.

**Chart 4.11. Communication with IJM by type of agency**



Note: 23.1% (n=3) of government officials reported they ‘do not know’ if they were able to overcome communication problems

IJM respondents were also asked about communication challenges with their partners. Table 4.7 shows that 68.8% of IJM respondents reported facing communication challenges with partners. One respondent explained, “when there are transitional changes, when they replace officials the challenges are developing relationships with the new officials. The relationships are not permanent, they depend on who sits in the position at the current time” (31, IJM, Manila). Among IJM respondents who reported facing communication challenges with their partners, 72.7% reported they were able to overcome those challenges.

*“I think, the reason why IJM’s model is for me successful is we are able to establish strong relationship with the partners in the Philippines . . . I think an NGO is not this successful in this kind of a program, unless we are able to develop these deep relationships with the partner. That fact that we are there when things get difficult walking alongside them.” (1, IJM, Manila)*

| Table 4.7. IJM's communication challenges with their partners          |             |          |
|--|-------------|----------|
|  | IJM<br>N=16 |          |
| <u>Have you faced any communication challenges with your partners?</u> | <u>n</u>    | <u>%</u> |
| Yes  | 11          | 68.8     |
| No   | 4           | 25.0     |
| <u>Were you able to overcome those challenges?</u>                     | N=11        |          |
| Yes  | 8           | 72.7     |
| No   | 2           | 18.2     |

## CHAPTER 5: TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO TO COMBAT SEX TRAFFICKING OF CHILDREN

### Chapter Highlights

- IJM conducted a wide range of capacity-building trainings and refresher courses for the anti-trafficking police, government social workers and private aftercare providers, and DOJ prosecutors
- 85.7% of respondents reported they and their colleagues participated in one or more of IJM's capacity building trainings
- 86.4% of respondents thought the content of IJM's trainings was 'very relevant' and 4.5% as 'relevant'; only 3.0% rated the content of IJM's trainings as 'somewhat relevant'
- 72.7% of respondents thought that IJM's trainers were 'very good' and 12.1% as 'good'; only 3.0% thought IJM's trainers were 'somewhat good'
- 86.4% of respondents would recommend the trainings they received to their colleagues or others in the field
- IJM typically coupled their capacity building trainings with technical assistance, and 70.0% of respondents reported IJM provided them and others in their agency/organization with technical assistance or guidance

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An important component of IJM's Program was to support public justice system agencies by providing them with capacity building and technical assistance. Although IJM was not the only organization providing technical assistance, including capacity building trainings, to public justice system agencies in the Philippines, this evaluation focused only on that technical assistance and strategic support provided by IJM. This chapter discusses the quality and impact of IJM's technical assistance on public justice system agencies and private aftercare providers.

### 5.1. Capacity Building Trainings Provided by IJM

Since 2003, IJM conducted a wide range of capacity building trainings and refresher courses for the anti-trafficking police, government social workers and private aftercare providers, and DOJ prosecutors. These trainings are discussed and evaluated in the sections that follow.

*Trainings Offered to Anti-Trafficking Police.* From 2006 to 2015, IJM partnered with the PNP, NBI and IACAT to conduct numerous trainings for law enforcement officials in Metro Manila, Metro Cebu, and Pampanga. The trainings were specially focused on educating anti-trafficking police on the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208) and as amended by R.A. No. 10364, as well as providing officers with the knowledge, skills, and techniques needed to conduct sex trafficking investigations, raid and rescue operations, write search warrants, collect and preserve evidence, interview victims and perpetrators, take affidavits, arrest perpetrators, and testify in court. The trainings also focused on developing victim sensitivity, equipping law enforcement with knowledge of trauma-informed care and appropriate techniques in interviewing child victims. Box 5.1 provides a list of many of the trainings developed and delivered to the PNP and NBI by IJM.

In 2012, IJM entered into a revised Memo of Agreement (MOA) with the PNP to strengthen its police training program with three levels of specialized anti-human trafficking training: 1) Managing Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Operations (for commissioned police officers); 2) TIP Investigations (for investigators); and 3) TIP Awareness and First Responder Training (for new police recruits involved in patrolling).<sup>140</sup> To facilitate course improvements, IJM and the PNP jointly

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<sup>140</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 6-8.

reviewed human trafficking cases on a periodic basis to ensure the police training program remained effective, accurate, and sensitive to the actual needs of the PNP. The intent was also to make sure the police training program reflected changes in relevant legislation, and remained responsive to the changing situation of commercial sexual exploitation of children in the Philippines.<sup>141</sup>

#### **Box 5.1. Capacity Building Training for the PNP and NBI**

The trainings covered topics such as:

- Legal/Procedural Training on R.A. No. 9208
- Moving from Good to Great, An Advanced Discussion on R.A. No. 9208
- Anti-Trafficking Legal Frameworks
- Trafficking in Persons Investigations and Operations
- Crime Scene Investigation Part I and II
- Intelligence Gathering and Raid Planning
- Video & Photographic Evidence Collection Training
- Technical Equipment Training
- Techniques in Interviewing Trafficking Victims
- Affidavit Taking and Writing
- Search Warrant Writing
- Investigative Report Writing
- First Responder Training
- Gender Sensitivity Training
- Managing Trafficking in Persons Cases
- Combating Child Sex Tourism
- Police Instructor Training

*Legal Trainings Offered to DOJ Prosecutors and Others.* From 2007 to 2016, IJM also provided legal trainings to DOJ prosecutors, judges, council members from the Barangays, and CSOs. The legal trainings were mainly focused on enhancing knowledge and understanding of the anti-trafficking laws and child protection laws in the Philippines. Trainings for DOJ prosecutors and judges also focused on prosecuting sex trafficking cases, presenting evidence and victim/witness testimony, and deciding convictions in accordance with the anti-trafficking laws. Some of these trainings were multi-sectoral and included judges, prosecutors, anti-trafficking police, and DSWD social workers. Box 5.2 provides a list of legal trainings developed and delivered by IJM.

#### **Box 5.2. Legal Trainings Provided by IJM**

The trainings covered topics such as:

- Introduction on R.A. No. 2908, R.A. No. 10364, R.A. No. 9344, and R.A. No. 9262
- Basic Training on Human Trafficking
- Basic Orientation on Child Protection
- Child Protection Law
- Creative and Effective Approaches to Prosecution of Trafficking Cases
- Paralegal Training on Child Protection
- Training on Interviewing Trafficking Victims and Drafting a Counter Affidavit
- Trafficking and its Legal Aspects
- Seminar-Forum for Judges and Prosecutors on Prosecuting Trafficking in Persons Cases
- Prosecutors Training on Handling Trafficking in Persons Cases
- Competency Enhancement Training for Judges, Prosecutors, Social Workers, and Law Enforcement Investigators Handling Trafficking in Persons Cases
- Inter-Disciplinary Seminar for Police Officers and Social Workers on Trafficking in Persons
- Judges Conference on Human Trafficking

<sup>141</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 6-8.

- Breaking the Chains: A Call to Action Against Human Trafficking
- Understanding Child Abuse and Exploitation
- Barangay Council for the Protection of Children
- Orientation on How to Conduct a Barangay Council for the Protection of Children

*Trainings Offered to Aftercare Providers.* From 2007 to 2015, IJM also partnered with the DSWD, Child Protection Network Inc., and Consuelo Zobel Alger Foundation to train more than 750 aftercare providers, including DSWD and LGU social workers, private aftercare providers, Reintegration Support Network (RSN) volunteers, shelter staff, and health workers in Metro Manila, Metro Cebu, and Pampanga.<sup>142</sup> The training focused on educating aftercare providers on the Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208) and amended R.A. No. 10364, as well as trauma-informed care and psychotherapy as effective approaches for dealing with survivors of sex trafficking. Trainings also focused on how to recognize signs of trauma and how to respond to trauma-impacted behaviors of clients, as well as how to implement self-care strategies to prevent burnout among social workers and aftercare providers. The trainings were mainly focused on developing the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that social workers and aftercare providers need to understand sex trafficking victims and to support them in their rehabilitation, recovery, reintegration, and restoration. Box 5.2 provides a list of trainings developed and delivered by IJM to social workers and aftercare providers.

#### **Box 5.2. Capacity Building Training for Aftercare Providers**

The trainings covered topics such as:

- Paralegal Training for Child Protection
- R.A. No. 9028 and R.A. No. 10364 Awareness Seminar
- Orientation on Human Trafficking
- Training on Rescue Handling of Victims
- Interview Training
- Aftercare Training
- Child Sexual Abuse Training
- Child Protection Policy Training
- Trauma Focused Cognitive Behavior Therapy
- Trauma-Informed Care Training
- Trauma-Informed Psychotherapy Training
- Behavioral Management Seminar
- Effective Parenting for House Parents of DSWD Shelters
- Training on Rights-Based and Gender Responsive Case Management
- Collaborative Case Management Training
- Skills Enhancement Training for Service Providers in the Care and Management of Victims of Trafficking
- Skills Enhancement on Writing Family Reintegration Assessment Reports
- Economic Self-Sufficiency and Re-Integration Program
- Job Readiness Training for Trainers
- Career Counseling Training
- SMART Mentor Training
- Adult Mentoring Training
- RSN Volunteers Orientation
- Capacity Building and Leadership Training

## **5.2. Impact of IJM’s Capacity Building Trainings**

This evaluation evaluated the impact of IJM’s capacity building trainings from the perspective of respondents who participated in IJM’s trainings. IJM typically conducted pre- and post-training surveys that they used to assess the impact

<sup>142</sup> Justice is Possible (2016). IJM: Manila, Philippines.

of trainings on participants. In some cases, IJM also used 6<sup>th</sup> month post-training evaluation forms to assess the more long-term impact of trainings on participants. This evaluation was designed to evaluate all of this data; however, given the limitations and format of that data, such an evaluation was not possible.<sup>143</sup> Instead, this evaluation focused on getting respondents to recall their participation in IJM’s trainings and the impact the trainings had on their knowledge, attitudes, and practices over the long-term.

Table 5.1 shows that 85.7% of respondents (including government officials, CSO respondents, and religious leaders) reported they and their colleagues participated in one or more of IJM’s capacity building trainings. Among respondents who participated in IJM’s training, 86.4% thought the content of IJM’s trainings was ‘very relevant’. Only 4.5% of respondents rated IJM’s trainings as ‘relevant’, and 3.0% maintained the trainings were only ‘somewhat relevant’. In terms of the quality of IJM’s instructors, 72.7% of respondents maintained IJM’s trainers were ‘very good’. Only 12.1% of respondents thought the trainers were ‘good’, and 3.0% thought they were ‘somewhat good’. In addition, 86.4% of respondents reported they would recommend the trainings they received to their colleagues or others in the field.

| <b>Table 5.1. Capacity building trainings provided by IJM</b>                                 |                             |          |
|---|-----------------------------|----------|
|   | Sample<br>N=77 <sup>1</sup> |          |
| <u>Did IJM provide you and others in your agency/organizations with training?</u>             | <u>n</u>                    | <u>%</u> |
| Yes   | 66                          | 85.7     |
| No  | 10                          | 13.0     |
| <u>Rate the relevance of the content of IJM’s trainings</u>                                   | N=66 <sup>1</sup>           |          |
| Very relevant   | 57                          | 86.4     |
| Relevant  | 3                           | 4.5      |
| Somewhat relevant   | 2                           | 3.0      |
| Not relevant  | 0                           | 0.0      |
| <u>Rate the quality of IJM’s instructors</u>  | N=66 <sup>1</sup>           |          |
| Very good   | 48                          | 72.7     |
| Good  | 8                           | 12.1     |
| Somewhat good   | 2                           | 3.0      |
| <u>Would recommend the trainings you received to your colleagues or others in your field?</u> | N=66 <sup>1</sup>           |          |
| Yes   | 57                          | 86.4     |
| No  | 2                           | 3.0      |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes only government officials, CSO staff, and religious leaders

Data in Table 5.1 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work (see Charts 5.1 to 5.6). Charts 5.1 and 5.2 reveal differences based upon type of agency. In particular, Chart 5.1 shows that 90.2% of government officials, 72.7% of CSO respondents, and 60.0% of religious leaders reported they participated in one or more of IJM’s trainings. Among respondents who participated in IJM’s training, 100.0% of religious leaders and 92.3% of government officials reported the content of IJM’s trainings was ‘very relevant’. In comparison, 75.0% of CSO respondents maintained the content of IJM’s training was ‘very relevant’, and 25.0% reported it was only ‘somewhat relevant’.

<sup>143</sup> Pre- and post-test training data was provided for the Trauma-Informed Care Trainings; however, the proportion of respondents who responded correctly to knowledge and attitudes questions as a result of several days of training offered little insight as to the impact of the trainings on service providers. Similarly, as it relates to law enforcement trainings, patches of pre- and post-test surveys in their raw form with true and false responses to knowledge and attitude questions offers little insight as to the impact of the trainings on police. No training evaluation data was provided for legal training of prosecutors or community mobilization trainings.

**Chart 5.1. Participation in and relevance of the trainings provided by IJM by type of agency**





Chart 5.2 shows that among respondents who participated in IJM’s trainings, 90.0% of government officials reported the quality of IJM’s trainers was ‘very good’, and 100.0% reported they would recommend the training they received to their colleagues or others in the field. In comparison, only 37.5% of CSO respondents reported IJM’s trainers were ‘very good’, while 37.5% rated them as ‘good’ and 25.0% rated them as ‘somewhat good’. Nevertheless, 75.0% of CSO respondents reported they would recommend IJM’s training to their colleagues or others in the field.

**Chart 5.2. Quality of trainings provided by IJM by type of agency**



Charts 5.3 and 5.4 reveal differences based upon project area. In particular, Chart 5.3 shows that respondents in Pampanga (100.0%) and Cebu (93.1%) were more likely to report they and others in their agency/organization participated in one or more of IJM’s trainings, compared to respondents from Manila (64.0%). Among respondents who participated in IJM’s training, 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 85.7% in Manila, and 84.6% in Cebu reported the content of IJM’s trainings was ‘very relevant’.

**Chart 5.3. Capacity building trainings provided by IJM by project areas**





Chart 5.4 shows that among respondents who participated in IJM’s trainings, 95.5% of respondents in Pampanga and 83.3% in Cebu reported IJM’s trainers were ‘very good’, compared to only 58.3% of respondents in Manila. In Manila, 41.7% of respondents reported IJM’s trainers were ‘good’. Regardless, 100.0% of respondents in Manila and Pampanga, and 91.7% in Cebu maintained they would recommend IJM’s training to their colleagues or others in the field.

**Chart 5.4. Quality of capacity building trainings provided by IJM by project areas**



Finally, Charts 5.5. and 5.6 reveal differences based upon sector of work. Chart 5.5 shows that 95.0% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector, 91.2% in the aftercare sector, and 70.6% in the legal sector reported IJM provided them and others in their agency/organization with training. Among those who were trained by IJM, 93.3% of respondents in the aftercare sector, 88.9% in the law enforcement/investigative sector, and 81.8% in the legal sector reported the content of IJM’s trainings was ‘very relevant’. One respondent explained, *“100% relevant, their topics and materials are relevant, they are very disciplined”* (37, Government, Pampanga). Another respondent added that *“the strengths I saw [in IJM’s trainings is] the confidence they have because of the experience, they have been investigating and prosecuting trafficking cases, they have very rich experience because they do investigation and prosecution”* (87, Government, Manila).

**Chart 5.5. Capacity building trainings provided by IJM by sector of work**





Chart 5.6 shows that among respondents who participated in IJM’s trainings, 88.9% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative and legal sectors, and 80.0% in the aftercare sector reported IJM’s trainers were ‘very good’. One respondent explained, *“They are all excellent and very knowledgeable”* (14, CSO, Manila). In addition, 100.0% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative and legal sectors, and 93.3% in the aftercare sector reported they would recommend IJM’s trainings to their colleagues or others in the field. The couple of aftercare providers who reported they would not recommend IJM’s trainings to others in their field maintained it was because they thought that the trauma-informed care training was *“done.”* As they explained, *“If there is something new and innovative [we would recommend the trainings, but IJM’s] trauma-informed care training has been going on since 2012, it is the same training”* (107 and 108, CSO, Cebu). These respondents requested that IJM develop more advanced training for aftercare providers that goes beyond the introductory trauma-informed care trainings.

**Chart 5.6. Quality of capacity building trainings provided by IJM by sector of work**



### 5.2.1. Impact of IJM’s Trainings on Anti-Trafficking Police

The significance and strengths of IJM’s training for anti-trafficking police were that they focused on building the capacities of the anti-trafficking police to understand and enforce the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208) and amended R.A. No. 10364. The trainings also built the capacities of the anti-trafficking police to use a wide

range of surveillance and investigation techniques that enabled them to conduct entrapment operations and to collect evidence against traffickers, evidence needed for proper case buildup, arrest, and prosecution. In particular, IJM taught anti-trafficking police *“how to prepare for surveillance, and what to expect and do during the entrapments [and] . . . during the rescue operations and all the undercover techniques”* (50, Government, Pampanga). The trainings also focused on *“how to get statements and affidavits to ensure that they contain the essential elements for the prosecution of the case”* (20, Government, Pampanga).

Anti-trafficking police appreciated the fact that IJM applied adult learning techniques that included a combination of lecture, discussion, and practical application of skills that enabled officers to acquire the necessary knowledge, attitudes, and skills needed to enforce anti-trafficking laws. Officers greatly appreciated the training approach that IJM took of teach officer how to apply the lessons and skills they learned during trainings through practical exercises.

*“Before we conducted operations, IJM conducted seminars and discussed the important and relevant matters of the anti-trafficking law in the Philippines, and they . . . instructed us on how to prepare credible reports and statements relevant to the circumstances surrounding the cases. They also conducted a seminar whenever they realized that there is something lacking. They did the seminar to develop your skills and techniques.”* (37, Government, Pampanga)

Another officer explained, *“all of the skills they [IJM] imparted to us have served as our guidance in every day work, and especially against the suspected traffickers”* (37, Government, Pampanga).

One of the cornerstones of IJM’s trainings was how to manage trafficking in person cases. This five-day training was delivered in phases, including to police managers, field training officers, and investigators assigned to the anti-trafficking police units. The training essentially used case studies and scenario-based training activities. On the fifth day of training, trainees were expected to carry out a live operation and apply lessons learned from the training. Eventually, the curriculum for this training was turned over to the PNP’s Department of Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM); now the PNP DIDM is responsible for delivering the training to investigators and new recruits.<sup>144</sup>

The so-called crown jewel<sup>145</sup> of IJM’s trainings for law enforcement officers is a ten-day course focused on investigations.

*It involved all coordination for DSWD and DOLE and case studies (good, bad, and in between), and had prosecutors come out and do that part of the training. We trained on tactical, evidence collection, raid operations and we identified establishments and broke into five teams and each given a target location and funds and materials to do surveillance, undercover, and identify elements of the crime. We need to know your plan for infiltration, and they were sitting with the instructors and learning about operational security. They had the intel and we knew what they needed to hit and direct them so they were able to identify infiltration. Then we met to determine what they found and if it matched what we found. Then, after that, we discussed here are the different cases and here is the one we should move forward with based upon which will go to prosecution. Then, they were able to execute a successful operation.”* (3, IJM, Manila)

Post-training follow-up was also important component of IJM’s trainings. Post-training follow-up usually occurred six months after the training and was designed to help ensure that officers were applying lessons learned in the trainings. One IJM respondent explained, *“Ultimately, what we want to do is see them learn it and apply it. We come back six months later and look at the skills that they apply . . . We were able to dial in deeper and get the members of the units that we were working with to conduct the operations”* (3, IJM, Manila). Based upon areas of weakness identified during post-training follow-up and in after-activity reviews<sup>146</sup>, IJM regularly conducted after-activity reviews with the police following operations and conducted follow-up refresher trainings. Refresher trainings focused on a wide range of topic

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<sup>144</sup> In 2012, IJM forged a MOU with the PNP to develop a training module for national use, for new police cadets and investigators.

<sup>145</sup> IJM Cebu Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, pp. 6-8.

<sup>146</sup> IJM conducts after action reviews following entrapment and raid and rescue operations conducted by the PNP anti-trafficking units to evaluate the operate and identify successful aspects of the operation, and challenges or limitations that officers still face when it comes applying lessons learned from the training and properly conducting entrapment and raid and rescue operations.

areas (see Box 6.1), including investigation techniques and skills, surveillance, operations planning, review of the anti-trafficking laws, and writing search warrants. In other words, IJM not only led trainings, but also engaged in mentorship to reinforce application of knowledge, skills, and abilities learned in the classroom-based trainings.

From the perspective of anti-trafficking police, IJM's trainings were 'very relevant' because *"before they conducted the training they asked the PNP, 'What do you need? What can we assist you in?' They tried to incorporate and augment the training. They tried to augment our learning, skills and knowledge. If there are new cases, they provide us with those"* (20, Government, Pampanga). As revealed in Chart 5.6, all PNP and NBI officers who participated in IJM's training reported they would recommend IJM's trainings to their colleagues or others in the field. One group of officers in Pampanga explained, *"During that time, we were only a chosen few. We wish other PNP personnel can experience and have that type of training with IJM"* (97, 98, 99, 100, Government, Pampanga). Similarly, another respondent reported,

*"I want others, especially those in the trafficking units, to have this standard in regard to training. If they teach this, that same training should be given in Cebu, Davao, and Manila. I have worked with other task forces; I have the expectation that they will have the same course and line of questions, the same expectation of answer . . . It is very important . . . the way IJM handles or teaches those trainings is very effective in comparison to the way PNP teaches it. PNP says, 'Here is your guide; read it.' IJM says, 'Here is number one and why it is important.' Participants get a strong grasp as to what it is about, compared to reading."* (20, Government, Pampanga)

The only concern that was expressed about IJM's training was that the procedures being taught were not always aligned with the PNP's standard operating procedures, or vice versa. One respondent maintained,

*"I think they should integrate their trainings with the published standard operating procedures of the PNP. For example, when they taught us about statement taking (affidavit taking), they say these are the important things you need to ask to establish the elements of the crime, and when the PNP published the standard operating procedures it is running on the same path, but they don't really meet. If they try to integrate with each other that would be great."* (20, Government, Pampanga)

### 5.2.2. [Impact of IJM's Trainings on DOJ Prosecutors](#)

The strengths of IJM's trainings for DOJ prosecutors were in the fact that they focused on *"skill enhancement and understanding the law"* (82, Government, Cebu). They also included simulations and mock trials that were especially beneficial because they gave participants *"more in-depth meaning of the law, and how to implement the law became clearer because there were technicalities."* IJM's trainings were particularly relevant because the trainers were able to show prosecutors *"this is how you do it"* (50, Government, Pampanga).

IJM maintained they *"were instrumental in training judges and prosecutors on the human trafficking law"* (31, IJM, Manila); however, there were a range of other trainings provided to prosecutors and judges by other organizations/agencies that were also identified as relevant to public prosecutors. It was IJM's case-based approach to training DOJ prosecutors about the anti-trafficking laws and prosecuting sex trafficking cases that was most effective.

*"Eventually we developed a type of gathering of case work experiences and pass it on and we wanted to take that posture because we are not public prosecutors. It seemed better to come from a position below and push the lessons up . . . we thought it was proper under the system. We also had some of the more garden-variety training/orientations, and through the years refined those trainings to talking about and dissecting the law, giving elements, talking about hard cases, and talking about how evidence is collected and preserved. We had a collaborative case work model, so there was passing of information between prosecutors and police; we could pass on information about the capacity and build bridges and mutual respect between the agencies . . . The training got more complex: we trained law enforcement and the judiciary; we helped to build the curriculum. Judges like to listen to other judges, and prosecutors as well, so we were called upon to do training."* (3, IJM, Manila)

Another IJM respondent explained,

*“Training for judges and prosecutors are more case-based and we use experiences from actual cases to demonstrate for the judges and prosecutor what are the common issues and challenges encountered in cases, and for prosecutors how to overcome those challenges, and how to judge such cases. And to train them on victim trauma and how to be sensitive to victims when presented in court. What is good about that competency enhancement training is police, prosecutor, judges, and social workers get to interact and they can understand legal process and what each needs and reasons and rational behind why judges do this procedure, and what prosecutors require, and to better understand each other’s part in the criminal justice process.” (36, IJM, Pampanga)*

In terms of relevance of the content of IJM’s trainings, DOJ prosecutors maintained IJM’s training were ‘very relevant’ because they demonstrated how prosecutors *“will be coordinating with other agencies . . . and focused on case build up, the trial, and who you will be working with; so it was very good for us. Also, how the process will be done if things like this will happen. [It was] very practical; we also do the mock court” (70, Government, Pampanga)*. Another respondent explained,

*“It was not until we attended the seminars that we were provided with the tools of the trade and knowing the acts, means, and elements of the offense [trafficking in persons]. This is a special law . . . it was recently amended . . . We need special trainings to prosecute the case. Because of the trainings, we have evolved into knowing the aspects. Even the judges, they have been invited and were clarified with the elements of the offense that will lead to the conviction of the accused.” (86, Government, Pampanga)*

Prosecutors also appreciated that IJM’s training focused on trafficking cases from other Asian countries and in the USA; this provided prosecutors with a better understanding of the international scope of human trafficking and legal challenges faced when prosecuting human trafficking cases in other countries and justice systems. It is notable that prosecutors recognized that IJM’s training differed from other trainings prosecutors received in the sense that in other trainings *“the atmosphere for the seminars was ordinarily that you would sit there and listen, but they [IJM] have specific modules. The methodology is to the effect that you have courtroom scenarios, actual cases, and the trainings are conducted in the manner of a real courtroom case. I remember participating in an actual simulated court proceeding” (86, Government, Pampanga)*.

Chart 5.6 revealed all respondents in the legal sector reported they would recommend IJM’s trainings to their colleagues or others in their field. In fact, the challenges for DOJ prosecutors were that *“not all members of the task force are trained.”* This same respondent went on to explain, *“[So] when I hear of trainings on human trafficking, I ask for two to three slots” (15 and 16, Government, Manila)*. Another respondent explained, *“I want everyone in my office to become experts. It is a pride of the city; I like them to be developed” (47, Government, Pampanga)*. The challenge in the DOJ is that *“there are no specific prosecutors for trafficking; any of us could have a trafficking case but have never been trained. When they [trafficking cases] are assigned to us, we [prosecutors] cannot say no” (72, Government, Cebu)*.

Public prosecutors in Pampanga maintained that because of the capacity building and technical assistance provided by IJM, they were able to achieve such a significant increase in the number of prosecutions and convictions in sex trafficking cases from 2012 to 2016. They were also able to witness a significant decrease in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the region, which was documented in IJM’s prevalence studies. As a result, one respondent explained, *“Other regional task forces have asked, ‘What have you been doing? Why is Region 3 exceptionally good?’ This same respondent went on to explain, “[I tell them it is] because I have IJM with me . . . if you have these trainings you would be as good as Region III” (50, Government,*

*“What they shared with us has enhanced us further to ensure the case we are prosecuting in court will result in a conviction, so they have shared the do’s and don’ts in prosecuting cases, the important evidence to present, the questions that have to be asked do to the sensitivity of the case and witnesses presenting.” (82, Government, Cebu)*

Pampanga). As a result of the significant increase in the number of prosecutions and convictions in sex trafficking in Pampanga, “others have come to look at how we are doing” (50, Government, Pampanga).

When prosecutors were asked what sort of skills and capacities they gained from IJM’s trainings, some respondents reported “we now have the mastery of the law with investigation and prosecution aspects, and with that I would say we are one step ahead of other prosecutors that are not trained” (50, Government, Pampanga). Other respondents reported they not only came to understand the anti-human trafficking laws and prosecution approaches, but also learned how to deal with other public justice system agencies. Based upon lessons learned from IJM’s trainings, many DOJ prosecutors maintained they can build a good case against sex traffickers. Many prosecutors also reported, “I became more empathetic with the victims and the realization of how important the trafficking case is, and how it [sex trafficking] is very rampant” (72, Government, Cebu).

### 5.2.3. Impact of IJM’s Trainings on Aftercare Providers

Through MOUs with the DSWD and private aftercare providers, IJM was able to focus on building the capacities of aftercare providers in a series of trainings. One of the strengths of IJM’s trainings for social workers and aftercare providers was in the subject matter, particularly the trainings on trauma-informed care and psychotherapy, those were topics that were new to social workers. One respondent explained,

*“Our social workers were trained on handling situations of abuse and understanding a child from exploitation in the sex trade; that was something new . . . So there was a need and IJM responded to it. I can still remember our social workers saying now they understand, they know why a particular child behaves the way they do; they need to understand and guide the children.”* (64, Government, Cebu)

Another respondent explained,

*“The training I really appreciated is the trauma-informed care training because I am now a trainer on trauma-informed care, and now I have seven roll-out trainings. This is one of the best trainings that they [IJM] offered, because it is also about the service providers. Now, we have an orientation for our social workers. We included one day on trauma-informed care, which is applicable to the staff. We have a lot of trainings now for staff on crisis care; we had several forums conducted by IJM. We have trainings of trainers for the child’s readiness curriculum and case management training.”* (67, Government, Cebu)

Over the years, as the anti-trafficking police began to work more closely and regularly with IJM to conduct raid and rescue operations, the number of rescued sex trafficking victims began to significantly increase. Rescued victims were transferred to the DSWD for protection, shelter, and rehabilitation services. In the early years, the DSWD was not equipped to deal with trafficking victims; many trafficking victims entered shelters with unique traumas and were resistant to being rescued and sheltered. Some trafficking victims became combative and aggressive, and destroyed property in the shelters and fought with staff to escape the shelters. This was a challenge for shelter directors and staff who did not understand the attitudes and behaviors of rescued sex trafficking victims. It was also difficult for other clients living in the shelters who were recovering from various forms of violence, abuse, and neglect.

In the early years, social workers feared parents of sex trafficking victims would file a writ of habeas corpus<sup>147</sup> against them for holding their children in a shelter following a raid and rescue operation. IJM provided trainings to DSWD social workers to help them understand the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208) and amended R.A. No. 10364, which protected social workers from being sued in such situations.

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<sup>147</sup> A writ of habeas corpus is used to bring a prisoner or other detainee before the court to determine if the person's imprisonment or detention is lawful. A *habeas* petition proceeds as a civil action against the State agent who holds the defendant in custody. It can also be used to examine any extradition processes used, amount of bail, and the jurisdiction of the court. Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute (LII). Retrieved on January 18, 2017 from: [https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas\\_corpus](https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus)

*“Before they were more hesitant and they were afraid they would be sued. We had one case, the parents filed habeas corpus against the DSWD. For that we cannot intervene, I just assisted one of the solicitor generals that represented the DSWD. There is still harassment with the social workers. Upon learning about the law, now that it was amended, they learned about the protection, that the law protected them from being sued. They are more confident now, the prosecutors, the RAHTTG and social workers to do the work on their own. They are more equipped now.” (54, IJM, Pampanga)*

Similarly, an IJM respondent recalled,

*“The first thing that IJM realized in all the research was that government, the DSWD, didn’t really understand the kind of trauma that victims/children had gone through. In effect, government had failed to increase competencies to understand trauma and to provide expert care when survivors presented trauma. Social workers in shelter who come with law enforcement during rescue operations didn’t have much knowledge on trauma and handling survivors of trauma. Both social work and law enforcement partners brought rescued children to the police department, but there was nothing. When children were rescued from bars they were high on drugs, they didn’t even have clothes, and they were crowded in one room at the police department with no amenities. So, it was unkind and insensitive to the plight of rescued victims. So, IJM showed there is a better way to handle clients, so trauma-informed care and trauma-informed psychotherapy training for government and NGOs was started. On that aspect IJM has been very strong bringing in experts from the USA and other parts of the world to provide training for psychologists and social workers handling rescued victims.” (57, IJM, Cebu)*

Eventually, in each of the project areas, the DSWD established teams of trained social workers who could be on call to accompany anti-trafficking police units when raid and rescue operations occurred. Social workers were trained to provide post-rescue care to sex trafficking victims, and trained on the procedures for transporting rescued victims to processing facilities where they receive victim-centered and gender-sensitive care and support. Social workers were also trained to provide support to trafficking victims during the police interviews.

*“Since trafficking cases started to rise here, the DSWD started to develop this team. Almost every day they get the requests to assist law enforcement, so they have established a team and every day have assigned people to send to assist during rescue operations. We are involved in training these social workers on how to work with clients during rescue and how to work with partners like in law enforcement, and what are the things that are non-negotiable during rescue. Some are invited to do case management training, handling clients after rescue, how to help clients go through the process of rehabilitation, and how to help the parents and community to do reintegration, and how to prevent re-trafficking of clients reintegrated back to the community. In the training, we are involved in trauma-informed care training for the partner . . . After trained on the trauma-informed psychotherapy we monitor the trained partners in how they implement the trainings.” (7, IJM, Manila)*

IJM’s trainings ultimately made aftercare providers *“more sensitive to the needs of the client [trafficking survivors] . . . We are more careful in terms of not re-traumatizing patients by talking to them, and the way we form our questions” (9 and 10, Government, Manila).*

In terms of the relevance of the content of IJM’s trainings, from the perspective of social workers and aftercare providers, *“what they [IJM] brought into the Philippines is evidence-based.”* This same respondent reported they thought that *“cognitive behavior is a good way for the children to cope with trauma, as well as trauma-informed care. [Moreover] the trauma-informed care module was very helpful as a health provider” (9 and 10, Government, Manila).* Aftercare providers also recognized that,

*“Because all of IJM’s trainings are the results of what are the problems encountered during the implementation or handling of the trafficking survivors, it is not a training just for the sake of training. [Rather] all of the trainings are implemented because there is a need to address the needs of trafficking survivors and service providers.” (67, Government, Cebu)*

DSWD social workers also appreciated the fact that IJM was able to provide training to almost all social workers in the project areas; not just one or two. As one respondent explained, “The DSWD has limited resources, so that when there is a training, only one can go and is able to participate, but with IJM all of us here participate” (74, Government, Cebu). Another strength of IJM’s trainings was that “they were able to impart the knowledge . . . [and] after the trainings they follow up and have consultations. It is a regular consultation every three months, until the social workers were able to practice the training” (95, Government, Pampanga).

### 5.3. Technical Assistance Provided by IJM

IJM typically coupled their capacity building trainings with technical assistance. IJM provided technical assistance to the PNP and NBI anti-trafficking units, DOJ prosecutors, DSWD and LGU social workers, and private aftercare providers. Table 5.2 shows that 70.0% of respondents reported IJM provided them and others in their agency/organization with technical assistance or guidance. IJM’s technical assistance came in various forms, including: resource assistance and logistical support; technical expertise to support the application of knowledge and skills learned through trainings; after-activity reviews; case conferences; and other forms of technical guidance and assistance with victims and case processing. The technical assistance provided by IJM is discussed briefly here, and in more depth in Chapters 6 through 9.

| Table 5.2. Technical assistance provided by IJM  |                             |      |
|--|-----------------------------|------|
| Did IJM provided you and others in your agency/organization with technical assistance or guidance? | Sample<br>N=70 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|  | n                           | %    |
| Yes  | 49                          | 70.0 |
| No   | 20                          | 28.6 |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes only government officials and CSO staff

The data in Table 5.2 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 5.7 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 76.3% of government officials reported they were provided with technical assistance or guidance from IJM, compared to only 36.4% of CSO staff.

**Chart 5.7. Technical assistance provided by IJM by type of agency**





Chart 5.8 shows differences based upon sector of work. Respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (75.0%), legal sector (68.8%), and aftercare sector (67.6%) were nearly equally likely to receive technical assistance or guidance from IJM. IJM provided government officials with not only technical assistance, but also financial and resource assistance to support their efforts to combat child sex trafficking and to support the rehabilitation, recovery, and reintegration of survivors of child sex trafficking.

**Chart 5.8. Technical assistance provided by IJM by sector of work**



In addition to providing specialized equipment and assistance, drawing up operation plans, discussing tactical strategies, and supporting proper case buildup, government officials reported IJM “provided support on every case we handled, they made sure the operation was successful. They provided us with financial assistance, even moral and spiritual assistance that we walk the straight line” (37, Government, Pampanga). Another official explained, “When it comes to the evidence collection, they observe us and support us, and give the necessary equipment. Everything we need, they provide everything we need when it comes to logistical operations” (97, 98, 99, 100, Government, Pampanga).

Government officials spoke highly of the technical assistance and guidance that IJM provided to public prosecutors, which helped to ensure the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, particularly IJM-supported cases.

*“You are allowed as a private lawyer to act as prosecutors as long as you are supervised by a prosecutor. It was better for our office to give them a free reign. They say sir, I need to file a motion on this and this; there is a lot of cooperation. The trial prosecutor is there and the IJM lawyer, and the nitty gritty they also collaborate and when IJM misses something or is objected to, the prosecutor is there. But more often than not, we give them free reign. In the courtroom, the terms too many cooks really apply.” (47, Government, Pampanga)*

Given the heavy caseload of public prosecutors, it was good that IJM lawyers were there to prosecute child sex trafficking cases as private prosecutors. One official explained, “Given the volume of cases each prosecutor is handling in this country, IJM, because their lawyers actively handle cases and are very good lawyers, so we could depend on them for a good outcome of the case. It was sort of the cases they were handling that were cases down from our load” (117, Government, Cebu). Respondents also recognized that IJM was able to ensure victims appeared in court and were prepared to testify during trial proceedings. One official explained, “When I need a witness from a case filed in court, I ask IJM to provide the witness; they can easily do that. Not only witnesses connected with the government, but also the complainant who are the victims” (88, Government, Manila). Similarly, another respondent reported,

*“I admire the IJM lawyers, because although they are experts in trafficking, they always defer to us and are respectful; they send memorandums for us to review. You cannot be an IJM lawyer if you are not very kind or soft spoken. It is more on the jurisprudence they include in the pleadings that helped me a lot, I also learned from that.” (72, Government, Cebu)*

In addition to prosecuting child sex trafficking cases as private prosecutors, IJM also “wanted to make sure public prosecutors were empowered and had the tools needed; [therefore] we put together a binder of templates and toolkits so that they would have the technical assistance needed for every case.” This same respondent explained,

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*“Our lawyers are available to meet with them [public prosecutors] if they want to do a strategy session for a case. If they are having a hard time finding a victim, our lawyers will try to find the victim. We will sit with the public prosecutors the first time they are doing a victim prep prior to a case. We advise and mentor them, we observe what they are doing to provide specific advice and mentorship afterward . . . If the defense files a motion, we ask what they are going to handle that.” (59, IJM, Cebu)*

Across sectors, government officials recognized that IJM’s technical assistance and guidance supported law enforcement agencies and DOJ public prosecutors, as well as the IACAT. Two respondents explained, *“IJM’s presence strengthens the operations in the IACAT and because of their support we saw a jump in the number of cases filed and more counter trafficking operations being carried out” (15 and 16, Government, Manila).*

## CHAPTER 6: STRATEGIC SUPPORT TO IMPROVE ABILITIES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT TO COMBAT CHILD SEX TRAFFICKING

### Chapter Highlights

- With support from IJM, the PNP created regional anti-trafficking units dedicated to combatting human trafficking by investigating and conducting operations, rescuing trafficking victims, and arresting and charging traffickers
- IJM provided NBI and PNP anti-trafficking units with capacity building trainings, logistical support, and technical assistance to enforce the anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking
- IJM played an important role in providing intelligence about child sex trafficking cases to the PNP and NBI through intervention requests, and provided resources and legal and logistical support to conduct surveillance and investigations, and gather evidence needed to validate information provided in the intervention requests
- 93.2% of respondents reported the anti-trafficking police got better at investigations and evidence collection in sex trafficking cases; of which 95.1% maintained IJM contributed to improving investigations and evidence collection techniques of the anti-trafficking police
- 92.9% of respondents reported the anti-trafficking police got better at conducting raid and rescue operations; of which 100.0% maintained IJM contributed to improving raid and rescue operations of the anti-trafficking police
- From 2007 to 2015, there were 216 IJM-supported raid and rescue operations, of which 196 were focused on child sex trafficking (130 in Cebu, 34 in Manila, and 31 in Pampanga)
- With support from IJM, anti-trafficking police went from investigating street-based trafficking to conducting raid and rescue operations in entertainment establishments (larger sex trafficking operations)
- From 2003 to 2015, IJM-supported the rescue of 777 children who were being sexually exploited commercially; of which 759 were children rescued from sex trafficking (352 were in Cebu, 273 in Manila, and 134 in Pampanga)
- 67.2% of respondents thought the anti-trafficking police got better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims, 22.4% did not know, of which 97.4% maintained IJM contributed to those improvements
- 86.4% of respondents recognized the anti-trafficking police got better at arresting sex traffickers, of which 100.0% maintained IJM contributed to improving the police's abilities to arrest sex traffickers
- From 2003 to 2015, 816 suspects were arrested for commercial sexual exploitation with IJM's support, and 722 arrests were for child sex trafficking (412 in Manila, 211 in Cebu, and 109 in Pampanga)
- On a 10-point scale respondents were quite confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the anti-trafficking police's abilities to investigate and collect evidence in sex trafficking cases (7.6), conduct raid and rescue operations (8.3), interview child sex trafficking victims (7.5), and arrest sex traffickers (7.8)
- Most common challenges to sustainability are resources, turnover of law enforcement officers assigned to anti-trafficking units, coordination between agencies, and corruption

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IJM's Program outcomes focused on creating and developing dedicated anti-trafficking law enforcement units, implementing a national level law enforcement training program in partnership with the PNP, and strengthening coordination protocols between the PNP, DOJ, and DSWD. This chapter evaluates the impact of IJM's Program on achieving each of these outcomes and improving the abilities of law enforcement to combat child sex trafficking. This chapter also evaluates the relevance, effectiveness, and impact of the strategic support that IJM provided to the PNP and NBI anti-trafficking units.

In general, findings demonstrate that IJM’s efforts resulted in the establishment of dedicated PNP regional anti-trafficking units in the three project areas. IJM’s efforts also resulted in improvements in the abilities of anti-trafficking police units to investigate child sex trafficking cases, buildup cases, conduct raid and rescue operations, interview sex trafficking victims, and arrest traffickers. The findings demonstrate how strategic support provided by IJM brought about system transformation<sup>148</sup> in the PNP, including: the establishment of dedicated regional anti-trafficking units in the PNP; development of knowledge, skills, and capacities of anti-trafficking police to effectively enforce the anti-trafficking laws, rescue victims, and arrest perpetrators; and, strengthened coordination between the PNP, DSWD, DOLE and DOJ. Findings also demonstrate there is a high likelihood that improvements made in the abilities of anti-trafficking police to combat child sex trafficking can be sustained over time.

## 6.1. Anti-Human Trafficking Law Enforcement Unit

In keeping with international conventions and protocols, and national anti-trafficking legislation, it is the government’s responsibility to prosecute trafficking crimes, and to protect and assist trafficking victims in their rehabilitation, recovery, and restoration. Since the enactment of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208), anti-trafficking units were established in the NBI and the PNP. Although the PNP did not initially have dedicated anti-trafficking units, with support and assistance from IJM, the PNP created regional anti-trafficking units that were dedicated to combatting human trafficking by investigating and conducting operations, rescuing trafficking victims, and arresting and charging traffickers. Over the years, IJM provided officers in both the NBI and PNP anti-trafficking units with capacity building trainings on child sex trafficking, and logistical support and technical assistance to enforce the anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking.

### 6.1.1. [NBI Anti-Human Trafficking Division](#)

The NBI had the first dedicated Anti-Human Trafficking Division (AHTRAD) in Metro Manila. Although based in Manila, NBI AHTRAD’s jurisdiction is the whole of the country; this has been a challenge at times, given the division is made up of approximately 20 agents. Nevertheless, the *“NBI AHTRAD conveys a strong message that the government is serious in addressing trafficking”* (1, IJM, Manila).

Over the years, IJM did not provide as much training or support to the NBI as it did to the PNP. This is mainly because the NBI AHTRAD *“are more resourced; they have higher capacity”* (1, IJM, Manila). NBI AHTRAD agents were also more specialized and tended to receive more training than PNP officers. NBI agents often have a legal background, so they were more aware of the legal aspects of case buildup, and their cases were more likely to reach conviction. Over the years, as the IACAT was strengthened with increased funding, anti-trafficking operations of the NBI AHTRAD increased and became more organized.

When IJM did support the NBI AHTRAD, it was *“more on the logistical support in every operation IJM is involved in. When IJM is on board they provide the vehicles and food [for] victims and operatives. They also help in the prosecution. If you are going to testify, they brief you before you testify in court, so chances of convictions are increasing”* (29 and 30, Government, Manila).

### 6.1.2. [PNP Regional Anti-Trafficking Units](#)

Since 2008, IJM invested heavily in providing resources and strategic support to establish dedicated regional anti-trafficking units in the PNP. As IJM’s Program evolved and expanded to the three project areas, there were changes in the environment and politics that IJM had to adapt to. There were also lessons learned. As a result, there were shifts in IJM’s approach to and vision for dedicated regional anti-trafficking units in the PNP. IJM maintained, *“as we worked on the ground with several dedicated anti-trafficking units, advocacy [staff in IJM] was working at a policy level for a unit that would be there even if we are not; something sustainable”* (18, IJM, Manila). The challenge for IJM was that in the PNP, the regional anti-trafficking units were *“not long lasting”* because they were not part of the permanent PNP

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<sup>148</sup> During the period of 2003 to 2015, the terminology justice system transformation was regularly used; however, in recent year IJM Philippines has moved away from using the term justice system transformation with certain government partners, and have shifted to “enhancing existing justice structure to effectively address the targeted issue.”

command structure. Thus, each new PNP regional director had the ability to cut funding to or dissolve the regional anti-trafficking units. This same respondent explained, *“When IJM realized this problem, the PNP then worked with the authorities to develop a dedicated anti-trafficking unit that is part of the PNP; that is part of the law that PNP and NBI should have their own anti-trafficking unit”* (18, IJM, Manila). In 2014, the WCPC was established as the dedicated anti-trafficking units in the PNP’s command structure, which significantly improved chances of sustainability.

The evaluation of PNP dedicated regional anti-trafficking units is described in the sections that follow. (For a summary description of the evolution of PNP regional anti-trafficking units in the three project areas see Chapter 4, Table 4.1).

*PNP Regional Anti-Trafficking Units in Metro Cebu.* In 2008, as part of Project Lantern, IJM began advocating for the creation of dedicated anti-trafficking units in the PNP. That same year, IJM worked with the PNP to establish a Regional Special Investigations Unit (RSIU) in Metro Cebu that could conduct investigations and operations related to child sex trafficking. The RSIU was not a truly ‘dedicated’ unit, as officers assigned to the RSIU were expected to keep their existing unit assignments and handle all crimes, not just human trafficking. There were also a lot of transfers and turnover of officers assigned to the RSIU. Given the challenges faced by the RSIU, IJM reportedly, *“brainstormed and thought the best way was to develop regional anti-trafficking units [in the PNP]”* (1, IJM, Manila). Eventually, IJM recognized it is better to have a regional anti-trafficking unit because the unit needed to have a wider jurisdiction to conduct investigations and operations across cities and jurisdictions within regions. IJM also recognized it should be a dedicated unit *“made up of law enforcement professionals who are ready and available to investigate cases, receive referrals and do rescue operations. You have the bodies with the time and the mandate to do that”* (59, IJM, Cebu).

IJM began their efforts to create a dedicated regional anti-trafficking law enforcement unit in Metro Cebu. In 2009, IJM signed a MOU with the PNP to create a specialized investigation unit call the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (RAHTTF-7), which was *“conferred with plenary authority to conduct surveillance, monitoring, investigation, and to affect arrests, and extend assistance in the prosecution of persons engaged in trafficking in persons for prostitution.”*<sup>149</sup> During the first year of operation (August 2009 to July 2010), the RAHTTF-7 proved to be effective in its mandate by conducting nine law enforcement operations against various establishments and individuals involved in trafficking activities; resulting in the removal of about 245 women and girls from exploitative situations, the arrest of 31 suspected traffickers, and filing of eight trafficking in persons cases with the prosecutor’s office.<sup>150</sup> Given RAHTTF-7’s success in Metro Cebu, IJM and the PNP entered into a second MOU for continued strategic support from IJM to build the capacities and capabilities of the RAHTTF-7 to *“curb the rising incidence of trafficking in persons for prostitution in Metro Cebu.”*<sup>151</sup> The RAHTTF-7 was the first dedicated anti-trafficking unit in Cebu, and the one that IJM invested in most heavily.

*“I don’t think the prevalence of child sex trafficking would have gone down without the RAHTTF-7 in Cebu. It creates a strong message to the traffickers, to that community, that the police are serious in addressing the issue.”* (1, IJM, Manila)

*“IJM provided their office space outside of the camp, we were paying the rent, and providing office supplies, just helping them out. We also provided intervention requests to them, as well as legal and aftercare and logistical support.”* (8, IJM, Manila)

Eventually, the RAHTTF-7 was recognized as *“one of the most effective units in the Central Philippines, and the RAHTTF-7 was given an award by the Office of the President as one of the most effective police units”* (1, IJM, Manila). Successes achieved brought recognition to the RAHTTF-7, as well as to IJM, and motivated members of the police task force.

<sup>149</sup> Memorandum of Understand, Philippine National Police, Police Region Office – 7 and International Justice Mission-Cebu, August 16, 2010, p. 1.

<sup>150</sup> Memorandum of Understand, Philippine National Police, Police Region Office – 7 and International Justice Mission-Cebu, August 16, 2010, p. 1.

<sup>151</sup> Memorandum of Understand, Philippine National Police, Police Region Office – 7 and International Justice Mission-Cebu, August 16, 2010, p. 1.

*“When they do successful operations, and get convictions, they see it works, they see results. If they don’t see results in law enforcement it is sort of demoralizing. But, RAHTTF-7 saw convictions and it motivated them to do something. IJM also provided a commendation letter to their chief for doing good work, coming to the hearing and helping for the case. It goes in their file and helps, it is good for the reconciliation.” (59, IJM, Cebu)*

From 2009 to 2015, IJM had four different MOUs with the PNP to provide training, technical assistance, and legal and logistic support to the RAHTTF-7. In 2015, efforts to combat human trafficking were shifted to the newly formed WCPC Visayas Field Unit. That same year, IJM entered into a MOU with the PNP to provide trainings, technical assistance, and legal and logistical support to the WCPC Visayas Field Unit. One respondent described the level of support and assistance that IJM provided to the WCPC Visayas Field Unit since it was established in 2015.

*“They all got a two-week training in Manila and we gave them a one-week training here on online investigations, so they can use that for online sexual exploitation of children or child sex trafficking. They receive ongoing mentoring. Every case we are talking through with them and they receive legal consultation from our lawyers. [IJM provides] ongoing mentoring and training. For IT investigations, we are able to provide them with IT consultations and laptops to do investigations.” (59, IJM, Cebu)*

[PNP Regional Anti-Trafficking Units in Metro Manila](#). In Metro Manila, there were originally several different PNP units designated as responsible for anti-trafficking initiatives, including the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) and the PNP Anti-Transnational Crime Unit (ATCU). In 2014, through various advocacy efforts and working with the IACAT and the DILG, a resolution was passed to create the WCPC, a national specialized unit in the PNP responsible for investigating sex trafficking cases and violence against women and children.<sup>152</sup> The WCPC is headquartered in Manila with unit offices in Manila, Cebu and Mindanao. Relevant to this evaluation is the WCPC Luzon Unit in Manila and the WCPC Visayas Field Unit in Cebu; both units report to WCPC leadership in Manila. IJM played a significant role in advocating for such a resolution, which ultimately led to the creation of the WCPC.

IJM also *“assisted in influencing the staff plan for the unit [WCPC], and advocated for more officers to be assigned to the unit. It is still a work in process . . . This year we met with the Secretary of Interior and LGU to make sure the WCPC staffing and resources will be sustained. We submitted a roadmap for the resources, staffing, equipment and facilities of the WCPC” (1, IJM, Manila).*

In 2014, IJM signed an MOU with the WCPC Luzon Unit and since then provided the unit with trainings, financial support, technical assistance, and legal and logistical support. From the perspective of IJM, the WCPC Luzon Unit *“produced an extraordinary number of rescues, especially last year, and helped in a reduction of the prevalence” (1, IJM, Manila).* Another respondent added, *“In just those six months [July – December 2015], they [WCPC Luzon Unit] conducted more than 20 establishment and street-based operations” (8, IJM, Manila).*

Although the majority of government respondents were not fully aware of the important role IJM played over the years in advocating for and establishing dedicated regional anti-trafficking units in the PNP, a few government officials recognized that IJM was *“the ones that strongly lobbied [for] the creation of the law [anti-trafficking law], and the law mandates the creation of a specialized anti-trafficking police unit.”* This same respondent went on to explain, *“They probably knew from the start that they need a focused unit; that is why the WCPC was transformed to become the anti-human trafficking unit” (19, Government, Manila).* Despite lack of awareness as to IJM’s role in lobbying the government and supporting the establishment of dedicated regional anti-

*“I think they [the WCPC] see us as a partner they trust. I think they see us as an added value, they are comfortable calling us for difficult questions on investigations, on evidence . . . We were quite helpful in that transition from being a newly organized unit to being a more established and effective unit . . . Also, because of our media engagement we are able to increase visibility or prominence of the WCPC and share their extraordinary results or success with partners here and abroad.” (1, IJM, Manila)*

<sup>152</sup> It is in the R.A. No. 10364 that the PNP have a specialized police unit to combat trafficking in persons.

trafficking units in the PNP, this was well documented in IJM program documents and MOUs which were part of the desk review.

[PNP Regional Anti-Trafficking Units in Pampanga](#). In 2012, IJM expanded their anti-trafficking efforts to Pampanga. IJM entered into a MOU with the PNP in Region 3 to create a specialized investigation unit called the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Special Operations Group (RAHTSOG-3). In Pampanga, IJM found they faced similar challenges with the RAHTSOG-3, as it did with the RSIU in Cebu. In particular, some officers were not assigned to the RAHTSOG-3 full-time; this hampered the unit's effectiveness. Nevertheless, the RAHTSOG-3 was better resourced and more effective than the RSIU. In 2014, based upon lessons learned from the RAHTTF-7 in Cebu, the RAHTSOG-3 was expanded and replaced by the Regional Anti-Trafficking Trafficking Task Group (RATTG-3), which was a truly dedicated anti-trafficking unit, similar in structure to the RAHTTF-7 in Cebu. IJM recognized that the RATTG-3 was able to have significant impact in Region III in just a few years.

*"I would say you can measure the improvement in the type of cases produced and filed. For a long time in Region 3, no one has been convicted. There were cases filed, but those were ways some police officials extorted money. They could easily be bribed and cases dismissed. That is why no one has been convicted. After RATTG-3 there has been an increase in the quantity of cases filed in court, and that created a deterrence because they recognize that police are doing the investigation and rescue operations in the area . . . Well supported cases are filed in court and those cases have resulted in convictions. We got the first conviction in 2013. For IJM-supported cases, we obtained 12 convictions. There are now 100s of cases being prosecuted in court. There is now a reliable unit that people can go to; if there are trafficking cases they can report." (36, IJM, Pampanga)*

Up until 2016, IJM continued their support to the RATTG-3 through a MOU. In 2016, IJM's support to the RATTG-3 waned, given the fact that IJM was closing its Pampanga FO following significant reductions in child sex trafficking in Region III, coupled with the fact that IJM established an MOU with the WCPC Luzon Unit in Metro Manila (a regional unit that includes the jurisdiction of Pampanga). Nevertheless, IJM maintained, "we still support them to find resources to sustain their operations, we have networked them with the DOJ regional anti-trafficking task force. The RATTG-3 is not well supported, so we are working for the DOJ to provide funds for the operations" (36, IJM, Pampanga).

*"If you look at 2013, the operations between NBI and PNP were split. But by 2014, 80% or more were done by the PNP. They had done enough cases, developed their own roles – they knew who was the evidence collector and who was taking the statements from the victims – they developed their own team. Even now, the PNP is doing more operations than the NBI." (5, IJM, Manila)*

## 6.2. IJM's Efforts to Provide Intelligence about Child Sex Trafficking

Although the PNP and NBI have their own intelligence gathering approaches and sources, they also act on intelligence that comes from reports from other organizations/agencies. Over the years, IJM played an important role in providing intelligence about child sex trafficking cases to both the PNP and NBI through intervention requests.

*"From our end, we ensure everything the police need to know is included in the intervention request – the victims, suspected perpetrators, modus operandi, location of the crime, and other relevant things. The background of the case is included in the intervention request. It is up to the police to validate, but it makes their work faster." (1, IJM, Manila)*

In many cases, IJM also provided resources, technical assistance, and logistical support to the anti-trafficking units to conduct surveillance and investigations, and gather evidence needed to validate the information provided by IJM in the intervention requests.

*"We write up in an intervention request that includes who suspects and victims are and the violation of the law . . . Then I take the request to law enforcement and build the case alongside them, but they*

*[PNP or NBI] need to do their own investigation and utilize that information as a basis for the operation.” (5, IJM, Manila)*

Although PNP and NBI officers maintained they were not more likely to pursue trafficking cases brought forward by IJM, they did recognize that the intervention requests provided by IJM were detailed and the intelligence gathered was credible and in most cases verifiable. In most cases, IJM was there to support the anti-trafficking units in their efforts to conduct surveillance and investigations, and to conduct case buildup and entrapment operations.

*“They try to build a case on their own and give an intervention request to the PNP, and coordinate with us through the intervention requested . . . so, we verify the information, we conduct surveillance and case build up to confirm. Once confirmed we schedule the operation, during the operation the PNP is the lead.” (20, Government, Pampanga)*

In comparison, IJM respondents maintained NBI and PNP anti-trafficking units were actually more likely to pursue sex trafficking cases brought forward by IJM *“because, we [IJM] already established the credibility and they [PNP and NBI] know if they act on the cases we support them all throughout, until prosecution, so they know the cases are well documented and well investigated . . . So, they are confident in pursuing the cases because they know the potential for success is high and that can make them look good and they know they will not be doing all the work” (36, IJM, Pampanga).*

At the time of this evaluation, PNP anti-trafficking units were taking more of a lead when it came to information validation work, including surveillance, investigations, and case buildup. They only called upon IJM for occasional resource support, technical assistance, and legal advice.

### 6.3. Improvement in Investigations and Evidence Collection

This evaluation found that since 2003, the anti-trafficking police (particularly in the PNP) got better at investigations and evidence collection in sex trafficking cases, and that IJM contributed to improving investigations and evidence collection techniques of the anti-trafficking police. Table 6.1 shows that among a sample of 44 respondents, 93.2% reported that since 2003, the anti-trafficking police got better at investigations and evidence collection in sex trafficking cases. Among respondents who recognized improvement, 95.1% reported IJM contributed to improving investigations and evidence collection techniques of the anti-trafficking police.

| Table 6.1. Improvement in anti-trafficking police investigations and evidence collection                                      |                          |          |
|---|--------------------------|----------|
| <u>Since 2003, the anti-trafficking police got better at investigations and evidence collection in sex trafficking cases?</u> | Sample N=44 <sup>1</sup> |          |
|   | <u>n</u>                 | <u>%</u> |
| Yes   | 41                       | 93.2     |
| No  | 2                        | 4.5      |
| Do not know   | 1                        | 2.3      |
| <u>IJM contributed to improving investigations and evidence collection techniques of the anti-trafficking police?</u>         | N=41 <sup>1</sup>        |          |
|   |                          |          |
| Yes   | 39                       | 95.1     |
| No  | 0                        | 0.0      |

<sup>1</sup> Sample includes only IJM and government officials from the law enforcement/investigative and legal sectors, and IJM managers.

Data in Table 6.1 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 6.1 shows differences based upon type of agency, particularly differences between IJM respondents and government officials. It is notable that 100.0% of IJM respondents and 91.4% of government officials reported that since 2003, the anti-trafficking police got better at investigations and evidence collection in sex trafficking cases. Among respondents who recognized improvement in the capabilities of the anti-trafficking police, 100.0% of IJM respondents and 93.8% of government officials reported IJM contributed to improving investigations and evidence collection techniques of the anti-trafficking police.

*“Our expat investigators are quite good at coaching them [police] on the best practices, even just taking photos of evidence with a label. [Before] they just put all the evidence in one bag . . . Now they are recording evidence and taking a photograph; the item seized, description, remarks, and signature – the logs. The evidence gets passed on to lawyers and used in trial.” (1, IJM, Manila)*

Government respondents recognized the important contribution that IJM made to improving evidence collection and evidence storage techniques of the anti-trafficking police. One respondent explained, *“Since we work with IJM, I think they are the one that taught us how to collect evidence properly . . . I remember them [IJM] asking who is the evidence collector and the photographer, and we made a list of personnel and assigned everyone responsibilities. We learned it from IJM” (21, Government, Manila).* Similarly, another respondent added,

*“IJM taught us how to properly seal and tag the evidence. They showed the standard, but having no budget to buy those things we tried to improvise. When I arrived that was a problem, I see the evidence in the room in the black storage bags, and I tried to fix that by putting a responsible person first. Whoever seized evidence they were in charge, but I assigned one person to be responsible for all evidence collection. Giving them that since of responsibility. It is one important improvement for me, it really helps.” (20, Government, Pampanga)*

IJM’s Program *“played a vital role, because based upon experience in prosecuting these cases, the case would rise or fall depending upon the quality of the evidence and the affidavits produced, also the quality of the evidence that has been preserved linking the perpetrators to the crime” (36, IJM, Pampanga).*

**Chart 6.1. Improvement in anti-trafficking police investigations and evidence collection by type of agency**






Chart 6.2 shows differences based upon project area. In particular, 94.1% of respondents in Manila, 92.9% in Pampanga, and 92.3% in Cebu reported that since 2003, the anti-trafficking police got better at investigations and evidence collection related to sex trafficking cases. Among respondents who recognized improvement, 100.0% of respondents in Manila and Pampanga, and 83.3% in Cebu reported IJM contributed to improving investigations and evidence collection technique of the anti-trafficking police.

**Chart 6.2. Improvement in anti-trafficking police investigations and evidence collection by project area**



Finally, Chart 6.3 shows differences based upon sector of work. In particular, 100.0% of IJM managers, 93.3% of respondents in the legal sector, and 91.3% in the law enforcement/investigative sector reported that since 2003, the anti-trafficking police got better at investigations and evidence collection related to sex trafficking cases. Among respondents who recognized improvement, 100.0% of IJM managers, 95.2% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector, and 92.9% in the legal sector reported that IJM contributed to improving investigations and evidence collection techniques of the anti-trafficking police.

**Chart 6.3. Improvement in anti-trafficking police investigations and evidence collection by sector of work**



Investigation and evidence collection are very important to case buildup in sex trafficking cases. This evaluation established that IJM did contribute to improving the abilities of the anti-trafficking police, particularly in the PNP, to conduct investigations and collect evidence for purposes of case buildup through capacity building and providing the police with surveillance equipment, logistical support, and legal advice. IJM encouraged and participated in case conferences with the anti-trafficking police to plan for and support proper case buildup practices. It was during case conferences that “we have a sharing of opinions on what we decided to achieve on the quality of evidence we want to gather and how to prepare the evidence for the filling of the complaint by the prosecutions office and in the court” (79, Government, Cebu). The anti-trafficking police

*“It is very important that we do not only get the right pieces of evidence that we can show the court, but we need to maintain the integrity of the evidence and that starts from the collection of evidence, that we do not add anything or lose anything. Evidence that satisfies relevance and competency of the evidence, it shows in a favorable prosecution from the court. It is really important, the integrity of the evidence.”*  
(20, Government, Pampanga)

also got better at knowing and understanding what evidence to submit to DOJ prosecutors to demonstrate probable cause and the elements of the crime. Being able to effectively do so improved the chances of charges being filed against traffickers, and prosecution and conviction of sex trafficking cases. One respondent explained, *“Now they have gotten better, they know what to attach to their files now . . . They know how to document the operations now.”* This same respondent added,

*“They know how to gather evidence now and to keep evidence; but there was a time when evidence was gone. But they know the process and what evidence is needed to prosecute the case. During the rescue operations, they gather the evidence, they keep the evidence (the actual evidence), but they need a picture of the evidence to be attached to their inquest documents to be presented to the prosecutor to determine probable cause. After that, once the prosecution continues and then they will present the evidence.”* (54, IJM, Pampanga)

In the Philippines, physical evidence of the crime is relevant; however, more important is testimony of victims or witnesses. In many sex trafficking cases, it is *“more about the availability of the witness, the complainant; we are oral testimony driven courts. If there is not someone there to say this, then there will likely be no conviction. The problem is 90% oral is needed and just 10% evidence. Give me a very participant complainant or witness and I can guarantee a conviction. That is a situation in the Philippines, with the complainant or witness, without her, no matter how good the evidence, there will be no conviction”* (47, Government, Pampanga).

Given the evidence and testimony requirements in sex trafficking cases, IJM was an important partner to both the police and DOJ prosecutors because they were able to prepare child sex trafficking victims to testify in court, as well as transported them to court to ensure their appearance and testimony in court trial proceedings (this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7). Because, after all, *“without the testimony of the private clients, the case is almost always dismissed by the court. That is my frustration . . . they [victims] are paid by the offenders and don’t appear in court”* (86, Government, Pampanga).

Over the years, improved police investigations, evidence collection, and case buildup led to increases in convictions in child sex trafficking cases brought forward by the anti-trafficking units in the three project areas. IJM reported, *“Now we are seeing a lot more convictions, the police are providing better quality evidence to the prosecutors. If the police provide shallow evidence, it will not pass probable cause. Because we are seeing more cases move through the pipeline, we are seeing a better quality of evidence”* (1, IJM, Manila). Another IJM respondent added,

*“When we started in Pampanga there were zero convictions and now there have been several convictions. More importantly, there are a bunch of cases ongoing that we will get conviction. That comes down to the way they attacked the case strategically, and the document of violation of law, and the collaborative evidence to support the same.”* (5, IJM, Manila)

#### **6.4. Improvement in Raid and Rescue Operations**

When it comes to counter-trafficking interventions, raid and rescue operations are often considered the most appropriate and effective course of action to protect victims and prevent future harm to victims by traffickers. However, effective raid and rescue operations require proper risk assessment and pre- and post-operation planning. Issues of victim mistreatment, corruption, and low capacity or political will of police are always factors to consider with counter-trafficking interventions, including raid and rescue operations. The outcomes of raid and rescue operations can be both positive and negative in the sense that they carry substantial risks for all involved, including those conducting the operation, the exploited victims, those whose employment is disrupted by the disruption to the business, and those who oversee and profit from the exploitation.<sup>153</sup> IJM was aware of these risks surrounding raid and rescue operations and took steps to improve the skills and abilities of anti-trafficking police to engage in proper pre- and post-operation planning, and to execute raid and rescue operations to result in the arrest of traffickers, and the rescue of sexually exploited and trafficked victims.

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<sup>153</sup> Raids, Rescues, Resolution: Removing Victims from Sex and Labor Exploitation. Strategic Information Response Network, United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP): Phase III. Bangkok, Thailand. September 2008.

Table 6.2 shows that 92.9% of respondents reported that since 2003, the anti-trafficking police got better at conducting raid and rescue operations. Among respondents who recognized there had been improvements, 100.0% of respondents maintained IJM contributed to improving raid and rescue operations of the anti-trafficking police.

| Table 6.2. Improvement in anti-trafficking police’s abilities to conduct raid and rescue operations                        |                             |       |
|--|-----------------------------|-------|
| Since 2003, did the anti-trafficking police get better at conducting raid and rescue operations to combat sex trafficking? | Sample<br>N=28 <sup>1</sup> |       |
|  | n                           | %     |
| Yes  | 26                          | 92.9  |
| No   | 0                           | 0.0   |
| Do not know  | 2                           | 7.1   |
| Did IJM contributed to improving raid and rescue operations of the anti-trafficking police?                                | N=26 <sup>1</sup>           |       |
|  | n                           | %     |
| Yes  | 26                          | 100.0 |
| No   | 0                           | 0.0   |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes only IJM and government officials in the law enforcement/investigative sector, and IJM managers

IJM contributed to improving raid and rescue operations of the anti-trafficking police through a combination of knowledge and skills-building trainings, participation in pre- and post-operation planning, and supporting the police during raid and rescue operations with logistical support, technical assistance, and legal guidance. IJM also provided post-rescue care to rescued trafficking victims, and made sure they were processed in locations separate from where traffickers were being interrogated and processed.

Keys to success for anti-trafficking police units are preparation for raid and rescue operations and a heavy reliance on operation manuals and guidelines that outline the roles and responsibilities of police raid and rescue teams and each team member.<sup>154</sup> Over time, IJM supported PNP anti-trafficking units to develop operation manuals and guidelines for conducting raid and rescue operations, and handling victim rescue and protection. One respondent explained, “IJM contributed a lot because they are always there supporting us, and with the lawyers.” This same respondent recognized that “because of IJM, the PNP became knowledgeable and was trained and equipped with information on how to handle cases of trafficking in persons. They [IJM] are really a tool for us being more effective and efficient police officers” (97, 98, 99, 100, *Government, Pampanga*). Similarly, another respondent recognized,

*“We are more organized now, we are quicker. Ninety percent of the operations we had, it is resolved in our favor. We are more victim-centered and more agents are more gender-sensitive, especially the male agents. And we know more how to take care of victims. We learned from our previous mistakes.”*  
(29 and 30, *Government, Manila*)

Another important contribution to improving raid and rescue operations of the anti-trafficking police was helping the PNP anti-trafficking units to coordinate with other agencies, including the DSWD and DOLE, to ensure they are present during raid and rescue operations. The DSWD was there to protect and care for trafficking victims, and to transport them to processing facilities where they can receive post-rescue care, be processed, and give their statements to the police. IJM helped the anti-trafficking police understand that raid and rescue operations require “a multi-agency approach, and they need the other organizations – DSWD and DOLE – to have successful operations.” This same respondent added that as a result, “victim treatment has improved, even actual processing during interviews” (36, *IJM, Pampanga*).

Finally, after-action reviews were another important contribution from the side of IJM. Following raid and rescue operations, IJM law enforcement experts and lawyers typically conducted an after-action review with officers from the anti-trafficking unit to discuss how the operation unfolded, what worked well, mistakes made, and challenges faced. IJM used the after-action review to offer guidance on how to improve the next raid and rescue operation. After-action reviews were important because each raid and rescue operation is different and officers encounter unique and

<sup>154</sup> Raids, Rescues, Resolution: Removing Victims from Sex and Labor Exploitation. Strategic Information Response Network, United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP): Phase III. Bangkok, Thailand. September 2008.

unexpected circumstances in each operation, including different challenges and successes. Respondents recognized that “IJM lawyers are regularly conducting small group seminars or discussions in order to address problems that arise in every operation. So, there are always lessons learned in every operation” (76, Government, Cebu). At the same time, IJM respondents recognized “there are hits and misses [in every operation], but in general, they [the anti-trafficking police] know how to learn from their mistakes” (8, IJM, Manila).

*“Before the victim and the perpetrator were in the same room and they were listening to each other, and now there is a separate room for the victim. And in the filing of the case we have the lawyers’ room in HerSpace, and there is no need for us to bring the victims to the police department for the affidavit. HerSpace is the one stop shop.” (74, Government, Cebu)*

#### 6.4.1. Trends in IJM-Supported Raid and Rescue Operations

This evaluation looked at the number of IJM-supported raid and rescue operations as a measure of impact and effectiveness. Data provided by IJM was analyzed to reveal the number of raid and rescue operations conducted by year. Chart 6.4 shows the number of IJM-supported raid and rescue operations by year for all forms of commercial sexual exploitation and trafficking for the period of 2007 to 2015.<sup>155</sup> The line chart shows that from 2007 to 2015, there were a total of 216 IJM-supported raid and rescue operations, of which 196 were focused on child sex trafficking.

Essentially, the number of raid and rescue operations increased from 14 in 2007 to as many as 23 in 2009. There was a slight decrease in IJM-supported raid and rescue operations in 2010, but then an increase from 2011 to 2015. In 2012, IJM continued to support raid and rescue operations in Metro Cebu, but also began supporting operations in Metro Manila and Pampanga (see Chart 6.5). In 2013, the number of IJM-supported raids increased to 33, and to 46 in 2015. In 2015, the total number of IJM-supported raid and rescue operations was higher than the number of child sex trafficking raid and rescue operations because IJM began to shift their focus to online sexual exploitation of children; thus, both child sex trafficking and online commercial sexual exploitation are included in the total number of raid and rescue operations conducted from 2011 to 2015 (see Chart 6.6).


Not only did the anti-trafficking police increase the number of raid and rescue operations that were conducted, but they also made progress in terms of their targets. They went from investigating street-based trafficking to conducting raid and rescue operations in entertainment establishments. With support from IJM, the PNP anti-trafficking units were able to go after larger sex trafficking and exploitation operations.

*“Definitely, you can see the progress in terms of investigating street-based trafficking to more established, big bars; progress in the kind of target they have worked on. In Cebu, we started with trafficking in the streets, pimps selling minors; they built their capacity and skills, then they started to target bars. Then we strategized which have the biggest impact. Then, they targeted the biggest establishments in Cebu . . . that kind of progression.” (1, IJM, Manila)*

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<sup>155</sup> Data for the period of 2003 to 2006 is not reported because data on the number of IJM-supported raid and rescue operations conducted prior to 2007 is incomplete.

**Chart 6.4. IJM-supported raid and rescue operations by year (2007-2015)**




Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2007 to 2015

Chart 6.5 reveals the number of IJM-supported child sex trafficking raid and rescue operations by year and project area from 2007 to 2015.<sup>156</sup> The data demonstrates between 2007 and 2015, there were a total of 196 IJM-supported raid and rescue operations for child sex trafficking, including 130 in Cebu, 34 in Manila, and 31 in Pampanga.

In Cebu, the number of raid and rescue operations significantly increased from 14 in 2007 to 23 in 2009. There was a slight decrease in 2010, but then an increase in 2011. This was followed by a slow, but steady decrease in the number of IJM-supported child sex trafficking raid and rescue operations from 2011 to 2015. During this same time period (2011 to 2015), the number of IJM-supported raid and rescue operations related to online sexual exploitation of children began to increase in Metro Cebu.

In 2012, IJM began project activities in Pampanga and Metro Manila. The number of operations significantly increased from 2013 to 2015 in both of these project areas.

**Chart 6.5. IJM-supported child sex trafficking operations by year and project area (2007-2015)**



Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2007 to 2015


#### 6.4.2. [Victims Rescued During IJM-Supported Raid and Rescue Operations](#)

The evaluation also looked at the number of victims rescued during IJM-supported raid and rescue operations as evidence of the impact and effectiveness of IJM’s Program. Data provided by IJM was analyzed to reveal the number of victims rescued by year during IJM-supported raid and rescue operations. Chart 6.6 shows that from 2003 to 2015, IJM-

<sup>156</sup> Data for the period of 2003 to 2006 is not reported because data on the number of IJM-supported child sex trafficking operations conducted prior to 2007 is incomplete.

supported the rescue of a total of 1,314 persons who were being sexually exploited commercially in the three project areas; of which 777 were children, including 759 from child sex trafficking and 18 from online commercial sexual exploitation. Among child victims, Chart 6.6 shows a steady increase in the number of child sex trafficking victims rescued from 0 in 2003 to 162 in 2009. There was a decrease in 2010, followed by a rapid increase to 162 child victims rescued in 2012. The decrease in the number of child sex trafficking victims rescued in 2013 and 2014 was due to leadership changes in IJM’s investigative departments in both Cebu and Manila. Once those leadership transitions occurred, the number of child sex trafficking victims rescued peaked to 139 in 2015. The peak in 2015 was also related to the number of WCPC Luzon Unit operations supported by IJM.

**Chart 6.6. Victims rescued/relieved by year and type of exploitation (2003-2015)**




Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2003 to 2015

Chart 6.7 shows the number of victims rescued by year and project area during IJM-supported raid and rescue operations. The data shows that among the 759 children rescued from child sex trafficking between 2003 and 2015, 352 were rescued in Cebu, 273 in Manila, and 134 in Pampanga. These findings are reflective of the fact that IJM engaged in more intensive program activities in Cebu from 2006 to 2015, as a result of Phases I and II of Project Lantern.

Chart 6.7 shows that in Cebu there were increases in the numbers of child sex trafficking victims rescued from 2006 to 2012, followed by a decrease from 2013 to 2015. In Pampanga, there was a consistent increase in the number of child sex trafficking victims rescued from 2012 to 2014, and then a slight decrease in 2015. In Manila, the numbers of rescued child sex trafficking victims remained fairly consistent from 2004 to 2011, followed by a significant increase in 2012 and another peak in 2015.


**Chart 6.7. Victims of child sex trafficking rescued/relieved by year and project area (2003-2015)**



Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2003 to 2015

Chart 6.8 shows the average age of children at the time of rescue from child sex trafficking and online sexual exploitation. In 2005, at the time of rescue, the average of age of child sex trafficking victims was 16 years. By 2013, the average age at rescue for child sex trafficking victims increased to 20 years, and 19.5 years in 2015. In comparison, children rescued from online sexual exploitation was 17.2 years in 2011 (average age is based upon 11 rescued victims); that is two years younger than the average age of child sex trafficking victims rescued that same year. Over time, the average age of children rescued from online sexual exploitation decreased to 13.1 years in 2013 (average age is based upon 24 rescued victims), but then peaked again in 2014 to 18.1 years of age (average age is based upon 5 rescued victims). In 2015, the average age of children rescued from online sexual exploitation was 10.7 years of age (average age is based upon 37 rescued victims); that is eight to nine years younger than the average age of child sex trafficking victims rescued in 2015. The average age of children rescued from online sexual exploitation has varied significantly from year to year because it has been driven by the number and ages of children rescued with support from IJM.

**Chart 6.8. Average age of children rescued for sex trafficking and online sexual exploitation by year (2003-2015)**



Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2003 to 2015

## 6.5. Improvement in Abilities to Interview Child Sex Trafficking Victims

Rescuing sex trafficking victims is at the heart of raid and rescue operations, and ensuring rescued victims are provided with post-rescue care is extremely important. Following raid and rescue operations in the Philippines, the anti-trafficking police have only 36 hours to obtain affidavits from victims, complete interrogations of traffickers, and compile collected

evidence for the inquest. Early on, IJM recognized police lacked the skills needed to interview sex trafficking victims; as a result, rescued sex trafficking victims were generally reluctant to give statements to the police. In response, IJM developed knowledge and skills-building trainings for the anti-trafficking police on how to interview child sex trafficking victims, and provided them with templates and guidelines for asking questions and conducting interviews with child sex trafficking victims. IJM lawyers also sat with officers from time to time and acted as a coach when they were interviewing child sex trafficking victims. IJM’s ultimate goal was to build the capacities of the anti-trafficking police to understand what questions to ask and how to ask questions using survivor-centered, child-friendly, and gender-sensitive approaches.

Respondents from the law enforcement/investigative and aftercare sectors were asked if the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims, and if IJM contributed to those improvements. Table 6.3 shows that only 67.2% of respondents thought that since 2003, the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims; 22.4% of respondents did not know because they only recently joined the anti-trafficking unit and/or had no knowledge of changes in the abilities of police to interview child sex trafficking victims. Among respondents who reported the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims, 97.4% maintained IJM contributed to those improvements.

| <b>Table 6.3. Improvement in abilities of anti-trafficking police to interview child sex trafficking victims</b>             |                                  |      |
|--|----------------------------------|------|
| <u>Since 2003, did the anti-trafficking police get better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims?</u>                 | Full Sample<br>N=58 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|  | n                                | %    |
| Yes  | 39                               | 67.2 |
| No   | 6                                | 10.3 |
| Do not know  | 13                               | 22.4 |
| <u>Did IJM contribute to improvement in the skills and abilities of officers to interview child sex trafficking victims?</u> | N=39 <sup>1,2</sup>              |      |
| Yes  | 38                               | 97.4 |
| No   | 1                                | 2.6  |


<sup>1</sup> The sample includes IJM, government, and CSO respondents from the law enforcement/investigative and aftercare sectors.

<sup>2</sup> 1.1% (n=1) respondents reported they ‘do not know’

Data from Table 6.3 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 6.9 shows differences based upon type of agency. IJM respondents (100.0%) were most likely to report the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims, compared to government officials (61.0%) and CSO respondents (57.1%). It is notable that 42.9% of CSO respondents and 24.4% of government officials reported they ‘do not know’ if there were improvements. Only 14.6% of government officials reported the anti-trafficking police did not get better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims. Chart 6.5 reveals government officials who did not think the anti-trafficking police got better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims were mainly in Metro Cebu. This finding is grounded in the finding that anti-trafficking police in Metro Cebu did not typically interview child sex trafficking victims; rather, they relied upon IJM and DSWD social workers to interview child sex trafficking in the ‘HerSpace’, the processing center that was jointly established by IJM and the DSWD.

Among respondents who recognized the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims, 100.0% of respondents from IJM and CSOs, and 96.0% of government officials maintained IJM contributed to improving the skills and abilities of officers to interview child victims of sex trafficking.

**Chart 6.9. Improvement in abilities of anti-trafficking police to interview sex trafficking victims by type of agency**




<sup>1</sup> Note: 14.6% of government officials reported the anti-trafficking police did not get better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims

<sup>2</sup> Note: 24.4% of government officials and 42.9% of CSOs reported they ‘do not know’ if the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at interviewing child victims of sex trafficking

Chart 6.10 shows differences across each of the project areas. Respondents in Manila (88.9%) were more likely to report the anti-trafficking police got better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims, compared to respondents in Pampanga (63.6%) and Cebu (50.0%). It should be noted that 27.8% of respondents in Cebu reported the anti-trafficking police had not gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims; this was a view held largely by government officials. In addition, 31.8% of respondents in Pampanga, 22.2% in Cebu, and 11.1% in Manila reported they ‘do not know’ if there were improvements.

Among respondents who recognized the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims, 100.0% of respondents in Manila and Pampanga, and 88.9% of respondent in Cebu reported IJM contributed to improving the skills and abilities of officers to interview child victims of sex trafficking.

**Chart 6.10. Improvement in abilities of anti-trafficking police to interview sex trafficking victims by project areas**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 27.8% of respondents in Cebu reported the anti-trafficking police had not gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims


<sup>2</sup> Note: 11.1% of respondents in Manila, 22.2% in Cebu, and 31.8% in Pampanga reported they ‘do not know’ if the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims

Finally, Chart 6.11 shows differences based upon sector of work. IJM managers (100.0%) and respondents working in the law enforcement/investigative sector (81.8%) were more likely than respondents in the aftercare sector (50.0%) to report the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims. It is notable that 13.6% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector and 10.0% in the aftercare sector reported the anti-

trafficking police had not gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking; whereas, 40.0% of respondents in the aftercare sector did not know.

Among respondents who recognized improvements, 100.0% of respondents in the aftercare sector and IJM management, and 94.4% of respondent in the law enforcement/investigative sector maintained IJM contributed to improving the skills and abilities of officers to interview child sex trafficking victims.

**Chart 6.11. Improvement in abilities of anti-trafficking police to interview sex trafficking victims by sector of work**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 13.6% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector and 10.0% in the aftercare sector reported they anti-trafficking police had not gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims

<sup>2</sup> Note: 40.0% of respondents in the aftercare sector and 4.5% of in the law enforcement/investigative sector reported they ‘do not know’ if the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims

Improvement in the abilities of anti-trafficking police to interview child sex trafficking victims was due to a combination of factors, including IJM training for police on how to conduct interviews with child sex trafficking victims, the practice of assigning female police officers to interview child sex trafficking victims, and the use of processing centers and child-friendly investigation rooms developed by IJM and the DSWD where child sex trafficking victims were interviewed. Each of these are discussed below in more detail.

*[IJM Trainings for Police on How to Conduct Interviews with Sex Trafficking Victims](#)*. IJM provided trainings for anti-trafficking police that focused on improving their skills and abilities to interview sex trafficking victims (see Chapter 5). Trainings included child-friendly interviewing techniques, and how to take statements and write affidavits.<sup>157</sup> These trainings resulted in notable improvements in the abilities of anti-trafficking police to interview trafficking victims, including how to handle victims who are hostile, uncooperative, and even quiet and reserved. The anti-trafficking police got better at “asking better victim friendly questions, asking questions that are not blaming the victims, asking more open-ended questions.” This same respondent added, “I think their interviewing has gotten better and become more patient with victims being interviewed” (59, IJM, Cebu).

Despite notable improvements, respondents recognized there was still room for improvement and a need for more training, especially given the high turnover rate for police officers in the anti-trafficking units. One respondent explained, “It is very slow, it is very difficult to change the ways of the police. With the police women, we have succeeded better than with the male officers, but there is a certain gap in terms of teaching the PNP about child forensic interviewing.” This same responded went on to add, “I agree it is hard for law enforcement to be sensitive. They are trained to follow a template and when we did training on child-friendly interviews, we had to have several refreshers because they have to use a template from the PNP” (57, IJM, Cebu). Similarly, another respondent reported,

<sup>157</sup> Bear in mind, IJM is not the only organization/agency that has provided police trainings on interviewing trafficking victims in the Philippines; other development agencies and CSOs have provided similar trainings.

*"If you saw the first ones you won't believe they would be dictating to the child, there have been a lot of improvement . . . There is a lot of training going on and they will all receive the training at some point. They are not perfect, but a big improvement has occurred since IJM began their Program." (9 and 10, Government, Manila)*

Similarly, IJM respondents spoke about the improvements they witnessed over the years in the abilities of the anti-trafficking police to interview child sex trafficking victims. As one respondent explained, *"They are more soft before they were interrogating the victims; now they know how to deal with them [child sex trafficking victims]" (54, IJM, Pampanga)*. Another IJM respondent maintained,

*"It has improved through the years. There was a time that we would take the affidavits because the police produced poor affidavits. But now, those people in the RAHTTG-3 are well trained and producing good affidavits, very detailed affidavits. They know what the elements [of the crime] are and getting those elements from the victim, and they know how to ask the questions of the victim." (36, IJM, Pampanga)*

[Assigning Female Police Officers to Interview Child Sex Trafficking Victims](#). Assigning female police officers to the anti-trafficking units and equipping them with the skills to interview child sex trafficking victims helped to improve the quality of statements given by trafficking victims. In fact, IJM was *"one of the advocates for women police to be in place in the police stations" (74, Government, Cebu)*. IJM maintained, as a result of assigning female police officers to interview child sex trafficking, *"the quality of the affidavits has gotten better . . . even prosecutors recognize that" (1, IJM, Manila)*.

The role that IJM played in helping the PNP recognize the important role that female police officers can play in specialized units, such as anti-trafficking units, is important and an example of system transformation. At the same time, however, assigning female police officers to anti-trafficking units because they are considered better equipped to interview child sex trafficking victims because of their gender relegates female officers into a position in these units where their roles and responsibilities may differ from their male counterparts. In fact, this evaluation found that interviewing child sex trafficking victims had become so-called 'women's work' in the anti-trafficking units: work that male officers were not considered capable of doing because of their gender and lack of sensitivity. This approach is counterproductive to improving the skills and abilities of all officers in the anti-trafficking units to interview child sex trafficking victims.

[Use of Processing Centers and Child-Friendly Investigation Rooms](#). Improved coordination between anti-trafficking police and DSWD social workers did contribute to improvement in interviewing child sex trafficking victims. Although it is not required by law that DSWD social workers be present during human trafficking raid and rescue operations, it is a good practice. IJM played an important role in fostering this practice and the collaboration between the PNP anti-trafficking units and the DSWD; however, this was not without challenges.

In Metro Cebu and Metro Manila, the DSWD operates the processing facilities where trafficking victims are brought following rescue. The processing centers, along with the child-friendly investigation rooms, had a positive impact on the ability of the anti-trafficking police to obtain victims' statements. At the processing centers, IJM and DSWD social workers worked together to assist the police in building a rapport with the trafficking victims, so that statements or affidavits could be taken. In some cases, IJM lawyers assisted the police to conduct these interviews. The processing centers provided a safe place where sex trafficking victims could receive post-rescue care and the support they needed to give a statement to the police.

*"There is a more child-friendly approach before starting the investigation. Now allowing the child a chance to rest if they are not ready to talk. The presence of the social workers during the interview is another child-friendly practice. Giving the child a break if they seem tired and not ready to talk. The police say if you are not ready to talk he will ask the social worker to bring her to rest. Now, the social workers usually talk to the children first before the police." (57, IJM, Cebu)*

Similarly, another respondent added,

*“We have a child-friendly investigation room . . . and we make use of the doll; if the child is not able to communicate they can just point. We make use of child-friendly trained investigators that have training in cognitive interviewing to interview them . . . We see to it that we visit them [trafficking victims] once in a while to show them that the police are concerned with them. It takes a long time to convince the child that is traumatized, but we learned there are ways and means to make the child talk.” (19, Government, Manila)*

In the child-friendly investigation rooms there were *“toys and materials that the child can use to communicate their feelings, to make the child more comfortable for the interview.”* Anti-trafficking police and social workers learned that it is important that *“children are not intimidated” (89, Government, Manila).*

This evaluation did find that it was not always the anti-trafficking police that took statements from trafficking victims in the processing centers; in many cases, the social workers were reportedly conducting the interviews and taking the statements or affidavits for sex trafficking victims. This is most likely why many respondents were reluctant to report the anti-trafficking police had actually gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims (see Chart 6.8). This is a limitation of IJM’s efforts to improve the ability of the anti-trafficking police to conduct child-friendly interviews with trafficking victims.

*“The police usually aren’t the ones making the interview. So, they [social workers] interview the victim carefully and they explain very well to them that their accounts about the abuses is very helpful in the investigation. The social workers and members of DOLE were the one’s first to conduct the interview with the rescued victims, and after that the PNP officers will interview them and take down their statements in the presence of the social worker.” (37, Government, Pampanga)*

Several respondents maintained that *“having the DSWD there is important because we remind them [the police] of their manner, voice, and how they interview. Law enforcement are always harsh” (43, 44, 45, Government, Pampanga).*

## 6.6. Improvement in Abilities to Arrest Traffickers

To effectively combat trafficking in persons, police need to arrest human traffickers. The ability to arrest human traffickers is an outcome of improved investigations and evidence collection, case buildup, and entrapment operations. Table 6.4 shows that 86.4% of respondents recognized that since 2003, the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at arresting sex traffickers. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 100.0% maintained IJM contributed to improving the anti-trafficking police’s abilities to arrest sex traffickers.


| Table 6.4. Improvement in anti-trafficking police abilities to arrest sex traffickers |                             |       |
|---|-----------------------------|-------|
| Since 2003, did the anti-trafficking police get better at arresting sex traffickers?  | Sample<br>N=44 <sup>1</sup> |       |
|   | N                           | %     |
| Yes   | 38                          | 86.4  |
| No  | 2                           | 4.5   |
| Do not know   | 4                           | 9.1   |
| Did IJM contribute to improving the police’s abilities to arrest sex traffickers?     | N=38 <sup>1</sup>           |       |
| Yes   | 38                          | 100.0 |
| No  | 0                           | 0.0   |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes IJM and government officials from the law enforcement/investigative and legal sectors.

Data in Table 6.4 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 6.12 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 88.9% of IJM respondents and 85.7% of government officials reported, since 2003, the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at arresting perpetrators of sex trafficking. It is notable that 11.4% of government officials did not know if the anti-trafficking police got better at

arresting sex traffickers. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 100.0% of IJM respondents and government officials reported that IJM contributed to improving the anti-trafficking police’s ability to arrest traffickers.


**Chart 6.12. Improvement in anti-trafficking police abilities to arrest sex traffickers by type of agency**



Note: 11.4% of government officials reported they 'do not know' if the anti-trafficking police got better at arresting sex traffickers

Chart 6.13 shows differences based upon project area. Data shows that 89.9% of respondents in Pampanga, 88.2% in Manila, and 76.9% in Cebu reported that since 2003, the anti-trafficking police got better at arresting sex traffickers. It should be noted that 15.4% of respondents in Cebu, 7.1% in Pampanga, and 5.9% in Manila did not know if the anti-trafficking police had gotten better at arresting sex traffickers. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 100.0% of respondents in the three project areas maintained IJM contributed to improving the anti-trafficking police’s abilities to arrest traffickers.


**Chart 6.13. Improvement in anti-trafficking police abilities to arrest sex traffickers by project areas**



Note: 15.4% of respondents in Cebu, 7.1% in Pampanga and 5.9% in Manila reported they 'do not know' if the anti-trafficking police got better at arresting sex traffickers

Finally, Chart 6.14 shows differences based upon sector of work. Data shows that 90.9% respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector, 83.3% of IJM managers, and 81.3% of respondents in the legal sector reported that since 2003, the anti-trafficking police got better at arresting sex traffickers. It is notable that 18.8% of respondents in the legal sector did not know if there were improvements. All respondents maintained IJM contributed to improving the anti-trafficking police’s abilities to arrest traffickers.


**Chart 6.14. Improvement in anti-trafficking police abilities to arrest sex traffickers by sector of work**



Note: 18.8% of respondents in the legal sector reported they 'do not know' if the anti-trafficking police got better at arresting sex traffickers

To evaluate the impact of IJM’s Program, data from IJM’s CTMS was analyzed to document the number the suspects arrested for commercial sexual exploitation of children with IJM’s support. Chart 6.15 shows that from 2003 to 2015, a total of 816 suspects were arrested for commercial sexual exploitation with IJM’s support, and 722 arrests were specifically for child sex trafficking. In terms of child sex trafficking, there was a steady and significant increase in the number of suspects arrested for child sex trafficking each year, from 0 in 2003 to 47 in 2007. This was followed by a decrease to 37 suspects arrested in 2008, and then a significant increase to 75 suspects arrested in 2009. In 2011, the number of suspects arrested for child sex trafficking increased to 83, and peaked in 2013 at 111. There was another peak in 2015 with 124 suspects arrested for child sex trafficking with IJM’s support.

**Chart 6.15. Suspects arrested for commercial sexual exploitation with IJM support by year (2003-2015)**




Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2003 to 2015

Chart 6.16 shows the number of suspects arrested for child sex trafficking with IJM’s support by year and project area. From 2003 to 2015, a total of 722 suspects were arrested for child sex trafficking with IJM’s support, of which 412 suspects were arrested in Manila, 211 in Cebu, and 109 in Pampanga. In Cebu, the number of suspects arrested for child sex trafficking increased from 1 in 2006 to a peak of 42 in 2009. There was then a steady decrease from 2010 to 2015. Similarly, in Pampanga the number of suspects arrested for child sex trafficking significantly increased from 5 in 2012 to

41 in 2015; this was the result of IJM’s project activities during this four-year period. In Manila, the number of IJM-supported arrests fluctuated from year-to-year.

**Chart 6.16. Suspects arrested for child sex trafficking with IJM’s support by year and project area (2003-2015)**



Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2003 to 2015

Interview data revealed that when it came to improvements in the anti-trafficking units to arrest sex traffickers, the discussion revolved largely around the fact that the anti-trafficking police got better over time at identifying who to arrest and they were able to arrest more suspects at the crime scene. In the early years, the anti-trafficking police reportedly focused more on street-based sex trafficking and pimps that were sexually exploiting children. In those days, the police would focus on arresting only those individuals involved in the transaction of selling sex with children. Over time, as the anti-trafficking police units improved, they began to focus on bigger establishments (such as bars, karaoke clubs, and massage parlors) that illegally employed children and/or sexually exploited children. They were also able to identify more suspects at the crime scene, including mama-sans<sup>158</sup> and papa-sans<sup>159</sup>.

*“During their intelligence gatherings and verification . . . they actually know that the girls in the bars are victims and to set an entrapment location. They know they need to interact with bar managers and the pimps, and identify the suspects; who to transact with. They have improved on arresting the correct people . . . I have seen during the briefing, they put on slides and identify the suspects and victims, and before they call an operation a go, they make sure the suspects are actually there.” (8, IJM, Manila).*

Similarly, a government respondent explained, *“We try our best to arrest not just the employees, but the manager and the mama-sans. We tried to schedule our operations to arrest the big fish, the owners of the establishment, and we even go after foreigners known to be involved in trafficking cases. So, we don’t just limit ourselves” (20, Government, Pampanga).*

IJM spent a significant amount of time training, coaching, and mentoring the anti-trafficking units to understand what an effective arrest should look like, how to determine who to arrest, and how to make more arrests. As a result, the anti-trafficking units gained confidence in their arrest decisions in sex trafficking cases.

*“IJM was able to influence and train the police officers on investigating and documenting the participation of perpetrators in the trafficking crime. So, they would know who is involved and their*

<sup>158</sup> In Asia, the term mama-san is used to describe a woman who manages or is in a position of authority over female workers in bars, nightclubs, brothels, and massage parlors.

<sup>159</sup> Papa-san is a term used to refer to a man in a similar position to a mama-san.

*involvement, that way they can arrest the right person and the actors. Now their understanding of the trafficking crime has expanded and they realize there are various actors and different acts, like harboring. They now understand who should be arrested and prove their participation. Also, respect for the rights of the perpetrators. During case work we remind them of proper treatment of suspects; respecting their rights and informing them of their rights.” (36, IJM, Pampanga)*

Because IJM provided significant support in the prosecution of sex trafficking cases, they were “able to circle back with them [the police] and say we have encountered some challenges in the way you executed the arrest because of this, this, and this” (1, IJM, Manila). This enabled IJM to provide enhanced coaching and mentoring to the anti-trafficking units on how to improve their entrapment operations and arrests, based upon lessons learned from working cases through the pipeline of the justice system. Officers thought IJM’s approach boosted the morale of the anti-trafficking police, and gave them more confidence in handling sex trafficking cases.

*“With IJM they make sure the rules are followed and the law is implemented, and with their presence it gives it validity with the prosecutor. No hanky-panky.” (15 and 16, Government, Manila)*

*“IJM is there to boost the morale of the law enforcement, some of the law enforcement know the law and how to implement it, but they don’t have a support group or someone to go to ask questions and to make sure they [anti-trafficking police units] are doing things right. I think IJM is good at that, when law enforcement is about to do something and they have IJM to back them, they are more confident.” (72, Government, Cebu)*

Despite significant improvement in the abilities of the anti-trafficking police to identify and arrest sex traffickers, and to build cases against traffickers, the anti-trafficking police maintained they were not arresting the owners of the entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex, or the persons running the more organized sex trafficking rings. One respondent maintained, “I would like to see the development of the case to the owner . . . create a paper trail, go to the Security and Exchange Commission, find out who is paying the taxes and social security of the employees. You can detect the people running this; that is an area that needs to be done. It is not enough that you are the manager or owner, you need to know about the exploitation” (22, Government, Pampanga).

## **6.7. Sustainability of Improvement in the Abilities of the Anti-Trafficking Police**

This evaluation found that there were significant improvements in the abilities of the anti-trafficking police to investigate and collect evidence in child sex trafficking cases (aspects of case buildup), conduct raid and rescue operations, interview child victims of sex trafficking, and identify and arrest child sex traffickers. It was also determined that IJM contributed to these improvements. These findings provide evidence that IJM’s Program and collaborative casework approach was both relevant and effective, and contributed to system transformation within the PNP. System transformation that has enabled the PNP to effectively combat child sex trafficking in the three project areas. Now the question is, will the improvements made be sustained over time?

In an effort to measure sustainability, respondents were asked about the sustainability of improvements in the abilities of the anti-trafficking police to investigate and collect evidence in sex trafficking cases, conduct raid and rescue operations, interview sex trafficking victims, and arrest sex traffickers. In an effort to quantify perceived sustainability, respondents were asked to rank on a scale of 1 to 10 how sustainable improvements will be over time in the abilities of the anti-trafficking police. Then, average scores were calculated for each measure on a scale of 1 to 10.

*“Because of the institutionalization of the unit [the WCPC] which will guarantee sustainability of the efforts and support.” (36, IJM, Pampanga)*

Table 6.5 shows the mean or average score for all respondents on a scale of 1 to 10 (1=not sustainable, 10=very sustainable).<sup>160</sup> On average, respondents were quite confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the anti-trafficking police’s abilities to investigate and collect evidence in sex trafficking cases (7.6), conduct raid and rescue operations (8.3), interview child sex trafficking victims (7.5), and arrest sex traffickers (7.8).

Given PNP anti-trafficking units, with support from IJM, institutionalized ‘good practices’ for investigating and collecting evidence in sex trafficking cases, conducting raid and rescue operations, interviewing child sex trafficking victims, and arresting sex traffickers into their standard operating procedures, improvements will be sustainable. In other words, “because it is imbedded in our standard operating prosecutors, it is part of our work” (21, Government, Manila). Another respondent added, “It has already been institutionalized . . . IJM played a role in drafting the rules and regulations in the amended law, IJM was able to put in there the best practices and proper way of victim treatment and coordination with other agencies. Since it is already established as a policy it will continue for years to come” (36, IJM, Pampanga).


| Table 6.5. Sustainability of improvement in the abilities of the anti-trafficking police                              |    |      |
|---|----|------|
| On a scale of 1 to 10, how sustainable will be the improvement in the ability of the anti-trafficking police to . . . | n  | Mean |
| Investigate and collect evidence in sex trafficking cases   | 41 | 7.6  |
| Conduct raid and rescue operations  | 26 | 8.3  |
| Interview child sex trafficking victims   | 46 | 7.5  |
| Arrest sex traffickers  | 39 | 7.8  |

Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Data from Table 6.5 was further analyzed to reveal differences in mean scores by type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 6.17 shows that IJM respondents and government officials were nearly equally confident in the ability of the anti-trafficking police to sustain improvements in their abilities to investigate and collect evidence in sex trafficking cases (7.6 and 7.6 respectively), conduct raid and rescue operations (8.0 and 8.4 respectively), interview child sex trafficking victims (7.9 and 7.5 respectively), and arrest traffickers (7.8 and 7.8 respectively).

Given that all CSO respondents worked in the aftercare sector, they were only asked about sustainability of the improvements seen in the ability of anti-trafficking police to interview child sex trafficking victims. Chart 6.10 shows that CSO respondents had a mean score of 6.5, slightly lower than the mean score for IJM respondents (7.9) and government officials (7.5).

**Chart 6.17. Sustainability of improvement in the abilities of the anti-trafficking police by type of agency**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

<sup>160</sup> The sample sizes vary because not all respondents were asked to rank sustainability on each of the measures, given not all respondents had knowledge of improvements in the abilities of the anti-trafficking police on each of the measures.

Chart 6.18 shows differences in perceived sustainability by project area. The mean scores were fairly equal across each of the three project areas; however, there were some minor differences. For instance, in terms of sustainability of the ability of anti-trafficking police to investigate and collect evidence in sex trafficking cases, respondents in Pampanga (7.9) and Cebu (7.8) had slightly higher mean scores, compared to respondents in Manila (7.1). A similar pattern emerges in sustainability of the police’s ability to arrest sex traffickers. Respondents in Cebu (8.2) and Pampanga (7.9) had slightly higher mean score than respondents in Manila (7.5). In comparison, respondents in Manila (7.9) had slightly higher mean scores compared to respondents in Cebu (7.5) and Pampanga (7.2) when it came to assessing the sustainability of improvements in the anti-trafficking police’s ability to interview child sex trafficking victims.


**Chart 6.18. Sustainability of improvement in the abilities of the anti-trafficking policy by project areas**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Finally, Chart 6.19 shows differences based upon sector of work. It should be noted that respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector and IJM management were asked to rank sustainability on all measures, whereas respondents in the legal sector were asked to rank sustainability on only two measures (i.e., ability of anti-trafficking police to investigate and collect evidence, and to arrest of sex traffickers) and aftercare providers ranked sustainability on only one measure (i.e., ability of anti-trafficking police to interview child sex trafficking victims).

**Chart 6.19. Sustainability of improvement in the abilities of the anti-trafficking policy by sector of work**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Chart 6.19 shows that respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (8.1) and IJM management (7.6) reported higher mean scores than respondents in the legal sector (6.6) when it comes to sustainability of the anti-trafficking police’s ability to investigate and collect evidence in sex trafficking cases. Respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector had similar mean scores to IJM management in perceived sustainability in the abilities of the anti-trafficking police to conduct raid and rescue operations (8.3 and 8.4 respectively) and to interview child sex

trafficking victims (8.3 and 8.0 respectively). Respondents in the aftercare sector (6.7) reported a mean score one and a half points lower than respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (8.3) and IJM management (8.4) when it came to sustainability of improvements in the ability of the anti-trafficking police to interview child sex trafficking victims.

Finally, Chart 6.19 shows that respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (8.2) reported a higher mean score than IJM management (7.6), and respondents in the legal sector (7.2) when it comes to sustainability in the abilities of the anti-trafficking police units to arrest sex traffickers. Nevertheless, respondents in each of the sectors generally had a high level of confidence and optimism that the anti-trafficking police would sustain improvement in their abilities to enforce the anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking.

### 6.7.1. [Challenges to Sustainability](#)

Although there is a high level of confidence and optimism that the anti-trafficking police will be able to sustain improvements in their abilities to enforce the anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking, there are still challenges that could affect sustainability going forward. The four most common challenges to sustainability are: resources; turnover of law enforcement officers assigned to anti-trafficking units; coordination between agencies; and corruption. Each of these challenges are briefly discussed in the sections that follow.

*Resource Challenges.* In terms of resource challenges, government officials recognized “most of the challenges we face is the financial resources when it comes to accommodating all the processes in anti-trafficking operations. Like funds for surveillance . . . full support for raids and logistics, and support in filing a case, and confinement of trafficking victims. We don’t have facilities; there is no processing center for victims” (97, 98, 99, 100, Government, Pampanga). These same respondents went on to explain,

*“They got better with the IJM, but without the support of IJM, sometimes we lack the necessary equipment like the surveillance cameras, the flashlight, and Ziplocs . . . If we do it on our own it is very difficult for us to provide the necessary equipment, it is a struggle for the PNP without them [IJM] helping us. Just the little things they can lend to us that is a big help. For example, the availability of cameras during operation and surveillance, it is hard for the PNP to provide” (97, 98, 99, 100, Government, Pampanga).*

Similarly, another respondent explained,

*“Conducting case buildup operations is expensive. During my past meetings with the IACAT members, I told them put your money where your mouth is, they want a massive anti-human trafficking campaign conducted by law enforcement, but the financial support comes in late or doesn’t come at all. So, how can we perform this mandate if we don’t have the resources? The frontline units should be supported all throughout, I understand they have concerns regarding corruption, but they can always do something to prevent the money from being misappropriated by the concerned agencies.” (25, Government, Manila)*

IJM’s partners recognized that the resources IJM provided to anti-trafficking police units over the years contributed significantly to their abilities to conduct police operations to combat child sex trafficking. The ability of the PNP to supplement those funds will be a serious challenge going forward. One respondent reflected on the fact that “IJM has lots of funds . . . whatever we [PNP anti-trafficking police units] ask for that pertains to operations, they [IJM] can give it to us . . . I cannot say the PNP can sustain that once IJM leaves. The PNP has to request [funding], it takes months” (20, Government, Pampanga).

At the time of this evaluation, a new presidential administration had just come into office and the focus shifted to combatting the illicit drug trade and drug abuse problems in the country. This will likely have a negative effect on the resource challenges faced by the anti-trafficking units and the IACAT, including regional IACATs. One respondent explained,

*“There is a problem now we are facing, the financial resources for the logistics. We don’t have enough finances to support the operation. One operation will cost 100,000 Pesos or more, especially if we rescue 100 girls we need to feed them. IJM is there to feed everyone, they even provide the incidental expenses, they cover the costs of everything . . . These past few months the DOJ resigned [due to a new Presidential administration] and they don’t want to sign. Now, I have to continue on my own without the finances, and I am financing from my own pocket.” (50, Government, Pampanga)*

IJM also recognized that resources will be a challenge for the anti-trafficking police units, and for sustainability of improvements made in those units. One IJM respondent explained the biggest challenge will be *“do they have enough funds to bring as many vehicles as necessary to do the raid?”* This same respondent maintained the *“best case scenario is they have a van for the arrest team, a van for the parameter team, a van for DSWD and the victims” (5, IJM, Manila).* Another resource challenge that IJM identified will be *“developing their own informants, developing relationships with people in the communities so they have their direct line of informants and operatives that are providing them with information on a regular basis. Getting intelligence funds from the PNP is a challenge, they have an office and equipment, but don’t always have funding for gathering intelligence.” (59, IJM, Cebu)*

Despite these challenges, there are hopes that the newly established WCPCs will ensure regular and continued funding to police efforts to combat child sex trafficking and exploitation. However, whether the funding will be there for surveillance equipment, evidence collection kits, and regular raid and rescue operations has yet to be seen.

*“I think they are very confident, they have the integrity, they are trained in what to do, but the challenge is still resources. For the operations to sustain their proactive investigations, they would need more resources and more people. For the national anti-trafficking unit, we are seeing a light at the end of the tunnel because we know that funds are coming, especially under the new administration because his focus is law enforcement.” (36, IJM, Pampanga)*

There are also hopes that anti-trafficking units *“can still go to IACAT for a budget.”* This same respondent explained, *“That is why the three-year road map will really make this be able to continue to implement the things we’re doing now. I am confident they will still do the operations, but not as comfortable for all involved” (5, IJM, Manila).*

*Turnover of Law Enforcement Officers Assigned to the Anti-Trafficking Units.* There is a high rate of turnover of law enforcement officers from the anti-trafficking units, particularly in the PNP, and this will be a challenge going forward when it comes to sustainability of abilities and performance of the anti-trafficking police units. In general, officers are transferred and/or promoted out of the anti-trafficking units every few years, which means resources invested in training those officers and developing their knowledge and skills are lost from the unit. One respondent explained, *“The challenge we have is when they get transferred to a new unit and you get new officers that look at you blankly because they have no background; but those that stay there can teach to the new ones what to do” (87, Government, Manila).* Another respondent also recognized,

*“If I am transferred, if the core group is replaced by another group or several more people it is shattered.” (20, Government, Pampanga)*

*“The problem with the PNP set up is the people get reassigned. The people we have trained and worked with will probably not be here in three years. We train people and they leave. The people trained here are reassigned somewhere else will use the skills, but I am not so optimistic if there is a change of leadership. It is not very sustainable at the moment.” (57, IJM, Cebu)*

Given the high turnover rate from the anti-trafficking unit, there are *“reservations for sustainability . . . It is a challenge of the PNP, the transfer of personnel from one unit to another.”* This same respondent went on to explain,

*“Everything will depend on the people placed in that unit, and very important is the officer that will lead that unit. If the officer there will not have the same thinking or advocacy as the previous ones; if he/she will go back to the old traditional PNP that they know can be bribed or paid. Whatever we built to establish a good reputation will go to waste. On sustainability, of what it is we have established will*

*depend on how those people subsequent to us will manage those that we left.” (20, Government, Pampanga)*

IJM worried about the impact of turnover within the anti-trafficking units, recognizing that *“you train someone to properly interview and they become good at it. But as years pass by this person is promoted and a new guy comes in that needs to be trained.”* However, this respondent was a bit more optimistic that the capacities should be sustainable *“because the training materials are already part of the curriculum, but there will be some transition time because of the changes in the staff in the unit” (36, IJM, Pampanga).* To some degree, sustainability of skills can be improved if the PNP is able to ensure there are ongoing specialized trainings for officers assigned to the anti-trafficking units, and to have a system of field training for new officers assigned to the unit by more senior officers who have been properly trained.

Sustainability can also be improved if there are standard operating procedures for the anti-trafficking units, those *“will help to sustain the efforts and to have the regular training for whoever comes in. If they follow the SOP that should help them sustain, whatever they learn and carry over” (87, Government, Manila).* The challenge, however, is making sure those standard operating procedures and manuals are readily available, because as one respondent explained, *“We have PNP manuals that would really provide for the dos and don’ts of handling victims; but these manuals are not always available” (78, Government, Cebu).*

*Coordination Between Agencies.* Another challenge to sustainability will be in the ability of the anti-trafficking units to sustain collaboration and coordination with the DSWD, DOLE, and DOJ prosecutors. IJM was a strong advocate of ensuring such collaboration and coordination, particularly during raid and rescue operations, when interviewing sex trafficking victims, in closing down entertainment establishments where minors are exploited, and in terms of case buildup and filling of charges against traffickers. The PNP and NBI anti-trafficking units have not always been willing and eager to coordinate with the DSWD when conducting raid and rescue operations, and vice versa. As IJM explained, *“it is a common challenge that DSWD doesn’t have enough social workers, because they don’t have enough people to assist in the operations. There is a manpower challenge” (36, IJM, Pampanga).* Nevertheless, if these agencies can continue to collaborate and coordinate with each other, some of the improvements that have been seen over the past decade or more can be sustainable.

*“The challenge for them [anti-trafficking units] will be . . . ensuring that they are coordinating well with DSWD . . . DSWD has their own lack of capacity issues, but if they can coordinate earlier versus the day of [the raid and rescue operation]. The law does not require DSWD to be there, but it is a best practice. A lot of times DSWD shows up the second day. They [the anti-trafficking units] are busy developing the case, and they don’t tell in advance. I think they will continue to designate officers for interviewing victims, and evidence person, and a person for security. For those reasons, it is sustainable.” (5, IJM, Manila)*

However, some government respondents recognize that as much as raid and rescue operations should be a multi-agency effort, *“somehow IJM has been the bridge, making sure that all the government agencies get together for a particular police operation . . . IJM has been instrumental in bringing the different agencies together” (78, Government, Cebu).* Whether the anti-trafficking police units will be able to sustain coordination between agencies for raid and rescue operations has yet to be seen in the three project areas.

It is also unclear whether the anti-trafficking police will be able to sustain their collaboration and coordination with DOJ prosecutors to ensure their victims’ participation in pre-trial and court proceedings. Over the years, IJM played a key role in helping to secure trafficking victims and prepare them to testify in court.

*“To the point when the victim moves away from the shelter homes we are no longer in control of them. Chances are the case will be lost, we can no longer locate them, we lose contact. There is a need to have a social worker in the WCPC so we are not dependent on the DSWD, sometimes they lack social workers; so, we do not lose an operation because we must have a social worker person. So, we are not reliant, we are trying to get IACAT to have a resident social worker and psychologist so we are a one stop shop.” (19, Government, Manila)*

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Corruption. Finally, corruption is a constant challenge to sustainability in the Philippines. Corruption can lead to *“leaks in information, [which] will definitely impact any rescue operation” (1, IJM, Manila)*. Respondents recognized confidentiality remains a challenge, particularly confidentiality regarding police operations, so as not to undermine persons or establishments being targeted by police operations.

Another respondent maintained the problem is that *“not all the police have been trained yet, and some of the police are still protectors of the perpetrators” (14, CSO, Manila)*. It was perceived that among officers who had been trained, the chances of sustainability were improved; however, if such trainings do not continue sustainability will be limited. One respondent explained, *“I think the hearts will be more interested in the bribes, than the children” (14, CSO, Manila)*.

## CHAPTER 7: STRATEGIC SUPPORT TO IMPROVE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX TRAFFICKING CASES

### Chapter Highlights

- IJM developed a legal department and hired private lawyers who could prosecute IJM-supported child sex trafficking cases as private prosecutors with approval from the Chief State Prosecutor or a Regional State Prosecutor
- IJM lawyers collaborated with public prosecutors to better understand the anti-trafficking law and how best to prosecute child sex trafficking cases
- IJM lawyers were able to push cases through the public justice system pipeline and identify gaps, challenges, and barriers that needed to be addressed
- IJM lawyers contributed to a significant increase in prosecutions and convictions in child sex trafficking cases in the three project areas, as well as at the national level
- 89.1% of respondents reported they saw improvements in the charges filed by DOJ against child sex traffickers
- From 2003 to 2015, IJM's Program resulted in a total of 747 suspects charged with child sexual abuse, child sex trafficking, and/or online sexual exploitation of children, of which 655 were charged specifically with child sex trafficking (268 in Manila, 250 in Cebu, and 137 in Pampanga)
- 91.3% of respondents reported improvements in the DOJ's prosecution of child sex trafficking; of which 61.9% maintained IJM contributed to improvements in the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases
- Factors that helped to improve the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases included: fast tracking of sex trafficking cases; improved evidence collection and presentation in court; increased willingness of trafficking victims to testify in court; case conferences and quarterly action reviews; and use of plea bargaining
- 89.2% of respondents reported public prosecutors had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings; of which, 80.0% maintained IJM contributed to improving the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings
- 88.9% of respondent reported that public prosecutors had gotten better at evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases; of which, 95.8% maintained IJM contributed to improving evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases
- Challenges faced by public prosecutors when it comes to evidence presentation in court proceedings include quality of evidence, technical arguments related to evidence, and inability to secure a victim's testimony
- 97.9% of respondents reported that public prosecutors had gotten better at understanding and applying anti-trafficking laws, of which 60.9% maintained IJM contributed to improving public prosecutors understanding and application of the anti-trafficking laws
- On a 10-point scale, respondents were very confident in the sustainability of improvements in the abilities of public prosecutors to file charges against sex traffickers (7.9), prosecute sex trafficking cases (8.1), interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings (7.9), and present evidence in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases (8.0)
- Challenges that could affect sustainability going forward include: resources (time and manpower) needed to prosecute sex trafficking cases; evidence presentation in court proceeding, particularly ensuring sex trafficking victims appear to testify in court; and corruption

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The overall goal of IJM's Program was to reduce the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas by addressing specific gaps that exist in the local public justice system. IJM's primary strategy was to support and build the capacity of public justice system actors, including DOJ prosecutors, to increase the quantity and quality of sex trafficking

prosecutions and convictions. The ToC was that increased prosecutions and convictions of child sex traffickers would lead to an increased deterrence towards child sex trafficking and result in a reduced prevalence of child sex trafficking.

IJM recognized they did not include a prosecution pillar as part of their program focus, similar to law enforcement and aftercare; nevertheless, public prosecutors and the judiciary were part and parcel to IJM's Program, and IJM was able to have an influence on the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases. IJM had several MOUs with the DOJ and IACAT (which is chaired by the DOJ)<sup>161</sup> which enabled them to provide some strategic support to DOJ prosecutors by acting as private prosecutors in IJM-supported child sex trafficking cases. By serving as private prosecutors in child sex trafficking cases, IJM was able to provide strategic support to DOJ prosecutors and impact their understanding of anti-trafficking laws and approaches to prosecuting child sex trafficking cases. IJM was also able to provide strategic support to DOJ prosecutors that resulted in increases in the number of child sex traffickers prosecuted and convicted. DOJ prosecutors were also provided with practical trainings by the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) and other development agencies, which helped to improve the type of charges filed against sex traffickers, prosecution of sex trafficking cases, and convictions for human traffickers. Data is presented in this chapter that demonstrates the impact IJM had on prosecution of child sex trafficking cases.

### 7.1. IJM's Role as a Private Prosecutor in Child Sex Trafficking Cases

In the Philippines, DOJ prosecutors have direct control in prosecuting all criminal actions; however, private prosecutors are allowed to act as lead prosecutors or assistant prosecutors with approval from the Chief State Prosecutor (CSP) or a Regional State Prosecutor (RSP).<sup>162</sup> This authority lasts until the trial is completed, unless it is revoked.<sup>163</sup> In early years, IJM identified lawyers who could offer *pro bono* legal services in response to casework needs. Over time, IJM developed a legal department and hired private lawyers who could prosecute IJM-supported child sex trafficking cases as private prosecutors with approval from the CSP or RSP. As private prosecutors, IJM lawyers were able to interview victims, present evidence in court, and write pleadings, motions, and briefs. They were also able to provide technical assistance and research on jurisprudence to DOJ prosecutors. As private prosecutors, IJM lawyers were able to assist public prosecutors to better understand the anti-trafficking law and how best to prosecute child sex trafficking cases. This approach also allowed IJM to continue to push cases through the public justice system pipeline and identify gaps, challenges, and barriers that needed to be addressed.

As private prosecutors' actively prosecuting child sex trafficking cases, IJM maintained *"we have enriched ourselves with the nuances in prosecuting these trafficking cases. We have made ourselves an expert, so we are better able to train and mentor and coach, especially for the [public] prosecutors new to the case. It was quite helpful at the start."* This same respondent went on to explain,

*"When we started to work on trafficking cases. The prosecutors would come to us asking what is the anti-human trafficking law and we would show them the law; that was the beginning. The strength of our model is we handle those cases, analyze the challenges and issues, and are able to share them in a training set up, in what we call case conferences and discuss the concerns and roadblocks in a particular case. We get to share. The public prosecutors, they are happy IJM is there and IJM is able to free up some of their caseloads . . . It is a good working relationship." (1, IJM, Manila)*

Another IJM respondent recalled, *"In the beginning, we took the driver's seat in a lot of cases."* This same respondent went on to explain, *"our role was helping to spark an interest in doing this right, demonstrating how it can be done right, finding the ones [public prosecutors] that had the will and supporting them . . . Our role was responsive to the need, sparking the interest, and helping to build the expertise"* (3, IJM, Manila).

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<sup>161</sup> IJM signed MOUs with the DOJ in 2009, 2011, and 2012 to provide material, logistical, and/or technical support and trainings to DOJ prosecutors

<sup>162</sup> Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 110, section 5

<sup>163</sup> Reye, D. (2008). Prosecution in the Philippines. Asian Human Rights Commission. Hong Kong. Retrieved on 27 January 2017 from: <http://alrc.asia/article2/2008/03/prosecution-in-the-philippines/>

Part of the challenge for public prosecutors is they are overburdened with large caseloads. As a result, public prosecutors lack the luxury of time to spend on one case. Oftentimes, their first sight at a child sex trafficking case is when they open the casefile in the courtroom. IJM recognized that public prosecutors simply didn't *"have the luxury of time, like making sure the witness appears, that is one common reason for delays in prosecution. So, we have people that make sure the witnesses are prepared and come [to court]"* (33, IJM, Manila). This is one way that IJM contributed a lot when it came to prosecution of child sex trafficking cases and building the capacities of public prosecutors to successfully handle such cases.

Public prosecutors recognized the important contribution that IJM made to prosecuting child sex trafficking cases. For example, they generally maintained that IJM is *"there to help us [public prosecutors] present evidence and formally offer exhibits. They are there to make memorandums, make sure witnesses appear [in] court, and to file appeals, and that the court tries the case* (72, Government, Cebu). Public prosecutors maintained IJM typically worked *"more hand-in-hand with the public prosecutors . . . [Yet] there are times when they [IJM] actively prosecuted the cases on their own, after authority was given to them. So, there were cases where they got convictions on their own efforts. However, of the 20 convictions, some were on IJM's own effort, but most in collaboration with the public prosecutors"* (50, Government, Pampanga).

*"We have contributed a lot when it comes to prosecution. Even the prosecutor doesn't know the trafficking laws, so when IJM came and worked alongside the prosecutors, the prosecutors learned what the new law is, how to do it, how to go over it, and during the trainings they learned about the law and how to prosecute the cases, and how to deal with victims. I think dealing with victims is one of the major improvements, whether law enforcement, DSWD, or prosecutors . . . Now it is child-friendly when they ask questions to the victims."* (54, IJM, Pampanga)

Over the years, some public prosecutors and judges did not allow IJM to prosecute child sex trafficking cases as private prosecutors. IJM faced situations where *"some public prosecutors objected, so the court agrees and does not allow IJM to prosecute the case"* (87, Government, Manila). At other times, *"there are some judges that do not allow them to handle the case without [a] public prosecutor"* (61, Government, Cebu). Similarly, another respondent explained,

*"When you enter as a private prosecutor you handle the civil aspect of the case, not the criminal aspects. When they [IJM] enter, it is still under the control of the public prosecutor, but if the public prosecutor allows them to handle the civil and/or criminal prosecution of the case. To what extent they participate depends upon courts, if they allow them to or not . . . In some courts, the court pushes them out of the court and asks why are you here. The court asks if they have authority to represent them . . . and in some cases, they cannot participate because the court does not allow them."* (87, Government, Manila)

Despite occasional resistance from public prosecutors and judges to allow IJM to prosecute child sex trafficking cases as private prosecutors, IJM's lawyers were successful at prosecuting sex trafficking cases, and made sure trafficking victims were prepared to testify in court and appeared in court.

### 7.1.1. [Differences in Child Sex Trafficking Cases Prosecuted by IJM](#)

The evaluation attempted to understand differences that may exist between child sex trafficking cases prosecuted by IJM versus those cases not supported by IJM. Interview data revealed that *"in the beginning [of IJM's Program], the difference was stark or dramatic because there was not as much leadership and will from government agencies [to prosecute child sex trafficking cases]"* (3, IJM, Manila). In fact, in the early years, child sex trafficking cases not supported by IJM were typically dismissed by prosecutors and/or judges; however, *"when IJM came in and supported enforcement and prosecution there was a big improvement"* (58, IJM, Cebu). Both IJM and public prosecutors maintained, over the years *"we have seen more public prosecutors willing to try the case without IJM's help . . . Now we see more public prosecutors say it is okay, I will handle the case ourselves"* (31, IJM, Manila).

One of the most significant differences between child sex trafficking cases prosecuted by IJM versus those not supported by IJM was in regards to coordination, particularly *“coordination with victims and producing the victims in court.”* This same respondent maintained, *“through the years we have a similar style and methodology [by public prosecutors]”* (36, IJM, Pampanga).

The challenge public prosecutors face is large caseloads, whereas IJM has the luxury of time to focus on prosecuting child sex trafficking cases, including spending time preparing their case and arguments, prepping victims and law enforcement officers to testify in court, transporting the victim to court to testify against their traffickers, and writing motions. As a result, IJM lawyers contributed to a significant increase in prosecutions and convictions in child sex trafficking cases in the three project areas, as well as at the national level.

*“Most of the trafficking prosecution in Cebu have been supported by IJM. I know there have been trafficking prosecutions and convictions not supported by IJM but I don’t know how many acquittals there have been. Quantitatively we have had more convictions . . . It could be IJM accounted for 70% to 75% of the convictions in the country; that is possible.”* (59, IJM, Cebu)

Government respondents also recognized that IJM is able to locate witnesses, as well as *“help the prosecutors in the preparation of documents and securing document in other agencies, because we don’t have the manpower to do that”* (88, Government, Manila). Government respondents recognized IJM assisted with many other aspects of the case led to effective prosecution and conviction of child sex traffickers. One respondent explained, *“I cannot say we cannot prosecute if they [IJM] are not there, but their presence really helps”* (115, Government, Cebu).

*“IJM prosecutors are very good and equipped. They have been trained for that purpose. I would like to give credit where credit is due, they are overzealous in the prosecution of the case. We were always there in a supervisory capacity, but if they encountered difficulties I would like to think we are more experienced than them. We always see to it that in every aspect we are there to guide them, but the nitty gritty and details are support by IJM. They are very good in the performance of the prosecution of the case.”* (86, Government, Pampanga)

In 2015, IJM began to transfer IJM-supported prosecutions over to public prosecutors. IJM was still available to provide legal and technical guidance in such cases; however, IJM worked to ensure public prosecutors would remain very active in prosecuting child sex trafficking cases. This evaluation found there has not only been an increase in public prosecutors’ desires to lead in the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, but there has also been a reported increase in confidence and dedication to prosecuting child sex trafficking cases. One respondent explained,

*“Over the past few years, they have increased their involvement as public prosecutors have gotten more training, they have gotten more involved as we transitioned cases to them. In Cebu, IJM has stopped prosecuting trafficking cases, the public prosecutors are prosecuting them on their own. There are a lot of prosecutions of trafficking cases ongoing . . . we are getting them more involved”* (59, IJM, Cebu).

IJM maintained public prosecutors *“are taking ownership of the case, and there is less involvement for IJM. Even if IJM is involved in the case, we see it as making them more independent from us”* (31, IJM, Manila). Similarly, in Pampanga, IJM reported,

*“We started to make the prosecutors more involved and take the lead in cases. But ever since we have made them involved, although we would do the preparations and write the pleadings, we would always involve the public prosecutors because we would ask if they want to present the witness in court, reading our pleadings or present. Ever since they have been involved, but our IJM lawyers would normally take the lead and do most of the work in the prosecution of cases. I think last year, we would no longer support them in bringing witness.”* (36, IJM, Pampanga)

## 7.2. Improvement in Charges Filed Against Sex Traffickers

In an effort to evaluate improvements in the ability of public prosecutors to effectively prosecute and convict traffickers, one of the areas of improvement that was explored was improvement in charges filed against sex traffickers. Table 7.1 shows that among respondents in the legal and law enforcement/investigative sectors, as many as 89.1% reported there have been improvements since 2003, in the charges filed against child sex traffickers by the DOJ in the three project areas. Only 6.5% of respondents reported there had been no improvement over the years.

| Since 2003, have you seen improvement in the charges filed against perpetrators of child sex trafficking by the DOJ in the project areas? | Sample<br>N=46 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|---|-----------------------------|------|
|   | n                           | %    |
| Yes   | 41                          | 89.1 |
| No  | 3                           | 6.5  |
| Do not know   | 2                           | 4.3  |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes IJM and government officials from the law enforcement/investigative and legal sectors, and IJM management.

Decisions about which sex trafficking cases to prosecute and what charges to file are based largely upon the quality of the inquest and determination of probable cause. One respondent explained, *“All cases that are filed before the DOJ, as long as there is probable cause, we don’t choose [which to prosecute]. If there is probable cause to file in court, we file in court. It is not a question of having to choose, but we do prioritize. DOJ came up with a circular, and the Supreme Court came up with a circular to prioritize cases”* (87, GO, Manila).

*“Now they [public prosecutors] are more knowledgeable, they know the elements, they know who to charge, they know the documents presented to them and if it is sufficient, and they know to ask the police officers for more sufficient evidence and give the time. That has improved a lot.”* (2, IJM, Manila)

DOJ maintained when it comes to filing charges in a sex trafficking case, *“it does not matter if it is an IJM case or the police, because at the end of the day when we receive the complaint, we will evaluate the evidence and decide whether or not to present or dismiss the case”* (79, Government, Cebu). Public prosecutors base their decisions to file charges on the merit of the cases, not who assisted in the complaint. Yet, some respondents recognized that *“cases filed by IJM are more concrete, compared to those from the ordinary police; maybe because they are more trained”* (61, Government, Cebu). Another respondent added, *“Those [officers] that prepared the affidavits are always with the guidance of IJM; if it is the police by themselves preparing it, they don’t have the resource or support the IJM provides.”* (86, Government, Pampanga)

Data in Table 7.1 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector or work. Chart 7.1 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 90.0% of IJM respondents and 88.9% of government respondents reported there have been improvements since 2003, in the charges filed by the DOJ against perpetrators of sex trafficking.

**Chart 7.1. Improvement in charges filed against sex traffickers by type of agency**






Chart 7.2 reveals difference based upon project areas. In particular, 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 88.3% in Manila, and 86.7% in Cebu reported there have been improvements since 2003, in the charges filed against sex traffickers by the DOJ. It is notable that 11.1% of respondents in Manila and 6.7% in Cebu reported they have not seen improvements over the years in the charges filed by the DOJ against sex traffickers.

**Chart 7.2. Improvement in charges filed against sex traffickers by project areas**



Finally, Chart 7.3 shows difference based upon sector of work. The data shows that 90.0% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector, 89.5% in the legal sector, and 85.7% of IJM managers reported there have been improvements since 2003, in the charges filed against sex traffickers by the DOJ. A small proportion of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative (10.0%) and legal (5.3%) sectors reported there had not been improvement in charges filed against sex traffickers by the DOJ.

**Chart 7.3. Improvement in charges filed against sex traffickers by sector of work**



Some respondents maintained there have been improvements in the charges filed against sex traffickers by the DOJ because “there has been improvement in the preparation of information and in the identifying the appropriate or proper offense to be charged; before it was overlooked” (82, Government, Cebu). Another improvement that was noted was that the DOJ is generally “more accurate in making the decision to charge or not charge; if there is evidence there, they will charge them and they might include additional charges under the child trafficking law or child pornography law . . . the old biases or misunderstanding of the law are no longer there” (59, IJM, Cebu).


Improvement in charges filed by the DOJ against sex traffickers is due to a combination of factors including: trainings for public prosecutors offered by PHILJA and other development agencies regarding the anti-trafficking laws and prosecution of sex trafficking cases; trial and error or lessons learned through practice; and evolution of the anti-trafficking law and charges that can be used to prosecute sex traffickers.

*“It has improved through the years and that is the result of learning from past failures in case work, if cases get dismissed because of inadequate information. So, with the support of the IJM we were able to develop trainings on information drafting, so like we have trained the prosecutors on what should go into that information to come up with a strong charge. Outside of the legal document I have seen improvement in charging not just the perpetrators arrested, but all of those involved, including the owners, the other participants in the crime. I have seen prosecutors properly charging them, based upon the evidence.” (36, IJM, Pampanga)*

Improvements in charges filed are reflected in the numbers, and the decision of public prosecutors to file charges based upon probable cause, the strength of the case, and chances of conviction. One respondent noted, “before, when you filed the case of trafficking, then the case was dismissed because of the evidence and uncooperative suspects; [however,] now, they file more charges and are also monitoring the case” (37, Government, Pampanga). Similarly, IJM maintained that over the years they saw “more charges and convictions done than before . . . I believe it has gotten better” (54, IJM, Pampanga).

IJM’s CTMS data was analyzed to reveal the number of suspects charged with child sex trafficking and exploitation by year and project area related to IJM-supported cases. Chart 7.4 shows the total number of suspects charged with child sexual abuse, child sex trafficking, and online sexual exploitation of children between 2003 and 2015, and the number of suspects charged specifically with child sex trafficking. In general, IJM’s Program resulted in a total of 747 suspects charged with child sexual abuse, child sex trafficking, and/or online sexual exploitation of children between 2003 and 2015, of which 655 were charged specifically with child sex trafficking. Chart 7.4 shows that IJM’s Program resulted a significant and continuous increase in the number of suspects charged with child sex trafficking from 0 in 2003 to 89 in 2011. This was followed by a slight decrease from 89 in 2011 to 66 in 2014, followed by a drastic increase to 123 in 2015.


**Chart 7.4. Suspects charged with child sex trafficking and exploitation by year (2003-2015)**



Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2003 to 2015

Chart 7.5 shows data for suspects charged specifically with child sex trafficking by project area and year. Among the 655 suspects charged with child sex trafficking, 268 suspects were charged in Manila, 250 in Cebu, and 137 in Pampanga. In Manila, there was a steady increase in suspected charged from 0 in 2003 to 22 in 2007, followed by a steady decline from 22 in 2007 to 9 in 2009, and a subsequent significant increased from 9 in 2009 to 58 in 2011. Again, the number of suspects charged with child sex trafficking significantly and steadily decreased from 58 in 2011 to 15 in 2014, to be followed again by a significant increase in suspects charged for child sex trafficking in 2015. It is notable that one respondent reported, “We only see this in Manila, Pampanga and Cebu, but there are 18 regions in the Philippines. But in the other regions, it is not as active. There are a lot of people trafficked in other regions and their task forces are not as good as the ones trained in those three areas.” (19, Government, Manila)

**Chart 7.5. Suspects charged with child sex trafficking by year and project area (2003-2015)**



Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2003 to 2015

In Cebu, IJM’s Program resulted in a steady increase in the number of suspects charged with child sex trafficking. From 2006 to 2010, IJM implemented Phase I of Project Lantern which resulted in a significant and steady increase in the number of suspects charged with child sex trafficking, from 2 in 2006 to 47 in 2009. This was followed by a steady

decrease from 47 in 2009 to 34 in 2012. Then, from 2011 to 2015, IJM implemented Phase II of Project Lantern, during which the number of suspects charged with child sex trafficking steadily decreased from 31 in 2011 to 11 in 2015.

Finally, in 2012, IJM began their program in Pampanga, during which six suspects were charged with child sex trafficking. The number of suspects charged with child sex trafficking significantly and steadily increased from 6 in 2012 to a peak of 68 suspects charged in 2015.

### 7.3. Improvement in Prosecution of Child Sex Trafficking Cases

IJM recognized they did not include a prosecution pillar as part of their program focus, similar to law enforcement and aftercare; nevertheless, public prosecutors and the judiciary were part and parcel to IJM’s Program, and IJM was able to have an influence on the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases. Table 7.2 shows that among respondents from the legal and law enforcement/investigative sectors, as many as 91.3% reported they had seen improvements since 2003, in the DOJ’s prosecution of child sex trafficking in the three project areas. Among respondents who recognized improvements in the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, 61.9% maintained IJM contributed to improvements in the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases. It is notable that 38.1% of respondents reported they did not know if IJM contributed to improving the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases; these were largely respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector.

| Table 7.2. Improvement in prosecution of child sex trafficking cases   |                          |      |
|--|--------------------------|------|
| Since 2003, have you seen improvement in the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases here in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga by the DOJ <sup>1</sup> | Sample N=46 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|  | n                        | %    |
| Yes  | 42                       | 91.3 |
| No   | 1                        | 2.2  |
| Do not know  | 3                        | 6.5  |
| Has IJM contributed to improving the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases?   | N=42 <sup>1</sup>        |      |
| Yes  | 26                       | 61.9 |
| No   | 0                        | 0.0  |
| Do not know  | 16                       | 38.1 |


<sup>1</sup> The sample includes IJM and government officials, including only those in the law enforcement/investigative and legal sectors

Data in Table 7.2 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 7.6 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 100.0% of IJM respondents and 88.9% of government respondents reported that since 2003, DOJ prosecutors had gotten better at prosecuting child sex trafficking cases in the three project areas. Among respondents who recognized improvement in the ability of the DOJ prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases, only 50.0% of government officials maintain IJM contributed to improving the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, compared to 100.0% of IJM respondents. The remaining 50.0% of government officials (predominately law enforcement/investigative respondents) had missing data because they were reluctant to answer the question and deferred the question to public prosecutors. Among government officials who did respond to this question (predominately respondents in the legal sector), 100.0% maintained IJM contributed to improving prosecution of child sex trafficking cases.

*“I would base that on statistics, we have more convictions, more trainings, more exposure now, and better understanding of the law. And we have the task force meetings where we share best practices and lessons learned, whether formal or informal.” (87, Government, Manila)*

Legal respondents generally maintained, *“it is nice to have them [IJM] around; someone you can rely upon. And the collaboration is really respectful and their capabilities are good . . . We have encountered a lot of other NGOs and we are not as comfortable working with them” (47, Government, Pampanga)*. A majority of respondents in the legal sector also maintained *“the conviction rate has improved immensely because of the logistical support from IJM” (86, Government, Pampanga)*.


**Chart 7.6. Improvement in prosecution of child sex trafficking cases by type of agency**



Note: 50.0% (n=16) respondents from the government had missing data related to whether IJM contributed to improving the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases

Chart 7.7 shows differences based upon project area. In particular, 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 88.9% in Manila, and 86.7% in Cebu reported that since 2003, there have been improvement in the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases by the DOJ in the project areas. Among respondents who recognized improvements, respondents in Manila (75.0%) and Cebu (69.2%) were more likely to recognize that IJM contributed to improving the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, compared to respondents in Pampanga (38.5%).


**Chart 7.7. Improvement in prosecution of child sex trafficking cases by project areas**



Note: 61.5% (n=8) of respondents from Pampanga, 30.8% (n=4) in Cebu, and 25.0% (n=4) in Manila had missing data related to whether IJM contributed to improving the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases

Finally, Chart 7.8 shows differences in sector of work. In particular, 100.0% of IJM managers, 94.7% of respondents in the legal sector, and 85.0% in the law enforcement/investigative sector reported there were improvements in the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases by the DOJ in the project areas. Among respondents who recognized improvements, IJM management (100.0%) and respondents in the legal sector (94.4%) were more likely to maintain IJM contributed to improving prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, compared to respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (11.8%). It is important to note that 88.2% of law enforcement/investigative respondents had missing data related to IJM’s contributions to improving prosecution of child sex trafficking cases. In most cases, law enforcement/investigative respondents were reluctant to answer the question and deferred the question to public prosecutors.

**Chart 7.8. Improvement in prosecution of child sex trafficking cases by sector of work**



Note: 88.2% (n=15) law enforcement/investigative respondents had missing data

There were several contributing factors that helped to improve the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, including:

- Fast tracking of sex trafficking cases
- Improved evidence presentation in court
- Increased willingness of trafficking victims to testify in court
- Case conferences and quarterly action reviews
- Use of plea bargaining

Each of these are discussed briefly below.

**Fast Tracking of Sex Trafficking Cases.** In terms of fast tracking sex trafficking cases, IJM maintained, “We were able to influence quite a lot . . . Just the amount of cases we are able to handle together . . . we are able to establish system reforms.” This same respondent maintained, “In 2011, the Supreme Court through IJM’s advocacy issued a circular to fast track trafficking cases; that was a system reform initiative” (1, IJM, Manila). In addition, IJM lobbied court administrators to focus on courts that take a long time to prosecute child sex trafficking. Lobbying and advocacy efforts reportedly resulted in a reduction of trial times for sex trafficking cases. Public justice system officials and IJM respondents noted a reduction from about three to four years to less than one year (i.e., from the point when a case is filed to the decision of the court) in some, but not all sex trafficking cases. Government officials recognized, “We are seeing shorter trials and I would say that is an improvement.” This same respondent attributed this success “not only the prosecutors, but the judges as well; but the prosecutor has a big hand because if the prosecutor can do its job swiftly, they achieve the shortened trial” (31, IJM, Manila). Some respondents also maintained, “prosecutors are more vigilant in these cases” (61, Government, Cebu).

**Improved Evidence Presentation in Court.** Improved evidence presentation in court by prosecutors has also improved prosecution and conviction rates. IJM recognized, “because there is good evidence preserved and presented in court, the legal challenges are being overcome by the prosecutors with the evidence produced” (36, IJM, Pampanga). IJM also maintained because they “sit with them [public prosecutors] when they prepare a witness, sit with them in court when they present a witness, and then debrief them afterwards . . . we encourage public prosecutors to engage in strategies that speed prosecutions; it also reduces backlog and increases chances of conviction” (59, IJM, Cebu).

**Increased Willingness of Trafficking Victims to Testify in Court.** Another improvement was that sex trafficking victims have been more willing to testify in court against their perpetrators, compared to the past. Sex trafficking victims are more willing to testify in court because they are being empowered by post-rescue care and aftercare services to “not be afraid anymore to say what they have encountered when they were trafficked” (97, 98, 99, 100, Government, Pampanga). Respondents also attributed the willingness of trafficking victims to appear in court and testify as due to IJM and their collaboration with the DSWD. IJM and the DSWD work together to support trafficking victims and prepare them to testify in court against their perpetrators.

[Case Conferences and Quarterly Action Reviews.](#) Case conferences and quarterly action reviews conducted by IJM, in cooperation with public prosecutors also helped improve prosecutions. Case conferences and quarterly action reviews provided a forum to share information and discuss lessons learned, trends in defense tactics used by defense lawyers, and legal challenges faced and how to overcome them. IJM maintained case conferences and quarterly action reviews, when coupled with formal trainings provided to prosecutors through the IACAT and PHILJA, enabled prosecutors to be more effective when prosecuting sex trafficking cases.

*“Because of the [IJM] training, the prosecutor is more effective; as a matter of fact, the prosecutor that obtained the first conviction in Region III underwent the training that IJM sponsored. They [public prosecutors] are more aware on the common defenses, the legal arguments they should use in overcoming legal challenges and legal issues. Victim sensitivity is an improvement; they [public prosecutors] are sensitive and aware they need to protect the victim on the witnesses stand. There are now legal objections they can use . . . and they are aware of special procedures of the children, and have been trained on rules of examination . . . they are more motivated now because they received recognition in their efforts in prosecuting and winning these types of cases.” (36, IJM, Pampanga)*

[Use of Plea Bargaining.](#) An improvement that IJM apparently spearheaded was the use of plea bargaining in sex trafficking cases. The opportunity for plea bargaining in sex trafficking cases began with the amended R.A. No. 10364. Some defense attorneys started to encourage their clients to plea bargain in child sex trafficking cases; particularly given sex trafficking of children/minors carries with it qualified and enhanced charges and sentences. A trial court conviction will often result in life imprisonment for child sex trafficking; whereas, a plea bargain can result in a shortened trial process and a penalty of at least 15 years in prison. Courts have been willing to plea bargain child sex trafficking cases given the large number of cases on court dockets, resulting in a significant backlog of cases.

*“For plea bargaining, we have seen the public prosecutors engage in plea bargaining even more. What they have learned is there are benefits to plea bargaining, benefits for victims because they don’t have to testify, and benefits for the system because it clears cases, and judges are supportive of it. Before they [public prosecutors] did not plea bargain because it was not common. With the support of IJM lawyers they started to recognize that it is okay to engage in plea bargaining. In 2015, Cebu, had 31 convictions, and 23 were through plea bargaining. In 2014, there were 17 convictions total. Lawyers have started to meet and ask if they thought about plea bargaining. We recently did plea bargaining in a case and the public prosecutor quoted there is wisdom to plea bargaining. In the past, you would talk about plea bargaining and they thought you should only do plea bargains in weak cases, and together helping them to change the mindset. There is such a big backlog in cases and the system can’t handle it, and the victims get tired or move away or are at risk of witness tampering.” (59, IJM, Cebu)*

#### **7.4. Improvement in Prosecutor’s Abilities to Interview Sex Trafficking Victims**


Respondents mainly in the legal sector were asked about improvements in public prosecutors’ abilities to interview sex trafficking victims. Table 7.4 shows that 89.2% of respondents reported that since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 80.0% maintained IJM contributed to improving the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings.

| Table 7.4. Improvement in public prosecutor’s abilities to interview child sex trafficking victims  |                          |      |
|---|--------------------------|------|
| Since 2003, do you think public prosecutors have gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings?              | Sample N=28 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|   | n                        | %    |
| Yes   | 25                       | 89.2 |
| No  | 1                        | 3.6  |
| Do not know   | 2                        | 7.1  |
| Did IJM contribute to improving the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings? | N=25 <sup>1</sup>        |      |
|   | n                        | %    |
| Yes   | 20                       | 80.0 |
| No  | 2                        | 8.0  |
| Do not know   | 3                        | 12.0 |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes IJM and government officials, including only those in the legal sector

Data in Table 7.4 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 7.12 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 94.1% of government officials and 81.8% of IJM respondents reported that since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings. It is important to note that 18.2% of IJM respondents reported they did not know if there had been improvements. Among respondents who recognized public prosecutors had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims, 88.9% of IJM respondents and 75.0% of government officials though that IJM contributed to improving the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings. Only 12.5% of government officials reported IJM did not contribute to improving the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child sex trafficking victims.


**Chart 7.12. Improvement in public prosecutor’s abilities to interview sex trafficking victims by type of agency**



Note: 12.5% (n=2) of government officials reported IJM did not contribute to improving the skills and abilities of prosecutors to interview child victims in pre-trial and court proceedings

Chart 7.13 shows differences based upon project area. In particular, 100.0% of respondents in Cebu, 84.6% in Manila, and 80.0% in Pampanga reported that since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 81.8% in Manila, 80.0% in Cebu, and 75.0% in Pampanga maintained IJM contributed to improving the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings. Only 9.1% of respondents in Manila and 10.0% in Cebu reported that IJM did not contribute to improving the skills and abilities of prosecutors to interview child sex trafficking victims.

**Chart 7.13. Improvement in public prosecutor’s abilities to interview sex trafficking victims by project areas**




Note: 10.0% (n=1) of respondents in Cebu and 9.1% (n=1) in Manila reported that IJM did not contribute to improving the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child victims in pre-trial and court proceedings

Finally, Chart 7.14 shows differences based upon sector or work. In particular, 94.7% of respondents in the legal sector and 71.4% of IJM managers reported that since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better at interviewing child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings. It is important to note that 28.6% of IJM managers did not know because they worked for IJM in the early years and were not aware of the progress made to date. Only 11.1% of respondents in the legal sector reported there had been no improvement in public prosecutor’s abilities to interview child sex trafficking victims.

Among respondents who recognized improvements, 72.2% in the legal sector and 100.0% of IJM managers maintained IJM contributed to improving the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings. It is notable that only 11.1% of respondents in the legal sector reported IJM did not contribute to improving the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child victims; the remaining respondents did not know.

**Chart 7.14. Improvement in public prosecutor’s abilities to interview sex trafficking victims by sector of work**



Note: 11.1% (n=2) respondents in the legal sector reported IJM did not contribute to improving the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child victims in pre-trial and court proceedings

Factors that contributed to improvements in the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings included mainly prepping sex trafficking victims prior to trial and being more sensitive to victims during court proceedings. Prosecutors learned that being patient and taking time to develop trust with sex trafficking victims helped to improve their testimony in pre-trial and court proceedings.

*“They follow the rules on presentation of child witness and I think it is more in the preparation before trial, what contributed more is the preparation before trial rather than the trial itself. They interview the victims, and prepare the victim before interviewing the victim in court. I was there for research support and the prosecutor handled it and I saw how serious he was prosecuting the case, presenting a child against the mother that was trafficking the girl. He was supportive of the child and not blaming the child and took a strong approach to support and give the child courage to speak up in the court.”* (2, IJM, Manila)

Given the gendered nature of the crime and the fact that most child sex trafficking victims are female, some head public prosecutors maintained female public prosecutors are best to handle sex trafficking cases. They also perceived that female public prosecutors are more sensitive and patient, and better able to ask questions about sexual exploitation when interviewing child sex trafficking.

*“One of the things the prosecutors have done now is assign lady prosecutors, the lady prosecutors have been serious on attending trainings on trauma-informed care and interviewing, and one was sent to the USA for further training. They have regular re-tooling on child-friendly forensic interviewing. I think the prosecutors have gotten better, in the past it was stressful for us that the prosecutors did not know the case and were supported to defend in the court. Now it is always a lady prosecutor, they are there, and attend case conferences in HerSpace.”* (57, IJM, Cebu)

Despite improvements within the offices of public prosecutors in the three project areas, respondents recognized more public prosecutors need to be trained to handle child sex trafficking cases. One respondent explained, *“There are trainings for child-friendly practices, but I don’t think we have enough technical trainings. We don’t have enough training on planted memories<sup>164</sup>, not just child witnesses, but witnesses in general”* (26, Government, Manila).

#### 7.4.1. Child-Friendly Practices Used by Prosecutors.

Respondents were also asked what sort of child-friendly practices public prosecutors are now using when interviewing child victims in pre-trial and court proceedings. Child-friendly practices are being used today because of special rules (promulgated by the Supreme Court) related to minor witnesses and practices, and the fact that public prosecutors have been trained to use child-friendly and gender sensitive practices when interviewing child victims. One respondent explained, *“We have a special law relative to minor witness, so when we are presenting a minor who is a victim of crime, like trafficking, we are at liberty to present the victim in the most comfortable way as possible”* (88, Government, Manila).

In pre-trial proceedings, one challenge public prosecutors face is that most DOJ Prosecutor’s Offices do not have child-friendly spaces; therefore, the child is often interviewed in the office. Nevertheless, public prosecutors *“make sure a social worker is present or a parent or guardian/custodian is with the child, and [steps are taken] to ensure the child is ready to talk, and [public prosecutors do] not force the child to talk”* (87, Government, Manila).

In the three project areas, public prosecutors are now using child-friendly techniques when interviewing child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings. For instance, they use *“dolls and . . . use video recordings, [and] sometimes the witnesses are presented with [a] one-way mirror where the perpetrators do not see them. We learned [to use child-friendly practices when interviewing child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings]”* (86, Government, Pampanga). Other prosecutors take steps to make sure that child victims do not have to face their traffickers in the courtroom. In some cases, public prosecutors use live links to bring a child’s testimony into the court, without the child needing to be present in courtroom. Public prosecutors also take steps to exclude the public from the courtroom when a child is testifying, and prosecutors *“can ask the judge to let the child testify where they are sitting, and we can ask the judge to remove his robe and not raise his/her voice if they child is afraid. We can also ask that the trial be held in the chamber of the judge and not in the court, so it is more child-friendly to the child”* (31, IJM, Manila). Similarly, another respondent explained,

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<sup>164</sup> The term ‘planted memories’, also known as ‘false memories’ was used to refer to the potential dangers of unintentionally implanting false memories in victims in the process of encouraging memory recall or memory recovery. Reference: <https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-19/edition-6/recovered-and-false-memories>

*“When I am with a child witness, I don’t let them face the court, I try to talk to them in a private room. But if there is no opportunity and we are in court I try to separate her from the rest and talk to the child and apprise her what will transpire in court. When I put her in the witness stand, because the judge sometimes does not allow it in chamber, I always use of the exclusion of others in court and I don’t let the child face the perpetrator” (115, Government, Cebu).*

## 7.5. Improvement in Evidence Presentation by DOJ Prosecutors in Child Sex Trafficking Cases

This evaluation also documented improvements in evidence presentation by public prosecutors in child sex trafficking cases. Table 7.5 shows that among respondents mainly in the legal sector, 88.9% reported that since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better at evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 95.8% maintained IJM contributed to improving evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases.

| Table 7.5. Improvement in evidence presentation by public prosecutors in child sex trafficking cases                                    |                               |      |
|---|-------------------------------|------|
| Since 2003, have public prosecutors gotten better at evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases? | Sample<br>N=27 <sup>1,2</sup> |      |
|   | n                             | %    |
| Yes   | 24                            | 88.9 |
| No  | 0                             | 0.0  |
| Did IJM contribute to improving evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases?                      | N=24 <sup>1</sup>             |      |
|   | n                             | %    |
| Yes   | 23                            | 95.8 |
| No  | 0                             | 0.0  |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes IJM and government officials, including only those in the legal sector

<sup>2</sup> 11.1% (n=6) respondent reported ‘do not know’

Since victim testimony is the most influential evidence in sex trafficking cases, being able to present victim evidence (testimony) in court proceedings is key to obtaining a conviction. This evaluation found that public prosecutors now *“have more knowledge on relevance of different evidence and proper questioning of victims to draw that information from the victims; and the sensitivity prosecutors now have toward victims, they are able to establish rapport with the victims, and their sensitivity with the victim facilitates disclosure of the victim to tell their story” (36, IJM, Pampanga)*. Public prosecutors also have a better understanding of anti-human trafficking laws, so they have *“improved a lot in prioritizing and selecting the evidence crucial to the case and presenting it in court” (31, IJM, Manila)*.


Further analysis of data in Table 7.5 was conducted to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 7.15 shows that 94.1% of government officials and 80.0% of IJM respondents reported that since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better at evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking victims. IJM respondents who did not report improvement reported they ‘do not know.’

*“We have to continually re-tool and enhance our skills because each case is unique. If we zero in on trafficking cases it will be finding the time to confer with witnesses before trial. Secondly, the levelling of expectations between prosecutor and the victims, so the victim knows we are behind them, and the prosecutor will know the mindset of the victim. It is about establishing a good relationship between the prosecutor and the victim, and establishing a trusting relationship, as well as with the police that conducted the operation.” (82, Government, Cebu)*

Among respondents who recognized improvements, 100.0% of government officials and 87.5% of IJM respondents reported that IJM contributed to improving evidence presentation in court proceedings. In particular, IJM provided input and guidance (e.g., guidance on proper questioning techniques and the type of questions to ask victims during court proceedings) which influenced how public prosecutors present evidence in court proceedings in child sex trafficking cases. In some cases, IJM lawyers provided public prosecutors with guide questions to help prepare them for the court

trial. Public prosecutors also reported IJM developed some learning toolkits and manuals for public prosecutors on anti-trafficking laws and how to prosecute sex trafficking cases.


**Chart 7.15. Improvement in evidence presentation by DOJ prosecutors in sex trafficking cases by type of agency**



Note: 20.0% (n=2) of IJM respondents reported they ‘do not know’ if public prosecutors had gotten better at evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases

Chart 7.16 shows differences based upon project area. In particular, 100.0% of respondents in Cebu, 84.6% in Manila, and 80.0% in Pampanga reported that since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better at evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 100.0% of respondents in Cebu and Pampanga, and 90.9% in Manila reported IJM contributed to improving evidence presentation in court proceedings in sex trafficking cases.


**Chart 7.16. Improvement in evidence presentation by DOJ prosecutors in sex trafficking cases by project areas**



Note: 9.1% (n=1) of respondents in Manila reported they ‘do not know’ if public prosecutors had gotten better at evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases

Chart 7.17 reveals differences based upon sector of work. Data shows that 94.7% of respondents in the legal sector and 71.4% of IJM managers reported that since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better at evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases. Among those who recognized improvements, 100.0% of respondents in the legal sector and 80.0% of IJM managers maintained IJM contributed to improving evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking.

**Chart 7.17. Improvement in evidence presentation by DOJ prosecutors in sex trafficking cases by sector of work**



Note: 28.6% (n=2) of IJM respondents reported they ‘do not know’ if public prosecutors had gotten better at evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases

### 7.5.1. Challenges with Evidence Presentation in Court Proceedings.

Despite improvements in the ability of public prosecutors to present evidence in court proceedings, there are still many challenges faced by public prosecutors when it comes to evidence presentation in court proceedings. This includes: quality of evidence; technical arguments related to evidence; and inability to secure a victim’s testimony.

**Quality of Evidence.** One challenge prosecutors face relates to the quality of evidence and evidence preservation. On the one hand, “the challenge lies with the quality of evidence gathered by the anti-trafficking police; if the police do not do their job, prosecutors can’t do their job either” (31, IJM, Manila). Storage of evidence is still an issue, particularly in the way the police store “evidence before sending it to courts” (58, IJM, Cebu). IJM noted that sometimes evidence disappears. IJM has had cases where “corruption comes into play . . . evidence locker smashed and evidence stolen, it takes a lot of work” (3, IJM, Manila). These are challenges that have an impact on public prosecutors’ abilities to present evidence in court proceedings.

*“Speaking for the region, we do not have that problem anymore considering our law enforcement were trained on how to deal with the evidence. They know what evidence and material is useful to the case, and they are now discriminatory and not discarding evidence . . . In the past, they didn’t think the permits were significant, but now they are bringing in everything. They better now.” (50, Government, Pampanga)*

**Technical Arguments Related to Evidence.** Other challenges that public prosecutors face when it comes to evidence presentation in court proceedings are the technical arguments that defense attorneys use to exclude evidence and the technicalities that can result in evidence being barred from presentation in court. Sometimes technical arguments related to how the evidence was collected, the quality of the evidence, and questions surrounding the chain of custody.

**Inability to Secure a Victim’s Testimony.** Another challenge to evidence presentation in court proceedings involved public prosecutors’ abilities to present victims and victim testimony in court. Sometimes prosecutors have not been able to establish a good rapport with sex trafficking victims or have not had time to prepare victims to testify in court. In large part, this is because “prosecutors are so loaded with so many cases and the quality of their presentation is affected” (87, Government, Manila). Another respondent explained,

*“Sometimes, if they [public prosecutors] have not built a good rapport with the victim witness then they just may not have the same connection when the witness is on the stand, and if they have not spent enough time prepping the witness, then that will be a challenge. With police witnesses they will just call the witness to the stand without a prep, where IJM will meet with the police or DSWD witness. Public prosecutors don’t have the luxury of time to do that.” (59, IJM, Cebu)*

Prosecutors have also faced challenges locating victims and/or victims simply do not appear in court. One respondent explained, “there are still situations where we lose our witnesses, and that is a challenge” (87, Government, Manila). Similarly, another respondent added, “How to locate the witnesses; that is the only thing, the most prevalent problem, and how to bring them in court. We lack budget, it really hampers the campaign; how can the prosecutors bring the witness that is in Carson City. Without the support and help of IJM we cannot do that.” (88, Government, Manila)

Given the challenges that public prosecutors experience with trafficking victims, it is important that they develop more evidence that is not victim-dependent. However, “some judges want the victim in the witness stand; that is the only thing that can assure them there is a case established beyond a reasonable doubt, if you present the victim.” This same respondent expressed hope that judges will come to understand it “is difficult for a child to testify because they don’t want to be in the witness stand. We hope the judges will see the mindset of the victim, and not be victim dependent” (115, Government, Cebu).

## 7.6. Improvement in DOJ Prosecutor’s Understanding and Application of Anti-Trafficking Laws

Another area of improvement that was found was in public prosecutors’ understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws. Table 7.6 shows that 97.9% of respondents from the government and IJM, particularly in the law enforcement/investigative and legal sectors, reported that since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better at understanding and applying anti-trafficking laws. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 60.9% maintained IJM contributed to improving public prosecutors understanding and application of the anti-trafficking laws.

| Table 7.6. Improvement in public prosecutor’s understanding and application of anti-human trafficking laws                     |                 |      |
|--|-----------------|------|
| <u>Since 2003, do you think public prosecutors have gotten better at understanding and applying the anti-trafficking laws?</u> | Sample<br>N=47  |      |
|  | N               | %    |
| Yes  | 46              | 97.9 |
| No   | 1               | 2.1  |
| <u>Did IJM contribute to improving public prosecutor’s understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws?</u>             | N=46            |      |
|  | N               | %    |
| Yes  | 28 <sup>1</sup> | 60.9 |
| No   | 0               | 0.0  |

<sup>1</sup> 39.1% (n=18) had missing data

One area in which IJM made significant improvement was in terms of the trainings focused on anti-trafficking laws (R.A. No. 9208 and R.A. No. 10364), jurisprudence and interpretation of relevant laws, special procedures, ‘good practices’ for prosecuting child sex trafficking cases, and common defense arguments and how to counter those arguments. Most of these topics were covered in PHILJA or IACAT trainings for DOJ prosecutors that IJM supported or led. It is important to recognize that PHILJA and IACAT, as well as other international organizations and development partners, also conducted trainings for DOJ prosecutors related to anti-trafficking laws and strategies for prosecuting human trafficking cases. Yet, the focus of this evaluation was only on trainings supported or led by IJM.

*“I believe IJM was the one that provided a framework as to the definition of trafficking, which includes acts, means, and purpose. When we started providing trainings in the past a lot of the prosecutors and stakeholders heard those elements for the first time, now everyone is talking about proving the acts, means, and purpose. It has been 13 years since the act was passed, we have done several trainings, and contributed significantly in amending the law [R.A. No. 10364] based upon the learning in our collaborative casework. In 2012, we provided more robust training to the partners to understand the new provisions in the amended law.” (1, IJM, Manila)*

Government officials recognized the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208) had provisions that defense attorney could use in their favor; however, the amended R.A. No. 10364 provided more ways of indicting perpetrators. In the eyes of public prosecutors, R.A. No. 10364 has “more teeth, and made prosecutors more committed to the fight


of child sex trafficking.” This same government official went on to say, “and our partnership with IJM not only made them [public prosecutors] committed, it made them aware . . . you need to prioritize and give attention to this” (20, Government, Pampanga).

By training public prosecutors and prosecuting child sex trafficking cases as private prosecutor (under the supervision of public prosecutors) IJM was able to demonstrate to public prosecutors not only how to prosecute such child sex trafficking cases and what motions to file, but also the importance of “close relationships between the DOJ task force, IJM, and the PNP and NBI, especially when the case is filed in courts” (88, Government, Manila).

“We sometimes laugh at defense attorneys because they will ask us, ‘If you have seminar for these cases, can we join?’ The lawyers want to know the technique on how to defeat and win the case. Lawyers look for loopholes. We feel special in being armed with this knowledge, how to analyze the law in connection with the case.” (47, Government, Pampanga)

Data in Table 7.6 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area and sector of work. Chart 7.18 reveals differences based upon type of agency. Data shows that 100.0% of IJM respondents and 97.2% of government officials reported since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better at understanding and applying anti-trafficking laws. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 100.0% of IJM respondents and 47.2% of government officials maintained IJM contributed to improving public prosecutors’ understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws. It is notable that 52.8% of government officials had missing data as it relates to knowledge that IJM contributed to improving prosecutors’ understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws.


**Chart 7.18. Improvement in prosecutor’s understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws by type of agency**



Note: 52.8% (N=19) of government officials had missing data as it relates to knowledge that IJM contributed to improving prosecutor’s understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws

Chart 7.19 reveals differences based upon project area. All respondents in Manila and Cebu, and 93.8% of respondents in Pampanga recognized that since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better and understanding and applying anti-trafficking laws. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 72.2% of respondents in Manila, 66.7% in Cebu, and 38.5% in Pampanga maintained IJM contributed to improving public prosecutors’ understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws. It is important to note that 61.5% of respondent in Pampanga, 33.0% in Cebu, and 27.8% in Manila had missing data as it related to knowledge that IJM contributed to improving public prosecutors’ understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws. This is because respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector deferred this question to public prosecutors.


**Chart 7.19. Improvement in prosecutor’s understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws by project areas**



Note: 27.8% (n=5) of respondents in Manila, 61.5% (N=8) in Pampanga, and 33.0% (n=5) in Cebu had missing data as it relates to knowledge that IJM contributed to improving prosecutor’s understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws

Chart 7.20 reveals differences based upon sector of work. In particular, 100.0% of IJM managers and respondents in the legal sector, and 95.0% in the law enforcement/investigative sector recognized that since 2003, public prosecutors had gotten better at understanding and applying anti-trafficking laws. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 100.0% of IJM managers and respondents in the legal sector reported IJM contributed to improving understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws. Only 5.3% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector thought that IJM contributed to improving understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws. It is important to note that 94.7% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector maintained they were unaware of IJM’s influence on DOJ prosecutors understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws, and deferred this question to the DOJ.

**Chart 7.20. Improvement in prosecutor’s understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws by sector of work**



Note: 94.7% (n=18) of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector had missing data as it relates to knowledge that IJM contributed to improving prosecutor’s understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws

### 7.7. Sustainability of Improvement in the Abilities of DOJ Prosecutors

Findings have revealed significant improvements in the abilities of public prosecutors to file charges against traffickers, prosecute child sex trafficking cases, interview child trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings, and present evidence in court proceedings. There have also been improvements in the ability of public prosecutors to understand and apply anti-trafficking laws. It has been established that IJM contributed to each of these improvements. Moreover, this evaluation found that IJM’s Program and collaborative casework approach was relevant and effective at improving the abilities of public prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases in the three project areas. Now the question is, will the improvements made be sustained over time?

In an effort to measure sustainability, respondents were specifically asked about the perceived sustainability of improvements in the abilities of the public prosecutors to file charges against sex traffickers, prosecute sex trafficking cases, interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings, and present evidence in court proceedings. Respondents were asked to rank on a scale of 1 to 10 how sustainable improvements in the abilities of public prosecutors will be over time. Then average scores were calculated for each measure on a scale of 1 to 10.

Table 7.7 shows the mean or average scores for all respondents on a scale of 1 to 10 (1=not sustainable, 10=very sustainable).<sup>165</sup> On average, respondents were very confident in the sustainability of improvements in the abilities of public prosecutors to file charges against sex traffickers (7.9), prosecute sex trafficking cases (8.1), interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings (7.9), and present evidence in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases (8.0).

| <b>Table 7.7. Sustainability of improvement in the abilities of public prosecutors</b>                                   |          |             |
|--|----------|-------------|
| <u>On a scale of 1 to 10, how sustainable do you think the improvement in the ability of public prosecutors to . . .</u> | <u>n</u> | <u>Mean</u> |
| File charges against sex traffickers   | 41       | 7.9         |
| Prosecute sex trafficking cases  | 41       | 8.1         |
| Interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings   | 24       | 7.9         |
| Evidence presentation in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases  | 23       | 8.0         |

Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Data was further disaggregated by type of agency, project area, and sector of work to see how perceptions of sustainability varied. Chart 7.21 shows mean comparisons based upon type of agency. Most notable is that IJM and government respondents were equally likely to believe public prosecutors would be able to sustain improvements in charges filed against sex traffickers (8.1 and 7.9 respectively), and prosecution of sex trafficking cases (8.2 and 8.1 respectively). However, IJM respondents were slightly more confident that public prosecutors would be able to sustain improvements in their abilities to interview child victims in pre-trial and court proceedings (8.4) and evidence presentation in court proceedings (8.6), compared to government respondents (7.7 and 7.8 respectively). Despite these differences, it is notable that government respondents had a high rate of confidence that public prosecutors would be able to sustain improvements in their abilities to interview child victims in pre-trial and court proceedings, and to present evidence in court proceedings.


Confidence in the sustainability of improvements made in the ability of public prosecutors to successfully prosecute child sex trafficking cases is linked to the fact that DOJ has the IACAT, and the IACAT was provided with sufficient resources over the past several years ensure the implementation of anti-trafficking laws. DOJ prosecutors have also been provided with various circulars related to prosecuting sex trafficking cases and using child-friendly practices. In addition, they have been provided with capacity building on how to prosecute human trafficking cases. As one respondent explained,

*“The benefit is there are specialized prosecutors, highly trained and experts in prosecution, and IJM has also trained them and influenced their strategies. We would have the case conferences with the special prosecutors on a regular basis and talk about the trends in trafficking cases and legal issues and challenges that prosecutors are confronted with, and there is a time to raise the issues and discuss ways to overcome: legal strategies.” (36, IJM, Pampanga)*

Sustainability is also grounded in the fact that *“there is not a lot of transfers or movement at the DOJ. If you are a member of an IACAT, you stay there a long time, and if you are in a state council, you stay there for a long time” (1, IJM, Manila)*. Similarly, another respondent added that, *“barring any changes in the government focus, and as long as we [prosecutors serving on the IACAT] are here and train the new prosecutors, as well as IJM and other NGOs provide training, it is easy to sustain” (47, Government, Pampanga)*.

<sup>165</sup> Sample size varies because not all respondents were asked to rank sustainability on each of the measures, given not all respondents had knowledge of improvement in the abilities of the public prosecutors on each of the measures.


**Chart 7.21. Sustainability of improvement in the abilities of public prosecutors by type of agency**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Chart 7.22 shows mean comparisons based upon type of agency. Most notable is that respondents from Manila (7.9), Pampanga (8.1), and Cebu (7.8) were nearly equally likely to believe public prosecutors would be able to sustain improvements in charges filed against sex traffickers. Differences do emerge in that respondents from Manila and Pampanga were slightly more confident than respondents in Cebu that public prosecutors would be able to sustain improvements in prosecution of sex trafficking cases, abilities to interview child victims in pre-trial and court proceedings, and to present evidence in court proceedings.

**Chart 7.22. Sustainability of improvement in the abilities of public prosecutors by project areas**




Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Finally, Chart 7.23 shows mean comparisons based upon sector of work. Respondents from law enforcement/investigative and legal sectors, as well as IJM management, were nearly equally likely to believe public prosecutors would be able to sustain improvement in charges filed against sex traffickers and to be able to prosecute sex trafficking cases. In addition, respondents in the legal sectors and IJM management were equally likely to believe public prosecutors would be able to sustain improvement in the skills and abilities of prosecutors to interview child victims in pre-trial and court proceedings, and to present evidence in court proceedings.

Not all respondents were confident that public prosecutors would be able to sustain improvements in charges filed against sex trafficking and to be able to prosecute sex trafficking cases. Among respondents who lacked confidence, some expressed, “We cannot say how sustainable it will be. In DOJ, there are prosecutors dedicated to trafficking, but they are not all on the same page” (29 and 30, Government, Manila). In other words, not all public prosecutors have

been trained to understand the crime of sex trafficking, including the elements of the crime, and/or sex trafficking victims. Thus, not all public prosecutors can effectively prosecute sex trafficking cases. It should be noted that law enforcement/investigative respondents were not asked about sustainability of public prosecutors to interview child victims or evidence presentation in court proceedings

**Chart 7.23. Sustainability of improvement in the abilities of public prosecutors by sector of work**



<sup>1</sup> Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Some government respondents maintained, given the Philippines was ranked a Tier 1 country in the US Department of State’s, *2016 Trafficking in Persons Report*, the Philippine Government will work to maintain that ranking. However, one respondent stated, “We can only maintain it with IJM there. It is a team effort actually. What the DOJ cannot provide, IJM provides. What assistance DOJ cannot give, IJM gives. IACAT and IJM complement each other. We wish that IJM continue assist with child sex trafficking, in addition to online sexual exploitation of children” (50, Government, Pampanga).

### 7.7.1. [Challenges to Sustainability](#)

Although respondents had a high level of confidence and optimism that public prosecutors would sustain improvements in their abilities to prosecute child sex trafficking cases, they still identified three challenges that could affect sustainability going forward. These include: resources (time and manpower) needed to prosecute sex trafficking cases; evidence presentation in court proceeding, particularly ensuring sex trafficking victims appear to testify in court; and corruption.

**Resource Challenges.** In terms of resource challenges, government officials recognized that public prosecutors often don’t have the luxury of time and resources that IJM had to effectively prosecute sex trafficking cases. Because a successful prosecution and conviction is typically dependent upon victim testimony, there needs to be a budget for protecting and caring for the victims, and preparing victims to testify in court proceedings. At the time of the evaluation, given the shift in focus to illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse, there were concerns that resources would be shifted away from supporting prosecution of child sex trafficking cases to illicit drug cases. However, most respondents were hopeful that because the IACAT is mandated by the Anti-Trafficking Law of 2003 (R.A. No. 9208), and in 2016 the Philippines was ranked a Tier 1 country in the US Department of State’s, *2016 Trafficking in Persons Report*, the government would continue to provide sufficient resources to the IACAT to effectively combat trafficking in persons.

**Evidence Challenges.** One of the most commonly cited challenges is evidence presentation in court proceedings, particularly ensuring there is enough evidence to prove the elements of the crime (sex trafficking) and to successfully prosecute the case and convict the traffickers. In the Philippine judicial system, successful prosecution and conviction is typically dependent upon victim and/or witness testimony; however, numerous challenges exist when it comes to ensuring sex trafficking victims appear in court and are prepared to testify. As one government respondent explained, “We have no problems prosecuting cases, but it is how to secure the witnesses [i.e., sex trafficking victims]. If you bring

me a witness I can prosecute, but without the witness we cannot successfully prosecute the cases” (86, Government, Pampanga).

Similarly, IJM explained the challenges that exist with witness coordination and witness tampering in sex trafficking cases in the Philippines.

*“I think the challenge is witness coordination, especially with the victim. Since our criminal procedures here still depend on testimonial evidence, usually our case is dependent on testimony of the victim, and if the victim does not testify we lose the convictions. And, usually the victim wants to restart their life or go back to their province or to another province, and sometimes victims are not interested in participating in legal proceedings. And it takes resource to find them and bring them to court. Also, witness tampering is a big issue in the defense. Although it is already a punishable act under the amended law, but it is happening in our cases.” (36, IJM, Pampanga)*

Over the years, IJM has been an important partner to public prosecutors, not only in terms of prosecuting child sex trafficking cases as private prosecutors, but also in helping to ensure that trafficking victims are prepared to testify in court and appear in court. IJM has actually transported victims to court. Public prosecutors maintained that as IJM ends their Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines, they are unsure where they will find the resources and/or time needed to locate trafficking victims, meet with them to prepare them to testify in court, and ensure they appear in court on the day(s) of the trial.

*“There will always be the challenge in case management and witness management because in both aspects we don’t have that much time in talking with witnesses or reaching out to victims. If they are adult victims sometimes they cannot be reached anymore. Hopefully, we would like to come up with a strategy where in trafficking cases they [prosecutions] will not be victim dependent. What has been seen so far is courts require the presentation of the victim and if we cannot find the victim, the dismissal of the case is high.” (82, Government, Cebu)*

In the Philippines, sustaining witness participation in sex trafficking cases is also difficult because the judicial process tends to move slowly. As one respondent explained, *“The only problem that prosecutors meet is when the case drags on too long and the witnesses slowly disappear. I think that is general, since our schedule/court dockets are really full” (61, Government, Cebu)*. Another respondent added, *“It is really sustaining the case in the court due to the absence of witnesses. Maybe we can include the slow judicial process in the Philippines. It is very slow and the victims move on and don’t want to come back anymore” (72, Government, Cebu)*.

**Corruption.** A few respondents also identified corruption as a challenge to sustainability. The corruption challenge that IJM recognized was *“the bullying and bribing of witnesses and the use of defense councils to influence communities and families.”* This same respondent went on to add, *“Big establishments will flex all their muscles . . . filing motion after motion to . . . corruption” (3, IJM, Manila)*. Government officials also recognized, *“the challenge is corruption; that is a big challenge for us. We are being criticized for that . . . The accused can pay the complainant, they stop talking. (15 and 16, Government, Manila)*. Traffickers have also been known to bribe law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges, if possible, to tamper with evidence and influence the outcome of the case.

*“Improvement in terms of securing our witnesses, we have an ad hoc structure. We have an operation center, and this operation center is tapped by all task forces in the Philippines. If they need to locate a witness, they contact us to assist in locating the witness. In 90% of the cases we are able to bring the witness to their jurisdiction, but there are funding challenges that we cannot secure a witness and bring the witness. We now want to institutionalize the victim witness protection program; the amendment to the law is a big help. We can go after people that try to influence our victim to not participate in the prosecution, now we can file a case against those people, including prosecutors, law enforcement, and judges who try to convince our victims not to testify. (87, Government, Manila)*

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Despite the fact that corruption remains a problem, some respondents do perceive that *“IACAT has probably discouraged corruption, witness tampering, or the judges not taking it serious. I think by having IACAT involved it makes them realize it is a serious case and should be above board”* (59, IJM, Cebu).

## CHAPTER 8: IMPROVEMENT IN COURTS HANDLING OF CHILD SEX TRAFFICKING CASES

### Chapter Highlights

- IJM’s Program and collaborative casework approach has been relevant and effective at improving courts handling of child sex trafficking cases
- 69.0% of respondents reported that since 2003, there have been improvements in the family courts handling of child sex trafficking (22.5% of respondents did not know), of which 57.1% maintained IJM contributed to improving the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases
- Improvements in the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases included: improvement in judges understanding of human trafficking and anti-trafficking laws in the Philippines; use of child-friendly practices in the family courts; and fast tracking of child sex trafficking cases by courts
- 95.5% of respondents reported the family courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases as victims and witnesses, of which 61.9% maintained IJM contributed to ensuring courts use child-friendly practices.
- Since 2003, there has been a significant increase in the number of convictions of sex traffickers’ due to the increased number of raid and rescue operations carried out by the anti-trafficking police, the number of suspected traffickers charged and prosecuted, and the number of cases brought to courts in the three project areas
- 92.3% of respondents reported they saw an increase in the conviction of perpetrators of child sex trafficking since 2003, of which 95.8% maintained IJM contributed to the increase in conviction of sex traffickers
- From 2003 to 2015, there were a total of 181 IJM-supported convictions of traffickers for child sexual abuse, child sex trafficking, and online sexual exploitation of children; 138 of those convictions for human trafficking (64 in Manila, 66 in Cebu, and 8 in Pampanga)
- Two key contributing factors to the increase in the number of convictions for human trafficking were an increase in understanding of the anti-trafficking laws by prosecutors and judges, and better case build up by law enforcement authorities
- On a 10-point scale, respondents were very confident in the sustainability of improvement in the ability of courts to handle child sex trafficking cases (8.1), use child-friendly practices (8.2), and increase convictions of child sex traffickers (8.1)
- There are still challenges that could affect sustainability, including corruption and ensuring victims testify in court proceedings

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This chapter documents improvements made in the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases, use of child-friendly practices in the courtroom, and conviction of sex traffickers. IJM recognized they did not include a judicial pillar as part of their program focus, similar to law enforcement and aftercare; nevertheless, the judiciary were part and parcel to IJM’s Program. This chapter documents the contribution IJM made in improving courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases. Data is presented that demonstrates the impact of IJM’s Program and explores perceived sustainability of gains made in the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases and convictions in sex trafficking cases.

### 8.1. Family Courts’ Handling of Child Sex Trafficking Cases

Although family court judges were not interviewed as part of this evaluation, IJM respondents and government officials who had knowledge of and/or experience with the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases were specifically asked about the courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases. Table 8.1 shows that 69.0% of respondents reported that


since 2003, they have seen improvements in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking; 22.5% of respondents reported they ‘do not know’. Among respondents who saw improvements, 57.1% maintained IJM contributed to improving the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases; 14.3% report they ‘do not know’.

| Table 8.1 Improvement in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases                  |                   |      |
|--|-------------------|------|
| Since 2003, have you seen improvement in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases? | Sample N=71       |      |
|  | n                 | %    |
| Yes  | 49                | 69.0 |
| No   | 6                 | 8.5  |
| Do not know  | 16                | 22.5 |
| Did IJM contribute to improving the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases?          | N=49 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|  | n                 | %    |
| Yes  | 28                | 57.1 |
| No   | 1                 | 2.0  |
| Do not know  | 7                 | 14.3 |

<sup>1</sup> 26.5% (n=13) of respondents had missing data on whether IJM contributed to the improvement in the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases

Data in Table 8.1 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 8.1 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 85.7% of IJM respondents, 69.1% of government officials, and 55.6% of CSO respondents reported they saw improvements in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases since 2003; 21.8% of government officials and 44.4% of CSO respondents did not know. Among those who recognized improvements in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases, 100.0% of IJM respondents, 60.0% of CSO respondents, and 50.0% of government officials maintained IJM contributed to improving the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases. It is important to note that 42.1% of government officials had missing data and 40.0% of CSO respondents reported they did not know if IJM contributed to improving the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases.

**Chart 8.1. Improvement in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases by type of agency**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 21.8% (n=12) government officials and 44.4% (n=4) CSO respondents reported they ‘do not know’ if there has been improvement in the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases since 2003


<sup>2</sup> Note: 40.0% (n=2) of CSO respondents reported they ‘do not know’ if IJM contributed to improving the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases

<sup>3</sup> Note: 42.1% (n=13) government officials had missing data related to IJM’s contribution to improving the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases

Chart 8.2 shows differences based upon project area. In particular, 77.3% of respondents in Pampanga, 68.0% in Manila, and 62.5% in Cebu reported they saw improvements in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases since 2003. It is notable that 29.2% of respondents in Pampanga, 22.7% in Pampanga, and 16.0% in Manila reported they did

not know if there had been improvement in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 70.6% of respondents in Manila, 66.7% in Cebu, and 35.3% in Pampanga maintained IJM contributed to improving the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases. It should be noted that 47.0% of respondents in Pampanga had missing data, and 11.8% reported they did not know if IJM contributed to improving the family courts. Also, 20.0% of respondents in Cebu and 11.8% in Manila reported they did not know if IJM contributed to improving the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases. In the future, it might be helpful for IJM to communicate more effectively with their public justice system partners, through public relations materials, the impact of IJM efforts on improving public justice agencies responses to child sex trafficking. This would help their partners better understand IJM’s efforts to improve the multi-sectoral response to child sex trafficking, and the benefits of a stronger multi-sectoral response to child sex trafficking.

**Chart 8.2. Improvement in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases by project areas**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 16.0% (n=4) of respondents in Manila, 22.7% (n=5) in Pampanga, and 29.2% (n=7) in Cebu reported they ‘do not know’ if there has been improvement in the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases since 2003


<sup>2</sup> Note: 11.8% (n=2) of respondents in Manila, 11.8% (n=2) in Pampanga, and 20.0% (n=3) in Cebu reported they ‘do not know’ if IJM contributed to improving the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases

<sup>3</sup> Note: 17.6% (n=3) of respondents in Manila, 47.0% (n=8) in Pampanga, and 13.3% (n=2) in Cebu had missing data related to IJM contributions to improving the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases

Finally, Chart 8.3 shows differences based upon sector of work. In particular, 80.0% of IJM managers 77.8% of respondents in the legal sector, 66.7% in the law enforcement/investigative sector, 63.3% in the aftercare sector reported that since 2003, there have been improvements in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases. It is notable that 36.7% of respondents in the aftercare sector did not know if there had been improvements.

Among respondents who recognized improvements, 100.0% of IJM managers, 78.6% of respondents in the legal sector, and 68.4% in the aftercare sector maintained IJM contributed to improving in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases; whereas, 21.4% of respondents in the legal sector and 21.1% in the aftercare sector did not know if IJM helped to improve the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases. No respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector were asked this question; thus, all data was missing.

**Chart 8.3. Improvement in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases by sector of work**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 11.1% (n=2) of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector, 16.7% (n=3) in the legal sector, and 36.7% (n=11) in the aftercare sector reported they ‘do not know’ if there were improvement in the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases since 2003

<sup>2</sup> Note: 21.4% (n=3) of respondents in the legal sector and 21.1% (n=4) in the aftercare sector reported they ‘do not know’ if IJM contributed to improving the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases

<sup>3</sup> Note: 100.0% (n=12) of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector had missing data related to IJM contributions to improving the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases

Improvements in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases included: improvements in judges’ understanding of human trafficking as a crime and anti-trafficking laws in the Philippines; use of child-friendly practices in the family courts; and fast tracking of child sex trafficking cases by courts. Each of these improvements are discussed in more detail in the sections that follow.

[Improvement in Judges’ Understanding of Human Trafficking and Anti-Trafficking Laws.](#) Improvements in judges’ understanding of human trafficking as a crime and anti-trafficking laws contributed to improvements in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases. In the early years, judges did not know much about human trafficking and often blamed girls and young women for their own sexual exploitation and victimization. They often viewed sex trafficking victims as nothing more than prostitutes with agency, i.e., women who made the choice to enter into prostitution. Sex trafficking victims were not perceived as victims of a crime.

*“The judges are more gender sensitive and more open to trafficking victims. Before some judges would say, ‘they [the victim] asked for it, and they like what they are doing.’ Now they know.” (15 and 16, Government, Manila)*

Since 2003, there have been numerous efforts to train judges to understand the crime of human trafficking and sexual exploitation, the plight of sex trafficking victims, and anti-trafficking laws in the Philippines. Judges were trained to understand the elements of the crime and what evidence is needed to convict traffickers on charges of human trafficking. In addition to formal training, IJM was able to educate judges through their pleadings and appeals. Appeals filed by IJM sometimes resulted in legal precedent that helped to improve courts adjudication of child sex trafficking cases. As one IJM respondent explained, *“In our pleadings, the issues are really well discussed and we put in all the legal support. We are able to influence the judges on proper interpretation of the law and proper consideration of evidence” (36, IJM, Pampanga).*

Over time, trained judges *“understand, and they know what to look for, and the way they conduct themselves, and the way they communicate and handle themselves with the children . . . there are no more harassing comments” (47, Government, Pampanga).* Other respondents found that trained judges may also go *“to the extent of trying those cases in the morning or afternoon, so we get record breaking conviction” (50, Government, Pampanga).* Ultimately, *“judges are more likely to convict if the evidence is there, now more than before; before there was less awareness of the law, more victim blaming, less sensitivity to victims” (59, IJM, Cebu).*

Trained judges are also more willing to approve of plea bargaining in child sex trafficking cases, and encourage prosecutors and defense attorneys to consider plea bargaining. Trained judges have also been more supportive of closed door hearings to protect the confidentiality of victims, and have been willing to set hearings at the end of their docket or to have marathon hearings in the afternoons when there is more time. Although judges still make legal errors when handling child sex trafficking cases, they are reportedly less frequent than before, particularly among the judges who have been trained on anti-trafficking laws and the elements of the crime. In general, trained judges are better at applying anti-trafficking laws.

*Use of Child-Friendly Practices in Family Courts.* In cooperation with the IACAT and PHILJA, IJM conducted trainings for DOJ prosecutors and judges on human trafficking, anti-trafficking laws, and child-friendly practices in pre-trial and court proceedings. IJM relied upon justices and judges trained on human trafficking, either internationally and/or nationally, to conduct the trainings. These trainings complemented trainings provided by PHILJA and other international organizations and development agencies working to build the capacities of judges and prosecutors to handle human trafficking cases and to use child-friendly practices in the courtroom.

*“A lot of people really do not understand, even judges did not understand human trafficking in the early period, and they didn’t know what to look for . . . I have seen a lot of prosecutors that are supposed to be experts in Manila making mistakes in indictments, filing, and procedures. What I have seen here is the training of the police and prosecutors, but there is a body brain barrier when it comes to judges. If they see no one is complaining they just dismiss the case, when IJM and other NGOs took the judiciary to task and sat with them and explained to them what human trafficking was about, the judges learned what to look for in the cases. You don’t just look for the acts, but the scheme in which they make money. When we got that, we were able to get convictions and they don’t readily dismiss at a whim.” (47, Government, Pampanga)*

Eventually the Supreme Court issued a circular which mandates family courts use child-friendly practices in cases involving children. The circular outlines the rules of procedure to be implemented with child victims and witnesses in court proceedings. Child-friendly practices include: using simple words and asking simple questions that children will understand; speaking in a non-threatening and non-accusatory manner; allowing children to testify in the judge’s chambers versus in the courtroom to ensure privacy and confidentiality; making sure that trafficking victims do not have to look at or see their traffickers in the courtroom when they testify; allowing social workers to accompany victims to court and sit beside them during court proceedings; using dolls to allow children to tell the story of what happened to them; and allowing videotaped testimony if the child victim is uncomfortable sitting in the courtroom.

*“The majority of the family courts in Region III, they already set up the child-friendly waiting area, so that while waiting to be called the children and social worker are staying in that child-friendly room. There are a lot of materials and toys where children can play before the hearing. Most of the time the court hearing is not being heard in the courtroom, but in the judge chambers so that only the perpetrator, the victim, and the concerned legal staff are there. Giving the victim more comfortable feelings to express herself during the trial. Usually the judges take off their robe and they introduce themselves not as a judge, but as an auntie and the accused’s lawyers and the victim’s lawyers they are addressed as uncle or auntie so they are more comfortable. Those are the improvements and we really appreciate it because it really helps the children with social and emotional preparedness prior to the trial.” (89, Government, Pampanga)*

This evaluation found there was no one standard or common practice across family courts when it came to the use of child-friendly practices; instead, judges used child-friendly practices inconsistently. One government respondent explained, *“Some judges we worked with they tried to give priority to child sex trafficking; as much as possible they schedule once or twice a week, it makes the hearings faster and eliminates the burden for all the parties involved.”* This same respondent added, *“and they improved their services for child victims as witnesses, they have the holding room now where the children can stay” (20, Government, Pampanga).* Another respondent maintained, *“There needs to be*

more courts like this, there needs to be more dedicated courts that fully understand the law and the difference between anti-human trafficking cases” (19, Government, Manila).

Although the use of child-friendly practices in courts is mandated by a circular from the Supreme Court, IJM regularly had to advocate for the use of child-friendly practices in court proceedings.

*“What we have observed so far is courts . . . they make sure the children are placed in an area where they do not feel fear or threat from the offender to them or their family. There was a victim that expressed fear and the victim was quite between being afraid and feeling pity to the accused because the accused was good to her and her family. When she expressed that the IJM prosecutor worked it with the judge that the judge took off his robe and was sitting in front of the child, that they were talking and listening. It was inside their chambers, they made sure the child would not feel antagonism.” (82, Government, Cebu)*

In 2016, however, family court judges were generally more sensitive and aware of special child-friendly procedures that should be used when children are in the court as victims or witnesses to a crime. As a result, *“judges are more friendly with the victims; they don’t terrorize the child victims” (29 and 30, Government, Manila)*. This has helped to prevent re-traumatization of trafficking victims, and improved testimony from victims.

[\*Fast Tracking Child Sex Trafficking Cases through courts.\*](#) A third improvement in the family courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases is the fast tracking of trafficking cases in courts. Fast tracking resulted in child sex trafficking cases being prosecuted more quickly than in the past. IJM explained, *“They do prosecution faster. My first case was three to four years, my last case was a year, and recently we had a case that was six months. There are other cases that take some time, but I think now it is more of an exception” (2, IJM, Manila)*. Even cases with qualified human trafficking charges (i.e., trafficking cases involving minors or more than three victims) were being fast tracked through the judicial system.

In 2016, there are *“a select number of courts following the continuous trial, they are on a pilot program now and we are hoping the Supreme Court will make it mandatory for all courts to follow this trial system. IJM was instrumental in lobbying for a memorandum from the court administrator stating that trafficking cases should be prioritized over other cases” (31, IJM, Manila)*. At times, IJM coordinated with courts to ensure the hearings would be fast tracked. While IJM recognized they are not the only organization that has worked over the years to improve the family courts handling of child sex trafficking cases, they maintained they were the organization that *“lobbied for the Supreme Court to issue a circular that helped to fast track the cases. I don’t know if other organizations lobbied as well, but we did” (2, IJM, Manila)*.

Ultimately, fast tracking and speedy trials in child sex trafficking cases *“has made victims more comfortable and willing to testify in courts” (37, Government, Pampanga)*. The use of plea bargaining in sex trafficking cases also helped to fast track cases through courts and increase conviction rates.

## **8.2. Family Courts’ Use of Child-Friendly Practices**

Respondents were asked specifically if family courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases as victims and witnesses, and if IJM contributed to ensuring courts’ use of children friendly practices. Table 8.2 shows that 95.5% of respondents, particularly those in the legal sector, reported family courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases as victims and witnesses. Among respondents who reported family court use child-friendly practices, 61.9% maintained IJM contributed to ensuring courts use child-friendly practices; 33.3% of respondents did not know.

Despite the fact that nearly all respondents recognized the framework is there for family courts to use child-friendly practices, some respondents maintained *“the issue is consistency”* because *“the quality of judge’s sensitivity to victims and witness varies” (1, IJM, Manila)*. Numerous respondents expressed concern that some, but not all, judges used child-friendly practices in the courtroom. One respondent explained, *“The judges that are aware of that will do it on their own because they want to do things in the right way, [but] there are judges that will not.”* This same respondent went on to


explain, “My judge will not on his own, but if he has a prosecutor that draws attention . . . I will be the one to insist the practices are in place. But it will be a problem if I am not there, and I do not insist on it” (26, Government, Manila).

| Table 8.2. Family courts’ use of child-friendly practices  |                                  |      |
|--|----------------------------------|------|
| Do family courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved in human trafficking cases as victims and witnesses?                      | Full sample<br>N=22 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|  | n                                | %    |
| Yes  | 21                               | 95.5 |
| No   | 0                                | 0.0  |
| Do not know  | 1                                | 4.5  |
| Did IJM contribute to ensuring courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved in human trafficking cases as victims and witnesses? | N=21                             |      |
|  | n                                | %    |
| Yes  | 13                               | 61.9 |
| No   | 1                                | 4.8  |
| Do not know  | 7                                | 33.3 |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes only IJM respondents and government officials in the legal sector and IJM management.

Data in Table 8.2 was further analyzed to compare differences in perceptions of the family courts use of child-friendly practices based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 8.4 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 100.0% of IJM respondents and 92.9% of government officials reported family courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases as victims and witnesses. Among respondents who recognized such improvements, 87.5% of IJM respondents and 46.2% of government officials maintained IJM contributed to ensuring courts use of child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases. It is notable that 53.8% of government officials did not know if IJM contributed to ensuring courts use child-friendly practices.


**Chart 8.4. Family courts use of child-friendly practices by type of agency**



Note: 53.8% (n=7) government officials reported they ‘do not know’ if IJM contributed to ensuring courts use of child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases

Chart 8.5 shows differences based upon project area. In particular, 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga and Cebu, and 90.9% in Manila reported courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases as victims and witnesses. Among respondents who recognized such improvements, 75.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 70.0% in Manila, and 42.9% in Cebu maintained IJM contributed to ensuring courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases as victims and witnesses. It is notable that 57.1% of respondents in Cebu, 25.0% in Pampanga, and 20.0% in Manila reported they did not know if IJM contributed to ensuring courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases.

**Chart 8.5. Family courts use of child-friendly practices by sector of work**



Note: 20.0% (n=2) of respondents in Manila, 57.1% (n=4) in Cebu, and 25.0% (n=1) in Pampanga reported they ‘do not know’ if IJM contributed to ensuring courts use of child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases

Chart 8.6 shows differences based upon sector of work. In particular, 100.0% of IJM managers and 93.8% of respondents in the legal sector reported family courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases as victims and witnesses. Among respondents who recognized such improvements, 80.0% of IJM managers and 53.3% of respondents in the legal sector maintained IJM contributed to ensuring courts use child-friendly practices; 46.7% of respondents in the legal sectors did not know if IJM contributed to ensuring courts use child-friendly practices.

**Chart 8.6. Family courts use of child-friendly practices by sector of work**



Note: 46.7% (n=7) respondents in the legal sector reported they ‘do not know’ if IJM contributed to ensuring courts use of child-friendly practices when children are involved in cases

### 8.3. Conviction of Sex Traffickers

Since 2003, there has been a significant increase in the number of convictions of sex traffickers in the Philippines. The increase in convictions is an outcome of the increased number of raid and rescue operations carried out over the years by the anti-trafficking police, the increased number of suspected traffickers arrested and charged with trafficking, and the increased number of traffickers prosecuted in the three project areas. Over the past decade, courts in the three project areas have seen a drastic increase in sex trafficking cases. In 2010, IJM collaborated with the IACAT to conduct an audit of all trafficking cases. At that time, there were reportedly 3,000 cases of trafficking in the courts, and a large portion of those cases were in the two regions in which IJM was implementing their program activities – Metro Manila and Metro Cebu.


Table 8.3 shows that 92.3% of respondents, particularly in the legal sector, reported seeing an increase in the number of convictions of child sex traffickers since 2003. Respondents who reported an increase in convictions, 95.8% maintained IJM contributed to the increase in convictions of sex traffickers. One respondent claimed, “We have the highest convictions [rate] in the entire Philippines, thanks to the IJM” (50, Government, Pampanga).

| Table 8.3. Conviction of child sex traffickers                            |                                  |      |
|---|----------------------------------|------|
| Since 2003, has there been an increase in convictions of sex traffickers? | Full sample<br>N=28 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|   | n                                | %    |
| Yes   | 24                               | 92.3 |
| No  | 0                                | 0.0  |
| Do not know   | 2                                | 7.7  |
| Did IJM contribute to the increase in convictions of sex traffickers?     | N=24 <sup>1</sup>                |      |
| Yes   | 23                               | 95.8 |
| No  | 0                                | 0.0  |
| Do not know   | 1                                | 4.2  |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes only IJM respondents and government officials in the legal sector

Data in Table 8.3 was further analyzed to reveal differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 8.7 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 100.0% of IJM respondents and 88.2% of government officials reported seeing an increase in the number of convictions of child sex traffickers since 2003. Among respondents who saw an increase in convictions, 100.0% of IJM respondents and 93.3% of government officials maintained IJM contributed to the increase in convictions of sex traffickers.


**Chart 8.7. Increase in convictions of sex traffickers by type of agency**



Note: The sample includes only IJM respondents and government officials in the legal sector

Chart 8.8 shows differences based upon project area. In particular, 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 91.7% in Manila, and 88.9% in Cebu reported that since 2003, they saw an increase in the number of convictions of child sex traffickers. Among respondents who reportedly saw an increase in convictions, 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga and Cebu, and 90.9% in Manila maintained IJM contributed to the increase convictions of child sex traffickers. The remaining 9.1% of respondents in Manila did not know if IJM contributed to the increase in convictions of child sex traffickers.


**Chart 8.8. Increase in convictions of sex traffickers by project areas**



Note: The sample includes only IJM respondents and government officials in the legal sector

Finally, Chart 8.9 reveals differences based upon sector of work. Data shows 100.0% of IJM managers and 89.5% of respondents in the legal sector saw an increase in the number of convictions of child sex traffickers since 2003. Among respondents who recognized an increase in convictions, 100.0% of IJM managers and 94.1% of respondents in the legal sector maintained IJM contributed to the increase in convictions. The remaining 5.9% of respondents in the legal sector did not know if IJM contributed to the increase in convictions of child sex traffickers.


**Chart 8.9. Increase in convictions of sex traffickers by sector of work**



Note: The sample includes only IJM respondents and government officials in the legal sector

Data from IJM’s CTMS was analyzed to assess the impact of IJM’s Program on convictions of traffickers. Chart 8.10 shows the number of IJM-supported convictions of traffickers by year and type of exploitation. From 2003 to 2015, there were a total of 181 IJM-supported convictions of traffickers for child sexual abuse, child sex trafficking, and online sexual exploitation of children; 138 of those convictions were specifically for child sex trafficking. There was essentially a steady increase in the number of IJM-supported convictions for human trafficking from 0 in 2003 to 5 in 2005, 13 in 2012 and a peak of 40 in 2015.


**Chart 8.10. IJM-supported convictions of human trafficking by year and type of exploitation (2003-2015)**



Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2003 to 2015

Chart 8.11 shows the number of IJM-supported convictions for human trafficking by year and project area. From 2003 to 2015, there were a total of 138 IJM-supported convictions of human traffickers, including 64 convictions in Manila, 66 in Cebu, and 8 in Pampanga. There was a steady increase in the number of IJM-supported convictions in the three project areas from 2003 to 2015. In Manila, convictions for human trafficking started as early as 2005, whereas in Cebu, convictions for human trafficking begin in 2010, and 2013 in Pampanga. Convictions for human trafficking peaked at 13 in 2014 in Manila, 29 in 2015 in Cebu, and 4 in 2014 in Pampanga.

**Chart 8.11. IJM-supported convictions of child sex traffickers by year and project area (2003-2015)**



Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2003 to 2015

Two main contributing factors to the increase in convictions of child sex traffickers were an increase in understanding of anti-trafficking laws by prosecutors and judges, and better case buildup by law enforcement authorities.

*Improved Coordination and Understanding of the Anti-Trafficking Laws.* Improved understanding of anti-trafficking laws emerged as a common theme and reason for the increased number of convictions of child sex traffickers in the three project areas. Government respondents recognize that in the early years, “most [child sex trafficking cases] were dismissed because there was no specific path, because of lack of knowledge and training, even by the judges. But the law has evolved and we have a clearer picture of the law, and that is the time the conviction rate has improved drastically” (86, Government, Pampanga). This in large part was because of a lack of expertise among prosecutors when it came to prosecuting child sex trafficking and understanding the anti-trafficking laws, and a lack of understanding by

judges as to the elements of the crime and the laws. At the time of this evaluation, both prosecutors and judges are much more knowledgeable of anti-trafficking laws and know how to apply them in child sex trafficking cases.

The IACAT was also very important in facilitating coordination, and monitoring the implementation of anti- trafficking laws. This included monitoring prosecutions and convictions of traffickers. Some respondents maintained the increase in convictions led to increased initiative on the part of law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges to ensure successful case build up, prosecution, and conviction of trafficking cases.

*“I think IJM helped to build the momentum. I think that was a huge contribution there; and just working alongside each other, and learning from each and every case helps a lot.”  
(33, IJM, Manila)*

***Better Case Buildup.*** The increase in convictions in child sex traffickers was also linked to *“better evidence gathering, which produces better evidence in court that supports the case to get to conviction”* (2, IJM, Manila). It is not just better case buildup on the part of the anti-trafficking police units, but also better evidence collection and preservation. Public prosecutors and judges were also trained to understand and appreciate the elements of the crime and the evidence presented in sex trafficking cases.

*“I have the impression the police improved in their handling of cases, and I think the increase in the number of convictions can be evidence of the higher level of capacity. Before, many cases were dismissed and the prosecutors complained, ‘how can I prosecute when the evidence from the police is not enough to prosecute.’ I think IJM in their training provided that ability to succeed in prosecuting and convincing the judges to convict . . . The evidence in that is the increase in the number of conviction[s].”* (64, Government, Cebu)

Still, however, there is an overreliance on testimonial or direct evidence in trafficking cases; whereas, other documentary or tangible evidence, such as demonstrative evidence, forensic evidence, and physical evidence should be given more weight in cases.

#### **8.4. Sustainability of Improvement in Courts’ Handling of Child Sex Trafficking Cases**

Findings thus far revealed significant improvements in courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases, use of child-friendly practices, and convictions of child sex traffickers. It is also apparent that IJM contributed to these improvements. These findings demonstrate that IJM’s Program and collaborative casework approach has been relevant and effective at improving courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases. Now the question is, will the gains made be sustained over time?

In an effort to measure sustainability, respondents were asked about the sustainability of improvement in the abilities of courts to handle child sex trafficking cases and use child-friendly practices in cases that involve children as victims and witnesses. They were also asked about the sustainability of improvements in convictions of child sex traffickers. In an effort to quantify perceived sustainability, respondents were asked to rank on a scale of 1 to 10 how sustainable improvement in courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases will be over time. Then, average scores were calculated for each measure on a scale of 1 to 10. It is important to note that sample size varies because not all respondents were asked to rank sustainability on each of the measures, given not all respondents had knowledge of improvement in the abilities of courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases on each of the measures.

Table 8.4 shows the mean or average score for all respondents on a scale of 1 to 10 (1=not sustainable, 10=very sustainable). On average, respondents were very confident in the sustainability of improvement in the ability of courts to handle child sex trafficking cases (8.1), use child-friendly practices (8.2), and increase convictions of child sex traffickers (8.1).

| Table 8.4. Sustainability of improvement in courts' handling of child sex trafficking cases                 |    |      |
|---|----|------|
| On a scale of 1 to 10, how sustainable do you think improvement in the abilities of courts will be to . . . | n  | Mean |
| Handle of child sex trafficking   | 56 | 8.1  |
| Use child-friendly practices  | 21 | 8.2  |
| Increase convictions of child sex traffickers   | 24 | 8.1  |


Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Sustainability of improvements in the family courts' handling of sex trafficking was rated high because judges assigned to the family courts typically remain in the family court for a long time; often until retirement. As long as family court judges are trained on human trafficking, apply anti-trafficking laws, and use of child-friendly practices, there is a good probability that improvements will be sustained over time.

*"Independent of IJM, courts have been trained on child-friendly practices. Especially the younger judges are trained, aware of that, but the older judges we need to remind them continuously. But the younger judges are very sensitive already although there are a few holdouts. Some judges are more friendly toward the perpetrators, but I am seeing less and less of that."* (57, IJM, Cebu)

Data in Table 8.4 was further analyzed to understand mean differences in perceived sustainability based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 8.12 shows mean differences based upon type of agency. Most notable is that IJM respondents (9.0) were more likely to believe courts will be able to sustain improvements in their handling of child sex trafficking cases over time, compared to government officials (8.0) and CSO respondents (8.0). In addition, IJM respondents (9.0) were more likely to believe courts will be able to sustain the use of child-friendly practices over time, compared to government officials (7.8). It was because of the Supreme Court circular that mandates the use of child-friendly practices in courts that respondents thought the use of child friendly practices by the courts would be sustainable. Finally, IJM respondents (8.6) were also more likely than government officials (7.8) to believe courts will be able to sustain over time increases in convictions of sex traffickers. CSO respondents were not asked about sustainability in the courts' use of child-friendly practices or convictions of sex traffickers.


**Chart 8.12. Sustainability of improvement in courts' handling of child sex trafficking cases by type of agency**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Chart 8.13 shows mean differences based upon project area. Respondents in Manila (8.3), Pampanga (8.1) and Cebu (8.0) were nearly equally likely to think the courts will be able to sustain their handling of child sex trafficking cases over time, whereas respondents in Pampanga (9.0) were more likely to think the courts will be able to sustain the use of child-friendly practices, compared to respondents in Manila (8.3) and Cebu (7.7). Finally, respondents in Manila (8.4) were slightly more likely than in Pampanga (7.8) and Cebu (7.9) to think the courts will be able to sustain the increase in convictions of sex traffickers.


**Chart 8.13. Sustainability of improvement in courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases by project areas**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Finally, Chart 8.14 shows mean differences based upon sector of work. IJM managers (9.0) and respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (8.5) were more likely to think the courts will be able to sustain over time their handling of sex trafficking cases, compared to respondents in the legal sector (8.1) and aftercare sector (7.7). Also, IJM managers were more likely to think courts will be able to sustain the use of child-friendly practices (9.0) and to convict sex traffickers (8.7), compared to respondents in the legal sector (7.9 and 7.8 respectively). Neither respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector nor aftercare sectors were asked about sustainability in courts’ use of child-friendly practices or their ability to convict traffickers.

**Chart 8.14. Sustainability of improvement in courts’ handling of child sex trafficking cases by sector of work**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

#### 8.4.1. [Challenges to Sustainability](#)

Although respondents had a high level of confidence and optimism that courts could sustain improvements in their handling of child sex trafficking cases, use child-friendly practices in the courtroom, and to convict sex traffickers, there were still challenges that could affect sustainability. The most common challenges to sustainability were corruption and ensuring victims testify in court proceedings. In terms of corruption, the challenge is making sure traffickers do not corrupt either prosecutors or judges in trafficking cases. In terms of victim testimony, the challenge will be ensuring trafficking victims are prepared to testify in court, and appear in court to testify. Over the years, public prosecutors have relied upon IJM to prepare trafficking victims to testify in court and to transport them to court. IJM also helped to make sure neither trafficking victims nor their families were paid off by traffickers prior to the court date. IJM also monitored for corruption among prosecutors and judges in IJM-supported prosecutions.

## CHAPTER 9: STRATEGIC SUPPORT TO IMPROVE AFTERCARE FOR CHILD SEX TRAFFICKING VICTIMS

### Chapter Highlights

- 84.5% of respondents maintained they saw improvements in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims since 2003
- 82.9% of respondents from the aftercare sector reported improvements in the DSWD's abilities to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and to refer them to aftercare shelters. Among respondents who recognized improvements, all respondents reported IJM contributed to improving the DSWD's abilities to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters
- 87.1% of respondents participated in trauma-informed care training conducted by IJM or Consuelo Foundation, including 90.9% of DSWD and LGU social workers and 77.8% of CSO aftercare providers interviewed
- 88.9% of respondents reported there have been improvements since 2003 in the quality and range of aftercare services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters
- 100% of respondents maintained IJM contributed to the improvements in the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters
- 90.9% of respondents thought the quality and range of services provided to child sex trafficking victims supported victim rehabilitation and recovery and reduced victim's risk of being re-trafficked.
- Improvements in the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters included: the emergence of designated aftercare shelters for sex trafficking victims; provision of psychological trauma counselling services for sex trafficking victims; access to medical care for sex trafficking victims; case management; and preparation for reintegration
- IJM contributed resources to facilitate the development and functioning of two government RSNs where community-based clients could receive needed services following reintegration (e.g., psychological counselling, vocational and job readiness training, and medical services)
- 78.9% of respondents reported that since 2003, they saw the development of a more coordinated aftercare network of government and private aftercare providers who work together to provide sex trafficking victims with quality aftercare and reintegration services
- 86.7% of respondents maintained IJM contributed to the development of a coordinated aftercare network
- 86.5% of aftercare providers reported that since 2003, there had been improvements in victim outcomes, meaning improved recovery and restoration
- 100.0% of respondents maintained IJM helped to improve victim outcomes
- 69.4% of aftercare providers maintained there has been a reduction in the number of sex trafficking victims being re-trafficked after rescue and recovery; 30.6% did not know
- On a 10-point scale, respondents were confident in the sustainability of improvement in the DSWD's ability to provide post-rescue care (7.5) and crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters (7.3)
- On a 10-point scale, respondents were confident in the sustainability of improvements in the quality and range of aftercare services for sex trafficking victims (7.5)
- Challenges to sustainability are mainly resources, manpower, and supervision

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As previously mentioned, IJM's Program was premised on a ToC that by improving public justice system performance to increase prosecution of traffickers, the prevalence of child sex trafficking will decrease and children will be protected. The ToC related to the aftercare component of the program was that by improving government aftercare services and delivery of those services to child sex trafficking victims, IJM would be able to increase victim recovery, reintegration, and restoration. Thus, IJM focused on increasing the capacities of social workers and aftercare providers to provide child

sex trafficking victims with post-rescue care, and supported the DSWD to develop safe spaces (processing centers) where trafficking victims could be processed and receive gender sensitive and victim-centered post-rescue and crisis care. IJM also focused on the provision of services in shelters, especially post-trauma counseling, trauma-informed care and psychotherapy, and victim assessment that supports victim rehabilitation, recovery, and reintegration. IJM had an MOU with the DSWD, and partnered with both DSWD-run shelters and private shelters to support trafficking victims in their rehabilitation and recovery. IJM also contributed resources to facilitate the development and functioning of local government Reintegration Support Networks (RSNs) in Metro Manila and Metro Cebu and a SSN in Pampanga. RSNs and the SSN were designed to provide community-based clients (survivors of trafficking who had been reintegrated) with access to community-based support services (e.g., psychological counselling, vocational and job readiness training, and medical services).<sup>166</sup> RSNs and the SSN were staffed by DSWD and LGU social workers, and trained volunteers. IJM also identified transitional housing facilities that could support trafficking survivors in their reintegration.

This chapter explores the impact of IJM’s efforts to improve aftercare for child sex trafficking victims. One of the limitations of this evaluation was that the evaluators did not have contact with the beneficiaries of IJM’s Program, particularly those trafficking survivors who had been rescued and restored with IJM’s aftercare support. Nevertheless, interviews were conducted with DSWD and LGU social workers and private aftercare providers that provided insight into the impact and effectiveness of IJM’s efforts to improve aftercare for rescued child sex trafficking victims.

It is important to note at the outset of this chapter that throughout this evaluation the term ‘aftercare’ was used to refer to services provided to rescued sex trafficking victims following the post-rescue care they received in the processing centers. Aftercare services provide trafficking victims with protection and access to a range of aftercare services that support their rehabilitation, recovery, and reintegration. During data collection in the field, some DSWD social workers pointed out that IJM and the DSWD define ‘aftercare’ differently. In other words, *“IJM defines aftercare as when we bring victims to the shelter, but for the DSWD, aftercare is after the rehabilitation program, when the victim is reintegrated into the community”* (43, 44, 45, Government, Pampanga). The fact that IJM and DSWD defined ‘aftercare’ differently could have caused some confusion and disagreement between the two organizations from time to time, as will be revealed in this chapter. This difference in terminology did not impact this evaluation, however, since data was analyzed with this understanding in mind.

## 9.1. Improvement in Post-Rescue Care for Sex Trafficking Victims

IJM set up a system of post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims that did not previously exist in the Philippines. As has already been documented and discussed in previous chapters, IJM facilitated and supported collaboration between PNP anti-trafficking units and the DSWD to ensure social workers were present at raid and rescue operations to provide post-rescue care, and to transport rescued victims to the processing centers. Respondents from law enforcement/investigative and aftercare sectors were asked specifically about improvements in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims, including post-trauma counselling and crisis care after rescue.

Table 9.1 shows that 84.5% of respondents maintained they saw improvements in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims since 2003. The majority of respondents who recognized improvements reported improvements were seen among DSWD social workers (89.8%). Only 46.9% of respondents saw improvements among private aftercare providers (nongovernment), and 36.7% saw improvements among LGU social workers. Part of the reason fewer respondents identified improvements among LGU social workers was because there are typically only one or two LGU social workers in each municipality, and LGU social workers have numerous responsibilities. LGU social workers do not only handle human trafficking cases in their barangay or district, but also adoption cases, children in conflict with the law, and demands of the local chief executive. In some cases, *“LGU social workers have refused to provide aftercare to trafficking victims because they believe they are not equipped to handle these kinds of cases”* (74, Government, Cebu).

Respondents were also asked if IJM contributed to improvements in post-rescue care for trafficking victims. Table 9.1 shows that among those respondents that recognized improvements, 83.7% maintained IJM contributed to improvements in post-rescue care, including post-trauma counselling and care after rescue for trafficking victims.

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<sup>166</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 2.


| Table 9.1. Improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims  |                          |      |
|---|--------------------------|------|
| Since 2003, have you seen improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims, including post-trauma counselling and care after rescue? | Sample N=58 <sup>1</sup> |      |
|   | N                        | %    |
| Yes   | 49                       | 84.5 |
| No  | 1                        | 1.7  |
| Do not know   | 8                        | 13.8 |
| Those improvements have been among . . .  | N=49 <sup>1</sup>        |      |
| DSWD social workers   | 44                       | 89.8 |
| LGU social workers  | 18                       | 36.7 |
| Private aftercare providers (nongovernmental)   | 23                       | 46.9 |
| Did IJM contribute to the improvement in post-rescue care for trafficking victims?  |                          |      |
| Yes   | 41                       | 83.7 |
| No  | 1                        | 2.0  |
| Do not know   | 3                        | 6.1  |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes IJM, government, and CSO respondents from the law enforcement/investigative and aftercare sectors

Data from Table 9.1 was further analyzed to explore differences by type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 9.1 shows differences based upon type of agency. The majority of respondents from each of the different types of agencies saw improvement in the post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims; however, IJM respondents (100.0%) were more likely than CSO respondents (88.9%) and government officials (81.4%) maintain there had been improvements in the post-rescue care provided to sex trafficking victims since 2003. It is notable that only 16.3% of CSO respondents reported they had not seen improvements in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims; while 11.1% of CSO respondents did not know. Similarly, 16.3% of government respondents reported they did not know if there were improvements in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims.

Among respondents who recognized improvements, IJM respondents (100.0%) and government officials (91.4%) were more likely than CSO respondents (75.0%) to report the improvements had been among DSWD social workers. Whereas, CSO respondents (62.5%) were more likely than IJM respondents (33.3%) and government respondents (31.4%) to report they saw improvements among LGU social workers. Also, CSO (100.0%) and IJM (83.3%) respondents were more likely to see improvement among private aftercare providers in the post-rescue care they provide to trafficking victims.

**Chart 9.1. Improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims by type of agency**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 16.3% (n=7) of CSO respondents reported they have not seen improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims

<sup>2</sup> Note: 16.3% (n=7) government respondents and 11.1% (n=1) of CSO respondents reported they 'do not know' if there has been improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims


Chart 9.2 reveals differences based upon project area. Respondents in Pampanga (95.5%) and Cebu (85.0%) were more likely to see improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims, compared to respondents in Manila (68.8%). It

is notable that 25.0% of respondents in Manila and 15.0% in Cebu did not know if there had been improvements in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims.

Among respondents who saw improvements, respondents in Pampanga (100.0%) were more likely than respondents in Cebu (82.4%) and Manila (81.8%) to see improvements in the post-rescue care provided by DSWD social workers. Still, however, the majority of respondents in the three project areas reported there had been improvements in the ability of DSWD social workers to provide post-rescue care to sex trafficking victims.

Respondents in Manila (54.5%) were more likely to see improvements in the ability of LGU social welfare officers to provide post-rescue care to sex trafficking victims, compared to respondents in Cebu (35.3%) and Pampanga (28.6%). Respondents in Manila (72.7%) and Cebu (64.7%) were also more likely to see improvements among private aftercare providers, compared to respondents in Pampanga (19.0%). This finding is grounded in the fact that there are very few nongovernmental, private aftercare providers operating in Pampanga which provide post-rescue care to sex trafficking victims; thus, rescued trafficking victims are transferred to aftercare shelters in Metro Manila for protection and rehabilitation services.

**Chart 9.2. Improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims by project areas**




<sup>1</sup> Note: 6.3% (n=1) of respondents in Manila reported they have not seen improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims

<sup>2</sup> Note: 25.0% (n=4) of respondents in Manila and 15.0% (n=1) in Cebu reported they 'do not know' if there has been improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims

Finally, Chart 9.3 shows differences based upon sector of work. IJM managers (100.0%) and aftercare providers (91.2%) were more likely to see improvements in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims, compared to respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector. Nevertheless, the majority of respondents reported seeing improvement in post-rescue care since 2003. It should be noted that 25.0% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector and 8.8% in the aftercare sector did not know if there had been improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims.

Among respondents who saw improvements, 100.0% of IJM managers, 92.9% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector, and 87.1% in the aftercare sector saw improvements in the abilities of DSWD social workers to provide post-rescue care to sex trafficking victims. Fewer respondents saw improvements in the ability of LGU social workers; however, respondents in the aftercare sector (41.9%) were more likely to see improvements among LGU social workers, compared to respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (28.6%) and IJM managers (25.0%). In terms of improvements identified among private aftercare providers, IJM managers (75.0%) were most likely to see improvements, compared to respondents in the aftercare (51.6%) and law enforcement/investigative (28.6%) sectors.

**Chart 9.3. Improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims by sector of work**



Note: 25.0% (n=5) of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector and 8.8% (n=3) in the aftercare sector reported they ‘do not know’ if there has been improvement in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims

[Improvement in Post-Rescue Care](#). Identified improvements in post-rescue care stemmed in large part from IJM-supported efforts to train DSWD social workers to provide post-rescue care to sex trafficking victims following raid and rescue operations. IJM and the DSWD determined it was more efficient to establish teams of trained social workers that could be available to accompany the anti-trafficking units on raid and rescue operations to ensure trafficking victims were treated properly and properly accompanied to the processing centers. IJM also identified the need for formal processing centers, and collaborated with the DSWD to support the establishment of such processing centers in Metro Manila and Metro Cebu. Processing centers were a place where rescued trafficking victims could be properly processed and receive victim-centered and gender sensitive post-rescue care, including counselling and crisis care, and essentials (e.g., food, clothing, hygiene kits, medical care, and a place to sleep). IJM renovated the buildings that housed the processing centers, and equipped them with furniture, computers, and printers, as well as contributed hygiene kits, food, clothing, and medical supplies. IJM also paid the salaries of the house parents who staffed the processing centers. Although a formal processing center had not been established in Pampanga, IJM was able to set up ad hoc processing centers that the DSWD could use following raid and rescue operations.

The establishment of DSWD processing centers was a significant improvement from the past, when rescued trafficking victims “were brought to the police department and then to the shelters. They [trafficking victims] would wreak havoc on clients who were there for a long time; it was chaotic. But with ‘HerSpace’ it is a one-stop shop; it is a long way from before. There is a dorm for the girls if they are not ready to talk. It is not top of the line like I have seen in the USA, but it is a big difference from sitting on the floor in the police department because there is nowhere to sit.” (57, IJM, Cebu)

Similarly, government respondents recalled that in the past there was “no coordinated post-rescue team, before DSWD would just send social workers to go to the rescue; they would do a quick interview and placement.” This same respondent went on to explain, “Before the clients were just brought to any shelter without consideration for

*“IJM and [the] DSWD created something that did not exist before. HerSpace represented a new mind set focused on taking care of children, providing them dignity even when rescued. Before HerSpace, during rescue the children and women were brought to congested offices of the NBI and the PNP, and many times the perpetrators and survivors were sitting together. There were times when 30 to 40 were rescued and it took from midnight to early morning with the police taking affidavits with typewriters, and the place was ill-equipped with no space and no food. They were treated like criminals and offenders . . . I received reports from social workers that were part of the rescue team that this situation needed to be changed. We [IJM and DSWD] decided to create a space; alone [without IJM] we would not have thought of it.” (64, Government, Cebu)*

*other clients in the shelter or the special needs of the clients . . . Now we have a processing center and their immediate needs are assessed . . . if there is a need for the victim to be brought to the hospital that is addressed and taken care of, and appropriate placement is identified and decided” (7, IJM, Manila).*

Victims can typically stay for a maximum of two weeks in the processing centers, during which time social workers conduct intake interviews and gather personal information, family history, and background information, including information as to how and why they were trafficked. Trafficking victims are also provided with a medical examination (including age identification), and the process is initiated to obtain their birth certificates with identification. Social workers also assess whether the rescued victims should be placed in a shelter or reintegrated back to their families. In the case of child sex trafficking victims, more often than not they go to a shelter for rehabilitation services (only counselling and crisis care are provided in the processing centers). IJM explained what typically happens in the processing centers,

*“The client is brought there and once there the social workers provide the orientation for the victims. We start the orientation once the clients calm down; they are sometime agitated because they are surprised they were rescued. Then we start to talk to them when they calm down, we conduct the intake interview, and prepare them for the interview with law enforcement, and identify the needs. And, we have coloring books and movies. Those are the things that are happening inside the child-friendly processing center.” (7, IJM, Manila)*

Another respondent recalled,

*“The PNP and NBI would bring the children to HerSpace through financial support and idea of IJM, it was a place where children could feel they mattered. There was a room for them where they could rest like a home, there was food available, IJM improved the toilet facilities. The place was enhanced. IJM engaged the law enforcement and they agreed to use the facilities of HerSpace to make the affidavits, and IJM provided equipment. The police loved the equipment, they loved doing their job.” (64, Government, Cebu)*

The fact that IJM social workers worked alongside DSWD social workers to provide post-rescue care following raid and rescue operations and in the processing centers contributed to improvements in the abilities of DSWD social workers to understand the mentality and behavior of sex trafficking victims, and how to properly conduct needs assessments, provide counselling and crisis care, support victims to give their statements to the police, and prepare them for placement in a shelter or reintegration to the community.

[Improved Post-Rescue Care Contributed to Improved Victim Testimony](#). This evaluation found that improvements in post-rescue care for rescued sex trafficking victims generally facilitated victim cooperation and contributed to improvements in victim statements and testimony in pre-trial and court proceedings. Providing victim-centered and gender sensitive post-rescue counselling and crisis care showed rescued victims that *“they are not threatened, they are respected [by police and the DSWD] in terms of their privacy and ensured confidentiality, and the consequences of their statements is explained to them.”* This same respondent explained, *“the readiness of victims is ensured before the interview with law enforcement” (7, IJM, Manila).* The fact that social workers were there while victims gives their sworn statements to the police helped to empower victims to give their statements to the police, and to testify in court, particularly when IJM was able to prepare them for the court hearing.

Training provided to anti-trafficking police on how to interview child sex trafficking victims and to take their affidavits also contributed to improved victim testimony. IJM provided the police with a checklist of questions that should be asked of trafficking victims, so the police were also getting better evidence collection and case build up. The

*“Social workers have the special ability to calm hostile witnesses and make uncooperative witnesses at least civil to police officers. When we rescue them, they have a sense that we are arresting them or taking them away from their source of income or freedom. Social workers help them understand what we are doing for them, the crime is not their fault, and they will not be arrested.” (20, Government, Pampanga)*

fact that police took written affidavits from victims in the processing centers was important because it allowed victims to give their statements in a safe environment where they felt less intimidated, and a social worker was present to support them. They were also able to stop the interview and take a break if they chose.

In cases where parents or family members are the traffickers or exploiters, the fact that victims are secluded from outside influences (e.g., parents and family) when in the processing centers enabled the police to get *“a good interview with the victims, because of the privacy and the confidentiality.”* This same respondent added, *“If we can get good disclosures from the victims in HerSpace that would help us in the prosecution of the cases. We are getting good disclosures now”* (78, GO, Cebu).

**Post-Rescue Care Challenges.** Despite improvements in post-rescue care identified in the sections above, the DSWD still faces challenges providing quality post-rescue care to rescued sex trafficking victims. One challenge that emerged in recent years is that boys have been rescued from online commercial sexual exploitation, and processing centers were not designed to be co-ed. Establishing separate spaces for boys and girls in the same processing center was a challenge. Also, because of a lack of shelters for sexually exploited boys, boys often remain in the processing center for much longer than the maximum two weeks. One respondent reported *“there have been boys staying there [in the processing center] for a year, and they are not getting an education”* (107 and 108, CSO, Cebu).

Also, sustaining the processing centers has been a challenge for the DSWD. At one point, the processing center in Cebu was converted into an accounting office and eventually fell into disrepair. After a few years, it was again re-established as a processing center and money was invested into making some renovations to the space to make it an adequate accommodation for rescued trafficking victims. Still, however, the processing center is not functioning as it did in the past, and the DSWD tends to rely more heavily on volunteers from churches to staff the centers, versus trained social workers who can provide rescued trafficking victims with care and support.

## 9.2. Improvement in Crisis Care and Referrals to Aftercare Shelters


Respondents were specifically asked about improvement in the DSWD’s abilities to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and to refer them to aftercare shelters. Table 9.2 shows that 82.9% of respondents from the aftercare sector reported there have been improvements in the DSWD’s abilities to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and to refer them to aftercare shelters. Among respondents who recognized improvements, all respondents reported IJM contributed to improving the DSWD’s abilities to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters.

| Table 9.2. Improvement in crisis care and referrals to aftercare facilities   |                             |          |
|---|-----------------------------|----------|
| <u>Since 2003, have you seen improvement in the DSWD’s abilities to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and to refer them to aftercare shelters?</u> | Sample<br>N=35 <sup>1</sup> |          |
|   | <u>n</u>                    | <u>%</u> |
| Yes   | 29                          | 82.9     |
| No  | 2                           | 5.7      |
| Do not know   | 4                           | 11.4     |
| <u>Did IJM contribute to improving the DSWD’s abilities to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters?</u>              | N=29 <sup>1</sup>           |          |
|   |                             |          |
| Yes   | 29                          | 100.0    |
| No  | 0                           | 0.0      |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes IJM, government, and CSO respondents from the aftercare sector

Data in Table 9.2 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 9.4 shows differences based upon type of agency. Government officials (90.5%) and IJM respondents (83.3%) were more likely than CSO respondents (62.5%) to report that since 2003, they saw improvement in the DSWD’s abilities to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and to refer them to aftercare shelters. It is notable that 12.5% of CSO respondents reported they did not see improvements, whereas 16.7% of IJM respondents and 25.0% of CSO respondents reported they did not know.

**Chart 9.4. Improvement in crisis care and referrals to aftercare facilities by type of agency**




<sup>1</sup> Note: 12.5% of CSO respondents reported they have not seen improvement in the abilities of DSWD to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and referrals to shelters/aftercare facilities

<sup>2</sup> Note: 16.7% of IJM respondents and 25.0% of CSO respondents reported they 'do not know' if there has been improvement in the abilities of DSWD to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and referrals to shelters/aftercare facilities

Chart 9.5 shows differences based upon project area. The data shows that 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga and 85.6% in Cebu reported that since 2003, they saw improvement in the DSWD's abilities to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and to refer them to aftercare shelters, whereas only 55.6% of respondents in Manila saw such improvements. It is notable that 44.4% of respondents in Manila did not know if there had been improvements. In comparison, only 14.3% of respondents in Cebu reported they had not seen improvements in the DSWD's abilities to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters.

**Chart 9.5. Improvement in crisis care and referrals to aftercare facilities by project areas**




<sup>1</sup> Note: 14.3% of respondents in Cebu reported they have not seen improvement in the abilities of DSWD to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters

<sup>2</sup> Note: 44.4% of respondents in Manila reported they 'do not know' if there has been improvement in the abilities of DSWD to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and referrals to shelters/aftercare facilities

Chart 9.6 shows differences based upon sector of work. In particular, 83.9% of respondents in the aftercare sector and 75.0% of IJM managers reported there have been improvements in the DSWD's abilities to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and to refer them to aftercare shelters. Note that 25.0% of IJM managers did not know if there had been improvements.

**Chart 9.6. Improvement in crisis care and referrals to aftercare facilities by sector of work**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 6.5% (n=2) respondents in the aftercare sector reported they have not seen improvement in the abilities of DSWD to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and referrals to shelters/aftercare facilities

<sup>2</sup> Note: 9.7% (n=3) respondents in the aftercare sector and 25.0% (n=1) IJM managers reported they 'do not know' if there has been improvement in the abilities of DSWD to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and referrals to shelters/aftercare facilities

In the past, after being rescued, trafficking victims were often immediately released without any crisis care or support; however, with support from IJM, the DSWD began to provide rescued sex trafficking victims with crisis care. In situations where it was determined the parents and/or family were not responsible or involved in a child being sexually exploited or trafficked, the DSWD could engage with parents after the child was rescued. IJM explained,

*"Since 2003, it was a big improvement. It is not just the rescued clients, but the parents and relatives, they are provided them with information about the rescue, what are the laws violated, the penalties and why is this happened . . . It is a far cry since 2003, when you didn't even talk to the clients with this information. Giving information is an important tool to calm down a person in crisis. One of the basic things now our social workers provide them with food to make them believe they are not the criminals, but there is a lot more we need to learn about crisis care, especially for very young children (infants and toddlers). We need to learn more about developmental crisis care, if you have one or three-year-old screaming for her mom, what type of crisis care is needed for the child." (57, IJM, Cebu)*

IJM helped to improve the process that DSWD social workers go through to assess the needs of rescued trafficking victims and to refer them to aftercare shelters. IJM was also instrumental in making sure that case conferences were regularly held in the processing centers to assist the DSWD in determining where to refer particular rescued victims. IJM mapped available and appropriate shelters for the DSWD, including private aftercare shelters. IJM also supported the establishment of CSOs that could operate aftercare shelters for trafficking victims, including a facility for boys.

### 9.3. Trauma-Informed Care Training

Trauma-informed care is an "organizational structure and treatment framework"<sup>167</sup> that involves understanding, recognizing, and responding to the effects of trauma experienced by sex trafficking victims. Building the capacity of aftercare providers to provide trauma-informed care was one of the cornerstones of IJM's ToC, and part of their approach to improve government aftercare services and the delivery of services to sex trafficking victims. To effectively provide trauma-informed care, social workers and aftercare providers needed to understand the impact of trauma on child development, and learn how to effectively minimize its effects without causing additional trauma. Thus, IJM

<sup>167</sup> "Trauma-informed care is an organizational structure and treatment framework that involves understanding, recognizing and responding to the effects of all type of trauma. Trauma-informed care also emphasizes physical, psychological, and emotional safety for both consumers and providers, and helps survivors rebuild a sense of control and empowerment." Retrieved from: <http://www.traumainformedcareproject.org/>

provided training and technical assistance to DSWD and LGU social workers to build trauma-informed systems of aftercare. Trainings focused on how to properly assess and respond to trauma, and issues of secondary trauma that can be experienced by social workers. Many of the trauma-informed care trainings were conducted by the Consuelo Foundation, in accordance with a MOU with IJM.

Table 9.3 shows that 87.1% of respondents participated in trauma-informed care training conducted by IJM or Consuelo Foundation. More specifically, 90.9% of DSWD and LGU social workers and 77.8% of CSO aftercare providers participated in the trauma-informed care training. In 2014, IJM commissioned an evaluation of the effects of trauma-informed care training at the DSWD’s Marillac Hills.<sup>168</sup> The evaluation found that the majority of social workers and house parents who participated in the training maintained they gained significant knowledge about trauma, its signs, and its impact on people, yet they faced challenges applying the concepts learned in the trainings in practice. The evaluation also found that six months after being trained, trainees were able to sustain the knowledge gained in the training and were attempting to apply trauma concepts more consistently in practice.

| Have you participated in trauma-informed care training provided by IJM or another organization? | Sample <sup>1</sup><br>N=31 |      | Government<br>N=22 |      | CSO<br>N=9 |      |
|---|-----------------------------|------|--------------------|------|------------|------|
|   | n                           | %    | n                  | %    | n          | %    |
| Yes   | 27                          | 87.1 | 20                 | 90.9 | 7          | 77.8 |
| No  | 4                           | 4.3  | 2                  | 9.1  | 2          | 22.2 |

<sup>1</sup> Sample includes only government and CSO aftercare providers

IJM explained that participants in the trauma-informed care training reported the trainings taught them “*how to appropriately respond to sex trafficking survivors.*” This same respondent went on to explain,

*“Those trained in trauma-informed care have improved in our interactions with sex trafficking survivors. We learned the basics of trauma, and how it impacted survivors. We became sensitive to the action and behaviors of the survivors. Now, before you would see house parents belittling the survivor as being hardheaded, flirtatious, or a problem child; now, that has been minimized, but there are still challenges; and how to sustain that and to train other staff in the shelter.” (7, IJM, Manila)*

Similarly, government social workers described how the trauma-informed care training helped them “*understand the individual is very important, that the manifested problem is a product of many problems of the past that have not been resolved . . . that is why if the girl does not want to eat because she is angry, the house parent or staff has no reason to be angry with that girl, because there could be a problem*” (74, Government, Cebu). In addition, the trauma-informed care training helped social workers understand the responsibilities they have to ensure the physical, psychological, and emotional safety of sex trafficking victims, and “*to listen to them [sex trafficking victims] and assure them that there is life*” after rescue.

*“Before the DSWD social workers were so stressed when we refer trafficking victims to them; they were so stressed, they don’t like trafficking victims, they don’t know how to deal with them. But, now they have a better understanding and they know how to treat them and give them counselling.” (54, IJM, Pampanga)*

Other aftercare providers maintained they acquired assessment and case management skills from the trauma-informed care training. Many respondents reported the training made them more aware of secondary trauma that is often experienced by aftercare providers. One respondent explained, “*I find it more of the social workers dealing with themselves, being aware of the process they go through, their own traumas, their own self-care*” (14, CSO, Manila). Following the trauma-informed care training, some directors of private aftercare services maintained they needed to revisit some of their policies and programming approaches, because they may not be responsive to trauma victims.

<sup>168</sup> Sotto, J.A. (2015). Report on the Evaluation of the Effect of Trauma-Informed Care (TIC) Training at the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s Marillac Hills – National Training School for Girls.

## 9.4. Improvement in Quality and Range of Services in Aftercare Shelters

Being labelled a ‘trafficking victim’ can have significant implication on a person’s sense of identity, self-worth, and ability to shape their future. ‘Good practices’ have demonstrated that sex trafficking victims should be ensured access to the fullest range of possible options and services needed to empower them to regain control and rebuild their lives. While adult sex trafficking victims should be given the right to choose what services they wish to accept and/or decline, child sex trafficking victims require special protections and access to rehabilitation, recovery, and reintegration services.<sup>169</sup> IJM was committed to improving government aftercare services and delivery of those services to sex trafficking victims. In doing so, IJM took steps to improve the quality and range of rehabilitation services made available to sex trafficking victims. IJM recognized that by improving the quality and range of rehabilitation services they would be able to improve victim rehabilitation, recovery, and restoration.

Table 9.4 shows that 88.9% of respondents reported there have been improvements since 2003, in the quality and range of aftercare services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters. Among respondents who saw improvements, 100.0% maintained IJM contributed to the improvements in the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters. Moreover, 90.9% of respondents thought the quality and range of services provided to child sex trafficking victims supported victim rehabilitation and recovery, and reduced victim’s risk of being re-trafficked.

| <b>Table 9.4. Improvement in quality and range of services in aftercare shelters</b>   |                             |          |
|--|-----------------------------|----------|
| <u>Since 2003, have you seen improvement in the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters?</u>                                       | Sample <sup>1</sup><br>N=36 |          |
|  | <u>n</u>                    | <u>%</u> |
| Yes  | 32                          | 88.9     |
| No   | 2                           | 5.6      |
| Do not know  | 2                           | 5.6      |
| <u>Did IJM contribute to improving the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking in aftercare shelters?</u>  | N=32                        |          |
|  |                             |          |
| Yes  | 32                          | 100.0    |
| No   | 0                           | 0.0      |
| <u>Has the quality and range of services provided to child sex trafficking victims supported their rehabilitation and recovery, and reduced their risk of being re-trafficked?</u> | N=33                        |          |
|  |                             |          |
| Yes  | 30                          | 90.9     |
| No   | 2                           | 6.1      |
| Do not know  | 3                           | 3.0      |


<sup>1</sup> The sample includes only IJM, government, and CSO aftercare providers and IJM management

Data in Table 9.4 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 9.7 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 95.5% of government officials, 83.3% of IJM respondents, and 75.0% of CSO respondents reported improvements in the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters since 2003. It should be noted that 25.0% of CSO respondents did not see improvements.

In addition, 100.0% of IJM respondents, 89.5% of government officials, and 87.5% of CSO respondents maintained the quality and range of services provided supported victim rehabilitation and recovery, and reduced the risk of victims being re-trafficked. It is notable that 10.5% of government respondents did not think the quality and range of services provided to child sex trafficking victims supported victim rehabilitation and recovery or reduced the risk of victims being re-trafficked, whereas 12.5% of CSO respondents did not know.

<sup>169</sup> Raids, Rescues, Resolution: Removing Victims from Sex and Labor Exploitation. Strategic Information Response Network, United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP): Phase III. Bangkok, Thailand. September 2008.

**Chart 9.7. Improvement in quality and range of services in aftercare shelters by type of agency**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 25.0% (n=2) of CSO respondents saw improvements in the quality and range of services provided in government and private aftercare shelters to sex trafficking victims


<sup>2</sup> Note: 16.7% (n=1) of IJM respondents reported they ‘do not know’ if there were improvements in the quality and range of services provided in government and private aftercare shelters to sex trafficking victims

<sup>3</sup> Note: 10.5% (n=2) of government respondents reported the quality and range of services provided to child sex trafficking victims has not supported their rehabilitation and recovery, or reduced their risk of being re-trafficked

<sup>4</sup> Note: 12.5% (n=1) of CSO respondents reported they ‘do not know’ if the quality and range of services provided to child sex trafficking victims has supported their rehabilitation and recovery, or reduced their risk of being re-trafficked

Chart 9.8 shows differences based upon project area. In particular, 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 88.9% in Manila, and 78.6% in Cebu reported that since 2003, there have been improvements in the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters. It is notable that 14.3% of respondents in Cebu (mostly CSO aftercare providers) maintained they had not seen improvements in the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters. In addition, 92.3% of respondents in Pampanga, 91.7% in Cebu, and 87.5% in Manila maintained the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims supported victim rehabilitation and recovery, and reduced victims’ risk of being re-trafficked.

**Chart 9.8 Improvement in quality and range of services in aftercare shelters by project areas**




<sup>1</sup> Note: 14.3% (n=2) of respondents in Cebu reported they had not seen improvements in the quality and range of services provided in government and private aftercare shelters to sex trafficking victims

<sup>2</sup> Note: 11.1% (n=1) of respondents in Manila and 7.1% (n=1) in Cebu reported they ‘do not know’ if there were improvements in the quality and range of services provided in government and private aftercare shelters to sex trafficking victims

<sup>4</sup> Note: 12.5% (n=1) of respondents in Manila reported they ‘do not know’ if the quality and range of services provided to child sex trafficking victims has supported their rehabilitation and recovery, or reduced their risk of being re-trafficked

Finally, Chart 9.9 shows differences based upon sector of work. Data shows that 90.6% of aftercare providers and 75.0% of IJM managers reported there have been improvements in the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters. It is notable that 25.0% of IJM managers did not know if there were improvements. In addition, 100.0% of IJM managers and 89.7% of aftercare providers reported the quality and range of services provided supported victim rehabilitation and recovery, and reduced the risk of victims being re-trafficked.

**Chart 9.9. Improvement in quality and range of services in aftercare shelters by sector of work**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 25.0% (n=1) of IJM managers reported they ‘do not know’ if there have been improvements in the quality and range of services provided in government and private aftercare shelters to sex trafficking victims

<sup>2</sup> Note: 6.9% (n=2) of respondents in the aftercare sector reported the quality and range of services provided to child sex trafficking victims has not supported their rehabilitation and recovery, or reduced their risk of being re-trafficked

Five common themes that emerged in terms of improvements in the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters were: the emergence of designated aftercare shelters for sex trafficking victims; provision of psychological trauma counselling services for sex trafficking victims; access to medical care for sex trafficking victims; case management; and preparation for reintegration. Although each of these were addressed as improvements in the quality and range of services, there were also limitations or challenges that were identified. Both improvements and limitations or challenges are addressed in the sections that follow.

*Emergence of Designated Aftercare Shelters for Sex Trafficking Victims.* In 2003, there were no aftercare shelters for sex trafficking victims because government shelters did not typically accept sex trafficking victims. In 2016, however, some government shelters have been designated as shelters for trafficking victims. Private shelters which are willing to take trafficking victims have also been established in Metro Manila and Metro Cebu. Both government and private shelters have established minimum standards of care for sex trafficking victims; however, their minimum standards are not the same.

There are also formalized processes for referring trafficking victims to designated aftercare shelters; however, at times it can be difficult for the DSWD to refer trafficking victims to aftercare shelters. In most cases, either prior to a rescue operation or shortly thereafter, the anti-trafficking police will prepare a letter for the shelter to confirm there is space to place rescued victims, then the shelter prepares space for rescued trafficking victims. Sometimes, shelters lack bed space, but they may have standby mattresses that can be brought out when needed to provide newly rescued trafficking victims with space in the shelter. While IJM agreed to provide salaries for house parents assigned to care for rescued trafficking victims in the shelters, particularly those rescued during IJM-supported raid and rescue operations, the salaries for house parents ended after the sex trafficking victims were discharged from the shelter. This created some inconsistencies and gaps in salaries for house parents. There were some concerns that in the future, without IJM’s support, there would not be additional funding to cover the salaries of house parents who work with sex trafficking victims.

In 2016, as a result of capacity-building trainings focused on trauma-informed care and psychotherapy, intake staff at the designated shelters are better equipped to provide care to newly rescued sex trafficking victims. They are aware that some victims may be very aggressive; nevertheless, they are confident that they can handle the challenging clients. IJM maintained, *“We are confident when we bring them to the shelter and the staff there will be able to handle those behaviors”* (7, IJM, Manila).

*Provision of Psychological Trauma Counselling Services.* Improving victim access to quality psychological and trauma counselling has been a challenge, given there are only a select number of social workers and psychologists trained in trauma-focused behavior therapy. In aftercare shelters, social workers and psychologists, although few in number, are reportedly providing sex trafficking victims with counselling and therapy.

*“We have been able to help them in a way, but the DSWD does not have psychologists in their shelter. The recommendation is that DSWD should move to endorse the recommendation to have one psychologist per shelter”* (104, CSO, Pampanga)

In some cases, trafficking victims in Manila may be referred to the Child Protection Unit or the Philippines General Hospital for specialized or psychiatric care. The challenge is that there are so many rescued trafficking victims in need of services and there are often not enough trained social workers and psychologists who can provide trauma-focused behavior therapy. Whether such specialized psychological trauma counselling services will be sustainable over time is not yet clear.

Because there are quite a few social workers that have not been trained, there are still problems of social workers blaming trafficking victims for their own victimization. In fact, numerous government respondents maintained there is a need for more training to understanding child sex trafficking victims and trauma-informed care. One respondent explained, *“We still in need trainings in terms of handling the behaviors of victims. We need more trainings”* (89, Government, Pampanga).

*“Now we understand because I myself when I came in I even blamed them, why do you have to go to that kind of work is there no other kind of work you can do. But working with them [IJM] and having trainings, changed my view.”* (74, Government, Cebu)

*Access to Medical Care.* Medical care for sex trafficking victims was not frequently discussed during the evaluation; nevertheless, interview data revealed that providing medical care for special health needs of trafficking victims (e.g., laboratory tests and specialized treatments) is often very expensive. IJM explained that sometimes *“one client needs to spend 10,000 pesos [200 USD] and the shelter does not have a budget to provide special health services for clients. Minor medical services are addressed, they have a doctor in the shelter”* (7, IJM, Manila). To address this challenge, IJM tried to help cover the costs of medication for children that they referred to the aftercare shelters.

The Child Protection Unit in Manila and the Pink House in Cebu were established to provide medical care to child victims of violence, abuse, and sexual exploitation/trafficking. The challenge facing the Pink House was that every sex trafficking case was sent to the Pink House; however, there was only one medical doctor trained to handle the cases. For the whole municipality, there was one medical doctor assigned to the Pink House. What happens in other municipalities where there is no Pink House or Child Protection Unit was raised as an issue of concern.

*“For us, we usually refer. We have a linkage with the government hospitals and so far, our coordination with them is quite good. I remember IJM also have their contacts with other NGO health care providers and assist us in accessing those health care providers.”* (89, Government, Pampanga)

For the DSWD, medical care for sex trafficking victims was a major challenge because they did not typically have the budget to cover medical care costs for sex trafficking victims. In many cases, the DSWD was not even able to provide antibiotics to their clients. Also, the DSWD did not have doctors or psychologists assigned to the shelters, and clients in need of medical and/or psychiatric care had to be referred to the Philippines General Hospital. For aftercare shelters, the ability to provide sex trafficking victims with medical care and medicines was *“very challenging because there is no unified system . . . and people do not collaborate well with medical services”* (107 and 108, CSO, Cebu). Everyone

recognized the challenge was a lack of resources and personnel when it comes to providing medical care to child sex trafficking victims.

**Case Management.** IJM worked to improve the ability of DSWD and LGU social workers to carry out proper case management; however, *“case management is still a problem”* (64, Government, Cebu). In part, the challenges are that social workers are generally responsible for very large caseloads, but also many social workers lack the knowledge and skills needed to carry out proper case management. Although the DSWD conducted case management trainings, there was no after training follow-up, and for new social workers, the case management training was only a one-time training.

*“That [case management] is one thing we were very low on before because of lack of knowledge and skills, but now because of the trainings, little-by-little we learn how to deal with the case and address the traumatic experiences and how to partner with other agencies, including the LGU. One of the major challenges is the lack of manpower of the DSWD.”* (67, GO, Cebu)

In terms of case management, the challenges extended beyond training to a lack of government resources and willingness of clients to accept the services. In other words, the DSWD can refer and connect clients to services, but they cannot guarantee that clients accept the services.

As part of the case management process, DSWD social workers started to conduct case conferences. IJM introduced the practice of case conferences to improve the planning of interventions for sex trafficking victims. Case conferences brought improvement, as the *“DSWD takes the lead on calling the case conferences and discussing what type of interventions need to be provided in the shelter.”* This

*“There are so many services that are needed [by sex trafficking victims], and how much as an organization can you provide. If the child needs ten things [services], but you can provide five [services], the other five [services] are not. It effects your outcome.”* (9 and 10, Government, Manila)

same respondent went on to add, *“There is a lot of leadership among DSWD to do case management, and more bi-annual meetings with DSWD to discuss gaps and challenges. We always discuss case management and assessment and reintegration; reintegration can be a big conversation because there is a lot of information and discussion around sending a child back to the family. It is a serious discussion”* (57, IJM, Cebu).

**Preparation for Reintegration.** Reintegration preparation is a challenge because there is generally no guarantee the services would be continued by clients or provided by LGU social workers who are responsible for providing community-based services to trafficking victims who have been reintegrated. One respondent explained, *“Once the client is ready for reintegration we call a conference and invite the LGU social worker, and once we reintegrate the children with their families, we have another conference, but sometimes the LGU social worker does not find time to fully implement what we agreed in the case conference because they lack manpower”* (89, Government, Pampanga). In every municipality, there is one LGU social worker and no direct services, so they sometimes fail to provide community-based clients with the services they need.

There is also a lack of income generating opportunities in communities for community-based clients. Most trafficking victims come from poor families and lack the skills needed to obtain employment, so they need vocational and job readiness training to develop skills that will make them employable. Given these challenges, the rehabilitation and recovery that sex trafficking victims achieved in shelters, may not be sustained when they are reintegrated back to their families and the community.

*“I think one of the challenges there is you have to provide an alternative for the trafficking victims and the value system has to be oriented. They are used to being exploited, and it is a big challenge to get that out of their system. And for the families that support the trafficking, it is a challenge to bring the victims back to the family. These are very strong issues that need to be addressed . . . We need to make sure the parents have been trained to handle the psycho-social problems of the child. If the parent is not trained abuse can occur, and it is putting both of them in danger.”* (14, NGO, Manila)

Despite these challenges, when it comes to reintegration preparation, there are success stories. Two aftercare providers explained, “We have our own benchmarks and we really see when they are able to finish their education, those with college degrees have done really well; but, it is the resources needed to get there. We have PTI and all our women have been through their program. We have done some of our own partnerships” (107, 108, CSO, Cebu). Also, government respondents reported, “Victims were able to overcome, they were able to continue their studies, some went to college. There were also a lot of victims employed in the DSWD” (95, Government, Pampanga).


### 9.5. Access to Support Services for Community-Based Clients

Not all rescued trafficking victims go to shelters, some immediately reintegrate back to their families. Others remain in shelters until they are reintegrated back to their families, after receiving some services that supported victim rehabilitation and recovery. After reintegration, the chances that community-based clients can continue to access community-based support services significantly decreases.

Chart 9.10 shows only 33.3% of respondents reported community-based clients were ‘very likely’ to receive support and assistance, livelihood assistance, and/or vocational training. Respondents were more likely to report that community-based clients were only ‘somewhat likely’ to receive support or assistance (44.4%), livelihood assistance (38.9%), and/or vocational training (36.1%). At least 16.7% to 19.4% of respondents reported community-based clients were ‘not likely’ to receive any support or assistance. Respondents maintained community-based clients were often ‘not likely’ to receive support and assistance because there was no case management for community-based clients, and community-based clients do not actively seek services on their own. In addition, when rescued sex trafficking victims “return immediately to the community, the one in charge [of helping them access services] is the LGU, and the LGU has limited funds and programs for victims of trafficking, especially rehabilitation” (90, Government, Pampanga).

*“It depends on the efforts of the LGU social workers. When you are able to track where they are the LGU social workers are able to reach out to them and give them the services they need. We do not encourage institutionalization, so what should be strengthened are community services.”*  
(96, Government, Pampanga)

**Chart 9.10. Access to support services for reintegrated trafficking victims**




Note: Sample includes only IJM, government, and CSO aftercare providers and IJM management

Data from Chart 9.10 was further analyzed to understand differences by type of agency; the differences are significant and notable (see Charts 9.11 to 9.14). Chart 9.11 shows differences by type of agency in terms of perceptions that community-based clients will receive support or assistance. IJM respondents (40.0%) were more likely to believe community-based clients were ‘very likely’ to receive support or assistance (40.0%), compared to government officials (18.2%) and CSO aftercare providers (0.0%). In comparison, government respondents (50.0%) and CSO aftercare providers (44.4%) were more likely to believe community-based clients were only ‘somewhat likely’ to receive support

or assistance. CSO aftercare providers (55.6%) were most likely to report community-based clients were ‘not likely’ to receive support or assistance, whereas 40.0% of IJM respondents reported community-based clients are ‘not likely’ to receive support or assistance.

**Chart 9.11. Access to support and assistance for reintegrated trafficking victims by type of agency**



Note: Sample includes only IJM, government, and CSO aftercare providers and IJM management


Chart 9.12 reveals differences by type of agency in terms of perceptions that community-based clients will access livelihood assistance. Only 22.7% of government officials and 20.0% of IJM respondents reported that community-based clients were ‘very likely’ to receive livelihood assistance. No CSO aftercare providers thought that community-based clients were ‘very likely’ to receive livelihood assistance. A larger proportion of government officials (40.9%), IJM respondents (40.0%), and CSO aftercare providers (33.3%) reported community-based clients were only ‘somewhat likely’ to receive livelihood assistance. Also, 40.0% of IJM respondents maintained community-based clients are ‘not likely’ to receive livelihood assistance.

*“Livelihood will depend on the LGU. I have always believed the LGU does not give children priority.”  
(73, Government, Cebu)*

Part of the problem is that LGUs have very limited funds. In the provinces there are first, second, third, and fourth-class municipalities. If trafficking victims were reintegrated into third- or fourth-class municipalities, the budget allocated to support them was very small. In fact, IJM recognized, “There are complexities for the client to fully use the livelihood assistance, but most of them do not succeed because of the livelihood and family pressure. Livelihood assistance is not responsive to clients with small children and really poor” (57, IJM, Cebu).

Part of the problem is that LGUs have very limited funds. In the provinces there are first, second, third, and fourth-class municipalities. If trafficking victims were reintegrated into third- or fourth-class municipalities, the budget allocated to support them was very small. In fact, IJM recognized, “There are complexities for the client to fully use the livelihood assistance, but most of them do not succeed because of the livelihood and family pressure. Livelihood assistance is not responsive to clients with small children and really poor” (57, IJM, Cebu).

**Chart 9.12. Access to livelihood assistance for reintegrated survivors by type of agency**




Note: Sample includes only IJM, government, and CSO aftercare providers and IJM management

Finally, Chart 9.13 shows that there was little confidence that community-based clients would access vocational training. IJM respondents (40.0%) were more likely than government officials (22.7%) and CSO aftercare providers (0.0%) to believe community-based clients were ‘very likely’ to access vocational training. In addition, as many as 44.4% of CSO aftercare providers, 40.0% of IJM respondents, and 36.4% of government officials reported community-based clients were only ‘somewhat likely’ to access vocational training, whereas 44.4% of CSO aftercare providers and 36.4% of government officials reported community-based clients were ‘not likely’ to receive vocational training. No IJM respondents reported that CSO aftercare providers were ‘not likely’ to receive vocational training.

*“We notice that most of the trafficked survivors are not into vocational skills, they want immediate livelihood assistance because most are supporting the families and they want livelihood assistance.” (67, Government, Cebu)*

**Chart 9.13. Access to vocational training for reintegrated trafficking victims by type of agency**



Note: Sample includes only IJM, government, and CSO aftercare providers and IJM management

## 9.6. Benefits and Sustainability of the Reintegration Support Networks

IJM contributed resources to facilitate the development and functioning of two government RSNs where community-based clients could receive needed services following reintegration (e.g., psychological counselling, vocational and job readiness training, and medical services).<sup>170</sup> RSNs were staffed by LGU social workers and trained volunteers, and supported by IJM’s Reintegration Specialist. The challenge was that LGUs did not always devote someone full-time to the RSN; rather, LGU social workers were typically appointed as a ‘focal person’ for each RSN. Only 30.0% (6 out of 20) of government aftercare providers and 66.7% (6 out of 8) of CSO aftercare providers reported having knowledge or experience with RSNs.

IJM maintained RSNs were important because ‘good practices’ demonstrated that being in a support group was one strategy for helping community-based to achieve restoration and reduce their risk of being re-trafficked. In some cases, community-based clients were able to access medical care through the RSN (e.g., IJM supported a whole day of providing medical service to RSN clients and their family members in Mandaue in Metro Cebu).

*“I think one of the benefits of the RSN is the women meet with other trafficking survivors . . . and they support each other.” (59, IJM, Cebu)*

RSNs were also supposed to collaborate with different community-based service providers to provide transitional housing and access to education, job readiness and vocational training. The challenge was that some community-based

<sup>170</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 2.

clients had mixed emotions about RSNs. On the one hand, they maintained RSNs are boring and not very helpful; on the other hand, they appreciate the support services they are able to access through RSNs.

*“We have women who have been invited and they don’t like it. We only go because there is a debt of gratitude, they feeling that they have a social worker that helped them. They find it boring and unhelpful, but they like the medical benefits, the dental, vitamins for their shelters, and allowances.” (107, 108, CSO, Cebu).*

There were concerns that RSNs were recently turned over to churches. Some community-based clients were reportedly turned off by this change. In Cebu, given RSNs were operated with support from volunteers (mainly volunteers from churches) recruited and trained by IJM, there were concerns that if IJM is not there in the future to recruit and train volunteers, RSNs would not be sustainable. For RSNs to be sustainable, there needs to be buy-in from the LGUs, as well as funding and manpower support. One respondent maintained, for RSNs to be sustainable they need to be institutionalized, because *“without a social worker that will be managing or that will stay there and coordinate activities according to the RSN”* it will not be sustainable (104, CSO, Cebu).

### 9.7. Development of a Coordinated Aftercare Network

Efforts to address all the needs of trafficking victims, whether residing in shelters or as community-based clients, required coordination among various aftercare providers. ‘Good practices’ are to establish a coordinated aftercare network that includes both government and private aftercare providers who can work together to ensure holistic care and support to trafficking victims. IJM was very supportive of developing a coordinated aftercare network; however, they did not take the lead to establish such a formal network. Nevertheless, IJM encouraged collaboration and coordination between DSWD and LGU social workers, and private aftercare providers

Table 9.5 shows that 78.9% of respondents reported that since 2003, they saw the development of a more coordinated aftercare network of government and private aftercare providers who work together to provide sex trafficking victims with quality aftercare and reintegration services. Among respondents who recognized the development of a coordinated aftercare network, 86.7% of respondents maintained IJM contributed to the development of a coordinated aftercare network.

| Table 9.5. Development of a coordinated aftercare network   |                             |          |
|---|-----------------------------|----------|
| <u>Since 2003, have you seen the development of a more coordinated aftercare network of government and private aftercare providers working together to provide sex trafficking victims with quality aftercare and reintegration services?</u> | Sample <sup>1</sup><br>N=38 |          |
|   | <u>n</u>                    | <u>%</u> |
| Yes   | 30                          | 78.9     |
| No  | 3                           | 7.9      |
| Do not know   | 5                           | 13.2     |
| <u>Did IJM contribute to the development of a more coordinated aftercare network?</u>   | N=30 <sup>1,2</sup>         |          |
| Yes   | 26                          | 86.7     |
| No  | 3                           | 10.0     |


<sup>1</sup> The sample includes IJM, government and CSO respondents in the aftercare sector, and IJM management

<sup>2</sup> 3.3% (n=1) had missing data

Data from Table 9.5 was further analyzed to understand differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 9.13 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 100.0% of IJM respondents and 88.9% of CSO respondents reported that since 2003, they saw the development of a more coordinated aftercare network of government and private aftercare providers working together to provide sex trafficking victims with quality aftercare and reintegration services, compared to only 69.6% of government officials. One government respondent recognized that *“right now the focus is on multi-disciplinary, so there are different agencies that come together and partner with each other so that the resources are given to the victims; that kind of strategy helps a lot of facilitate the services to them”* (96, Government, Pampanga).

It is notable that 11.1% of CSO respondents and 8.7% of government officials maintained they had not seen the development of a more coordinated aftercare network, whereas 21.7% of government respondents did not know. Among respondents who recognized improvements, 100.0% of IJM and CSO respondents, and 85.7% of government officials maintained IJM contributed to the development of a more coordinated aftercare network.

**Chart 9.13. Development of a coordinated aftercare network by type of agency**




<sup>1</sup> Note: 8.7% (n=2) of government respondents and 11.1% (n=1) of CSO respondents reported they have not seen the development of a more coordinated aftercare network

<sup>2</sup> Note: 21.7% (n=5) government respondents reported they 'do not know' if there is a more coordinated aftercare network

Chart 9.14 reveals differences based upon project area. In particular, 85.7% of respondents in Cebu and 81.8% in Manila reported that since 2003, they saw the development of a more coordinated aftercare network of government and private aftercare providers working together to provide sex trafficking victims with quality aftercare and reintegration services, compared to 69.2% of respondents in Pampanga. It is notable that 18.2% of respondents in Manila and 7.1% in Cebu maintained they had not seen the development of a more coordinated aftercare network, whereas 30.8% of respondents in Pampanga did not know if there was a more coordinated aftercare network. Respondents who recognized improvements, 100.0% of respondents in Cebu, 88.9% in Manila, and 66.7% in Pampanga maintained IJM contributed to the development of a coordinated after network.

**Chart 9.14. Development of a coordinated aftercare network by type of agency**




<sup>1</sup> Note: 18.2% (n=2) of respondents in Manila and 7.1% (n=1) in Cebu reported they had not seen the development of a more coordinated aftercare network

<sup>2</sup> Note: 30.8% (n=4) of respondents in Pampanga reported they 'do not know' if there is a more coordinated aftercare network

Finally, Chart 9.15 shows differences based upon sector of work. Data shows that 100.0% of IJM managers and 76.5% of respondents in the aftercare sector reported seeing the development of a more coordinated aftercare network of government and private aftercare providers working together to provide sex trafficking victims with quality aftercare and reintegration services. It is notable that only 8.8% of respondents in the aftercare sector reported they had not seen a more coordinated network, whereas 14.7% did not know. Among those respondents who recognized the development of a more coordinated aftercare network, 100.0% of IJM managers and 84.6% of respondents in the aftercare sector maintained IJM contributed to the development of a more coordinated aftercare network.

**Chart 9.15. Development of a coordinated aftercare network by type of agency**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 8.8% (n=3) of respondents in the aftercare sector reported they have not seen the development of a more coordinated aftercare network

<sup>2</sup> Note: 14.7% (n=5) of respondents in the aftercare sectors reported they 'do not know' if there is a more coordinated aftercare network

## 9.8. Improvement in Recovery and Restoration of Sex Trafficking Victims

This evaluation did not include interviews or focus group discussions with sex trafficking victims who had been supported by IJM and fully restored; therefore, it was difficult to assess improvements in the recovery and restoration of sex trafficking victims. Nevertheless, aftercare providers were asked about the improvements they saw in the recovery and restoration of sex trafficking victims over the years. Table 9.7 shows that 86.5% of aftercare providers reported that since 2003, there have been improvements in victim outcomes, meaning improved recovery and restoration. Among respondents who saw improvements, 100.0% maintained IJM helped to improve victim outcomes.


| Table 9.7. Improvement in recovery and restoration of sex trafficking victims                        |                             |       |
|--|-----------------------------|-------|
| Since 2003, have you seen improvement in victim outcomes, meaning improved recovery and restoration? | Sample <sup>1</sup><br>N=37 |       |
|  | n                           | %     |
| Yes  | 32                          | 86.5  |
| No   | 2                           | 5.4   |
| Do not know  | 3                           | 8.1   |
| Has IJM has helped to improve victim outcomes?   | N=32 <sup>1</sup>           |       |
| Yes  | 32                          | 100.0 |
| No   | 0                           | 0.0   |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes IJM, government and CSO respondents in the aftercare sector, and IJM management

Data in Table 9.7 was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 9.16 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 100.0% of IJM respondents and 90.9% of government officials reported there have been improvements in victim outcomes, compared to only 66.7% of CSO

respondents. In fact, 22.2% of CSO respondents maintained they had not seen improvements in victim outcomes. It was apparent, *“there is still a lot of room for improvement” (9 and 10, GO, Manila)*.

**Chart 9.16. Improvement in recovery and restoration of sex trafficking victims by type of agency**




<sup>1</sup> Note: 22.2% (n=2) of CSO respondents reported they have not seen improvement in victim outcomes

<sup>2</sup> Note: 9.1% (n=2) government respondents and 11.1% (n=1) of CSO respondents reported they ‘do not know’ if there has been improvement in victim outcomes

Chart 9.17 shows differences by project area. In particular, 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 90.0% in Manila, and 71.4% in Cebu maintained that since 2003, there had been improvement in victim outcomes, meaning improved recovery and restoration. Only 14.3% of respondents in Cebu reported they had not seen improvements in victim outcomes.

**Chart 9.17. Improvement in recovery and restoration of sex trafficking victims by project areas**




<sup>1</sup> Note: 14.3% (n=2) of respondents in Cebu reported they have not seen improvement in victim outcomes

<sup>2</sup> Note: 10.0% (n=1) of respondents in Manila and 14.3% (n=2) in Cebu reported they ‘do not know’ if there has been improvement in victim outcomes

Finally, Chart 9.18 shows differences based upon sector of work. In particular, 100.0% of IJM managers and 84.8% of aftercare providers reportedly saw improvement in victim outcomes (recovery and restoration) since 2003. Only 6.1% of aftercare providers reported they had not seen improvement in victim outcomes.

**Chart 9.18. Improvement in recovery and restoration of sex trafficking victims by sector of work**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 6.1% (n=2) of respondents in the aftercare sector reported they have not seen improvement in victim outcomes

<sup>2</sup> Note: 9.10% (n=3) of respondents in the aftercare sector reported they ‘do not know’ if there has been improvement in victim outcomes


### 9.8.1. [Trends in Restoration of Child Sex Trafficking Victims](#)

CTMS data was analyzed to understand trends in restoration of child sex trafficking victims supported by IJM. The data in Chart 9.19 shows that 166 child sex trafficking victims were restored between 2012 and 2015, including 63 in Manila, 111 in Cebu, and 1 in Pampanga. It is important to note that there is no data on the number of clients restored between 2003 and 2012 because IJM did not have a restoration metric that enabled them to document restoration. In 2013, the development of a restoration metric was linked to the Aftercare Successful Outcome (ASO) assessment, which IJM established, along with very specific standards around what constitutes restoration. The assessment covers level of education achieved, therapy or trauma care provided, trauma recovery achieved, ability to protect oneself, and access to safe housing. For an aftercare participant to be categorized as restored, they must have completed their aftercare treatment plan and they have scored a 3.0 or above on the ASO assessment.

It is notable that most child sex trafficking victims were reported restored in 2015, at a time when IJM began to shift away from street-based and commercial child sex trafficking to online sexual exploitation of children. In 2015, IJM social workers reportedly reviewed all client case files and determined which clients still had open case files and were still receiving services, but were actually doing well enough that they could be categorized as restored. IJM re-categorized these survivors as restored and closed the case files. This, in part, explains the drastic spike in restored survivors in 2015. Another possible reason was time; people rescued in the years prior eventually achieved restoration.

*“It was sort of an issue of social workers feeling like they were still providing a good service to clients and they felt they should keep it up, but we were seeing unsustainable caseloads. You provided this client two services in the past six months. In a way, it was an issue of case management, and the social workers still wanting to care for and support the client. But, we had to say we are not geared to be the lifelong case managers. The clients were ready to graduate and move on; let them graduate and move on.” (59, IJM, Cebu)*

**Chart 9.19. Child sex trafficking victims restored under IJM’s care (2012-2015)**



Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2012 to 2015. IJM’s restoration metric did not exist prior to 2012.

Restoration of sex trafficking victims is a challenge because some victims will be re-trafficked into sexual exploitation. IJM recognized, “The real test is when they go back, and we do have a lot of successful clients reintegrated, but there are some that when they meet a crisis and the local government is not there to provide support during the crisis, there are high chances they will be re-victimized. Not to be re-trafficked, but they find a partner that is abusive and exploitative. They live together and have problems because they don’t have any means” (57, IJM, Cebu).

*“In the beginning, DSWD discharged clients and forgot about them. IJM promoted there needs to be a sustained effort to support the child in the community and I think IJM has demonstrated that, but if LGU can do that without IJM I am not sure. It is not because they don’t want to, there are so many political and economic obstacles in the communities where the clients are and the social workers are under the mayors. There is the difficulty of politics and lack of political will.” (57, IJM, Cebu)*

Although reintegrated trafficking victims can receive a livelihood assistance of 10,000 pesos (200 USD), that is not enough money to live on and feed a family (10,000 pesos may last one week or one month). Many women that IJM rescued and restored over the years faced challenges working because they had children to care for, and there was often no one there to provide support. Reintegrated survivors face a multitude of problems that make restoration difficult. At the same time, however, there were success stories. Some survivors completed their education and went on to college and/or got jobs outside of the commercial sex industry.

Although DSWD and LGU social workers should be responsible for following up with survivors who were reintegrated, they often lacked the resources and manpower to do the follow-up work. Therefore, IJM played an important role following-up with and monitoring survivors who had been reintegrated, especially those supported by IJM. IJM also helped to link survivors with RSNs and LGUs that could provide them access to livelihood assistance and vocational training, and to private aftercare providers that offered vocational and job readiness trainings, and that could link them with job opportunities.

Although DSWD and LGU social workers should be responsible for following up with survivors who were reintegrated, they often lacked the resources and manpower to do the follow-up work. Therefore, IJM played an important role following-up with and monitoring survivors who had been reintegrated, especially those supported by IJM. IJM also helped to link survivors with RSNs and LGUs that could provide them access to livelihood assistance and vocational training, and to private aftercare providers that offered vocational and job readiness trainings, and that could link them with job opportunities.

### 9.9. Standards for Determining Restoration

IJM had standards, including indicators and measures, for determining when sex trafficking victims had been successfully rehabilitated and restored, as did the DSWD; however, these standards, indicators, and measures were not the same. The DSWD’s standards, indicators and measures for determining restoration were the same regardless of the type of violence, abuse, or exploitation experienced by a young woman or child under their care and support. In other words, the indicators for determining restoration of domestic violence victims was the same as those for determining

restoration of a sex trafficking victims; however, the needs of these clients are often quite different. In comparison, IJM had developed standards, indicators and measures that were specific to sex trafficking victims; these were developed and tested in IJM programs implemented across countries.

Essentially, IJM had a needs assessment that they conducted with each client and used to develop individual treatment plans for each client. As clients completed the treatment plan, there was an ASO assessment conducted and score assigned, including scores in domains such as education, therapy or trauma, ability to protect oneself, and housing. So, clients were given an ASO score when they started the treatment plan and then were scored against that initial ASO score at several points in time during their rehabilitation and recovery. Once clients achieve an ASO rating of 3.0 they were categorized as successfully restored; however, they were still encouraged to complete their treatment plan.

*“Here in IJM we have tool to determine if the client is restored, we have this tool we call aftercare successful outcomes, it is a scorecard and we rate them [clients] based upon the specific outcome in protection; how the client is doing in progress. If the client scored 3 she is fine in that areas. In all the domains of aftercare the client has scored 3 we can say the client is restored and recovered and can sustain her safety and functionality in the community . . . Once a client has consented to be under the care of IJM the social worker is assigned and must check in once a month and assess every six months . . . After closure, we have a year to monitor the client to see if they have sustained the restoration. We involved them in our support group and connect them to our church partners.” (7, IJM, Manila)*

Respondents in the aftercare sector were asked if their organization/agency had standards for determining when a sex trafficking victim was successfully rehabilitated and restored. Table 9.8 shows that 70.3% of respondents reported their organization/agency had standards for determining when a sex trafficking victim was successfully rehabilitated and restored; 24.3% of respondents did not know if there were such standards, indicators, or measures in their organization/agency. Among respondents who reported having such measures, only 76.9% reported their organization/agency follows these standards on a regular basis; 15.4% did not know. In addition, only 42.9% of aftercare providers reported knowing what steps IJM takes to track survivors to ensure they receive quality aftercare and achieve restoration.

| <b>Table 9.8. Standards for determining restoration</b>   |                             |          |
|---|-----------------------------|----------|
| <u>Does your organization/agency have standards for determining when a sex trafficking victim has been successfully rehabilitated and restored?</u> | Sample <sup>1</sup><br>N=37 |          |
|   | <u>n</u>                    | <u>%</u> |
| Yes   | 26                          | 70.3     |
| No  | 2                           | 5.4      |
| Do not know   | 9                           | 24.3     |
| <u>Does your organization follow these standards on a regular basis?</u>  | N=26                        |          |
| Yes   | 20                          | 76.9     |
| No  | 2                           | 7.7      |
| Do not know   | 4                           | 15.4     |
| <u>Do you know what steps IJM takes to track survivors to ensure they receive quality aftercare and achieve restoration?</u>                        | N=35                        |          |
| Yes   | 15                          | 42.9     |
| No/Do not know  | 19                          | 57.2     |


<sup>1</sup> Sample includes IJM, government and CSO respondents in the aftercare sector, and IJM management

Given that these questions were only asked of respondents in the aftercare sector, data from Table 9.8 was further analyzed to explore differences by type of agency. Chart 9.20 shows that 83.3% of IJM respondents, compared to 68.2% government officials and 66.7% of CSO respondents report their organization/agency had standards for determining when a sex trafficking victim was successfully rehabilitated and restored. Only 9.1% of government officials reported their agency does not have such standards, whereas 22.7% of government officials did not know. Also, 33.3% of CSO respondents reported they did not know if their organization had standards for determining rehabilitation and restoration of sex trafficking victims.

Among respondents who reported their organization had standards for determining rehabilitation and restoration, 100.0% of IJM and CSO respondents reported their organization followed these standards on a regular basis. In comparison, only 60.0% of government officials reported their agency followed these standards on a regular basis; 13.2% of government respondents maintained their agency did not follow these standards on a regular basis, and 26.7% of government respondents did not know.

Chart 9.20 also shows that while all IJM respondents were aware of what steps IJM takes to track survivors to ensure they receive quality aftercare and achieve restoration, only 36.4% of government officials and 33.3% of CSO respondents knew what steps IJM takes to track survivors. Moreover, 68.6% of government respondents and 66.6% of CSO respondents reported they did not know what steps IJM takes to track survivors to ensure they receive quality aftercare and achieve restoration.

**Chart 9.20. Standards for determining restoration by type of agency**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 9.1% (n=2) of government respondents reported their agency does not have standards for determining when sex trafficking victims have been successfully rehabilitated and restored

<sup>2</sup> Note: 16.7% (n=1) of IJM respondents, 22.7% (n=5) of government respondents, and 33.3% (n=3) of CSO respondents reported they ‘do not know’ if their organization has standards for determining successful rehabilitation and restoration of trafficking victims

<sup>3</sup> Note: 13.2% (n=2) of government respondents reported their agency does not follow these standards on a regular basis

<sup>4</sup> Note: 26.7% (n=4) of government respondents reported they ‘do not know’ if their agency follows these standards on a regular basis

<sup>5</sup> Note: 68.6% (n=14) of government respondents and 66.6% (n=6) of CSO respondents reported they ‘do not know’ what steps IJM takes to track survivors to ensure they receive quality aftercare and achieve restoration

## 9.10. Reduction in Risk of Trafficking Victims Being Re-Trafficked

Aftercare providers were also asked if they saw a reduction in the risk of trafficking victims being re-trafficked. Table 9.9 shows that only 69.4% of aftercare providers maintained there has been a reduction in the number of sex trafficking victims being re-trafficked after rescue and recovery; 30.6% did not know.

| Since 2003, have you seen a reduction in the number of sex trafficking victims being re-trafficked after rescue and recovery? | Sample <sup>1</sup><br>N=36 |      |
|---|-----------------------------|------|
|   | n                           | %    |
| Yes   | 25                          | 69.4 |
| No  | 0                           | 0.0  |
| Do not know   | 11                          | 30.6 |

<sup>1</sup> The sample includes IJM, government and CSO respondents in the aftercare sector, and IJM management

Data from Table 9.9 was further analyzed by type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 9.21 shows that 80.0% of IJM respondents, 72.7% of government officials, and 55.6% of CSO respondents reported since 2003, they saw a reduction in the number of sex trafficking victims being re-trafficked after rescue and recovery; the remaining respondents did not know. One respondent explained, *“it is hard to track [whether trafficking victims are re-trafficked] . . . even if they client is reintegrated into the community, as long as the client wants to be involved in aftercare services our social workers will track them down and give them support, so that will lower the re-trafficking rate”* (54, IJM, Pampanga).

**Chart 9.21. Reduction in the risks of trafficking victims being re-trafficking by type of agency**






Chart 9.22 shows differences based upon project area; in particular, 92.3% of respondents in Pampanga, 76.9% in Cebu, and 30.0% in Manila reported seeing a reduction in the number of sex trafficking victims being re-trafficked after rescue and recovery; the remaining respondents did not know.

**Chart 9.22. Reduction in the risks of trafficking victims being re-trafficking by project area**



Finally, Chart 9.23 shows differences based upon sector of work. Data shows that 69.7% of IJM managers and respondents in the aftercare sector reported seeing a reduction in the number of sex trafficking victims being re-trafficked after rescue and recovery; the remaining respondents did not know.

**Chart 9.23. Reduction in the risks of trafficking victims being re-trafficking by sector of work**



### 9.11. Sustainability of Improvement in Post-Rescue and Aftercare Services

Findings thus far revealed nearly all respondents recognized there have been significant improvements in the post-rescue care and quality and range of aftercare services provided to rescued trafficking victims, and that these services helped to rehabilitate sex trafficking victims and support their recovery and reintegration. Moreover, nearly all respondents maintained IJM contributed to these improvements. These findings demonstrate that IJM’s Program and collaborative casework approach was relevant and effective at bringing about system transformation within the DSWD and among private aftercare services, and to a lesser extent with LGU social workers. Respondents recognized that these improvements contributed to improved victim outcomes, including recovery and restoration, and a reduced risk of being re-trafficked. Now the question is, will the gains made be sustained over time?

In an effort to measure sustainability, respondents were asked to rank on a scale of 1 to 10, how sustainable are the improvements in the ability of DSWD to provide post-rescue and crisis care to sex trafficking victims, as well as to refer rescued victims to aftercare shelters. Respondents were also asked how sustainable are improvements in the quality and range of aftercare services for sex trafficking victims. Average scores were calculated for each measure on a scale of 1 to 10. It is important to note that sample size varies because not all respondents were asked to rank sustainability on each of the measures, given not all respondents had knowledge of improvements in post-rescue and aftercare services for sex trafficking victims.

Table 9.10 shows the mean or average score for all respondents on a scale of 1 to 10 (1=not sustainable, 10=very sustainable). On average, respondents were confident in the sustainability of improvement in the DSWD’s ability to provide post-rescue care (7.5) and crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters (7.3). Respondents were also confident in the sustainability of improvements in the quality and range of aftercare services for sex trafficking victims (7.5).


| Table 9.10. Sustainability of improvement in post-rescue and aftercare services                         |    |      |
|---|----|------|
| On a scale of 1 to 10, how sustainable will be the improvement in . . .                                 | n  | Mean |
| DSWD’s ability to provide post-rescue care to sex trafficking victims?                                  | 46 | 7.5  |
| DSWD’s ability to provide sex trafficking victims with crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters? | 32 | 7.3  |
| Quality and range of aftercare services for sex trafficking victims?                                    | 35 | 7.5  |

Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Data in Table 9.10 was analyzed to reveal differences in mean scores by type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 9.24 shows that IJM and government officials were nearly equally confident in the sustainability of the abilities of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care (8.2 and 7.7 respectively) and crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters (7.6 and 7.5 respectively), whereas CSO respondents were not as confident in the sustainability of the DSWD’s abilities to provide post rescue care (6.3) and crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters (6.2). In comparison, IJM respondents

(7.8), government officials (7.5), and CSO respondents (7.4) were equally confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the quality and range of aftercare services for sex trafficking victims.


**Chart 9.24. Sustainability of improvement in post-rescue and aftercare services by type of agency**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Chart 9.25 shows differences in perceived sustainability by project area. The mean scores were fairly equal across each of the three project areas; however, there were some minor differences. For instance, respondents in Pampanga (7.9) had a slightly higher mean score compared to respondents in Cebu (7.0) and Manila (6.5) in terms perceived sustainability of improvements in the ability of the DSWD to provide crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters. Also, respondents in Pampanga (7.9) and Cebu (7.6) had slightly higher mean scores, compared to respondent in Manila (6.9) in terms of perceived sustainability of the improvements in the quality and range of aftercare services for sex trafficking victims.

**Chart 9.25. Sustainability of improvement in post-rescue and aftercare services by project area**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Finally, Chart 9.26 shows differences in perceived sustainability by sector of work. The mean scores were fairly equal across each of the sectors of work; however, there were some minor differences. For instance, IJM managers (8.3) had a slightly higher mean score compared to respondents in the law enforcement/investigative (7.6) and aftercare (7.4) sectors in terms of perceived sustainability of the improvements in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to sex trafficking victims. It is important to note that respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector were not asked about the other two measures of improvement in aftercare services.

**Chart 9.26. Sustainability of improvement in post-rescue and aftercare services by sector of work**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not sustainable to 10=Very sustainable

Challenges to sustainability are mainly resources, manpower, and supervision. DSWD and LGU social workers recognize that without support from IJM, it will be difficult for them to sustain the range and quality of services offered to child sex trafficking victims. As one respondent explained, *“The services will not be sustainable if they pull out; unless the DSWD provides additional staff or funding”* (95, Government, Pampanga).

IJM also recognized that the DSWD is *“overwhelmed and it may take them longer if they are doing it on their own to get the referrals out. They don’t have an IJM social worker following up with them, if they sent out the referrals; they have so much to do”* (59, IJM, Cebu). There is also a lack of supervision in the DSWD, particularly supervision needed to make sure social workers working in the shelters implement trauma-informed care; therefore, there are concerns that trauma-informed care for child sex trafficking victims will not be sustained.

## CHAPTER 10: REDUCTION IN THE PREVALENCE OF CHILD SEX TRAFFICKING

### Chapter Highlights

- In Metro Cebu, prevalence studies commissioned by IJM found that locating children/minors who were being commercially exploited for sex on the streets and/or in entertainment establishments became more difficult from 2006 to 2008, and in 2010, suggesting the prevalence of child sex trafficking had decreased over time
- In Metro Manila, using a time-space sampling approach, IJM found there had been a 75.4% reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking from 2009 to 2016, and a 64.4% reduction in child sex trafficking from 2014 to 2016
- In Pampanga, using a time-space sampling approach, IJM found there had been an 86.23% reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Angeles City and Mabalacat from 2012 to 2016. They also concluded the locations found to be exploiting minors for sex decreased by 72.0% from 2012 to 2016
- For IJM, the prevalence studies have been a challenging and resource-intensive process, yet the data generated has been invaluable to documenting and evaluating the impact of their anti-trafficking strategies, demonstrating the effectiveness of a law enforcement model to combat child sex trafficking
- IJM's efforts to conduct prevalence studies in each of the project areas are an important and effective approach to assessing the impact of their anti-trafficking strategies and program activities
- 66.7% of respondents reported they saw a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Manila, Cebu and/or Pampanga since 2003
- 63.1% of respondents maintained that in 2016 there are fewer children being trafficked for sex in the project areas, compared to in 2003
- 91.9% of respondents maintained IJM contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking in Manila, Cebu and Pampanga; government respondents maintained most of the raid and rescue operations carried out by the anti-trafficking police in the three project areas were initiated and/or supported by IJM
- 60.3% of respondents maintained the reduction in child sex trafficking will be sustained over time, whereas 38.1% of respondents maintained the problem can or will re-emerge
- 75.9% of respondents maintained that in 2016 there were fewer entertainment establishments where children/minors are being exploited for sex in the three project areas, compared to 2003
- 74.2% of respondents maintained IJM contributed to the closure and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex
- From 2003 to 2015, IJM-supported raid and rescue operations resulted in the closure of 52 entertainment establishments for sexual exploitation children/minors, including 31 in Manila, 10 in Cebu, and 10 in Pampanga
- 52.2% of respondents believe the reduction of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited/trafficked for sex will be sustained over time, whereas 40.3% of respondents maintained the problem can or will re-emerge

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As documented in previous chapters, IJM's strategy included supporting the development of an effective law enforcement response to child sex trafficking, which is a critical component of any comprehensive counter-trafficking strategy and effort to reduce the prevalence of commercial sexual exploitation of children. IJM's Program was premised on a ToC that improving enforcement of anti-sex trafficking laws would increase prosecutions and convictions of traffickers, leading to an increased deterrence from child sex trafficking, resulting in a reduction of the prevalence of child sex trafficking. In an effort to evaluate whether IJM's Program had an impact on the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas, IJM developed a methodology that enabled them to systematically measure the

prevalence of child sex trafficking.<sup>171</sup> This methodology and the findings generated from the prevalence studies will be discussed in the first section of this chapter.

Moving beyond the prevalence studies, data from respondents will be examined to gather information about perceived reductions in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas, as well as closures of and reductions in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors are trafficked and exploited for sex. This chapter also explores IJM's role in reducing the prevalence of child sex trafficking and entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex, and whether respondents think those reductions will be sustained over time. Given that it is too early to actually measure sustainability of the reductions, the evaluation focused on understanding what are the risk factors that exist and may contribute to the re-emergence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas.

## 10.1. IJM's Prevalence Studies on Child Sex Trafficking

Prevalence studies on child sex trafficking have been an integral component of IJM's efforts to document the impact of their program activities in the three project areas. IJM recognizes measuring or quantifying child sex trafficking is challenging given the clandestine nature of the activity, and the fact that victims and perpetrators of sex trafficking are part of a 'hard-to-reach' or 'hidden' population<sup>172</sup> for which no sampling frame exists. IJM also recognizes that identification of participation or membership in the child sex trafficking can be stigmatizing and potentially threatening (whether socially, physically or legally) for an individual.<sup>173,174</sup> Nevertheless, IJM has set out to overcome these challenges by combining established sampling methodologies with undercover data collection to conduct prevalence studies in each of the project areas.<sup>175</sup>

In 2006, as part of their assessment of Project Lantern in Cebu, IJM contracted Crime and Justice Analysts (CJA), an external, independent research and evaluation firm, to develop a methodology and conduct an assessment of the impact of Project Lantern on reducing the incidence of child sex trafficking in Metro Cebu. Given the clandestine and illegal nature of sex trafficking, the evaluators recognized that

*"generating an accurate count of the total population of sex trafficking victims is difficult, and without an accurate knowledge of the total size of the sex trafficking victim population, it is difficult to measure with confidence a reduction in the absolute number of people who have been trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation."<sup>176</sup>*

Given these limitations, instead of coming up with measures based on enumerating the population or its various subparts, CJA in cooperation with IJM identified proxy indicators that would enable CJA to measure the availability of child sex trafficking victims. These eight proxy indicators included:<sup>177</sup>

- Number of children trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation found in the project area
- Elapsed time to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

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<sup>171</sup> The methodology for measuring the prevalence of child sex trafficking was developed by Crime and Justice Analysts, Inc., U.S. consultancy firm. The methodology was used in Metro Cebu to measure the impact Project Lantern was having on reducing the prevalence of child sex trafficking.

<sup>172</sup> Tyldum, G. & A. Brunovskis (2005). Describing the Unobserved: Methodological Challenges in Empirical Studies on Human Trafficking, P. 17 in *Data and Research on Human Trafficking: A Global Survey*, edited by F. Laczko and E.M. Godziak. New York: United Nations Publications.

<sup>173</sup> IJM (2016). Expert Paper: How to Measure the Prevalence of Child Sex Trafficking. Global Study Exploitation of Children in Travel and Tourism, p. 2.

<sup>174</sup> Internationally, research on sex trafficking often use varying methods, such as differences in how the population is defined and how data are collected (e.g., estimates based on youth risk factors, interviews with stakeholders, police records), as well as vary in their geographic scope (e.g., city, state, or national).

<sup>175</sup> IJM (2016), p. 2.

<sup>176</sup> Maguire, E.R. & M. Gantley (2010). Wave 3 Assessment for Project Lantern: Final Report (p. 5). Crime and Justice Analysts, Inc. Fairfax, VA: USA.

<sup>177</sup> Proxy indicators and terminology used in the indicators are a reflection of terminology used during Project Lantern. See Maguire, E.R. & M. Gantley, p. 6.

- Number of attempts to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation
- Number of establishments offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation
- Number of people not affiliated with a commercial sex establishment offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation
- Price charged for purchasing the services of a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation
- Percentage of total attempt to procure a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation that results in the presumed facilitator, victim, or prostituted or commercially exploited person citing the police/law enforcement as the reason why a minor is not available for sex.
- Incidence/type of security measures at establishments taken to guard against police enforcement

The methodology and indicators developed in 2006 revealed 103 or 6.6% of the prostituted or commercially sexually exploited persons identified in Metro Cebu were minors. The assessment was replicated by CJA in 2008 and 2010, as part of a midline and endline for Project Lantern. In 2008, 29 or 2.2% of the prostituted or commercially sexually exploited persons identified were minors; then by 2010, 21 or 1.5% of the prostituted or commercially sexual exploited persons found were minors. Data collectors also found that locating minors became more difficult from 2006 to 2008, and in 2010, suggesting the prevalence of child sex trafficking had decreased over time. For IJM, the success of Project Lantern exceeded their expectations by demonstrating the effectiveness of a law enforcement-based model to combat child sex trafficking. At the same time, however, IJM recognized successes were limited to the local context, given the local focus of Project Lantern.

In 2009, IJM took the lead to conduct a prevalence study of child sex trafficking in Metro Manila. Using a modified methodology from the prevalence studies conducted in Metro Cebu, IJM used a time-space sampling approach to identify non-detected child sex trafficking victims.<sup>178,179</sup> This methodology entailed identifying a comprehensive list of areas or locations where members of the target population typically congregated or gathered, and then carrying out the time-space sampling approach in two distinct phases.<sup>180</sup> This list was developed based on a review of existing studies and reports on prostitution and child sex trafficking in the area, undercover mapping of commercial sex locations, and consultation with NGO partners. Next, the study team randomly selected locations to visit from the comprehensive list of mapped locations. The sample size was calculated to yield a statistically significant sample, with a five percent margin of error.<sup>181</sup> IJM maintained *“one of the key benefits of the time-space sampling approach is that it approximates probability sampling by randomly selecting mapped locations as a proxy for randomly selecting members of the target population. This allows inferences to be made regarding the population through the use of a randomized sampling.”*<sup>182</sup>

IJM trained data collectors to systematically observe, quantify, and verify if an individual is a minor, without alerting potential perpetrators (i.e., avoiding causing further harm to trafficking victims or having a negative impact on non-victim sex workers). In 2009, in Metro Manila, using a time-space sampling approach, IJM found that among the 92 sex establishments visited in District 5 of Manila City, Paranaque, and Pasay, 8.13% of the 1,306 commercial sex workers observed were minors. In 2014, they replicated this methodology and found that 5.54% of commercial sex workers identified in 292 locations visited were minors.<sup>183</sup> Finally, in 2016, using the same time-space sampling approach, the prevalence of child sex trafficking victims was estimated at 1.94% to 2.00%, depending the sample comparison to 2006 or 2014. Based upon this longitudinal data, IJM identified there had been a 75.4% reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking from 2009 to 2016, and a 64.4% reduction in child sex trafficking from 2014 to 2015.<sup>184</sup>

<sup>178</sup> Time-space sampling was developed in the late 1980’s and has been considered by many researchers to be a standard method for HIV behavior surveillance among at-risk populations in the United States. IJM (2016). Expert Paper: How to Measure the Prevalence of Child Sex Trafficking. Global Study Exploitation of Children in Travel and Tourism, p. 2.

<sup>179</sup> The prevalence study in Metro Manila and the time-space sampling approach did not include the same proxy indicators included in the 2006, 2008, and 2010 assessments conducted in Metro Cebu.

<sup>180</sup> IJM (2016), p. 2.

<sup>181</sup> IJM (2016). Expert Paper: How to Measure the Prevalence of Child Sex Trafficking. Global Study Exploitation of Children in Travel and Tourism, p. 3.

<sup>182</sup> IJM (2016). Expert Paper: How to Measure the Prevalence of Child Sex Trafficking. Global Study Exploitation of Children in Travel and Tourism, p. 3.

<sup>183</sup> The 2015 prevalence study included not only District 5 of Manila City, Paranaque, and Pasay which were included in the 2009 prevalence study, but also Makati and Quezon City.

<sup>184</sup> Shaw & Fruge (2016). *Child Sex Trafficking in Metro Manila*. Washington, DC: International Justice Mission.

In 2012, IJM used a time-space sampling approach to conduct a baseline of child sex trafficking in Pampanga, particularly in Angeles City and Mabalacat. The 2012 baseline study revealed 8.79% of commercial sex workers found were minors. In 2016, IJM conducted a follow-up assessment and found that 1.21% of commercial sex workers identified were minors. Based upon this data, IJM concluded there had been an 86.23% reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Angeles City and Mabalacat from 2012 to 2016. They also concluded the locations found to be exploiting minors for sex decreased by 72.0% from 2012 to 2016.<sup>185</sup>

For IJM, the prevalence studies have been a challenging and resource-intensive process, yet the data generated has been invaluable to documenting and evaluating the impact of their anti-trafficking strategies, as well as informing decision-making related to program activities.<sup>186</sup> The prevalence studies provided IJM with data-driven evidence of the extent of child sex trafficking in each of their project areas at various stages of project implementation, and within the various types of entertainment establishments (i.e., karaoke bars, massage parlors/spas, bikini bars, and bar/club/restaurants), as well as on the streets. Prevalence data helped IJM to focus their anti-trafficking activities to areas of greatest need, which resulted in the rescue of hundreds of sex trafficking victims by anti-trafficking police units, and the closure of entertainment establishments engaged in commercial sexual exploitation of children. Prevalence data also helped to guide IJM with decision-making about future initiatives.<sup>187</sup> For example, prevalence studies in Pampanga provided IJM with data that informed and justified the decision to close the Pampanga FO. In addition, documented reductions in child sex trafficking in the three project areas informed and justified IJM's decision to shift their focus away from child sex trafficking in entertainment establishments and on the streets toward the emerging trend of online sexual exploitation of children.

While others in the international community are focused on developing innovative research approaches to estimate the number of non-detected trafficking victims or the size of the hidden populations and the prevalence of the crime, IJM hopes that *“dissemination of its prevalence study methodology and results will foster further development of innovative approaches to measure and quantify human trafficking.”*<sup>188</sup>

This evaluation determined that IJM's efforts to conduct prevalence studies in each of the project areas is an important and effective approach to assessing the impact of their anti-trafficking strategies and program activities. Such targeted counting, along with measuring the number of survivors from a specified region or subpopulation who were rescued and receiving services, and the number of traffickers charged, prosecuted, and convicted are important measures of program impact and success. These are wise investments of resources, particularly when data collection is carried out in a systematic way over time and across project areas.

Prevalence data is an efficient and effective way to describe a social problem, such as child sex trafficking. Knowledge of the scale and scope of child sex trafficking is critical to commanding attention and action, especially in environments where resources are limited and other problems present similar urgencies.

## 10.2. Reduction of Child Sex Trafficking

Moving beyond the prevalence studies, this evaluation set out to explore whether respondents had seen a reduction in child sex trafficking in the three project areas, and to understand what factors contributed to these reductions, as well as whether the reductions are sustainable.

Respondents were specifically asked if they saw a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas – Manila, Cebu, and/or Pampanga – since 2003, and if there are fewer children being trafficked for sex. Table 10.1 shows that as many as 66.7% of respondents reported they saw a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in

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<sup>185</sup> Shaw & Fruge (2016). *Child Sex Trafficking in Angeles City*. Washington, DC: International Justice Mission.

<sup>186</sup> IJM (2016). Expert Paper: How to Measure the Prevalence of Child Sex Trafficking. Global Study Exploitation of Children in Travel and Tourism.

<sup>187</sup> IJM (2016). Expert Paper: How to Measure the Prevalence of Child Sex Trafficking. Global Study Exploitation of Children in Travel and Tourism.

<sup>188</sup> IJM (2016). Expert Paper: How to Measure the Prevalence of Child Sex Trafficking. Global Study Exploitation of Children in Travel and Tourism.

Manila, Cebu and/or Pampanga since 2003. In addition, 63.1% of respondents maintained in 2016, there are fewer children being trafficked for sex in the project areas, compared to in 2003. Most notably, 91.9% of respondents reported IJM contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking in Manila, Cebu and Pampanga. In fact, government respondents maintained most of the raid and rescue operations carried out by the anti-trafficking police in the three project areas were initiated and/or supported by IJM.

| Table 10.1. Reduction of child sex trafficking  |                     |          |
|---|---------------------|----------|
| <u>Have you seen a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003?</u>             | Full sample<br>N=87 |          |
|   | <u>n</u>            | <u>%</u> |
| Yes   | 58                  | 66.7     |
| No  | 13                  | 14.9     |
| Do not know   | 16                  | 18.4     |
| <u>Do you think there are fewer children being trafficked for sex in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga in 2016, compared to in 2003?</u> | N=84                |          |
|   |                     |          |
| Yes   | 53                  | 63.1     |
| No  | 22                  | 26.2     |
| Do not know   | 9                   | 10.7     |
| <u>Do you think IJM has contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga?</u>                  | N= 74               |          |
|   |                     |          |
| Yes   | 68                  | 91.9     |
| No  | 2                   | 2.7      |
| Do not know   | 4                   | 5.4      |


Data was further analyzed to explore attitudes toward reductions of child sex trafficking by type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 10.1 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, 91.7% of IJM respondents reported seeing a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking since 2003. IJM respondents were more likely to report reductions in child sex trafficking compared to government officials (66.7%), CSO respondents (50.0%), and religious leaders (40.0%). In comparison, 40.0% of religious leaders, 15.0% of government officials, and 10.0% of CSO representatives reported they did not see a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the project areas since 2003. It is also important to note that 40.0% of CSO respondents, 20.0% of religious leaders, and 18.3% of government officials did not know if there had been a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking since 2003.

*“In all instances, we see a reduction in the prevalence of child trafficking compared to five to six years ago; the reduction is very steep, the prevalence in commercial sex establishment was reduced so big that we could barely see children in trafficking.”  
(19, Government, Manila)*

Chart 10.1 also shows that 91.7% of IJM respondents reported that in 2016, there were fewer children being trafficked for sex in the project areas, compared to 2003; this is compared to only 62.1% of government officials, 60.0% of religious leaders, and 33.3% of CSO respondents. It is important to note that 44.4% of CSO respondents, 29.3% of government officials, and 20.0% of religious leaders did not think there were fewer children being trafficked for sex in the project areas in 2016, compared to 2003. Also, 22.2% of CSO representatives and 20.0% of religious leaders did not know if there were fewer children trafficked for sex in the project areas.

Most notable is that 100.0% of IJM respondents and religious leaders, and 92.3% of government officials maintained IJM contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking in the project areas. In comparison, 71.4% of CSO respondents reported IJM contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking; 28.6% of CSO respondents did not know if IJM contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking in the project areas.

**Chart 10.1. Reduction of child sex trafficking by type of agency**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 15.0% of government officials, 10.0% of CSO respondents, and 40.0% of religious leaders reported there has been 'no' reduction the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003

<sup>2</sup> Note: 18.3% of government officials, 40.0% of CSO respondents, and 20.0% of religious leaders reported they 'do not know' if there has been a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003

<sup>3</sup> Note: 29.3% of government officials, 44.4% of CSO respondents, and 20.0% of religious leaders reported there are 'no' fewer children being trafficking for sex in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003

<sup>4</sup> Note: 8.3% of government officials, 22.2% of CSO respondents, and 20.0% of religious leaders reported they 'do not know' if there are fewer children being trafficking for sex in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003


<sup>5</sup> Note: 28.6% of CSO respondents reported they 'do not know' if IJM contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga

Chart 10.2 shows response differences based upon project area. In particular, 84.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 65.6% in Cebu, and 53.3% in Manila reported they saw a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking since 2003. In comparison, 23.3% of respondents in Manila and 15.6% in Cebu maintained there had been no reductions in prevalence of child sex trafficking. It is notable that 23.3% of respondents in Manila, 18.8% in Cebu, and 12.0% in Pampanga did not know if there had been a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Manila, Cebu, or Pampanga.

Chart 10.2 also shows that 80.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 61.3% in Cebu, and 50.0% in Manila reported that since 2003, there are fewer children being trafficked for sex, whereas 35.5% of respondents in Cebu, 28.6% in Manila, and 12.0% in Pampanga maintained there were not fewer children being trafficking for sex. It notable that 21.4% of respondents in Manila did not know if there were fewer children being trafficking for sex in 2016, compared to 2003.

Most notable is that 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 93.8% in Cebu, and 80.0% in Manila reported IJM contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking; 25.0% of respondents in Manila did not know if IJM contributed to the reductions of child sex trafficking.

**Chart 10.2. Reduction of child sex trafficking by project area**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 23.3% of respondents in Manila, 4.0% in Pampanga, and 15.6% in Cebu reported there has been ‘no’ reduction the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003

<sup>2</sup> Note: 23.3% of respondents in Manila, 12.0% in Pampanga, and 18.8% in Cebu reported they ‘do not know’ if there has been a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003

<sup>3</sup> Note: 28.6% of respondents in Manila, 12.0% in Pampanga, and 35.5% in Cebu reported there are ‘no’ fewer children being trafficking for sex in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003

<sup>4</sup> Note: 21.4% of respondents in Manila reported they ‘do not know’ if there are fewer children being trafficking for sex in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003


<sup>5</sup> Note: 25.0% of respondents in Manila reported they ‘do not know’ if IJM contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga

Chart 10.3 reveals differences based upon sector of work. IJM managers (100.0%) and respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (87.0%) were more likely than respondents in the aftercare (62.9%) and legal (47.4%) sectors to report a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking since 2003. In comparison, 31.6% of respondents in the legal sector maintained they did not see a reduction the prevalence of child sex trafficking since 2003. It is notable that 28.6% of respondents in the aftercare sector and 21.1% in the legal sector did not know if there had been reductions in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the project areas since 2003.

Chart 10.3 also shows that IJM managers (80.0%) and respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (73.9%) were more likely than respondents in the aftercare (59.4%) and legal (52.6%) sectors to report there are fewer children being trafficked for sex in the project areas in 2016, compared to 2003. In comparison, 31.6% of respondents in the legal sector, 28.1% in the aftercare sector, and 26.1% in the law enforcement/investigative sector reported they do not think there were fewer children being trafficking for sex in the three project areas. It is notable that 20.0% of IJM managers, 15.8% of respondents in the legal sector, and 12.0% in the aftercare sector did not know if there were fewer children being trafficking for sex in Manila, Cebu and/or Pampanga in 2016, compared to 2003.

*“I think the operations we launched and carried and we let them realize that the child has no place in commercial sex establishment. Before they would willing flaunt the availability of minors to entice clients. Now they deny, even if you raid, the chances are if there is a minor they easily move them, there are just a few of them. (19, Government, Manila)”*

**Chart 10.3. Reduction of child sex trafficking by sector of work**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 31.6% of respondents in the legal sector reported there has been ‘no’ reduction the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003

<sup>2</sup> Note: 21.1% of respondents in the legal sector and 28.6% in the aftercare sector reported they ‘do not know’ if there has been a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003

<sup>3</sup> Note: 26.1% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector, 31.6% in the legal sector, and 28.1% in the aftercare sector reported there are ‘no’ fewer children being trafficking for sex in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003

<sup>4</sup> Note: 15.8% of respondents in the legal sector, 12.05% in the aftercare sector, and 20.0% of IJM managers reported they ‘do not know’ if there are fewer children being trafficking for sex in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga since 2003

<sup>5</sup> Note: 14.3% of respondents in the legal sector and 6.9% in the aftercare sector reported they ‘do not know’ if IJM contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga

*“I believe there is a reduction because people are more aware and afraid to commit the offense.” (15 and 16, Government, Manila)*

From IJM’s perspective, there had been a significant reduction in the number of minors being rescued in recent years. In fact, Chart 6.8 showed that the average age of sex trafficking rescued had been increasing in recent years. Also, IJM maintained the length of time it takes to find child sex trafficking victims has increased, and it is “harder and harder to ferret out the establishments with children in them” (3, IJM, Manila). This is because many bar owners are reportedly taking a more stringent approach to ensuring they employ

girls with the proper documentation (whether legitimate or falsified) that establishes they are 18 years of age or older. This is because owners and managers of entertainment establishment (e.g., bars, beer houses, and clubs) are aware the penalties for employing children/minors are high, and it is no longer profitable to employ minors. For one, employing minors can result in their arrest and being charged with child sex trafficking, which can bring a penalty of life in prison. Two, it can result in their business being closed down either temporarily or permanently.

*“When I started in 2013 in Cebu it was already difficult to find minors . . . I heard before that, when they started in 2007, they would just say this bar would have a minor and a raid would take place and 100 girls would be rounded up and one minor . . . but now, it is a career ender if you go to a bar and there are no minors. So, when I joined I made sure we verified there was a minor . . . Before I left Cebu, we had a list of bars and went bar to bar to just verify, and we really did not find any minors . . . In Manila, there is also a reduction in prevalence, just because of the numerous operations that law enforcement conducted. When I joined, there was a lot of low hanging fruits, we would enter a bar and after spending one to two hours’ inside we would find a minor. But after back-to-back operations, we see a lot of the establishments close or the minors identified would be fired or let go by the establishment because it does not make business sense for the owners to have them.” (8, IJM, Manila)*

In Pampanga, respondents explained that in the past, you could drive down Fields Ave in Angeles City and see many girls under the age of 18 years working in the entertainment establishments. In 2016, while the girls are still there, they are older. Also, there are reportedly fewer entertainment establishments on Fields Ave.

In each of the three project areas, IJM and government respondents maintained there is greater awareness that there are regional anti-trafficking police units that are effectively investigating and cracking down on entertainment establishments engaged in trafficking children/minors for sexual exploitation. They are also more aware that persons engaged in child sex trafficking are being arrested and charged for child sex trafficking, and DOJ prosecutors are aggressively prosecuting and convicting traffickers, and pursuing qualified charges and penalties when children/minors are involved or there are three or more victims. Thus, *“they [entertainment establishments] are afraid to employ minors”* (29 and 30, Government, Manila).

*“I think the perpetrators if they are still there they are aware of the law and they know they could be sent away for a very long time and if they are still doing it they are doing it secretly. There used to be a lot of bars in Lapu-Lapu and Mandaue, there has been a decline and if they do have these special services they are not employing children anymore, just adults. The people are more aware not to employ children.”* (72, Government, Cebu)

Respondents maintained there is also more awareness that the PNP, in cooperation with DOLE and LGUs, are closing down entertainment establishments that engage in sex trafficking and exploitation, and *“they put a sign up that this establishment was closed because they employed minors in prostitution”* (36, IJM, Pampanga). The aggressive and intensified enforcement campaigns against child sex trafficking in the three project areas, and the effective multi-sectoral response of public justice system agencies has served as a deterrent. Ultimately, there has been a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking because *“the risks out way the benefit . . . It is no longer worth it as far as children are concerned”* (47, Government, Pampanga).

Information campaigns and awareness-raising efforts have also contributed to the reduction in prevalence of child sex trafficking. Both IJM and government agencies have taken steps to disseminate information to entertainment establishments, hotels, motels, and pension houses about child sex trafficking and the penalties for trafficking children for purposes of sexual exploitation.

### 10.3. Sustainability in the Reduction of Child Sex Trafficking

Respondents were asked if the reduction in child sex trafficking will be sustained over time, or if the problem can re-emerge. Table 10.2 shows that as many as 60.3% of respondents maintained the reduction in child sex trafficking will be sustained over time, whereas 38.1% of respondents maintained the problem can or will re-emerge.

| Table 10.2. Sustainability in the reduction of child sex trafficking                                   |                     |      |
|--|---------------------|------|
| Will the reduction in child sex trafficking will be sustained over time or will the problem re-emerge? | Full sample<br>N=63 |      |
|  | n                   | %    |
| Will be sustained  | 38                  | 60.3 |
| Will re-emerge   | 24                  | 38.1 |
| Do not know  | 1                   | 1.6  |

Data was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector or work. Chart 10.4 shows differences based upon type of agency. IJM respondents (81.8%) were significantly more likely to believe the reduction in child sex trafficking will be sustained over time, compared to government officials (57.8%), CSO respondents (50.0%), and religious leaders (33.3%). In comparison, as many as 66.7% of religious leaders, 50.0% of CSO respondents, and 40.0% of government officials maintained the problem of child sex trafficking can or will re-emerge.

**Chart 10.4. Sustainability in the reduction of child sex trafficking by type of agency**




Chart 10.5 shows differences based upon project area. Data shows that 66.7% of respondents in Pampanga, 60.0% in Manila, and 54.2% in Cebu reported the reduction in child sex trafficking will be sustained over time, whereas 41.7% of respondents in Cebu, 40.0% in Manila, and 33.3% in Pampanga maintained child sex trafficking can or will re-emerge.

**Chart 10.5. Sustainability in the reduction of child sex trafficking by project area**





Chart 10.6 reveals differences based upon sector of work. IJM managers (80.0%) and respondents in the aftercare sector (79.2%) were more likely to report the reduction in child sex trafficking will be sustained over time, compared to respondents in the legal (54.5%) and law enforcement/investigative (40.0%) sectors. The majority of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (60.0%) actually believed the problem of child sex trafficking can or will re-emerge. In addition, 45.5% of respondents in the legal sector, 20.0% of IJM managers, and 16.7% of respondents in the aftercare sector maintained the problem of child sex trafficking can or will re-emerge.

**Chart 10.6. Sustainability in the reduction of child sex trafficking by sector of work**



The majority of respondents recognized there are always risks that child sex trafficking can re-emerge; however, they maintained *“even if there is an increase it will not go back to the way it was [before].”* This same respondent when on to add, *“The problem is not gone for good, there are still victims out there... but it will never go back to the way it was, and at that level on the streets”* (3, IJM, Manila). Respondents recognized that sustainability is largely dependent on law enforcement enforcing the anti-trafficking laws, because *“as long as there are dedicated anti-trafficking units, it is sustainable”* (8, IJM, Manila). The concerns of many respondents are that if the police stop conducting entrapment operations, raid and rescue operations, and arresting perpetrators of child sex trafficking, the problem will re-emerge.

*“If there is still strong coordination, but if not, it will go back to where we are before.”* (95, Government, Pampanga)

At the same time, respondents thought reductions in child sex trafficking can be sustained because there are anti-trafficking laws, with enhanced charges and penalties for trafficking children/minors. Also, they thought the IACAT had been empowered through funding and capacity building, and could support a multi-sectoral response to human trafficking and effectively monitor implementation of the anti-trafficking laws. As long as coordination and commitment of public justice system agencies continues, and the IACAT continues to be supported and strengthened with increases in resources and capacity-building, the reduction in child sex trafficking can be sustained.

*“If we won’t be vigilant or the campaign is not part of the policy of the administration it would be the same way as several years ago.”* (25, Government, Manila)

Some respondents also thought that because the Philippines was ranked a Tier 1 country in the US Department of State’s, *2016 Trafficking in Persons Report*, the Philippine Government would not allow the country to fall in ranking to a Tier 2 or Tier 3 country. Such conclusions, however, are pre-mature, particularly given the new presidential administration’s focus on illicit drug trafficking and use/abuse, and the fact that, on average, 26.3% of the population lives in poverty.<sup>189,190</sup>

Respondents who reported the problem of child sex trafficking can re-emerge maintained, if the government cannot sustain the resources and personnel to continue to combat child sex trafficking, and public justice system agencies become lax in enforcement, the problem can re-emerge. Some respondents expressed serious concern that *“without*

<sup>189</sup> Retrieved on February 12, 2017 from: <https://psa.gov.ph/content/poverty-incidence-among-filipinos-registered-263-first-semester-2015-psa>

<sup>190</sup> In 2015, on average, incomes of poor families were short by 24.6% of the poverty threshold. This means that on average, an additional monthly income of PHP 2,230 is needed by a poor family with five members in order to move out of poverty in 2015. Retrieved on February 2, 2017 from: <https://psa.gov.ph/poverty-press-releases>

IJM there will be lesser operations because of finances, and if they [traffickers] felt there is a waning in our interest, then there will be a reemergence of the problem” (50, Government, Pampanga).

#### 10.4. Closure and Reduction in the Number of Entertainment Establishments


From 2003 to 2015, IJM in collaboration with DOLE and the PNP worked to close and reduce the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors were being sexually exploited. Table 10.3 shows that 75.9% of respondents maintained in 2016, there were fewer entertainment establishments where children/minors are being exploited for sex in the three project areas, compared to 2003. In addition, 74.2% of respondents reported IJM contributed to the closure and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex.

| Table 10.3. Closure and reduction of entertainment establishments   |                     |      |
|---|---------------------|------|
| Compared to 2003, are there fewer entertainment establishments where children/minors are being exploited for sex in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga?   | Full sample<br>N=83 |      |
|   | n                   | %    |
| Yes   | 63                  | 75.9 |
| No  | 11                  | 13.3 |
| Do not know   | 9                   | 10.8 |
| Has IJM contributed to the closure and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited for sex? | N=75                |      |
| Yes   | 69                  | 74.2 |
| No  | 1                   | 1.1  |
| Do not know   | 5                   | 5.4  |

Data was further analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 10.7 shows differences based upon type of agency. In particular, IJM respondents (100.0%) were most likely to report there are fewer entertainment establishments in 2016, compared to 2003, where children/minors are exploited for sex. Also, IJM respondents (100.0%) and government officials (78.6%) were more likely than religious leaders (60.0%) and CSO respondents (40.0%) to report there are fewer entertainment establishments in the project areas where children/minors are exploited for sex. In comparison, 40.0% of religious leaders, 30.0% of CSO respondents, and 10.7% of government officials did not believe there were fewer entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited for sex, whereas 30.0% of CSO respondents and 10.7% of government officials did not know.

Data in Chart 10.7 also shows that 100.0% of IJM respondents, 94.1% of government officials, 80.0% of religious leaders, and 71.4% of CSO respondents maintained IJM contributed to the closure and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex. It is notable that 28.6% of CSO respondents and 20.0% of religious leaders did not know if IJM contributed to the closure of and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex.

**Chart 10.7. Closure and reduction of entertainment establishments by type of agency**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 10.7% of government officials, 30.0% of CSO respondents, and 40.0% of religious leaders reported there are ‘not’ fewer entertainment establishments in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga where children/minors are exploited for sex


<sup>2</sup> Note: 10.7% of government officials and 30.0% of CSO respondents reported they ‘do not know’ if there are fewer entertainment establishments in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga where children/minors are exploited for sex

<sup>3</sup> Note: 28.6% of CSO respondents and 20.0% of religious leaders reported they ‘do not know’ if IJM contributed to the closure of and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited for sex

Chart 10.8 shows differences based upon project area. Respondents in Pampanga (79.2%), Cebu (77.4%), and Manila (71.4%) were nearly equally likely to report there are fewer entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited for sex in the three project areas, compared to 2003. Only, 10.7% of respondents in Manila, 16.7% in Pampanga, and 12.9% in Cebu maintained there are not fewer entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited for sex in the project areas.

The data in Chart 10.8 also reveals that 100.0% of respondents in Pampanga, 89.7% in Cebu, and 87.0% in Manila maintained IJM contributed to the closure and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex in the three project areas.

**Chart 10.8. Closure and reduction of entertainment establishments by project area**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 10.7% of respondents in Manila, 16.7% in Pampanga, and 12.9% in Cebu reported there are ‘not’ fewer entertainment establishments in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga where children/minors are exploited for sex


<sup>2</sup> Note: 17.9% of respondents in Manila and 9.7% in Cebu reported they ‘do not know’ if there are fewer entertainment establishments in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga where children/minors are exploited for sex

<sup>3</sup> Note: 8.7% of respondents in Manila and 10.3% in Cebu reported they ‘do not know’ if IJM contributed to the closure of and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited for sex

Finally, Chart 10.9 shows differences based upon sector of work. Data shows 100.0% of IJM managers and 95.7% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector maintained there are fewer entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited for sex in the project areas, compared to 2003; this is in comparison to 73.7% of respondents in the legal sector and 61.3% in the aftercare sector. It is notable that 25.8% of respondents in the aftercare sector did not believe there are fewer entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited for sex in the project areas. In addition, 21.1% of respondents in the legal sector and 12.9% in the aftercare sector did not know if there are fewer entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited for sex.

Most notably, 100.0% of IJM managers and respondents in the legal sector, 95.5% in the law enforcement/investigative sector, and 85.7% in the aftercare sector maintained IJM contributed to the closure and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors were sexually exploited. Note that 10.7% of respondents in the aftercare sector did not know if IJM contributed to the closure of and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex.

**Chart 10.9. Closure and reduction of entertainment establishments by sector of work**



<sup>1</sup> Note: 25.8% of respondents in the aftercare sector reported there are ‘not’ fewer entertainment establishments in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga where children/minors are exploited for sex

<sup>2</sup> Note: 21.1% of respondents in the legal sector and 12.9% in the aftercare sector reported they ‘do not know’ if there are fewer entertainment establishments in Manila/Cebu/Pampanga where children/minors are exploited for sex

<sup>3</sup> Note: 10.7% of respondents in the aftercare sector reported they ‘do not know’ if IJM contributed to the closure of and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited for sex


IJM’s CTMS data was analyzed to reveal the number of entertainment establishments IJM helped to close by year and project area between 2003 and 2015. Overall, IJM-supported raid and rescue operations resulted in the closure of a total of 52 entertainment establishments for sexually exploiting children/minors between 2003 and 2015, including 31 in Manila, 10 in Cebu, and 10 in Pampanga. The number of entertainment establishments that IJM helped to close in Manila varied from year to year, starting from as few as 1 in 2005 to as many as 9 in 2008. There was a fairly consistent decline from 2009 to 2013, followed by an increase to 4 in 2014.

In Cebu, the closure of entertainment establishments began in 2007 with Project Lantern. In Cebu, efforts to close entertainment establishments were often done in coordination with the PNP and LGUs. The LGU in Cebu City, along with other LGUs in Metro Cebu, passed anti-trafficking ordinances that gave LGUs the power to close down entertainment establishments that sexually exploit children and revoke their business licenses. IJM was instrumental in helping to lobby and get the ordinances passed through the Mayor’s Office and the City Hall. The ordinances do require effective investigation and case buildup on the part of the anti-trafficking police units.

In Pampanga, the closure of entertainment establishments began in 2012, when IJM began program activities in Pampanga. The closure of entertainment establishments was done in coordination with the PNP and DOLE. Similarly, in Manila, government respondents explained, “*In collaboration with DOLE, we are the one requesting for the closure of*

those establishment that have minor victims” (21, Government, Manila). Over time, IJM learned that involving DOLE labor inspectors in raid and rescue operations conducted by the PNP and/or NBI was highly beneficial because DOLE labor inspectors had the authority to automatically close a business that was found to be engaged in child sex trafficking.

**Chart 10.10. Number of entertainment establishments IJM helped to close by year and project area (2003-2015)**



Note: Data obtained from IJM’s CTMS database for the period of 2003 to 2015


### 10.5. Sustainability in the Reduction of Entertainment Establishments

Respondents were asked if the reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited/trafficked for sex can be sustained over time, or if the problem can or will re-emerge. Table 10.4 shows that 52.2% of respondents believe the reduction of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited/trafficked for sex will be sustained over time, whereas 40.3% of respondents maintained the problem can or will re-emerge (refer to page 178 for further explanation of why some respondents think the entertainment establishment where children/minors are exploited/trafficking for sex will re-emerge). Only 7.5% of respondents did not know.

| Will the reduction of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited/trafficked for sex be sustained over time, or will the problem re-emerge? | Full sample<br>N=67 |      |
|--|---------------------|------|
|  | n                   | %    |
| Will be sustained  | 35                  | 52.2 |
| Will re-emerge   | 27                  | 40.3 |
| Do not know  | 5                   | 7.5  |

Data was analyzed to explore differences based upon type of agency, project area, and sector of work. Chart 10.11 shows differences by type of agency. IJM respondents (81.8%) and CSO respondents (75.0%) were more likely to believe the reduction in entertainment establishments where children minors are exploited/trafficked for sex will be sustained over time, compared to government officials (46.9%) and religious leaders (0.0%). In fact, 100.0% of religious leaders believed the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited/trafficked for sex can or will re-emerge. Also, 42.9% of government officials believed the problem can or will re-emerge, compared to only 25.0% of CSO respondents and 18.2% of IJM respondents.


**Chart 10.11. Sustainability in the reduction of entertainment establishments by type of agency**



Note: 10.2% of government officials reported they 'do not know'

Chart 10.12 shows differences based upon project area. Respondents in Cebu (64.0%) were more likely to report the reduction in entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited/trafficked for sex will be sustained over time, compared to only 47.4% of respondent in Manila and 43.5% in Pampanga. In comparison, 52.6% of respondents in Manila believed the numbers of entertainment establishment where children/minors are exploited/trafficked for sex can or will re-emerge. Also, 36.0% of respondents in Cebu and 34.8% in Pampanga believed the number of entertainment establishments would re-emerge. It is notable that 21.7% of respondents in Pampanga did not know if the reduction of entertainment establishments will be sustained over time or could re-emerge.


**Chart 10.12. Sustainability in the reduction of entertainment establishments by project area**



Note: 21.7% of respondents in Pampanga reported they 'do not know'

Finally Chart 10.13 shows differences based upon sector of work. IJM managers (80.0%) were most likely to believe the reduction of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited/trafficked for sex will be sustained over time, compared to 58.3% of respondents in the aftercare sector, 50.0% in the legal sector, and 47.6% in the law enforcement/investigative sector. Similarly, 50.0% of respondents in the legal sector and 47.6% in the law enforcement/investigative sector maintained the number of entertainment establishment where children/minors are sexually exploited/trafficked can or will re-emerge. Only 25.0% of respondents in the aftercare sector and 20.0% of IJM managers thought the number of entertainment establishments can or will re-emerge.

**Chart 10.13. Sustainability in the reduction of entertainment establishments by sector of work**



Note: 4.8% of respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector and 16.7% in the aftercare sector reported they 'do not know'

Respondents who believed the reduction of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited/trafficked for sex will be sustained over time often maintained that sustainability will be “as long as the government continues to support the campaign against trafficking and is serious about the campaign” (2, IJM, Manila). Other respondents recognized sustainability is possible because there is a law that enables the government to close entertainment establishments where children/minors are sexually exploited/trafficked. At the same time, however, respondents maintained sustainability will depend upon police performance, including advocating for police funds and logistical support to conduct raid and rescue operations, and the ability of the police to draft petitions for the closure of such entertainment establishments. One IJM respondent explained, “We have seen them do operations without us but they need to continue that sustainability, if they stop the problem will come back” (5, IJM, Manila).

*“If the law enforcement and other government agencies will sustain their efforts, then that will be sustained. But if there is a time that the government agencies will forget about their mandate, there is the possibility that the problem can be remerge. But, I am confident in IACAT, I have confidence they can sustain the efforts in Cebu.” (57, IJM, Cebu)*

Also, respondents recognized the reduction can be sustained if there is strict regulation when it comes to issuing business permits, and that DOLE monitors to make sure no children are employed in the entertainment establishments. The challenge exists in the fact that there is a loop hole in the law related to the closure of entertainment establishments. DOLE is able to close entertainment establishments where children/minors are sexually exploited/trafficked; however, a few weeks or months later the establishment is often re-opened in another name. DOLE and IJM maintain the loophole in the law needs to be addressed through an amendment to the law to ensure sustainability in the reduction of the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors are sexually exploited.

*“So, if the same owner opens another establishment with a different name. Then, if he opens up that establishment and there is trafficking of children than that is a separate case. Because of that loophole it seems like that law is useless, they can pack up and close that establishment and open an establishment in different way.” (46, Government, Pampanga)*

Some maintain the reduction of entertainment establishments will be sustained over time because there is increased awareness among both the foreign and local business owners as to the penalties for sexually exploiting and trafficking children/minors in entertainment establishments. The penalty can be life imprisonment for even a first offense.

Respondents who believed the numbers of entertainment establishments where children/minors are exploited/trafficked for sex can re-emerge maintained, if there is a lack of continuous law enforcement, including raid

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and rescue operations, entertainment establishments will begin to employ and sexually exploit minors again. In fact, one respondent explained,

*“I can see there will be a re-emergence. The law enforcement efforts will be reduced because of a lack of finances, so it will be sporadic operations or when funds are available, and funds are not always available. And, if bar workers would feel there are fewer raids, it would die down eventually and then they would come again.” (50, Government, Pampanga)*

Other respondents worried that when IJM shifts their focus away from child sex trafficking to online sexual exploitation of children, the problem can re-emerge. One respondent reported, *“since the focus has shifted to online sexual exploitation of children, and when your attention is not focused on the ground there is a possibility it can re-emerge” (118, Government, Manila).*

Some respondents recognized sustainability also depends heavily on the current presidential administration’s political will to continue to support the campaign against sex trafficking. One respondent explained, *“If the partnership remains strong it will be sustained, but if it weakens, then it will prosper to a big problem again” (95, Government, Pampanga).*

# CHAPTER 11: CONFIDENCE IN THE PUBLIC JUSTICE SYSTEM

## Chapter Highlights

- In 2003, respondents lacked confidence in the abilities of police to enforce the anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking (3.5), prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases (3.9), courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers (4.0), and the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities (4.6)
- In 2016, respondents had higher levels of confidence in the abilities of police to enforce anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking (7.4, a point change of 3.9 from 2003), prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases (8.0, a point change of 4.1 from 2003), courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers (7.9, a point change of 3.9 from 2003), and the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities (7.8, a point change of 3.2 from 2003)

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This chapter examines confidence in public justice agencies to effectively combat child sex trafficking in the three project areas, particularly whether confidence has increased from 2003 to 2016. It is important to understand that increases in confidence presented in this chapter are based upon improvements identified and discussed in previous chapters; those will not be reiterated in this chapter.

### 11.1. Confidence in the Public Justice System


Respondents were asked about their confidence in public justice system agencies to combat child sex trafficking. This includes: confidence in the abilities of the police to enforce the anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking; confidence in prosecutors to effectively prosecute child sex trafficking cases; confidence in courts and judges to fairly and efficiently adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers; and confidence in the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities. To measure change in confidence levels, respondents were asked to rank on a scale of 1 to 10 how confident they were in each of the public justice system agencies in 2003 or as far back as they can remember (but no earlier than 2003 because that is when anti-trafficking legislation was enacted and IJM's Program began), and their confidence in 2016 (at the time of this evaluation). Then, average scores were calculated for each measure at each point in time (2003 and 2016) on a scale of 1 to 10. It is important to note that sample sizes vary because not all respondents were asked to rank confidence on each of the measures, given not all respondents had knowledge of improvement in the abilities of public justice system agencies from 2003 to 2016; however, the sample sizes were nearly equal for each point in time.

Chart 11.1 shows the mean or average score for all respondents on a scale of 1 to 10 (1=no confidence, 10=very confident). On average, when respondents were asked to rank their confidence in public justice system agencies going back to 2003 or as far back as they could remember, they reported they generally lacked confidence in the abilities of police to enforce the anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking (3.5), prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases (3.9), courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers (4.0), and the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities (4.6).

When asked to rank their confidence in public justice system agencies in 2016, respondents generally had high levels of confidence in the abilities of police to enforce anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking (7.4, a point change of 3.9 from 2003), prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases (8.0, a point change of 4.1 from 2003), courts and

judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers (7.9, a point change of 3.9 from 2003), and the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities (7.8, a point change of 3.2 from 2003).

**Chart 11.1. Confidence in public justice system agencies to combat child sex trafficking, 2003 to 2016**



Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not important to 10=Very important

Data was further analyzed to examine mean differences in confidence based upon type of agency. Table 11.1 shows that IJM respondents (3.4), government officials (3.6), and CSO respondents (3.7) were equally likely to maintain they lacked confidence in the police’s abilities to enforce the anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking in 2003. However, in 2016, IJM respondents (8.1) had higher levels of confidence in the abilities of anti-trafficking police to enforce anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking, compared to government officials (7.3) and CSO respondents (7.0). In addition, IJM respondents (+4.7 points) had a higher point change from 2003 to 2016, compared to government officials (+3.7 points) and CSO respondents (+3.3 points).

Similarly, IJM respondents (4.1), government officials (4.0), and CSO respondents (3.4) all lacked confidence in the ability of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases in 2003 (Table 11.1). However, in 2016, IJM respondents (8.4) and government officials (8.1) had much more confidence in the abilities of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases, compared to CSO respondents (6.8). In addition, IJM respondents (+4.3 points) and government officials (+4.1 points) had a higher point change from 2003 to 2016, compared to CSO respondents (+3.4).

Table 11.1 also shows that there were no significant differences among IJM respondents (4.2), government officials (4.2), and CSO respondents (3.6) in their confidence in the ability of courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers in 2003. They were equally likely to lack confidence in courts and judges to convict sex traffickers. However, in 2016, IJM respondents (8.4) had more confidence in the ability of courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers, compared to government officials (7.9) and CSO respondents (7.3). IJM respondents (+4.2 points) also had a slightly higher point change from 2003 to 2016, compared to government officials (+3.7 points) and CSO respondents (+3.7 points).

Finally, Table 11.1 shows that IJM respondents (4.7), government officials (4.7), and CSO respondents (4.2) had equally low levels of confidence in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities in 2003. In 2016, there was increased confidence in the abilities of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities; however, IJM respondents (7.8), government officials (7.9), and CSO respondents (7.3) had nearly equal levels of confidence in the DSWD; there were no significant differences. In addition, they had similar point changes from 2003 to 2016 in their levels of confidence.

**Table 11.1. Comparisons in confidence of public justice agencies to combat child sex trafficking from 2003 to 2016 by type of agency**

|   | <u>IJM</u><br><u>Mean</u> | <u>Government</u><br><u>Mean</u> | <u>CSO</u><br><u>Mean</u> | <u>F-Score</u>    |
|---|---------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|
| <u>Confidence in the ability of police to enforce the anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking</u>   |                           |                                  |                           |                   |
| 2003  | 3.4                       | 3.6                              | 3.7                       | 1.28              |
| 2016  | 8.1                       | 7.3                              | 7.0                       | 2.56 <sup>2</sup> |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | +4.7                      | +3.7                             | +3.3                      | ---               |
| <u>Confidence in the ability of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases</u>  |                           |                                  |                           |                   |
| 2003  | 4.1                       | 4.0                              | 3.4                       | 1.59              |
| 2016  | 8.4                       | 8.1                              | 6.8                       | 4.43 <sup>1</sup> |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | +4.3                      | +4.1                             | +3.4                      | ---               |
| <u>Confidence in the ability of courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers</u>   |                           |                                  |                           |                   |
| 2003  | 4.2                       | 4.2                              | 3.6                       | 1.95              |
| 2016  | 8.4                       | 7.9                              | 7.3                       | 2.14 <sup>2</sup> |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | +4.2                      | +3.7                             | +3.7                      | ---               |
| <u>Confidence in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities</u> |                           |                                  |                           |                   |
| 2003  | 4.7                       | 4.7                              | 4.2                       | .47               |
| 2016  | 7.8                       | 7.9                              | 7.3                       | 1.51              |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | +3.1                      | +3.2                             | +3.1                      | ---               |

Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not important to 10=Very important

<sup>1</sup> Sign ≤ .01

<sup>2</sup> Sign ≤ .10

Data was further analyzed to examine mean differences in confidence based upon project area. Table 11.2 shows that respondents in Manila (3.0), Pampanga (3.9), and Cebu (3.6) lacked confidence in the abilities of police to enforce the anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking in 2003. Confidence was lowest in Manila. In 2016, respondents in Manila (7.3), Pampanga (7.6), and Cebu (7.4) had increased levels of confidence in the ability of the police to enforce anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking. Respondents from Manila (+4.3 points), Cebu (+3.8 points) and Pampanga (+3.7 points) also fairly similar point changes from 2003 to 2016.

Similarly, respondents in Manila (3.6), Pampanga (4.3), and Cebu (3.7) each maintained they lacked confidence in the abilities of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases in 2003. Confidence was lower in Manila and Cebu than in Pampanga. In 2016, there was a significant increase in confidence; yet respondents in Manila (7.9), Pampanga (8.1), and Cebu (7.8) had nearly similar levels of confidence in the ability of the prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases. Respondents from Manila (+4.3 points), Cebu (+4.1 points) and Pampanga (+3.8 points) also had fairly similar point changes from 2003 to 2016.

Table 11.2 also shows that respondents in Manila (3.6), Pampanga (4.5), and Cebu (4.0) lacked confidence in the ability of courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and to convict sex traffickers in 2003. Confidence was lowest in Manila. In 2016, respondents in Manila (7.7), Pampanga (8.2), and Cebu (7.8) had increased confidence in the abilities of courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers. Respondents from Manila (+4.1 points), Cebu (+3.8 points) and Pampanga (+3.7 points) had fairly similar point changes from 2003 to 2016.

Finally, Table 11.2 shows that respondents in Pampanga (5.6) had more confidence in the abilities of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities in 2003, compared to respondents in Manila (4.2) and Cebu (4.2). In 2016, respondents in Pampanga (8.4) again had more confidence in the abilities of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to

shelters and aftercare facilities, compared to respondents in Cebu (7.7) and Manila (7.2). However, respondents in Cebu (+3.5 points) had a slightly higher point change from 2003 to 2016, compared to respondents in Manila (+3.0 points) and Pampanga (+2.8 points).

| <b>Table 11.2. Comparisons in confidence of public justice agencies to combat child sex trafficking from 2003 to 2016 by project area</b>                         |                    |                      |                  |                   |
|---|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| <u>Confidence in the ability of police to enforce the anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking</u>   | <u>Manila Mean</u> | <u>Pampanga Mean</u> | <u>Cebu Mean</u> | <u>F</u>          |
| 2003  | 3.0                | 3.9                  | 3.6              | 1.93              |
| 2016  | 7.3                | 7.6                  | 7.4              | 3.45              |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | +4.3               | +3.7                 | +3.8             |                   |
| <u>Confidence in the ability of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases</u>  |                    |                      |                  |                   |
| 2003  | 3.6                | 4.3                  | 3.7              | 1.18              |
| 2016  | 7.9                | 8.1                  | 7.8              | .21               |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | +4.3               | +3.8                 | +4.1             |                   |
| <u>Confidence in the ability of courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers</u>   |                    |                      |                  |                   |
| 2003  | 3.6                | 4.5                  | 4.0              | 1.31              |
| 2016  | 7.7                | 8.2                  | 7.8              | .74               |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | +4.1               | +3.7                 | +3.8             |                   |
| <u>Confidence in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities</u> |                    |                      |                  |                   |
| 2003  | 4.2                | 5.6                  | 4.2              | 5.31 <sup>1</sup> |
| 2016  | 7.2                | 8.4                  | 7.7              | 7.04 <sup>1</sup> |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | +3.0               | +2.8                 | +3.5             |                   |

Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not important to 10=Very important

<sup>1</sup> Sign ≤ .01

Further analysis was conducted to examine mean differences in confidence based upon sector of work. Table 11.3 shows that IJM managers (3.4) and respondents in the legal (3.9) and aftercare (3.4) sectors were equally likely to lack confidence in the abilities of police to enforce the anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking in 2003. In 2016, IJM managers (7.9) and respondents in the legal (7.5) and aftercare (7.2) sectors had increased levels of confidence in the abilities of the police to enforce anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking. Still, there were no significant differences between these groups. IJM respondents (+4.5 points) had a slightly higher point change from 2003 to 2016, compared to respondents in the aftercare (+3.8 points) and legal (+3.6 points) sectors.

Table 11.3 also shows that respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (4.7) were more likely to have confidence in the ability of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases in 2003, compared to IJM managers (4.1) and respondents in the aftercare sector (3.6). In 2016, both respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (8.4) and in IJM management (8.3) had more confidence in the ability of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases, compared to respondents in the aftercare sector (7.6). Yet there was also a larger point change in the confidence levels of IJM managers (+4.2 points) and respondents in the aftercare sector (+4.0 points) from 2003 to 2016, compared to respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (+3.7 points).

In terms of confidence in the ability of courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers in 2003, respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (5.1) had high levels of confidence, compared to IJM managers (4.0) and respondents in the legal (4.4) and aftercare (3.4) sectors. Respondents in the aftercare sector had the lowest levels of confidence in the courts and judges. In 2016, confidence in the courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers significantly increased. Respondents in the law enforcement/investigative sector (8.5) and IJM managers (8.3) had more confidence in courts and judges, compared to respondents in the legal

| <b>Table 11.3. Comparisons in confidence of public justice agencies to combat child sex trafficking from 2003 to 2016 by sector of work</b>                       |  |                       |                           |                                |                   |
|---|--|-----------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| <u>Confidence in the ability of police to enforce the anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking</u>   | <u>Law Enforcement/<br/>Investigative<br/>Mean</u> | <u>Legal<br/>Mean</u> | <u>Aftercare<br/>Mean</u> | <u>IJM Management<br/>Mean</u> | <u>F</u>          |
| 2003  | ---  | 3.9                   | 3.4                       | 3.4                            | 1.30              |
| 2016  | ---  | 7.5                   | 7.2                       | 7.9                            | 1.69              |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | ---  | +3.6                  | +3.8                      | +4.5                           |                   |
| <u>Confidence in the ability of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases</u>  |  |                       |                           |                                |                   |
| 2003  | 4.7  | ---                   | 3.6                       | 4.1                            | 3.55 <sup>1</sup> |
| 2016  | 8.4  | ---                   | 7.6                       | 8.3                            | 3.67 <sup>1</sup> |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | +3.7   | ---                   | +4.0                      | +4.2                           |                   |
| <u>Confidence in the ability of courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers</u>   |  |                       |                           |                                |                   |
| 2003  | 5.1  | 4.4                   | 3.4                       | 4.0                            | 4.63 <sup>1</sup> |
| 2016  | 8.5  | 7.9                   | 7.5                       | 8.3                            | 3.02 <sup>2</sup> |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | +3.4   | +3.5                  | +3.1                      | +4.3                           |                   |
| <u>Confidence in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities</u> |  |                       |                           |                                |                   |
| 2003  | 4.4  | 4.6                   | 4.9                       | 4.2                            | .50               |
| 2016  | 7.9  | 7.6                   | 8.0                       | 7.2                            | 1.31              |
| Point change from 2003 to 2016  | +3.5   | +3.0                  | +3.1                      | +3.0                           |                   |

Note: The 10-point scale ranged from 1=Not important to 10=Very important

<sup>1</sup> Sign ≤ .01

<sup>2</sup> Sign ≤ .05

<sup>3</sup> Sign ≤ .10

(7.9) and aftercare (7.5) sectors. Yet there was a larger point change from 2003 to 2016, in the confidence levels of IJM managers (+4.3 points), compared to respondents in the legal (+3.5 points), law enforcement/investigative sector (+3.4 points), and aftercare (+3.1 points) sectors.

Finally, Table 11.3 shows that IJM managers (4.2) and respondents in the aftercare (4.9), legal (4.6), and law enforcement/investigative (4.4) sectors lacked confidence in the abilities of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities in 2003. Respondents in the aftercare sector had the highest levels of confidence in the DSWD in 2003, whereas IJM managers had the lowest levels of confidence in the DSWD. In 2016, respondents in the aftercare (8.0), law enforcement/investigative (7.9), and legal (7.6) sectors, as well as IJM managers (7.2), had increased levels of confidence in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities. IJM managers still had lower levels of confidence than respondents in the other sectors; however, the difference was not significant. In addition, the point change from 2003 to 2016 in the confidence levels of IJM managers (+3.0 points) and respondents in the law enforcement/investigative (+3.5 points), legal (+3.0 points), and aftercare (+3.1 points) sectors was fairly similar.

## CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 12.1. Conclusions

Findings from this evaluation resulted in the key conclusions that are presented in this chapter. Key conclusions are grounded in the evaluation findings and aligned with the evaluation's objectives related to relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability, as outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.

#### 12.1.1. [Relevance](#)

This evaluation found that IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in the Philippines was very relevant and helped to build political support for a strong public justice system response to child sex trafficking (98.9% of respondents reported IJM's Program was relevant to the situation of child sex trafficking in the Philippines). In fact, IJM was recognized as a significant and influential partner by the Philippine Government when it was invited to be a member of the IACAT, the national mechanism for monitoring implementation of anti-trafficking legislation. Serving as a member of the IACAT reinforced and demonstrated that IJM's Program was aligned with the relevant strategies of the Philippine Government for combatting human trafficking. Membership on the IACAT also provided IJM with a platform from which to contribute to the dialogue on trafficking in persons in the Philippines. Being a member of the IACAT allowed IJM to participate in working group meetings that shaped national priorities and action plans, including the NAP for Combatting Human Trafficking for 2010-2016 and the succeeding NAP for 2017-2023, and to provide input into the amended R.A. No. 10364. It was found that 82.8% of respondents maintained IJM's Program was aligned with the national priorities and action plans for combatting trafficking in persons, and 78.5% thought IJM's Program contributed to the dialogue on trafficking in persons in the Philippines and helped to shape national priorities and action plans.

IJM was able to contribute to the development and implementation of national and stakeholder plans and strategies, and to respond to and support needs identified by stakeholders and partners. For instance, through MOUs with the PNP and DSWD, IJM was able to support and build the capacity of public justice system actors to enforce anti-sex trafficking laws and provide quality aftercare to trafficking victims through the government and other relevant stakeholders. IJM's Program was particularly relevant because it supported the PNP to establish anti-trafficking units in the three project areas. IJM also trained the anti-trafficking police and provided them with intelligence, logistical support, and technical assistance needed to arrest sex traffickers and rescue sex trafficking victims. Over time, IJM's Program contributed to increases in prosecutions and convictions of child sex traffickers in the three project areas. For DOJ prosecutors, having IJM lawyers there to prosecute child sex trafficking cases as private prosecutors helped to improve DOJ prosecutors' abilities to prosecute child sex trafficking cases. IJM also supported DSWD and LGU social workers and private aftercare providers to provide post-rescue care and quality aftercare services to survivors of sex trafficking. IJM initiated and supported the establishment of processing centers where rescued trafficking victims could receive victim-centered and gender-sensitive support, counselling, and crisis care immediately after rescue.

In the three project areas, IJM's Program activities and outputs were consistent with the intended outcomes and impact. This evaluation found that IJM's Program made significant progress toward achieving its intended outcomes, particularly:

- Increasing the capacity, will, and mandate of regional and national Philippines law enforcement to investigate and intervene in suspected sex trafficking cases;
- Increase the quantity and quality of child sex trafficking prosecutions in the Philippines, which resulted in an increase in the number of convictions;

- Increase the capacity of Philippines government and private social service providers to process sex trafficking survivors immediately post-rescue, provide trauma-informed care and reintegrate sex trafficking survivors into local communities.

Findings presented throughout this report clearly demonstrate that IJM's Program was able to effectively monitor and adapt to changes in the operating environment, including political changes and changes in the nature and extent of commercial sex exploitation of children in the three project areas. IJM assigned an internal team of managers to a Philippine Leadership Team (formally known as the Philippine Anti-Trafficking Team) that was responsible for providing support and guidance to ensure IJM successfully achieved defined outcomes and effectively engaged with and advocated for activities within the Philippine Government.

### 12.1.2. Effectiveness

This evaluation found that IJM's Program was effective on multiple levels, including improving the abilities of law enforcement to combat child sex trafficking, improving prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, improving courts handling of child sex trafficking cases, and improving aftercare for child sex trafficking victims.

In terms of improving the abilities of law enforcement to combat child sex trafficking, IJM was able to achieve its intended outputs, outcomes, and impact. Through an MOU with the PNP in the three project areas, IJM supported the PNP to create dedicated regional anti-trafficking law enforcement units and provide the units' officers with capacity-building trainings, logistical support, and technical assistance/guidance to improve their abilities to investigate sex trafficking cases, collect evidence, conduct raid and rescue operations, interview sex trafficking victims, and arrest sex traffickers. In fact, the majority of respondents recognized that IJM effectively contributed to improving investigations and evidence collection techniques of the anti-trafficking police (95.1%), raid and rescue operations (100.0%), and skills and abilities of anti-trafficking police to interview child victims of sex trafficking (97.4%). All respondents (100.0%) also recognized that IJM effectively contributed to improving the police's abilities to arrest sex traffickers. These findings demonstrate how strategic support provided by IJM brought about system transformation in the PNP, including improving the knowledge, attitudes, and skills of anti-trafficking police to effectively enforce anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking. IJM also helped to strengthen coordination among the PNP, DOJ, DSWD, and DOLE to effectively enforce anti-trafficking laws and combat child sex trafficking.

In terms of improving prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, IJM provided strategic support to DOJ prosecutors by acting as a private prosecutor in IJM-supported child sex trafficking cases. The results included improvements in charges filed against perpetrators of child sex trafficking and prosecution of child sex trafficking cases, improvements in the abilities of prosecutors to interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings, and evidence presentation in court proceedings. In fact, the majority of respondents maintained IJM effectively contributed to improving the prosecution of child sex trafficking cases (61.9%), the skills and abilities of public prosecutors to interview child victims in pre-trial and court proceedings (80.0%), and evidence presentation in court proceedings related to sex trafficking cases (95.8%). Respondents also recognized that IJM contributed to improving public prosecutors' understanding and application of anti-trafficking laws (60.9%).

In terms of improving courts' handling of child sex trafficking cases, 57.1% of respondents maintained IJM contributed to improving the family courts' handling of child sex trafficking cases. Documented improvements were in the family courts' use of child-friendly practices and conviction of sex traffickers. The majority of respondents recognized that IJM effectively contributed to ensuring that courts use child-friendly practices when children are involved as victims and witnesses (61.9%) in sex trafficking cases, and that IJM effectively contributed to the increase in conviction of sex traffickers (95.8%). These improvements resulted in a total of 138 IJM-supported convictions of sex traffickers.

In terms of improving aftercare for child sex trafficking victims, IJM provided strategic support that resulted in improvement in post-rescue and crisis care for sex trafficking victims, and the abilities of DSWD social workers to provide trauma-informed care and referrals to aftercare shelters. IJM was also able to provide strategic support that resulted in improvements in the quality and range of services provided to child sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters and development of a more coordinated aftercare network of government and private aftercare providers. In general, improvements in aftercare led to improved victim outcomes (improved recovery and restoration), and reductions in the

number of child sex trafficking victims being re-trafficked after rescue and recovery. It is important to note that the majority of respondents maintained IJM contributed to improvements in post-rescue care for sex trafficking victims (83.7%), crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters (100.0%), and the quality and range of services provided to sex trafficking victims in aftercare shelters (90.9%). The majority of respondents also recognized IJM contributed to the development of a more coordinated aftercare network (86.7%) and all respondents thought IJM helped to improve victim outcomes (100.0%).

Finally, contributing to IJM's effectiveness were steps they regularly took to monitor and evaluate the impact of program activities, including collaborative casework and system reform in the three project areas. IJM monitored and evaluated to document progress made toward project goals and outcomes, and to identify and analyze gaps in the public justice system, as well as challenges faced in program implementation. Monitoring and evaluation enabled IJM Philippines FOs to develop and enhance program activities from time to time, building upon lessons learned and 'good practices' identified. Periodic evaluation also enabled IJM to ensure their Program remained aligned with national priorities and needs in each of the project areas.

IJM's Philippine Leadership Team was also responsible for monitoring and assessing progress toward outcomes, as well as providing guidance to ensure IJM successfully accomplished defined outputs and outcomes. The Philippine Leadership Team often responded to change occurring in the operating environment and tried to identify 'good practices' and lessons learned that could be built upon and replicated.

### 12.1.3. [Impact](#)

In terms of impact, this evaluation found support for IJM's ToC that improving enforcement of anti-sex trafficking laws would increase the prosecution and conviction of traffickers, leading to an increased deterrence towards child sex trafficking and resulting in reduced prevalence of child sex trafficking. Furthermore, reducing the prevalence of child sex trafficking and closing entertainment establishments involved in commercial sexual exploitation of children would lead to an increase in confidence in the public justice system to combat child sex trafficking. The ToC was also premised on the understanding that by improving government aftercare services and delivery of those services to child sex trafficking victims, IJM would be able to increase victim recovery, reintegration, and restoration.

As revealed in the section above, this evaluation found IJM's Program had significant impact on improving the abilities of law enforcement to combat child sex trafficking, improving prosecution and courts' handling of child sex trafficking cases, and improving aftercare for child sex trafficking victims. The impact of these improvements was reflected in an increase in the number of IJM-supported raid and rescue operations conducted by the PNP anti-trafficking units, as well as an increase in the number of rescued/relieved child sex trafficking victims, suspects arrested for child sex trafficking, and prosecutions and convictions of sex traffickers.

To evaluate the impact of IJM's Program, data from IJM's CTMS was analyzed to document the number of IJM-supported and government-led raid and rescue operations and sex trafficking victims rescued in the three project areas. From 2007 to 2015, there were a total of 261 IJM-supported and government-led raid and rescue operations, of which 196 were focused on child sex trafficking. During this same time period, IJM-supported Philippines law enforcement efforts resulted in the rescue of 1,357 sexually exploited children in the three project areas, of which 1,207 were children rescued from child sex trafficking. In general, there was a fairly steady increase in the number of raid and rescue operations and child sex trafficking victims rescued from 2007 to 2015. CTMS data also revealed IJM-supported raid and rescue operations resulted in the closure of a total of 52 entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex between 2007 and 2015.

IJM's CTMS data revealed that from 2003 to 2015, a total of 816 suspects were arrested for commercial sexual exploitation by the PNP and/or NBI with IJM's support, and 722 arrests were specifically for child sex trafficking. In addition, a total of 747 suspects were charged with child sexual abuse, exploitation, and/or trafficking during this same period, of which 655 were charged specifically with child sex trafficking. In total, there were a total of 181 IJM-supported convictions of traffickers from 2003 to 2015; 138 of those convictions were specifically for child sex trafficking. In general, the number of suspects charged, prosecuted, and convicted for child sex trafficking steadily increased from 2003 to 2015.

In terms of aftercare, this evaluation found that IJM increased the capacities of social workers and aftercare service providers to provide child sex trafficking victims with post-rescue care. IJM also supported the development of safe spaces (processing centers) where sex trafficking victims could be processed and receive gender-sensitive and victim-centered post-rescue care. IJM also improved services offered to child sex trafficking victims in shelters, including trauma-informed care and post-trauma counselling that support victim rehabilitation and recovery and services designed to support survivors' reintegration and access to community-based services. IJM had an MOU with the DSWD, and partnered with both DSWD-run shelters and private shelters to support trafficking victims in their rehabilitation and recovery. IJM also focused on identifying transitional housing facilities that could support survivors of trafficking in the process of reintegration. Finally, IJM contributed resources to facilitate the development and functioning of local government Reintegration Support Networks (RSNs) in Metro Manila and Metro Cebu. RSNs were designed to provide community-based clients with access to needed rehabilitation and reintegration services (e.g., psychological counselling, job readiness training, vocational training, and medical services).<sup>191</sup> RSNs were staffed by DSWD and LGU social workers, as well as trained volunteers from faith-based groups.

*Reduction in the Prevalence of Child Sex Trafficking.* An important component of IJM's monitoring and evaluation was to measure the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas. In Metro Cebu, IJM commissioned Crime and Justice Analysts (CJA) to design and conduct prevalence studies at the baseline (2006), midline (2008) and endline (2010) of Project Lantern Phase I.<sup>192</sup> Prevalence studies enabled IJM to measure and document whether IJM was achieving its intended impact (i.e., reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in entertainment establishments and on the streets in and around Metro Cebu). IJM carried out similar prevalence studies in Metro Manila (2009, 2014, and 2016) and Pampanga (2012 and 2016).<sup>193</sup>

Based upon a methodology and indicators by CJA developed in 2006, 6.6% (103 out of 1,560) of the commercial sex workers identified in Cebu were minors. The assessment was replicated in 2008, at which time 2.2% (29 out of 1,200) of the commercial sex workers identified were minors. By 2010, 1.5% (21 out of 1,400) of the commercial sexual workers found were minors. From 2006 to 2010, data collectors also found that locating minors became more difficult, suggesting the prevalence of child sex trafficking had decreased over time. IJM eventually concluded there had been a 79.0% reduction in the availability of children for commercial sexual exploitation in Metro Cebu from 2006 to 2010.<sup>194</sup> Based upon these prevalence studies, the success of Project Lantern exceeded IJM's expectations and demonstrated the effectiveness of a law enforcement-based model to combat child sex trafficking. IJM recognized success was limited to the local context, given the local focus of Project Lantern.

By 2009, IJM took the lead to conduct a prevalence study of child sex trafficking in Metro Manila. Building upon methodology developed CJA, IJM used a time-space sampling approach to identify non-detected child sex trafficking victims.<sup>195,196</sup> In 2009, IJM found that among the 92 sex establishments visited in District 5 of Manila City, Paranaque, and Pasay, 8.13% of the 1,306 commercial sex workers observed were minors. In 2014, they found that 5.54% of commercial sex workers identified in 292 locations visited were minors.<sup>197</sup> Finally, in 2016, the prevalence of child sex trafficking victims was estimated at 1.94% to 2.00%, depending the sample comparison to 2006 or 2014. Based upon this longitudinal data, IJM maintained there had been a 75.4% reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking from 2009 to 2016, and a 64.44% reduction in child sex trafficking from 2014 to 2016.<sup>198</sup> (For a discussion of the methodology used to conduct the prevalence studies see Chapter 10, Section 10.1)

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<sup>191</sup> IJM Manila Anti-Sex Trafficking System Transformation Proposal Package, 2012, p. 2.

<sup>192</sup> IJM contracted Crime and Justice Analysts, Inc. to conduct each of the prevalence studies for Phase I of Project Lantern.

<sup>193</sup> The 2012 prevalence study in Pampanga was a baseline study that was conducted before the Pampanga FO was opened.

<sup>194</sup> IJM System Reform Project Overview. Philippines – Cebu.

<sup>195</sup> Time-space sampling was developed in the late 1980's and has been considered by many researchers to be a standard method for HIV behavior surveillance among at-risk populations in the United States. IJM (2016). Expert Paper: How to Measure the Prevalence of Child Sex Trafficking. Global Study Exploitation of Children in Travel and Tourism, p. 2.

<sup>196</sup> The prevalence study in Metro Manila and the time-space sampling approach did not include the either proxy indicators that were included in the 2006, 2008, and 2010 assessments conducted in Metro Cebu by the independent

<sup>197</sup> The 2015 prevalence study included not only District 5 of Manila City, Paranaque, and Pasay which were included in the 2009 prevalence study, but also Makati and Quezon City.

<sup>198</sup> Shaw & Fruge (2016). *Child Sex Trafficking in Metro Manila*. Washington, DC: International Justice Mission.

In 2012, IJM used the same methodology and time-space sampling approach to conduct a baseline of child sex trafficking in Pampanga, particularly in Angeles City and Mabalacat. The 2012 baseline study revealed 8.79% of commercial sex workers found were minors. In 2016, IJM conducted a follow-up assessment and found that 1.21% of commercial sex workers identified were minors. Based upon this data, IJM concluded there had been an 86.23% reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Angeles City and Mabalacat from 2012 to 2016. They also concluded the locations where minors were being exploited for sex decreased by 72.0% from 2012 to 2016.<sup>199</sup> Based upon this data, along with documented improvements in the public justice system's response to child sex trafficking in Pampanga, and creation and subsequent restructuring of the PNP's regional anti-trafficking unit (i.e., development of anti-trafficking units into a national unit with bases in Manila, Cebu, and Mindanao). IJM decided to close their Pampanga FO.

As part of this evaluation, respondents were also asked if they had seen a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the three project areas. It was found that 66.7% of respondents maintained they had seen a reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in the project areas since 2003, of which 91.9% maintained IJM contributed to the reduction of child sex trafficking. Also, 75.9% of respondents reported there were fewer entertainment establishments in the project areas where children/minors are being exploited for sex (compared to 2003), of which 74.2% maintained IJM contributed to the closure and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex. As for sustainability of these reductions there were mixed responses. While 60.3% of respondents thought the reduction in child sex trafficking would be sustained over time, some 38.1% thought the problem could re-emerge. Also, while 52.2% of respondents thought the reduction of entertainment establishments where children/minors were exploited for sex would be sustained, some 40.3% thought the problem could re-emerge, particularly if law enforcement becomes complacent and stops aggressively enforcing the anti-trafficking laws, i.e., stops conducting entrapment operations and raid and rescue operations, and arresting perpetrators of child sex trafficking, the problem will re-emerge.

[Confidence in the Public Justice System.](#) Confidence in public justice system agencies' abilities to combat child sex trafficking (they were asked to rank their confidence) on a scale of 1 to 10 (1=not confident, 10=very confident). The focus was on their confidence in the abilities of the police to enforce the anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking, the abilities of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases, courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking cases and convict sex traffickers, and the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities.

On average, when respondents were asked to rank their confidence in public justice system agencies going back to 2003 or as far back as they could remember, they reported they generally lacked confidence in the abilities of police to enforce the anti-trafficking law and combat child sex trafficking (mean=3.5). They also lacked confidence in the ability of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases (mean=3.9), and of courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking and convict sex traffickers (mean=4.0). Furthermore, they lacked confidence in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities (mean=4.6).

When asked to rank their confidence in public justice system agencies in 2016, respondents expressed much higher levels of confidence in the abilities of police to enforce anti-trafficking laws and to combat child sex trafficking (mean=7.4, a point change of 3.9 from 2003). They also had much higher levels of confidence in the abilities of prosecutors to prosecute child sex trafficking cases (mean=8.0, a point change of 4.1 from 2003), and of courts and judges to adjudicate sex trafficking and convict sex traffickers (mean=7.9, a point change of 3.9 from 2003). Their confidence also increased in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue care to trafficking victims and to refer rescued victims to shelters and aftercare facilities (mean=7.8, a point change of 3.2 from 2003). (See Chapter 11, Chart 11.1 for a visual depiction of the means scores and changes in mean scores from 2003 to 2016)

#### 12.1.4. [Sustainability](#)

In terms of sustainability, IJM's approach was to identify weaknesses in the local public justice system, form relationships with local authorities and public justice system actors, and help to strengthen the public justice system by providing resources, training, technical assistance/guidance, and accountability. IJM also supported policy change, including

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<sup>199</sup> Shaw & Fruge (2016). *Child Sex Trafficking in Angeles City*. Washington, DC: International Justice Mission.

amendments to the anti-trafficking law and the creation of PNP dedicated regional anti-trafficking units, which were new structures in the public justice system. IJM aimed to demonstrate to local authorities and public justice system actors that change is possible.

To improve sustainability, IJM recognized the need to continue addressing identified gaps in the public justice system's response to sex trafficking. By the end of Phase 2, IJM planned to begin scaling back their casework and anti-sex trafficking activities in the three project areas, as public justice system actors should be able to take greater responsibility and initiative for combatting sex trafficking. To ensure sustainability, IJM focused on improving political will to address sex trafficking by providing trainings on trafficking related issues to local government partners, as well as working closely with government partners and actors on the IACAT.

*Sustainability of Improvement in the Abilities of Anti-Trafficking Police.* Sustainability was measured on a scale of 1 to 10 (1=not sustainable, 10=very sustainable). This included sustainability of improvement in the abilities of anti-trafficking police to investigate and collect evidence in sex trafficking cases, to conduct raid and rescue operations, to interview sex trafficking victims, and to arrest sex traffickers. On average, respondents were quite confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the anti-trafficking police's abilities to investigate and collect evidence in sex trafficking cases (mean=7.6), conduct raid and rescue operations (mean=8.3), interview victims of sex trafficking (mean=7.5), and arrest sex traffickers (mean=7.8). Perceived sustainability was generally linked to the fact that the PNP had established regional anti-trafficking police units and officers were trained to enforce anti-trafficking laws. Moreover, sustainability was tied to the fact that anti-trafficking police units had succeeded at regularly conducting entrapment and raid and rescue operations that resulted in rescues of trafficking victims, arrests and convictions of sex traffickers, and closure of entertainment establishments where children were sexually exploited.

Although there is a high level of confidence in the ability of the anti-trafficking police to sustain improvements made, there are still several challenges that could affect sustainability going forward. The four most common challenges to sustainability include: resources; turnover of law enforcement officers assigned to anti-trafficking units, coordination between agencies, and corruption.

*Sustainability of Improvement in the Abilities of Public Prosecutors.* Respondents were also asked to rank the sustainability of improvement in the abilities of the public prosecutors to file charges against sex traffickers, to prosecute sex trafficking cases, to interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings, and to present evidence in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases. On average, respondents were very confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the ability of public prosecutors to file charges against sex traffickers (mean=7.9), prosecute sex trafficking cases (mean=8.1), interview child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings (mean=7.9), and present evidence in court proceedings related to child sex trafficking cases (mean=8.0).

Perceived sustainability was largely linked to the fact that prosecutors now understand the anti-trafficking laws and had successfully prosecuted and convicted child sex traffickers using the anti-trafficking laws. Prosecutors also maintained they better understand the crime of child sex trafficking and are able to effectively use child-friendly practices when interviewing child sex trafficking victims in pre-trial and court proceedings. Despite having a high level of confidence, they identified three main challenges that could affect sustainability going forward. These challenges include resources (time and manpower) needed to prosecute sex trafficking cases, evidence presentation in court proceeding, particularly ensuring sex trafficking victims appear to testify in court, and corruption.

*Sustainability of Improvement in courts Handling of Child Sex Trafficking Cases.* Respondents were also asked to rank the sustainability of improvements in the abilities of courts to handle child sex trafficking cases, to use child-friendly practices in trafficking cases that involve children as victims and witnesses, and to convict child sex traffickers. On average, respondents were very confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the ability of courts to handle child sex trafficking cases (mean=8.1), use child-friendly practices (mean=8.2), and increase convictions of child sex traffickers (mean=8.1).

Perceived sustainability was generally linked to the fact that courts had succeeded in convicting child sex traffickers and some judges, not all, were trained to understand child sex trafficking and were using child-friendly practices in the courtroom. In some project areas, family courts were also responsible for handling child sex trafficking cases. Another

important factor was that some courts were processing child sex trafficking cases more quickly and some judges were clearing time on their dockets to hold hearings in such cases.

Although respondents had a high level of confidence that courts would sustain such improvements, there were still a couple of challenges that could affect sustainability. The most notable challenges to sustainability were corruption and ensuring victims testify in court proceedings.

*Sustainability of Improvement in Post-Rescue and Aftercare Services.* Finally, respondents were asked how sustainable are improvements in the ability of the DSWD to provide post-rescue and crisis care to sex trafficking victims, and to refer rescued victims to aftercare shelters. Respondents were also asked how sustainable are improvements made to the quality and range of aftercare services for sex trafficking victims. On average, respondents were confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the DSWD's ability to provide post-rescue care (mean=7.5) and crisis care and referrals to aftercare shelters (mean=7.3). Respondents were also confident in the sustainability of improvements made in the quality and range of aftercare services for sex trafficking victims (mean=7.5). Still, however, challenges to sustainability remain and include resources, manpower, and supervision. DSWD and LGU social workers recognized that without support from IJM it will be difficult to sustain the range and quality of services currently being offered to child sex trafficking victims.

## **12.2. Recommendations**

This evaluation revealed IJM's Justice System Transformation Model has been effective in the Philippines at bringing about justice system reform in the law enforcement and aftercare sectors; however, more time is needed before the long-term impact and sustainability of IJM's Program can be assessed. Given the strengths of IJM's Justice System Transformation Model and the way it was implemented in the Philippines, the recommendations that follow are limited in number and scope.

*Recommendation 1: IJM should continue employing collaborative casework as a core driver to its system reform approach.* Based upon findings from this evaluation, it is apparent that IJM Philippines has had significant success when it comes to applying IJM's collaborative casework and justice system reform approaches to combat child sex trafficking in the three project areas. Given this finding, IJM Philippines should continue to apply these approaches as they implement their program to combat online sexual exploitation of children. IJM Philippines should continue to build upon the existing partnerships they have established with the NBI, PNP, DSWD, DOJ, and the IACAT to combat online sexual exploitation of children, as these are key government players. IJM should also consider investing more resources in supporting the DSWD, LGUs and CSOs to provide shelter and victim support services (including rehabilitation, recovery, and reintegration services) to children sexually exploited online. Many of these children are very young in age, and boys are increasingly being identified as victims. Age- and sex-appropriate protection and shelter should be provided by government and/or private shelters, and rehabilitation and recovery services should be developed around the specific needs of young children and boys. The majority of victim support services for trafficking victims have been developed for and around the needs of girls and young women.

*Recommendation 2: In general, IJM should continue to conduct prevalence studies on child sex trafficking at the baseline, midline and endline using a time-space sampling approach to measure progress toward their goal of reducing child sex trafficking in project areas.* This evaluation found that IJM Philippines' prevalence studies were challenging and a resource-intensive process, yet the data generated from them has been invaluable to documenting and evaluating the impact of anti-trafficking strategies, and for informing decision-making related to program activities. In particular, prevalence studies provided IJM with data-driven evidence of the extent of child sex trafficking in each project area at various stages of project implementation (baseline, midline, and endline in some cases). This included street-based child sex trafficking and sexual exploitation of children in various types of entertainment establishments (i.e., karaoke bars, massage parlors/spas, bikini bars, and bar/club/restaurants). Prevalence data did help IJM Philippines focus their anti-trafficking activities to areas of greatest need, which resulted in the rescue of hundreds of sex trafficking victims by anti-trafficking police units and the closure of entertainment establishments engaged in commercial sexual exploitation of children.

Prevalence data are an efficient and effective way to describe a social problem such as child sex trafficking, and knowledge of the scale and scope of child sex trafficking is critical to commanding attention and action, especially in environments where resources are limited and other problems present similar urgencies.

The caution, however, is that prevalence data that documents a significant reduction (e.g., a 72% to 79% reduction) can be misleading,<sup>200</sup> and can hinder anti-trafficking efforts and lead to inappropriate reductions in the allocation of funding for victim services, police anti-trafficking operations, trafficking prosecutions, and trainings for public justice officials. It can also hinder policy- and decision-makers who do not fully understand the methodology and findings to make assumptions about the current state of child sex trafficking in the Philippines.

*Recommendation 3: IJM should provide strategic support to the DSWD and private aftercare providers to develop a coordinated network of aftercare providers.* This evaluation found a lack of coordination among private aftercare providers that IJM partnered with to support rescued trafficking victims with their rehabilitation, recovery, and reintegration. Although IJM took steps to establish partnerships between DSWD social workers and private aftercare providers, those partnerships could have been strengthened through formal coalitions of DSWD and LGU social workers and private aftercare providers. A formal coalition of aftercare providers would support improved rehabilitation, recovery, and restoration of sex trafficking victims.

It would have been beneficial if IJM had developed a coordinated network of aftercare providers (government and private) with whom they have MOUs and/or regularly collaborate to ensure child sex trafficking victims have access to aftercare services that can support their rehabilitation, recovery, reintegration and restoration. Such a coordinated aftercare network should work together to raise the standards of advocacy, prevention, and care for sexually exploited children of all ages, including both boys and girls. Collaboration and coordination among government and private aftercare providers that hold similar goals in addressing sexual exploitation and trafficking of children will allow them to actively combine their resources and experiences of experts and practitioners and assist stakeholders in establishing a strong commitment to support one another's work.

*Recommendation 4: IJM should continue to operate their Philippine Leadership Team, but enhance its function.* This evaluation found that IJM's Philippine Leadership Team, which was composed of key leaders from IJM's FOs (i.e., directors, deputy directors, and pillar owners) was critical for effective and efficient program management. The Philippine Leadership Team would come together on a quarterly basis to share information and discuss highlights, what works, lessons learned and 'good practices', as well as challenges and roadblocks faced and steps to overcome them. The team also discussed strategies and priorities and ensured they were aligned with the goals of the pillars and FOs, and with HQ. The Philippine Leadership Team leads to a more coordinated strategy for IJM Philippines FOs.

This evaluation found there are ways to improve the functioning of IJM's Philippine Leadership Team. In particular, the amount of time the team meets could be lengthened so that more in-depth discussions can occur. There should also be more administrative discussions and discussions should be more program-focused, such as how IJM is achieving specific outcomes, which activities and strategies are working and which are not, how IJM can improve, things needed to improve the program approach, strategies, and activities.

*Recommendation 5: IJM should take steps to make sure that both male and female police officers assigned to the WCPCs are equally responsible for interviewing and taking affidavits from sex trafficking victims.* This evaluation found that the practice of assigning female police officers to anti-trafficking units because women are considered better equipped to interview child sex trafficking victims because of their gender relegates female officers into a position in the units where their roles and responsibilities may differ from their male counterparts. Interviewing child sex trafficking

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<sup>200</sup> A significant reduction can be misleading because: a) it may represent a reduction at only one point and time in a limited number of locations within a particular region, but be interpreted by public justice officials and/or policy makers to reflect prevalence in the larger region; b) it may be the result of law enforcement activities and operations aimed to target the crime within the particular location(s) within the weeks or months prior to the prevalence study, and not reflect a long-term or lasting reduction in prevalence; and c) it may be effected the clandestine crime going more underground if there are rumors or leaks that such surveillance is being undertaken during a particular timeframe as part of a prevalence study or perceived efforts of uncovering incidents of child sex trafficking.

victims had become so-called ‘women’s work’ in the anti-trafficking units; work that male officers were not considered capable of doing because of their gender and lack of sensitivity. This approach is counterproductive to improving the skills and abilities of all officers to interview child sex trafficking victims.

*Recommendation 6: IJM should explore ways to strengthen their results-based monitoring.* This evaluation found that IJM developed quite a few monitoring and evaluation tools; however, it was not always clear how many of them were monitoring actual results and/or were useful to those responsible for utilizing them. IJM should consider conducting an internal review of their monitoring and evaluation tools to understand their strengths and limitations. One thing that was particularly notable is that IJM only monitored their own progress, they did not monitor or measure their progress against government data for the nation and the three project areas. It would have been useful for this evaluation if IJM could provide government data on the total number of raid and rescue operations in the three project areas, and the number of sex trafficking victims rescued and the number of traffickers arrested, charged, prosecuted, and convicted. This would have provided better understanding of IJM’s contribution to the government’s efforts to combat child sex trafficking in the three project areas.

*Recommendation 7: IJM should explore ways to collect annual government administrative data related to child sex trafficking arrests, prosecutions, and convictions, as well as trafficking victims rescued in project areas so that IJM can more effectively demonstrate the contributions of their work as a proportion of the larger work carried out by anti-trafficking units, public prosecutors, and the courts to combat child sex trafficking.* This evaluation did not include collection or analysis of administrative data from government sources on the total number of police operations to rescue child sex trafficking victims and to arrest traffickers, or to capture the total number of prosecutions and convictions in the three project areas. IJM should consider collecting annual data from key partners – police, prosecutors, courts, and social workers – in project areas so that IJM can more effectively quantify the contribution of their work to the total number of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions of child sex traffickers, and to the total number of child sex trafficking victims rescued in the project areas.

*Recommendation 8: IJM should commit more time and resource to Phase 3, Sustaining Gains, of their Justice System Transformation Model.* IJM seeks to sustain the gains achieved through its system reform initiatives with robust advocacy initiatives, while reducing direct IJM collaborative casework support and scaling back system reform initiatives implemented during Phase 2. During Phase 3, monitoring and evaluation activities measure whether or not gains are sustained. It is important that IJM FOs commit sufficient time to Phase 3, so that they can effectively monitor the sustainability of their initiatives among government partners and other key stakeholders.

*Recommendation 9: IJM should communicate more effectively with partners to highlight the impact of IJM’s efforts to improve public justice agencies responses to social justice issues, such as child sex trafficking.* This evaluation found that IJM’s partners were not always aware of the impact of IJM’s efforts on improving public justice agencies’ responses to child sex trafficking or the progress that IJM made on improving the abilities of the anti-trafficking police, public prosecutors, and/or the courts to enforce anti-trafficking laws. IJM’s partners also did not have knowledge of the reductions in child sex trafficking that IJM had documented in their prevalence studies, except in Pampanga where the IJM Pampanga FO did a good job of publicizing among its partners that Pampanga experienced an 86% reduction in the prevalence of child sex trafficking in Angeles City and Mabalacat from 2012 to 2016.

In the future, it would be helpful for IJM to communicate more effectively with their public justice system partners, through public relations materials, the impact of IJM efforts on improving public justice agencies’ responses to child sex trafficking. This would help partners to better understand IJM’s efforts to improve the multi-sectoral response to child sex trafficking, and the benefits of a stronger multi-sectoral response to child sex trafficking.

Finally, Recommendations 10 to 12 should inform IJM’s new program to combat online sexual exploitation of children in the Philippines as well as child sex trafficking programming in other countries around the world. At the time this evaluation was written, IJM Philippines reportedly recognized these challenges related to aftercare for child victims of online commercial sexual exploitation, and appreciated the below recommendations. IJM maintained their future program activities in the Philippines were being developed to include aftercare system reform strategies that would address Recommendations 10 to 12.

*Recommendation 10: IJM should work with the DSWD to identify alternative systems of long-term care for boys rescued from commercial sexual exploitation.* Despite improvements in post-rescue care for trafficking victims, this evaluation found there are still a variety of challenges the DSWD faces when it comes to providing quality post-rescue care to trafficking victims. A particular challenge is providing post-rescue care to boys rescued from commercial sexual exploitation. Processing centers were not designed to be co-ed, and establishing separate spaces for boys and girls in the same processing center is a challenge. Also, given the lack of shelters for sexually exploited boys, boys end up staying in the processing center for much longer than the maximum two weeks. In some cases, boys have been sheltered in the processing centers for a year or more. If IJM Philippines is rescuing boys from online commercial sexual exploitation, they should make sure there are alternative systems of long-term care for boys; shelters where boys can live and receive aftercare services that are gender-appropriate and address the needs of boys who have been sexually exploited.

*Recommendation 11: IJM should work with the DSWD to identify alternative systems of long-term care for very young children (including infants and toddlers) rescued from commercial sexual exploitation.* This evaluation found the DSWD has challenges when it comes to providing quality post-rescue care to young children who are rescued from commercial sexual exploitation. In the Philippines, young children are being rescued from online commercial sexual exploitation, and the processing centers were not designed for very young children (sometimes only two to four years of age). Providing young children with age-appropriate care and support in processing centers is a challenge for the DSWD, as is providing young children with long-term care and protection. Young children should have access to age-appropriate shelters which are separate from shelters for older rescued victims, as well as age-appropriate rehabilitation, recovery, and reintegration services.

*Recommendation 12: IJM should provide training to social workers and aftercare providers to understand boys and young children who experience commercial sexual exploitation.* This evaluation found that social workers and aftercare providers have a tendency to label boys who have been sexually exploited as homosexuals. In addition, they do not necessarily understand or know how to respond to children suffering from traumatic stress symptoms or behaviors, including those of boys and girls who have been exposed to commercial sexual exploitation. Sexually exploited boys and girls tend to exhibit different symptoms and behaviors related to the victimization and traumas they experience, and aftercare providers need training to understand these gender differences (e.g., boys maybe re-enact the sexual abuse they experienced on other children and/or act out aggressively, while girls are more likely to internalize their trauma and engage in self-harming and suicidal behaviors). Social workers and aftercare providers who work with sexually exploited children should be educated to understand these gender differences in symptoms and behaviors related to victimization and trauma. They should also be trained to understand the myths surrounding boys who are sexually exploited (e.g., sexually exploited boys are homosexuals), and counter those myths with the realities. Aftercare providers should also be trained to understand young children who have been sexually exploited and how to provide them with care, and the type of aftercare services they need in the short- and long-term to support their rehabilitation, recovery, and safe reintegration.